미국도 이란을 상대로 기뢰전을 펼 수 있다

[위종민]

퀵스트라이크 등 미국의 기뢰전 역량을 사용해 이란이 호르무즈해협을 통제할 수 없게 봉쇄할 수 있다고 주장하네요. 베트남전 당시 하이퐁항 봉쇄처럼 이란의 항구를 기뢰로 근접봉쇄해야 한다는 주장입니다. 

미국의 해군 기뢰는 이란을 상대로 결정적인 역할을 할 수 있다

2026년 7월 3일
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이란 전쟁 주간 특집

미국 해군(예비역) 로널드 E. 스워트(Ronald E. Swart) 중령, 스콧 C. 트루버(Scott C. Truver) 박사

도널드 J. 트럼프 대통령은 2026년 3월 9일 “우리는 이란의 테러 정권이 세계 석유 공급을 차단하도록 내버려 두지 않을 것이다. 호르무즈 해협은 계속 안전하게 유지될 것이다. 우리는 그곳에 많은 해군 함정을 배치하고 있다. 우리는 기뢰를 탐지하는 데 있어 세계 최고의 장비를 갖추고 있다.”라고 선언하며, 이란이 이미 약 6,000발로 추정되는 기뢰 가운데 약 80발을 주 항로에 부설했음을 시사했다. 트럼프는 “그들의 함선 대부분은 이미 바다 밑바닥에 가라앉아 있다.”라며 “그러나 우리는 그들을 너무나 강하게 타격할 것이며, 그들이든 그들을 돕는 누구든 다시는 그 지역을 회복하는 것이 불가능할 것이다.”라고 주장했다.

2026년 2월 이후 호르무즈 해협 분쟁에서 비롯된 폭력의 양상은 매우 광범위했다. 수로에 정박한 수많은 선박 사이에서 더 유리한 위치를 차지하기 위해 선장들이 서로 치킨 게임을 벌이는 모습은 드문 일이 아니었다. 분쟁에는 이슬람혁명수비대 전투원들이 소화기와 경량 기뢰로 무장시킨 소형 고속정과 초계정을 이용한 자살 공격도 포함되었다. 미국 수상함과 전술항공기, 공격헬기는 5인치 함포와 대함미사일을 발사했다. 미국의 공격형 원자력잠수함 USS 샬럿(SSN 766)은 국제수역에서 이란 호위함 데나를 어뢰로 격침해 승조원 104명이 사망했다.

이란을 상대로 한 '에픽 퓨리(Operation Epic Fury)' 작전을 개시한 지 6주 후, 트럼프 대통령은 해군에 이란 항구를 봉쇄하고 해당 해역의 모든 이란 기뢰를 제거하라고 명령했다. J.D. 밴스 부통령은 호르무즈 해협을 봉쇄한 이란을 "경제 테러리즘"이라고 비난하면서, 이란 항구 봉쇄는 이에 상응하는 대응이라고 옹호했다. 그는 "그들은 사실상 호르무즈 해협을 통과하는 모든 선박을 위협했다."라고 말했다.

5월 3일, 트럼프 대통령은 선박을 호르무즈 해협으로 안내하기 위한 또 다른 계획인 '프로젝트 프리덤(Project Freedom)'을 발표했다. 이 계획은 기뢰를 탐지하고 위치를 확인해 회피하도록 하는 것이 목적이며, 기뢰를 무력화하는 것은 아니었다. 기뢰 탐색과 소해 작업은 이후에 이루어질 예정이었다.

이 모든 과정에서 미 중부사령부(CENTCOM)나 미국 해군의 계획 담당자들이 미국산 해군 기뢰를 사용해 잔존한 이란 해군과 이란 항구를 드나들려는 다른 선박들을 무력화하는 방안을 진지하게 검토했다는 징후는 전혀 없었다. 미국의 계획 수립에 참고가 될 수 있는 기뢰전 목표는 『합동작전을 위한 차단, 장애물 및 기뢰전(Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations)』, 합동교리 간행물 3-15(Joint Publication 3-15)에 다음과 같이 제시되어 있다.

교란(Disrupt): 기뢰지대는 적의 대형과 작전 속도를 변화시키고, 적의 시간 계획을 방해하며, 적으로 하여금 기뢰대항작전(MCM)을 수행하도록 강요하거나, 이러한 효과를 복합적으로 달성하기 위해 사용된다.

고정(Fix): 기뢰지대는 목표를 지연시키거나 정지시켜 아군이 교전 지역에서 풍부한 표적을 확보할 수 있도록 설계된다. 이상적으로는 적이 아군에 대해 효과적으로 방어하는 능력을 저해해야 한다.

유도(Turn): 기뢰지대는 적의 부대를 원래 계획한 항로에서 아군에게 유리한 항로로 우회시키기 위한 목적을 가진다.

차단(Block): 기뢰지대는 특정 접근 항로를 따라 이루어지는 해상 교통을 완전히 차단하기 위해 부설된다. 차단용 기뢰지대는 적의 기뢰대항기술을 견뎌낼 수 있어야 하며, 창의성, 기술, 기뢰 밀도 또는 이들의 조합을 활용해 소모를 통한 제거를 포함한 적의 소해 시도를 극복해야 한다. 모든 기뢰지대는 합동 또는 통합 화력과 연계될 수 있지만, 차단용 기뢰지대가 그 효과를 가장 크게 얻는다.

해군 항공모함이 운용하는 재래식 폭탄은 공격 및 방어 목적에 따라 수중뿐 아니라 육상에도 부설할 수 있는 비재래식 '퀵스트라이크(Quickstrike)' 해군 기뢰로 쉽게 전환할 수 있으며, 이는 전략적·작전적·전술적 차원의 영향을 만들어낼 수 있다.

검증된 무기

해군 기뢰는 1776년 9월 6일 데이비드 부시넬의 반잠수정 터틀(Turtle)이 윌리엄 하우 장군의 HMS 이글(Eagle)을 공격한 이래 미국 해군 역사에서 꾸준히 사용되어 온 무기이다. 보다 최근에는 1960년대 초 해군이 표준형 Mk-82 500파운드 폭탄을 개조한 Mk-36 디스트럭터(DST) 자기감응식 해저기뢰(최대 운용 수심 300피트) 4,000발 이상을 위한 개조 키트를 도입했다. 이 DST는 1980년에 실전 배치된 Mk-62/63 퀵스트라이크 기뢰의 기반이 되었다.

1972~1973년 '포켓 머니(Operation Pocket Money)' 작전에서 미국은 북베트남의 항구와 수로에 수천 발의 기뢰를 투하하여 하이퐁항을 봉쇄했고, 북베트남이 파리 평화회담에 복귀하도록 압박했다. 1972년 5월 9일 해군 공격기는 하이퐁항에 대한 기뢰 부설 작전을 시작했다. 총 36발의 기뢰가 부설되었으며, 소련·중국 및 기타 제3국을 자극하는 것을 최소화하기 위해 기뢰는 72시간의 지연 시간을 설정한 뒤 활성화되도록 했다.

리처드 M. 닉슨 미국 대통령은 다음과 같이 설명했다.

“북베트남의 모든 항구 입구에는 기뢰를 부설하여 이들 항구에 대한 접근과 이들 항구를 거점으로 하는 북베트남 해군의 활동을 차단할 것이다. 또한 미국군은 북베트남의 내수와 자국이 영해라고 주장하는 해역에서 모든 보급품의 전달을 차단하기 위해 적절한 조치를 취하라는 지시를 받았다. 철도와 기타 모든 통신망은 가능한 한 최대한 차단될 것이다. 북베트남의 군사 목표물에 대한 공군 및 해군의 공격도 계속될 것이다.”

닉슨의 발표는 다른 국가의 선박들이 항구에 갇히기 전에 3일 동안 빠져나갈 시간을 제공했다. 9척의 선박은 안전하게 하이퐁항을 떠났지만, 27척은 계속 항구에 정박한 채 남아 있었다. 하이퐁으로 향하던 여러 상선도 기뢰 위협 때문에 항로를 돌렸다. 해군은 1972년 내내 하이퐁과 다른 북베트남 항구의 기뢰지대를 지속적으로 재부설했다.

43년째 이어지고 있는 운용

가장 최근에 설계된 기뢰는 1983년에 실전 배치되었다. Mk-65 항공투하식 해저기뢰는 얇은 외피의 전용 기뢰 본체와 노즈 페어링, 그리고 낙하산 장착이 가능한 꼬리 부분으로 구성되어 있다. Mk-65는 잠수함과 수상 표적을 모두 공격하는 데 사용된다. Mk-60 CAPTOR(enCAPsulated TORpedo) 기뢰에는 Mk-46 Mod 4 경량 유도어뢰가 탑재되었다. 2001년에 퇴역한 CAPTOR는 약 17,000야드의 장거리에서 잠수함을 탐지하고 식별하며 공격할 수 있었다.

그 이후에는 외국 해군의 후보 모델을 포함해 약 15개의 신규 설계 개념이 제안되었지만, 어느 것도 실제로 개발되지 못했다.

2026년 현재 미국의 수상 전투함과 특수임무 수상정은 기뢰를 부설할 수 없으며, 2,000파운드급 Mk-67 잠수함 발사 이동식 기뢰(SLMM)와 기존의 얇은 외피를 가진 항공투하식 Mk-65만 소수 남아 운용되고 있다. 3척의 시울프급(SSN 21) 원자력 공격잠수함과 약 26척의 버지니아급(SSN 774) 잠수함은 이러한 무기가 사용될 경우 기뢰를 부설할 수 있다.

항공기에서 투하하는 천해용(약 150피트) 퀵스트라이크 기뢰는 해군이 대량으로 운용할 수 있는 유일한 기뢰이며, 남아 있는 SLMM은 노후화된 로스앤젤레스급(SSN 688) 공격잠수함에서만 발사할 수 있다. 주목할 점은 해군이 새로운 비밀 부설 기뢰 프로그램을 위해 SLMM Mk-13 탄두를 다른 용도로 전환했다는 것이다.

퀵스트라이크는 신속 대응 능력도 제공한다. Mk-62 500파운드형과 Mk-63 1,000파운드형은 기존 폭탄을 개조한 무기이므로, 항공모함 항공단은 기뢰 전용 탄약고에 이를 별도로 보관할 필요가 없다. Mk-62/63 개조 키트를 일반 무유도 폭탄에 장착하면 해군 기뢰로 전환할 수 있다.

Mk-62 플라운더(Flounder)와 Mk-63 스킵잭(Skipjack) 기뢰는 범용 Mk-82(500파운드) 및 Mk-83(1,000파운드) 무유도 폭탄의 탄체를 사용한다. 이 스마트 기뢰에는 가변 감응식 Mk-57 표적탐지장치(TDD)가 탑재되어 있다. 이 기뢰들은 잠수함과 수상함을 표적으로 하며, 다양한 기폭 지연, 표적 무효화, 자폭 및 기타 운용 설정을 적용할 수 있다. Mk-57 TDD는 자기 및 지진파 신호를 이용해 표적을 탐지하며, 일정한 크기의 자기 및 지진파 신호가 동시에 감지될 때만 작동하도록 설정할 수 있다.

2014년 9월 미국 태평양사령부(PACOM)는 500파운드급 날개 장착 합동직격탄(JDAM)-ER을 개조한 사거리 연장형 Mk-62 퀵스트라이크-ER을 시연했다. B-52H 전략폭격기에서 투하된 이 무기는 고정밀·초정밀·장거리 원거리 투하형 공중 기뢰가 처음으로 실전 시연된 사례였다.

이후 태평양사령부, 해군, 공군의 또 다른 공동 사업을 통해 B-52H에서 발사한 2,000파운드급 Mk-64 퀵스트라이크-JDAM-ER의 투하에도 성공했다. 이 무기는 최대 300해리의 거리에서, 최고 40,000피트의 순항 고도로부터 운용할 수 있었으며, 목표로 설정한 투하 지점에 정밀하게 도달했다.

2019년 5월 30일 태평양. 작전 시연 중 B-52 스트래토포트리스에서 투하된 퀵스트라이크-ER(QS-ER) 해군 기뢰가 태평양을 향해 낙하하고 있다. (미국 해군 사진 / 공보전문요원 1급 홀리 L. 헐라인)

공군은 앞으로의 무장 구성에 대함 공격용 '퀵싱크(Quicksink)' 무기를 포함할 계획도 추진했다. 2024년 7월 미국 공군과 동맹국 공군은 장거리에서 대형 수상함을 격침하는 시험을 실시했으며, 여기에는 미국 공군의 B-2 스피릿 스텔스 폭격기가 처음으로 참가했다. 이 무기 시험은 7월 19일 실시되었으며, B-2는 소형 항공모함 규모의 퇴역 상륙강습함인 전 USS 타라와(LHA-10)를 격침하는 데 참여했다. 약 2,000파운드급 퀵싱크 탄두는 잠수함을 탐지와 표적화의 위험에 노출시키지 않으면서도, 공군 폭격기에 잠수함 발사 어뢰와 유사한 대함 공격 능력을 제공할 수 있다.

2026년 해군은 퀵스트라이크 기뢰를 최첨단 기폭장치인 Mk-71 TDD로 개량하고 있었다. Mk-71은 자기, 지진파, 압력 신호를 감지하며, 정교한 표적 처리 및 대응책 무력화 알고리즘을 프로그램할 수 있다. 이를 통해 해군 기뢰 운용 부대는 서로 다른 표적 유형에 맞추어 성능을 최적화하고 미래의 새로운 표적에도 대응할 수 있다. 요컨대 퀵스트라이크 기뢰는 단순한 무기가 아니라, 복잡성과 정교함 면에서 해군의 순항미사일에 필적하는 수준의 체계를 갖추고 있다.

미국의 해군 기뢰 운용 경험을 분석해 보면, Mk-71 TDD가 함대 운용 승인을 받기까지 약 30년이 걸렸음을 알 수 있다. 자원 확보 경쟁 속에서 해군 기뢰전 분야가 종종 해군이 잊고 지내는 전력으로 취급되는 것도 놀라운 일은 아니다.

이란 봉쇄

미국의 기뢰전 계획이 최신 상태로 갱신되어 있고 기뢰 장비가 즉시 사용할 준비가 되어 있다는 전제하에, 미국산 기뢰를 이용하면 호르무즈 해협 안팎에 위치한 이란의 항구들을 봉쇄할 수 있다. 다수의 이란 기뢰부설함은 매우 소형이며, 이란 해안을 따라 있는 수많은 항구나 동굴에서 출동할 수 있기 때문에 이를 저지하는 일은 결코 쉽지 않을 것이다. 이러한 위협 세력을 항구 안에 묶어 두는 것만으로도 상당히 어려운 과제가 될 것이다.

미국의 기뢰 부설 결정이 내려지는 즉시 해군 항공모함은 퀵스트라이크 기뢰를 탑재한 공격기를 곧바로 출격시킬 수 있다. 퀵스트라이크의 표적탐지장치(TDD)는 감도를 매우 세밀하게 설정할 수 있어, 이란의 소형 선박이 갖는 신호 특성을 포함한 다양한 수상 및 수중 함정을 탐지하고 기폭할 수 있다. 미국과 이란 간의 전투가 종료되면, 미리 정해진 시점에 자폭하도록 설정된 퀵스트라이크 기뢰는 스스로 제거된다. 이는 미국과 다른 국가 해군의 기뢰대항부대가 안전한 항로를 확보하는 과정에서 추가적인 위험 요소를 줄여준다. 이후 호르무즈 해협의 상선과 군함은 정상적인 항행을 재개할 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 호르무즈 해협과 페르시아만에서의 교전이 완전히 끝난 뒤에는 위험하고 어려운 기뢰 제거 작업이 시작되어야 한다.

『해군작전법 지휘관 지침서(The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations NWP 1-14)』(1907년 헤이그 협약)에 따르면, 기뢰를 부설한 국가는 전쟁이 끝난 뒤 이를 제거해야 하며, 기뢰 위치를 다른 교전국에 통보해야 한다. 이는 막대한 부담이 따르는 작업이다. 예를 들어, 1992년 사막의 폭풍(Operation Desert Storm) 작전 종료 이후 북부 페르시아만의 10개 기뢰 위험 해역을 제거하는 데 다국적 연합 기뢰대항부대가 1년이 넘는 시간을 투입해야 했다. 미국 해군의 기뢰대항작전은 1997년까지 계속되었다.

마찬가지로, 발트해와 북해에서 각종 NATO 훈련에 참가한 기뢰대항함들은 지금도 제1차 세계대전과 제2차 세계대전 당시의 기뢰를 계속 발견해 제거하고 있다. 현재까지 이들이 발견한 기뢰는 5만~8만 발에 이른다. 2026년 중반 미국이 해상 기뢰를 이용해 이란 해역을 봉쇄하기로 결정한다면, 미국 기뢰전 부대의 과제는 효과적인 기뢰지대를 신속하고 정확하게 구축하는 것이 될 것이다. 기뢰 소해함과 기뢰탐색함이 호르무즈 해협의 항로를 완전히 안전하게 만드는 데 걸리는 시간은 1개월에서 1년 이상까지 다양한 추정이 제시되었다.

전장으로

기뢰전은 쉽지도, 빠르지도, 경력에 도움이 되는 분야도 아니다. 1776년 이후 기뢰전 부대를 지휘한 해군 장성(RDML/RADM)은 극소수에 불과했다. 대령(O-6)까지 진급하는 것만으로도 뛰어난 성과로 평가되었다. 기뢰전 보직을 연속으로 여러 차례 맡는 것은 사실상 진급 경쟁에서 가장 불리한 위치에 서는 것을 의미했다. 기뢰전 역사학자 타마라 모저 멜리아(Tamara Moser Melia)가 지적했듯이, “제1차 세계대전이 끝날 무렵 대부분의 미국 해군 장교들은 기뢰 소해[및 기뢰 탐색]가 여전히 해군 군인에게는 그저 불쾌한 일, 마치 쥐잡이와 같은 직업이라고 평가했을 것이다.” 이러한 인식은 오늘날에도 여전히 이어지고 있다.

미국 해군의 퀵스트라이크 해저 감응식 기뢰는 성공을 위한 핵심 전력이 될 것이다. 전쟁이 진정으로 끝난 뒤 이를 제거하는 데 상당한 비용이 들겠지만, 그 효과는 분쟁을 종결하는 데 결정적인 역할을 할 것이다. 이제는 이 무기들을 전장에 투입해야 할 때가 지났다.

미국 해군 예비역 로널드 E. 스워트(Ronald E. Swart) 중령은 기뢰전협회(Mine Warfare Association)의 수석 고문이다. 그는 해군 기뢰지대 계획 수립과 기뢰 운용 준비 분야에서 32년의 경험을 보유하고 있다.

스콧 트루버(Scott Truver) 박사는 역시 기뢰전협회의 수석 고문으로, 1990년부터 미국 해군의 기뢰전 분야를 지원해 왔으며, 『Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy』(제2판, Naval Institute Press)의 공저자이다.

American Naval Mines Can Be Decisive Against Iran | Center for International Maritime Security

American Naval Mines Can Be Decisive Against Iran | Center for International Maritime Security

Mine Warfare

American Naval Mines Can Be Decisive Against Iran

July 3, 2026 Guest Author 3 Comments

Iran War Topic Week

By Commander Ronald E. Swart, United States Navy (Retired) and Scott C. Truver, PhD

President Donald J. Trump on March 9, 2026 declared that the United States “will not allow Iran’s terrorist regime to stop global oil supply. The Strait of Hormuz is going to remain safe. We have a lot of Navy ships there. We have the best equipment in the world inspecting for mines,” hinting that Iran had already deployed in the main channel about 80 of its estimated 6,000 mines. “Most of their ships are down at the bottom of the sea,” Trump asserted. “But we will hit them so hard that it will not be possible for them or anybody else helping them to ever recover that section of the world.”

Since February 2026, the spectrum of violence stemming from the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz has been expansive. It was not uncommon to see vessel masters playing “chicken” for better positions among many vessels anchored in the waterway. It included suicide attacks by small fast craft and patrol boats armed by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters brandishing small arms and lightweight mines. Five-inch guns and anti-ship missiles were fired from U.S. surface warships and tactical aircraft and attack-helicopters. The U.S. fast-attack submarine USS Charlotte (SSN 766) torpedoed the Iranian frigate Dena in international waters, killing 104 crewmembers.

Six weeks after launching Operation Epic Fury against Iran, Trump ordered the Navy to blockade Iranian ports and to clear the area of any Iranian mines. Vice President J.D. Vance accused Iran of “economic terrorism” by closing the Strait and defended the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports as an equal response: “They basically threatened any ship that’s moving through the Strait of Hormuz.”

On May 3, Trump announced yet another plan to guide ships through the Strait, Project Freedom, which would search for and locate mines to be avoided but not to render them safe. Mine-hunting and sweeping would come later.

In all of this, there has been no indication that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) or U.S. Navy planners have seriously considered using American-made naval mines to neutralize what was left of the Iranian navy and other vessels attempting to make runs into and out of Iran’s ports. Minefield objectives that could inform U.S. planning are listed in the Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-15:

• Disrupt: A minefield is used to alter enemy formations and tempo, interrupt enemy timetables, cause the enemy to conduct MCM operations, or some combination.
• Fix: A minefield is designed to slow or stop targets to create a target-rich environment for friendly forces in an engagement area. Ideally, this field would inhibit the enemy’s capability to defend itself against friendly forces.
• Turn: A minefield is intended to divert enemy formations from their intended transit onto one that is advantageous to friendly units.
• Block: A minefield is emplaced to stop maritime traffic along a specific avenue of approach. Blocking minefields should be able to withstand enemy MCM techniques, including clearance through attrition, using creativity, technology, mine density, or some combination to overcome enemy efforts. While all minefields can be integrated with joint/integrated fires, blocking minefields benefit the most.

The conventional bombs carried by the Navy’s aircraft carriers could easily be converted to unconventional “Quickstrike” naval mines to be planted in water as well as on dry land for offensive and defensive requirements, generating strategic, operational, and tactical implications.

A Proven Weapon

Naval mines have been a constant for the United States since David Bushnell’s semi-submersible Turtle attacked General William Howe’s HMS Eagle on September 6, 1776. More recently, in the early 1960s the Navy bought conversion kits for more than 4,000 Mk-36 Destructor (DST) magnetic-influence bottom mines (maximum operational depth of 300 feet) fashioned from standard-issue Mk-82 500-pound bombs. The DSTs were the provenance of the Mk-62/63 Quickstrike mines that entered service in 1980.

In 1972-1973 Operation Pocket Money, the United States dropped thousands of mines against North Vietnamese ports and waterways, shutting down the port of Haiphong and energizing North Vietnam to return to the Paris Peace Talks. On May 9, 1972, Navy attack aircraft began minelaying strikes against Haiphong harbor. Thirty-six mines were planted, and, to limit provocation of the Soviets, Chinese, and other third parties, the mines were set with a 72-hour delay before they became active.

U.S. President Richard M. Nixon explained:

“All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue.”

Nixon’s announcement gave other nations’ ships three days to escape the port before becoming trapped. Nine ships departed Haiphong safely, while twenty-seven vessels remained “swinging on the hook.” Several merchant ships headed toward Haiphong turned away because of the mine threat. The Navy continued to reseed the minefields in Haiphong and at other North Vietnamese ports throughout 1972.

43 Years and Counting

The most recently designed mines reached the fleet in 1983. The Mk-65 aircraft-laid bottom mine consists of a thin-walled, purpose-built mine case, nose faring, and tail section adaptable to a parachute option. The Mk-65 is used against submarines and surface targets. The Mk-60 CAPTOR (enCAPsulatedTORpedo) mine was armed with a Mk-46 Mod 4 lightweight homing torpedo. CAPTORS, which were decommissioned in 2001, were able to detect, target, and attack submarines at long ranges, about 17,000 yards.

Since then, some 15 new-design concepts, including foreign navy candidates, never saw the light of day.

As of 2026, U.S. surface warships and special-mission surface craft cannot deploy mines, while only a handful of the 2,000 pound Mk-67 Submarine-Launched Mobile Mines (SLMMs) and the traditional thin-walled air-delivered Mk-65s remain in service. The three-boat Seawolf (SSN 21) nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines and some 26 Virginia (SSN 774)-class boats can deploy mines, should such weapons be used.

The aircraft-deployed shallow-water (about 150 feet) Quickstrike mines are the Navy’s only high-volume mines, and the remaining SLMMs can be launched only by aging Los Angeles-class (SSN 688) attack submarines. Of note, the Navy has repurposed SLMM Mk-13 warheads for the new clandestine delivered mines program.

The Quickstrikes also provide rapid-response capability. Because the Mk-62 500-pound and Mk-63 1,000-pound mines are bomb-conversion weapons, aircraft carrier air do not need to store them in special magazines reserved only for mines. A Mk-62/63 conversion-kit can be applied to a standard dumb bomb to create a naval mine.

The Mk-62 Flounder and Mk-63 Skipjack mines use the general-purpose Mk-82 (500-pound) and Mk-83 (1,000-pound), dumb bomb bodies. The smart bomb includes a variable-influence Mk-57 target detection device (TDD). These mines target submarines and surface ships and are capable of numerous arming delay, target sterilization, self-destruct, and other operational settings. The Mk-57 TDD uses magnetic and seismic influences for target detection and can be set to require combined magnetic and seismic influences of specific magnitudes.

In September 2014, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) demonstrated the extended-range Mk-62 Quickstrike-ER, a modification of the 500-pound winged Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM)-ER. Dropped from a B-52H strategic bomber, this was the first-ever deployment of a high-accuracy, razor-sharp-precision, long-standoff aerial mine.

Subsequently, another joint effort between PACOM, the Navy, and the Air Force successfully dropped a 2,000-pound Mk-64 Quickstrike-JDAM-ER launched from a B-52H. It was effective out to ranges of 300 nautical miles, and from cruise altitudes at up to 40,000 feet, and landed with precision at desired drop points.

PACIFIC OCEAN (May 30, 2019) the Quickstrike-ER (QS-ER) Naval mine project drops towards the Pacific Ocean from a B-52 Stratofortress during an operational demonstration. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Holly L. Herline)

The Air Force has also planned anti-ship “Quicksink” weapons in future loadouts. In July 2024, the Air Force and allied air forces tested sinking a large surface ship at long range, including for the first time using a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The test of the weapon occurred on 19 July, when a B-2 participated in sinking the ex-USS Tarawa (LHA-10), a retired amphibious assault warship the size of a small aircraft carrier. Quicksink warheads of some 2,000 pounds could give the Air Force bombers the anti-ship capability of a submarine-launched torpedo without exposing a submarine to risk from detection and targeting.

In 2026, the Navy was upgrading the Quickstrike mines to the Mk-71 TDD, a state-of-the-art firing mechanism. The Mk-71 senses magnetic, seismic, and pressure signatures and can be programmed with sophisticated target-processing and counter-countermeasures algorithms. This enables the Navy’s miners to optimize performance against different target classes and to counter future targets. In short, the Quickstrike mines are not simple devices but rival even the Navy’s cruise missiles in complexity and sophistication.

Analysis of the American experience with naval mines reveals that it took about three decades to approve the Mk-71 TDD for fleet operations. It is little surprise that in the competition for resources the Navy mine warfare community is often regarded as the service’s forgotten capability.

Blockading Iran

A blockade of Iran’s Hormuz ports, both inside and outside the Strait, could be accomplished with the use of American mines, assuming that U.S. minefield plans are updated and the mine hardware is ready to use. Stopping Iran’s minelayers, many of which are very small and can be deployed from numerous ports or caves along the Iranian littoral, will not be trivial. The job of keeping these threats in ports­­ will be challenging enough.

As soon as the decision to lay U.S. mines is received, the Navy’s carriers could immediately launch Quickstrike-armed attack aircraft. Quickstrike TDDs can be set to such a sensitivity that they can detect and detonate on a wide range of surface and subsurface vessels, including Iran’s small-vessel signatures. Once U.S.-Iran War hostilities are exhausted, the deployed Quickstrike mines, already pre-set to self-destruct at a predetermined time, will self-clear, eliminating an additional hazard for U.S. and other navies’ mine countermeasure force efforts to ensure safe passage. Strait of Hormuz commercial and naval ship traffic will return to normal transits. Still, when hostilities in the Strait and Persian Gulf and Hormuz finally wind down, the dangerous and difficult task of clearing mines must begin.

As The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations NWP 1-14 (Hague Convention 1907) explains, nations that laid mines must remove them when hostilities end and must notify the positions of mines to the other belligerents. This is an extremely burdensome task. For example, following the cessation of Operation Desert Storm in 1992, it took a dedicated multi-navy coalition mine countermeasure force more than a year to clear the ten mine danger areas in the northern Persian Gulf.  U.S. Navy mine counter-measure operations continued into 1997.

Similarly, mine countermeasures vessels participating in various NATO exercises in the Baltic and North Sea have continued to find and destroy World War I- and World War II–era mines. To date, they have discovered between 50,000 and 80,000 mines. In mid-2026, should the United States decide to blockade Iran’s waters with sea mines, the challenges for U.S. miners would be to develop and plant effective minefields quickly and accurately. Estimates of the time it would take mine-sweepers and -hunters to sanitize a Hormuz waterway ran from a month to more than a year.

Into the Fight

Mine warfare is not easy, quick, or career-enhancing. Since 1776, only a handful of Navy flag officers (RDML/RADM) commanded mine warfare forces. Reaching Captain (O-6) was considered stellar performance. Multiple back-to-back mine warfare tours assured sitting in the last pew. As mine warfare historian Tamara Moser Melia recognized,  “By the end of World War I, most U.S. naval officers probably agreed with the assessment that mine sweeping [and mine hunting] remained merely unpleasant work for a naval man, an occupation like that of rat-catching.” The sentiment holds true today.

The U.S. Navy’s Quickstrike bottom influence mines will be critical to success. Despite the cost it will take to clear them when the war truly ends, their effects will be decisive in bringing the conflict to a conclusion. It is past time to get them into the fight.

CDR Ronald E. Swart, USN (Ret.) is the Principal Advisor to the Mine Warfare Association (https://minwara.org). He has 32 years of experience in naval minefield planning and mine readiness.

Dr. Scott Truver, also a Principal Advisor at MINWARA, has worked in support of U.S. Navy mine warfare since 1990 and is the co-author of Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (2nd ed, Naval Institute Press).

References

Brad Lendon, “How the US Navy could Blockade Iran’s Port and Sweep Mines from the Strait   of Hormuz,” CNN World, 13 April 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/13/middleeast/us-iran-hormuz-blockade-minesweeping-explainer-intl-hnk-ml. Brad Lendon, “The U.S. Says It Has Successfully Practiced Using a Low-Cost Bomb to Sink a Major Surface Ship: China is Taking Note,” Navy Strategy News, 29 July 2024.

Brad Lendon, “The U.S. Says It Has Successfully Practiced Using a Low-Cost Bomb to Sink a Major Surface Ship: China is Taking Note,” Navy Strategy News, 29 July 2024.

Bryan Clark, “’Shoot and Kill’” Orders Made on Mine-Laying Boats in the Strait, Hudson Institution, CNN, April  2026 shttps://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/shoot-kill-orders-made-mine-laying-boats-strait-bryan-clark.

Jessie Yeung, “Day 45 of Middle East conflict––US Navy starts Blockade on Iranian ports,” CNN World, 14 April 2026.

Edwards, “Preparing Today for the Mines of Tomorrow,” Naval War College Review, Vol72, No3, 2019, 12, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/5/.

Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncertain World. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-00/OP-03, 29 January 1992. Mimeo.

Riley Cedar, “The US has counter-mine ships homeported in the Middle East. Are they effective?” Navy Times, 23 March 2026, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2026/03/23/the-us-has-counter-mine-ships-homeported-in-the-middle-east-are-they-effective/.

Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations NWP 1-14 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, March 2022, NWP­_1-114M.pdf)/.

Tamara Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777–1991, (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1991).

Tony DiGiulian, Owner, Naval Weapons Systems (NavWeaps, http//www.NavWeaps.com) military database. Accessed 3 June 2026.

“Trump Announces Plan to help ‘Guide’ Ships Out of the Strait of Hormuz, The Maritime Executive, 3 May 2026.

Featured Image: A Mk-63 Quickstrike Mine is mounted on a P-3 Orion aircraft. (US Navy photo)

[김유철]

순수한 군사적 관점에서 강경파들은 초반부터 역기뢰전 걸고 호루므즈 전역에 킬박스 설정하자고 주장했던 것으로 압니다만, 걸프 인접국들 때문에 쉽게 쓰기 어려운 선택인 것도 사실이겠죠.

그나저나 기뢰전 전문가들이 이번에 목소리를 크게 낼 만한 상황이 되었습니다. 아마도 USV의 활용분야 최우선 순위로 기뢰전 분야가 될 것 같아보이고...