미해군 SSBN이 입출항 시 드론이나 대전차로켓 공격을 받을 수 있다

[위종민]

미해군이 SSBN이 항구에 정박중이거나 입출상시에 드론이나 대전차로켓 공격을 받을 가능성을 우려하고 있습니다. 

미 해군, 탄도미사일 잠수함이 드론과 대전차 로켓 공격을 받을 수 있다고 우려

마이클 펙

2026년 7월 8일 오전 4시 10분

무인항공기가 오하이오급 탄도미사일 잠수함 USS 헨리 M. 잭슨에 화물을 전달하고 있다. (미국 해군 / 해군 공보전문요원 1급 데빈 M. 랭어)

광활한 대양 깊숙이 숨어 있을 때 미국의 탄도미사일 잠수함은 사실상 무적에 가깝다.

그러나 항구에 정박해 있거나, 항구를 오가는 동안 수면 위를 항해할 때는 이러한 강력하면서도 취약한 잠수함이 드론과 기뢰, 심지어 대전차 로켓 공격에도 속수무책인 표적이 될 수 있다.

한때는 스릴러 소설에서나 나올 법한 이야기였지만 이제는 현실이 되었다. 우크라이나는 지난해 흑해의 노보로시스크항에서 수중 드론을 이용해 러시아 잠수함을 손상시키는 데 성공했다고 주장했다. 수로 주변에 숨어 있는 게릴라나 테러리스트는 대전차 유도미사일이나 휴대용 대전차 로켓을 이용해 방심한 잠수함을 기습할 수도 있다.

이러한 새로운 위협에 대응하기 위해 미국 해군은 탄도미사일 잠수함과 이를 지원하는 육상 시설을 보다 효과적으로 방어할 수 있는 방법을 개발하려 하고 있다.

미 해군의 수요조사 공고(Sources Sought)에 따르면, 이러한 방어 체계에는 "모든 영역에서 무인체계를 탐지, 추적, 식별, 차단 및 격파하기 위한 시제품 기술"이 포함된다. 또한 "이 분야는 항만, 항구, 연안 및 수로(PHLW)와 외해 환경에서 육상 시설과 해상 작전을 모두 지원할 수 있는 확장 가능한 해결책을 모색한다."고 설명했다.

해군은 또한 탄도미사일 잠수함이 항구를 드나들 때 이를 호위하고 보호할 수 있는 방안도 찾고 있다.

공고는 목표가 "전략적 해상 자산의 이동을 실패 없이 안전하게 보장하는 것"이라고 밝혔다. 이어 "이 분야는 고도화된 해양 상황인식 능력, SSBN(핵탄도미사일 잠수함) 호위를 위한 물리적 보안 강화, 잠항 지점과 항구 사이의 항만·항구·연안·수로(PHLW) 구간을 이동하는 동안 해상 기뢰의 탐지·회피·무력화, 그리고 직접 사격 방식의 운동에너지 위협(예: 육상 발사 대전차유도미사일(ATGM) 및 RPG)의 격파를 위한 기술을 모색한다."고 설명했다.

대전차 무기의 위협은 잠수함 기지로 대륙간탄도미사일(ICBM)을 운반하는 트럭 호송대에도 미친다. 해군은 "전략 무기 및 장비의 육상 운송과 호송 작전"을 위해, 장갑차에 센서와 산탄총처럼 작동하는 발사기를 장착하여 접근하는 대전차 로켓을 요격하는 능동방호체계(Active Protection System)에도 관심을 보이고 있다.

미 공군, ICBM 탄두 운반용 장갑 수송차량 추가 확보 추진

해군 전략체계프로그램(Strategic Systems Program)이 해결하려는 22개의 "중점 분야"를 제시한 이번 수요조사 공고에는 항만 방어용 센서도 포함되어 있다. 해군은 또한 수상 순찰용 무인수상정(USV), 경계선 감시용 무인지상차량(UGV), 기존 대응 전력과 원활하게 연동되는 로봇 점검 플랫폼 등 보안 로봇에도 관심을 보이고 있다.

인공지능 역시 드론 군집이나 사이버전의 형태로 새로운 위협으로 떠오르고 있다.

해군은 "자율 군집체계를 무력화하고, 핵시설을 대상으로 하는 AI 기반 정보·감시·정찰(ISR)을 교란하며, AI 기반 사이버-물리 공격이나 기만(spoofing)에 대비해 전략 보안 네트워크를 강화하는 데 초점을 맞춘" 대응 기술을 찾고 있다.

잠수함을 방어하는 가장 좋은 방법은 애초에 탐지되지 않는 것이다. 이를 위해 해군은 "평시와 전시를 모두 포함한 잠수함 및 무인체계 운용과 관련하여 발생하는 다양한 신호(음향, 화학, 광학, 전자기, 방사선, 유체역학, 사이버)의 생성, 방출, 전파 및 산란을 줄일 수 있는 시제품 기술"을 모색하고 있다.

마이클 펙 소개

마이클 펙은 《디펜스 뉴스(Defense News)》의 기자이자 유럽정책분석센터(Center for European Policy Analysis)의 칼럼니스트이다. 러트거스대학교에서 정치학 석사 학위를 취득했다. 그의 글은 theuncommondefense.com에서도 확인할 수 있다. 이메일은 [mikedefense1@gmail.com](mailto:mikedefense1@gmail.com)이다.

US Navy fears ballistic missile subs can be hit by drones, anti-tank rockets

US Navy fears ballistic missile subs can be hit by drones, anti-tank rockets

US Navy fears ballistic missile subs can be hit by drones, anti-tank rockets

By Michael Peck

 Jul 8, 2026, 04:10 AM

An unmanned aerial vehicle delivers a payload to the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson. (MCS1 Devin M. Langer/U.S. Navy)

When hidden deep in the vastness of the ocean, America’s ballistic missile subs are practically invulnerable.

But berthed in port — or sailing on the surface while transiting to and from port — these powerful yet fragile boats can be sitting ducks for drones, mines and even anti-tank rockets.

What once seemed the plot of thriller novels has become reality. Ukraine claims it successfully used an underwater drone to damage a Russian submarine in the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk last year. Guerrillas and terrorists lurking along a waterway could use anti-tank guided missiles or handheld anti-tank rockets to ambush an unwary sub.

To face the new threat, the U.S. Navy is looking to develop better methods of protecting its missile subs, as well as the shore installations that support them.

These defenses include “prototype technologies to detect, track, identify, deny, and defeat unmanned systems across all domains,” according to a Sources Sought announcement. “This area seeks scalable solutions for shore-based installations and afloat operations in Port, Harbor, Littoral, and Waterways (PHLW) and open ocean environments.”

The Navy is also searching for ways to escort and protect its missile subs as they transit to and from port.

The goal is to “ensure the zero-failure secure movement of strategic maritime assets,” the announcement said. “This area seeks advanced maritime situational awareness, physical security enhancements for escorting SSBNs [nuclear missile subs], and the detection, avoidance, and mitigation of maritime mines, and the defeat of direct-fire kinetic threats (e.g., shore-launched ATGMs/RPGs) during transit through PHLW to and from dive points.”

The threat of anti-tank weapons even extends to the truck convoys hauling ICBMs to sub bases. The Navy is interested in active protection systems — sensors and shotgun-like launchers mounted on armored vehicles to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets — “for ground transport and convoy operations of strategic weapons and equipment.”

RELATEDUS Air Force wants more armored transporters for ICBM warheads

Other security items in the Sources Sought announcement, which lists 22 “focus areas” that the Navy’s Strategic Systems Program wants to address, include sensors to protect harbors. The Navy is also interested in security robots, including “Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) for waterside patrol, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) for perimeter screening, and robotic inspection platforms that seamlessly integrate with existing response forces.”

Artificial intelligence has also emerged as a threat in the form of drone swarms or cyberwarfare.

The Navy is searching for countermeasures that “focus on defeating autonomous swarms, disrupting AI-enabled Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) directed at nuclear facilities, and hardening strategic security networks against AI-driven cyber-physical attacks or spoofing.”

The best defense for submarines is simply not to be detect in the first place. To that point, the Navy is seeking “prototype technologies that may mitigate the generation, radiation, propagation, and scatter of a variety of signal types (acoustic, chemical, optical, electromagnetic, radiological, hydrodynamic, and cyber) associated with submarine and unmanned system operations, to include both peacetime and wartime operations.”

About Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him at theuncommondefense.com. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

[김유철]

최근 파나마 운하에 대한 통제권 갈등이라던가, 스리랑카 콜롬보항에 대한 대규모 투자 등을 통해 항만운항에 대한 중국의 영향력을 계속 축소시키려는 미국의 노력도 다 일맥상통하는 이야기겠죠.