북한의 핵전략

[위종민]

38north에 실린 북한의 핵전략에 대한 기고문입니다. 정권 생존용이 아니라 전구 차원의 강압과 핵전쟁 수행을 위한 공세적 능력으로 전환했다고 하고, 실제 군사목표를 향한 모의 타격훈련도 정례화됐다고 하네요. 

북한의 핵전략은 '4대 축 핵전략'으로, 전략적으로는 ICBM을 통해 한미동맹을 분리시키고 전술적으로는 지역 위기에서 북한의 강제력을 강화하는 데 쓰일 수 있다고 보네요. 이런 공세적, 공격적 사용으로 핵사용 문턱이 낮아진다고 보고 있습니다. 

4대축 핵전략은 처음 듣는 용어라 각주에 링크된 NIE 문서를 찾아봤더니 원 보고서에선 강압, 공세, 방어적 목적으로 북한이 핵무기를 쓸 수 있다고 하고, 순수한 방어전략은 가능성이 매우 낮고, 강압전략이 가능성이 가장 높고, 공세전략은 가능성은 낮지만 한미동맹에 미칠 위험은 가장 크다고 평가했네요. 원저자는 여기에 '억제'를 포함해 4대 축으로 분리했나 봅니다. ( NIC-Declassified-NIE-North-Korea-Scenarios-For-Leveraging-Nuclear-Weapons-June2023.pdf _

북한의 핵 교리: 한미동맹에 대한 함의와 전략적 대응책

한용섭
2026년 7월 23일
외교, 대량살상무기

(출처: 조선중앙통신)

북한 헌법 개정은 스스로 주장하는 “책임 있는 핵보유국” 지위를 국가의 최고법 안에 공식적으로 명문화했다. 핵무력 발전을 헌법적 틀 안에 포함시키고 지휘통제 절차를 법제화함으로써, 평양은 핵 능력을 유지하고 현대화하려는 절대적이고 장기적인 의지를 나타내며 사실상 전통적인 비핵화 구상에 문을 닫은 것으로 보인다. 서울과 워싱턴의 정책결정자들은 이러한 변화를 단순한 상징적 조치로 다루기보다, 그것이 북한의 전략적 행동, 군사계획, 외교적 태도에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 비판적으로 평가해야 한다. 이 위험한 새 시대에 안정을 유지하고 국가 주권을 지키기 위해 한국과 한미동맹은 통합된 핵 공유, 기술 혁신, 다층적 외교를 통해 방어체계를 근본적으로 개편해야 한다.

북한의 진화하는 핵 전략과 교리

평양의 핵 추구는 정권 생존을 위한 방어적 수단이라는 본래의 역할을 근본적으로 넘어, 전구 차원의 강압과 핵전 수행을 위한 공세적 능력으로 전환됐다. 수십 년간의 비밀 개발을 거친 뒤 북한은 핵보유국 지위와 핵 프로그램 개발을 헌법에 공식화함으로써 핵 억제력을 지속적으로 강화할 국내 정치적 정당성과 의무를 확립했다.

2026년 7월 현재 북한은 약 60~100기의 핵무기를 보유한 것으로 추정되며, 핵무기를 기하급수적으로 늘리겠다는 김정은의 선언된 정책에 따라 무기급 핵분열성 물질 생산을 계속 확대하고 있다.[1] 현재 공개자료에 기반한 평가는 북한이 무기 설계와 핵분열성 물질 배분 방식에 따라 매년 약 7~18기의 추가 핵무기를 생산할 수 있을 만큼 충분한 고농축우라늄(HEU)과 플루토늄을 생산할 능력을 보유하고 있음을 보여준다. 현재의 생산 추세가 지속된다면 북한의 핵무기 비축량은 2035년까지 크게 증가할 수 있다.[2] 북한은 또한 2020년대 초반 전술적 전장 운용에 최적화된 근거리탄도미사일(CRBM), 단거리탄도미사일(SRBM), 첨단 순항미사일을 빠르게 개발하며 운반체계를 공격적으로 다변화했다.

더 나아가 북한 정권은 한국 전역의 주요 군사표적, 공군기지, 항만, 지휘시설을 겨냥한 매우 현실적인 모의 전술핵 타격훈련을 일상화했다.[3] 이러한 활동은 핵전력을 더 광범위한 실시간 군사작전에 통합하는 데 고도화된 작전적 중점을 두고 있음을 보여주며, 핵 지휘통제(C2), 명령 인증, 전시 핵물질 취급에서 발전된 숙련도를 입증한다.

본질적으로 북한은 정교한 “4대 축 핵전략”을 추구하는 것으로 보인다.[4] 이 구상 아래 장거리 전략핵전력과 대륙간탄도미사일(ICBM)은 미국을 겨냥해 강력한 “동맹 분리 효과”를 만들어내고, 이를 통해 한반도 유사시 워싱턴의 개입 결정을 복잡하게 만들고 지연시키는 한편, 전술체계는 지역 위기에서 북한의 전구 차원 강압과 강제력을 강화하는 데 동시에 활용된다.

이러한 공세적 태세는 핵 사용 문턱이 전례 없이 흐려지는 위험한 “제3의 핵시대”의 도래를 알린다.[5] 이러한 행동은 사실상의 군사동맹으로 기능하는 조러 포괄적 전략적 동반자 관계 조약과, 평양의 핵무기를 미국의 지역 영향력에 맞서는 유용한 지정학적 균형추로 보는 베이징의 전략적 계산에 의해 더욱 대담해지고 있으며, 그 결과 동북아시아에 경직된 신냉전 구도가 공식화되고 있다.

북한의 진화하는 핵 교리가 지니는 전략적 함의

2022년 이후 북한의 핵 프로그램과 관련된 법률 및 헌법 개정은 여러 핵심 차원에서 지역 안보환경을 변화시키는 중대한 전략적 함의를 지닌다.

첫째, 관련 법률 전체는 북한의 비핵화 거부를 강화한다. 핵 개발을 국가의 정체성과 정당성에 직접 연결하고 핵무력 강화를 헌법상 의무로 규정함으로써, 평양은 자발적 핵 양보나 전통적 방식의 단기 비핵화 가능성을 사실상 0으로 낮췄다.

둘째, 이러한 조치들은 인식되는 핵 사용 문턱을 크게 낮춘다. 북한의 2022년 핵무력법은 선제적이고 자동적인 핵 사용 가능성을 허용하는 교리를 제시한다. 여기에 평양의 갈수록 적대적인 수사와 “두 국가” 서사 아래 한국을 교전국으로 규정한 조치가 결합되면서, 같은 민족인 한국인을 상대로 핵무기를 사용하는 데 대한 이념적·민족주의적 제약이 사실상 제거됐다. 이는 또한 전술핵 능력이 즉각적인 작전교리에 통합되고 있다는 인식을 강화하며, 핵 신호와 핵 선제사용 가능성의 장벽을 낮춘다.

셋째, 이처럼 낮아진 잠재적 핵 사용 문턱은 “핵 후원 효과” 또는 “확전 방패”를 만들어낸다. 우크라이나에서 러시아가 보인 강압적 핵 신호와 유사하게, 평양은 고도화된 핵 능력을 제한적인 재래식 또는 복합 행동을 보호하는 우산으로 활용할 수 있다. 이 경우 재래식 또는 회색지대 도발의 문턱이 크게 낮아질 수 있다. 북한 정권은 재앙적인 핵 확전 위협을 이용해 한미동맹의 재래식 대응을 마비시키거나 범위를 제한하면서 국지적 침투, 해상경계 침범, 사이버작전을 수행할 수 있다고 계산할 수 있다.

마지막으로, 남북관계에 대한 평양의 재정의와 별개의 주권적 국경에 대한 주장은 기존 안보구조에 모호성을 더한다. 북한은 오랫동안 북방한계선의 정당성에 도전해 왔으며, 새롭게 규정한 국경은 북한이 주장하는 주권 관할구역 안에서 더 빈번하거나 더 공세적인 도발을 감행하는 근거로 활용될 수 있다. 이는 특히 서북도서 주변의 불안정한 수역에서 오판과 회색지대 침투의 위험을 높인다.

한국의 전략적 대응책

과거 다른 핵 경쟁국들 사이에서 형성된 대칭적 억제와 달리, 한국은 엄격한 비핵정책을 유지하며 워싱턴의 확장억제 공약에 의존하고 있다. 그러나 남북한 사이의 심각하고 확대되는 핵 비대칭은 한국 내 깊은 안보불안의 원인이 되고 있다. 위협을 완화하고 전략적 안정을 강화하기 위해 서울과 한미동맹은 다층적인 다섯 가지 전략적 대응책을 추진해야 한다.

1. 핵 비대칭의 시정과 한미 통합억제의 재설계

동맹 내부에는 미묘하지만 중대한 인식 차이가 존재한다. 워싱턴은 당연히 전략 ICBM으로부터 미국 본토를 방어하는 데 우선순위를 두는 반면, 서울은 한반도에서 당면한 전술핵 위협에 대한 대응이 의도치 않게 후순위로 밀릴 수 있다는 우려를 점점 더 크게 느끼고 있다.

핵협의그룹(NCG)을 통해 발표된 선언적 경고, 특히 북한의 어떠한 핵 공격도 김정은 정권의 종말로 이어질 것이라는 경고는 여전히 정치적으로 중요하다. 그러나 미국 본토에 기반한 전략자산을 전개하는 데 필연적으로 필요한 시간적 지연은 북한이 고속·기동형 극초음속 운반체계를 사용할 가능성에 중대한 취약점을 남긴다. 따라서 최우선 과제는 이 구조적 비대칭을 시정하는 것이어야 한다.

이를 위해서는 한국 주변 해역에 미국 탄도미사일잠수함(SSBN)을 순환 방식으로 사실상 상시 배치하거나, 미국 전술핵무기를 한반도에 재배치하기 위한 명확한 절차를 수립하는 등 강력한 작전 대안을 검토해야 한다. 베이징을 자극하거나 비핵화 서사를 훼손할 수 있다는 전통적인 반론은 북한의 헌법 개정과 비핵화 거부를 고려할 때 더 이상 분석적으로 타당하지 않다. 작전비용을 상쇄하기 위해 서울은 국방예산을 국내총생산(GDP)의 3.5%까지 늘리겠다고 선제적으로 제안해야 한다. 또한 한국은 독자적 핵 능력을 지지하는 국내 여론의 증가를 정교한 외교적 지렛대로 활용해, 비확산 공약을 고정하고 다른 전략적 선택지에 대한 국내 압력을 완화하기 위해 물리적이고 가시성이 높은 미국 핵전력의 존재가 필요하다는 점을 워싱턴에 보여줘야 한다.[6]

2. 전시작전통제권 전환과 연계된 NATO식 핵 공유체제 구축

정치적 선언을 넘어 확장억제를 제도화하기 위해 한미동맹은 공식적인 한미 핵공유위원회를 설치해야 한다. NATO 모델의 핵심 협의 및 작전 원칙을 적용해, 미국이 통제하는 전술핵무기를 엄격한 “이중열쇠”식 조율 및 인증체계 아래 한국의 이중임무수행항공기(DCA)와 개념적으로 통합해야 한다. 이러한 상설 재래식·핵 통합(CNI) 체계는 원활한 조율을 보장하도록 영구적으로 작전화돼야 한다. 또한 전시작전통제권 전환은 미국 전술핵자산이 배치되고, 공동 핵 교전규칙(ROE)이 확정되며, 핵공유위원회가 완전히 기능한 이후에만 진행되도록 신중하게 순서를 조정해야 한다. 이를 통해 전환 과정에서 어떠한 작전 공백도 발생하지 않도록 해야 한다.

3. 인공지능과 무인기술에 기반한 “4축 체계” 혁신

한국은 기술혁신, 특히 인공지능(AI)과 무인항공체계(UAS)를 전면적으로 수용해 재래식 방어교리를 신속히 개선해야 한다. 이는 기존의 “한국형 3축 체계”를 AI가 주도하는 유기적 “킬 웹”으로 발전시킬 것이다. 저궤도 위성, 첨단 정보자산, 자율 군집드론을 빈틈없이 연결함으로써 군은 기존의 선형 추적체계를 역동적이고 복원력 있는 네트워크로 전환할 수 있다. AI 기반 센서 융합 알고리즘을 활용해 북한의 이동식발사대(TEL)와 같은 고가치 이동표적을 실시간으로 자동 식별하고, 탐지에서 타격까지 걸리는 시간을 사실상 0에 가깝게 줄여야 한다. 또한 한국의 재래식 능력과 미국의 전략 네트워크 사이에 존재해 온 역사적 분리를 해소해 실시간 정보 공유와 미사일방어 상호운용성에 기반한 완전한 통합을 달성해야 한다.

4. 성급한 군비통제 협상 거부와 핵확산금지조약 규범의 집행

갑작스러운 정상회담을 통해 신속하고 조율되지 않은 미북 군비통제 합의를 추진하는 것은 세계 비확산체제를 훼손할 수 있는 심각한 전략적 위험을 의미한다. 워싱턴과 서울은 핵확산금지조약(NPT)에서 탈퇴한 불법 핵보유국을 의도치 않게 합법화하는 양자 군비통제 협상에 참여할 전략적 이익이 없다. 제한적인 북한 핵 동결과 주한미군 감축을 맞바꾸는 어떠한 성급한 거래도 심각한 외교적 실책이 될 것이다. 대신 서울과 워싱턴은 단독 및 다자 제재를 엄격히 유지하고, 평양과 거래하는 기관에 대해 2차 보이콧을 철저히 시행하며, 심화되는 북러 연대가 초래하는 전략적 부담에도 불구하고 중국이 오랫동안 유지해 온 북한 비핵화 공약을 지키도록 정교한 분리 외교를 전개해야 한다.

더 나아가 기존 제재체계를 유지하는 것은 향후 평양과의 협상에서 활용할 수 있는 귀중한 지렛대를 보존한다는 점에서 전략적으로 신중한 선택이다.

5. 책임 있는 핵 관리체계를 위한 간접 규범외교 전개

평양은 1998년 핵실험에서 2005년 미국과의 사실상 핵 협력으로 이동한 인도의 역사적 경로를 점진적인 국제적 인정 획득을 위한 실행 가능한 청사진으로 볼 가능성이 있다. 그러나 국제사회는 공격적이고 수정주의적인 정권이 공세적 선제 핵공격을 일상적으로 위협하는 상황에서 그 정권의 핵보유국 지위를 용인하거나 합법화할 수 없다. 북한이 성숙한 핵강국의 특권을 주장하려 한다면, “책임 있는 핵 관리체계”의 규범적 비용과 행동 기준을 받아들이도록 강요해야 한다.

서울은 평양과 활발한 외교관계를 유지하는 인도, 인도네시아, 베트남 같은 글로벌 사우스 국가들과 유럽의 비확산 전문가 집단을 끌어들여 표적화된 외교공세를 조직해야 한다.[7] 이 연합은 북한이 최소한의 국제 기준을 수용하도록 집단적 압력을 가해야 한다. 여기에는 공식적인 핵 선제불사용(NFU) 정책 선언, 핵분열성물질생산금지조약(FMCT) 가입 의사 표명, 핵폭발시험의 영구 중단, 포괄적핵실험금지조약(CTBT) 비준, 핵공급국그룹(NSG) 지침을 엄격히 준수하며 핵물질·농축시설·무기기술을 제3국이나 비국가행위자에게 이전하는 것을 엄격하고 검증 가능하게 금지하는 조치, 확산방지구상(PSI)에 대한 실질적 참여가 포함된다.

이처럼 엄격한 기준의 준수를 요구하는 것은 북한이 스스로 주장하는 책임 있는 핵강국 지위의 허구성을 효과적으로 드러내고, 국제규범을 강력한 전략적 압박수단으로 전환한다.

결론

북한의 개정 헌법은 한반도 안보환경이 과거의 조율되지 않은 대화 방식으로 단순히 돌아갈 수 없음을 선언하는 암울한 이정표다. 지속 가능한 평화는 더 이상 성급한 관여를 통해 얻을 수 없다. 그 대신 평양의 핵전 수행 의도를 선제적으로 무력화하기 위한 포괄적인 거부적 억제태세를 강화해야 한다.

한국과 미국의 전략적 과제는 강력한 군사 대비태세, 빈틈없는 동맹 결속, 기술적 적응, 정교한 외교적 유연성 사이의 균형을 맞추는 것이다. 한국의 주권을 지키고 장기적인 지역 안정을 보장하려면 통합된 다각적 접근이 필요하다. 즉, 국내 전략 논쟁을 정교한 외교적 지렛대로 전환해 미국 핵자산의 가시적 통합을 보장하고, 신중하게 순서를 조정한 전시작전통제권 전환과 함께 강화되고 작전적인 한미 핵공유위원회를 설계하며, 철통같은 제재연합을 유지하는 동시에 국제 네트워크를 동원해 북한이 국제규범을 따르도록 강제해야 한다. 따라서 헌법 개정은 정책 선택지의 종말이 아니라, 진화하고 불안정한 전략환경에 동맹을 적응시키기 위한 중대한 촉매로 간주해야 한다.

이 글은 원래 한국어로 작성됐다. 최초 번역은 AI 도구를 이용해 이루어졌으며, 이후 정확성과 가독성을 보장하기 위해 단어 하나하나를 검토하고 다듬었다.

[1]
스톡홀름국제평화연구소(SIPRI), 『SIPRI 연감 2026: 군비, 군축 및 국제안보』(옥스퍼드: 옥스퍼드대학교 출판부, 2026), 259~260쪽. 조선중앙통신(KCNA), 「조선로동당 제8기 중앙위원회 제6차 확대전원회의에 관한 보도」, 2023년 1월 1일.

[2]
브루스 W. 베넷, 최강, 코르테스 A. 쿠퍼 3세, 브루스 E. 벡톨 주니어, 고명현, 그레고리 S. 존스, 차두현, 양욱, 『한국의 핵 보장 강화를 위한 선택지』(캘리포니아주 샌타모니카: RAND연구소 및 아산정책연구원, 2023).

[3]
밴 H. 밴 디펜, 「13개 신형 핵·미사일체계 개발을 위한 북한의 5개년 노력 평가」, 38노스, 2026년 1월. 또한 북한 『로동신문』 2022년 10월 10일자와 2023년 3월 20일자 참조.

[4]
미국 국가정보위원회, 『국가정보평가: 2030년까지 북한이 핵무기를 활용할 시나리오』, 2023년 1월. 나는 앞선 연구에서 대부분의 분석이 방어, 억제, 강압에 주로 초점을 맞추던 시기에 북한 핵전략에 공세적 차원이 포함돼 있다고 주장했다. 미국 국가정보평가(NIE)가 중요한 이유는 공세를 독립적인 전략적 축으로 명시적으로 인정한 최초의 미국 공식 정보평가이기 때문이다. 따라서 내가 NIE를 인용하는 이유는 이 개념이 거기서 처음 나왔기 때문이 아니라, 그것이 미국 분석 공동체 내에서 북한의 공세적 핵전략을 처음으로 권위 있게 인정한 사례이기 때문이다.

[5]
전통적으로 핵시대의 역사는 두 개의 핵시대로 나뉘어 왔다. 제1의 핵시대는 핵확산금지조약(NPT)이 인정한 5개 핵보유국 사이의 전략적 경쟁으로 특징지어졌다. 제2의 핵시대는 이스라엘, 인도, 파키스탄, 북한을 비롯한 사실상 핵무장국의 등장과 함께 나타났다. 그러나 북한이 신뢰할 수 있는 핵강국으로 등장하면서 일부 학자들은 이것이 제3의 핵시대의 시작을 의미한다고 주장한다. 이들은 북한이 비교적 약한 국가도 생존 가능한 핵 억제력을 확보하고, 미국을 직접 위협하며, 핵무기를 평화와 정권 생존의 보증수단이라고 선언할 수 있음을 보여줌으로써 세계 핵 질서를 근본적으로 변화시켰다고 주장한다. 앤드루 퍼터, 『제3의 핵시대: 복잡성, 경쟁, 세계질서의 진화』, 옥스퍼드대학교 출판부, 2026.

[6]
한국의 정책 불안과 전략적 대안에 관한 여론조사는 다음 자료에서 분석됐다. 「독자적 핵무장과 한미동맹에 관한 한국 여론」, 아산정책연구원 연례평가. 피터 K. 리, 강충구, 「압박을 감수할 가치가 있는가: 한국의 핵 억제 지지에 대한 조건 기반 분석」, 아산정책연구원 아산 이슈브리프, 2025년 5월.

[7]
스베레 로드가르드, 『핵군축과 비확산: 핵무기 없는 세계를 향하여』(뉴욕: 라우틀리지 글로벌 안보연구, 2013), 95~114쪽. 

North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine: Implications and Strategic Countermeasures for the US-ROK Alliance - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine: Implications and Strategic Countermeasures for the US-ROK Alliance - 38 North: Informed Analys

North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine: Implications and Strategic Countermeasures for the US-ROK Alliance

• By: Yong-sup Han
• July 23, 2026
• Foreign Affairs, WMD

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(Source: Korean Central News Agency)

Revisions made to North Korea’s constitution formally codify its self-proclaimed “responsible nuclear weapons state” status within the country’s supreme law. By embedding the development of nuclear forces within its constitutional framework and codifying command-and-control protocols, Pyongyang appears to be signaling an absolute, long-term commitment to maintaining and modernizing its nuclear capabilities, effectively closing the door on traditional denuclearization frameworks. Rather than treating these changes as purely symbolic, policymakers in Seoul and Washington must critically eval‎uate how it influences North Korea’s strategic behavior, military planning, and diplomatic posture. To preserve stability and safeguard national sovereignty in this dangerous new era, South Korea and the ROK-US alliance must fundamentally overhaul their defensive architecture through integrated nuclear sharing, technical innovation, and multi-layered diplomacy.

North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine

Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuit has fundamentally transitioned beyond its original role as a defense-oriented mechanism for regime-survival into an offensive capability designed for theater coercion and warfighting. Following decades of covert development, North Korea has formalized its nuclear status and program development into its constitution, establishing the internal political justification and mandate for constantly enhancing its nuclear deterrent.

As of July 2026, North Korea is estimated to possess approximately 60–100 nuclear weapons and continues to expand its production of weapon-grade fissile materials, consistent with Kim Jong Un’s declared policy of exponentially increasing the country’s nuclear arsenal.[1] Current open-source assessments indicate that North Korea has the capacity to produce sufficient highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for approximately 7–18 additional nuclear weapons annually, depending on weapon design and fissile-material allocation. If current production trends continue, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could grow substantially through 2035.[2] North Korea has also spent the early 2020s aggressively diversifying its delivery systems through the rapid development of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and advanced cruise missiles optimized for tactical battlefield deployment.

Furthermore, the regime has normalized highly realistic, simulated tactical nuclear strike exercises directed against major military targets, airbases, ports, and command nodes across South Korea.[3] These activities indicate a sophisticated operational emphasis on integrating nuclear forces into broader, real-time military operations, demonstrating advanced proficiency in nuclear command and control (C2), order authentication, and wartime material handling.

Essentially, North Korea appears to be pursuing a sophisticated “Four-Pillar Nuclear Strategy.”[4] Under this framework, long-range strategic nuclear forces and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are targeted at the United States to enforce a potent “decoupling effect”—thereby complicating and delaying Washington’s intervention decisions during a Peninsula contingency—while tactical systems are simultaneously leveraged to strengthen North Korea’s theater-level coercion and coercive leverage during a regional crisis.

This offensive posturing heralds a dangerous “Third Nuclear Age,” characterized by an unprecedented blurring of the nuclear threshold.[5] This behavior is further emboldened by the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which functions as a de facto military alliance, alongside Beijing’s strategic calculus, which views Pyongyang’s arsenal as a useful geopolitical counterweight to US regional influence, thereby formalizing a rigid New Cold War paradigm in Northeast Asia.

Strategic Implications of North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine

North Korea’s laws and constitutional revisions about its nuclear program since 2022 carry profound strategic implications that alter regional security dynamics across several key dimensions.

First, the totality of laws reinforces North Korea’s rejection of denuclearization. By linking nuclear development directly to the country’s identity and legitimacy and making the advancement of nuclear forces a constitutional mandate, Pyongyang has effectively reduced the probability of voluntary nuclear concessions (low-hanging fruit) or traditional near-term denuclearization to zero.

Second, these measures significantly lower the perceived nuclear threshold. North Korea’s 2022 nuclear forces law outlines a doctrine that allows for potential preemptive and automatic nuclear use. Combined with Pyongyang’s increasingly hostile rhetoric and its designation of South Korea as a belligerent state under the “two-state” narrative, these changes have effectively removed ideological and nationalist constraints on nuclear use against fellow Koreans. They also reinforce the perception that tactical nuclear capabilities are being integrated into immediate operational doctrine, lowering the barrier for nuclear signaling and possible first-use scenarios.

Third, this low threshold for potential nuclear use creates a “nuclear backing effect” or “escalatory shield.” Reminiscent of Russia’s coercive nuclear signaling in Ukraine, Pyongyang may use its advanced nuclear capability as an umbrella to shield limited conventional or hybrid actions. In this case, the threshold for conventional or gray-zone provocations may drop significantly; the regime may calculate that it can execute localized incursions, maritime border violations, or cyber operations while using the threat of catastrophic nuclear escalation to paralyze or limit the scope of an allied ROK-US conventional response.

Finally, Pyongyang’s redefinition of inter-Korean relations and its assertion of separate sovereign borders introduce ambiguities into the existing security architecture. North Korea has long challenged the legitimacy of the Northern Limit Line and its newly defined borders could serve as a basis for more frequent or more assertive provocations within its claimed sovereign jurisdiction. This increases the risk of miscalculations and gray-zone incursions, particularly in the volatile waters surrounding the Northwest Islands.

South Korea’s Strategic Countermeasures

Unlike the symmetric deterrence established historically between other nuclear rivals, South Korea maintains a strict non-nuclear policy, relying on Washington’s extended deterrence commitments. However, the severe and growing nuclear asymmetry between the two Koreas is a source of deep security anxiety in the South. To mitigate the threat and reinforce strategic stability, Seoul and the alliance should pursue five multi-layered strategic countermeasures.

1. Correcting the Nuclear Asymmetry and Redesigning ROK-US Integrated Deterrence

A subtle yet critical perception gap exists within the alliance: while Washington naturally prioritizes defending the US homeland against strategic ICBMs, Seoul increasingly fears that countering immediate tactical nuclear threats on the Peninsula may be inadvertently deprioritized.

Declaratory warnings issued through the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)—most notably that any North Korean nuclear attack would result in the end of the Kim regime—remain politically significant. However, the inherent time-lag required to deploy US-based strategic assets leaves a critical vulnerability against North Korea’s potential use of fast, maneuverable hypersonic delivery systems. The highest priority must therefore be correcting this structural asymmetry.

This requires eval‎uating robust operational options, such as the rotational, near-permanent presence of US ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in or around Korean waters, or establishing clear protocols for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Peninsula. Traditional objections—such as provoking Beijing or undermining denuclearization narratives—are no longer analytically valid given North Korea’s constitutional revisions and rejection of denuclearization. To offset operational costs, Seoul should proactively offer to raise its defense budget to 3.5% of GDP. Furthermore, South Korea should leverage its growing domestic sentiment favoring an independent nuclear capability as a sophisticated diplomatic lever, demonstrating to Washington that a physical, highly visible US nuclear presence is required to anchor nonproliferation commitments and temper domestic pressure for alternative strategic options.[6]

2. Establishing a NATO-Style Nuclear-Sharing System Linked to OPCON Transition

To institutionalize extended deterrence beyond political declarations, the alliance should establish a formalized ROK-US Nuclear Sharing Committee. Adapting the core consultative and operational principles of the NATO model, US-controlled tactical nuclear weapons would be conceptually integrated with South Korean dual-dapable Aircraft (DCA) under a strict “dual-key” coordination and authentication system. This standing conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) framework must be permanently operationalized to ensure seamless coordination. Furthermore, the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) should be deliberately sequenced to proceed only after US tactical nuclear assets are positioned, joint nuclear rules of engagement (ROE) are finalized, and the nuclear sharing committee is fully functional, ensuring no operational gaps occur during the transition.

3. Innovating a “4-Axis System” Based on AI and Unmanned Technology

South Korea must rapidly upgrade its conventional defense doctrine by fully embracing technological innovation, specifically Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). This would upgrade the existing “Korean 3-Axis System,” into an AI-driven, organic “kill web.” By seamlessly linking low-earth orbit satellites, advanced intelligence assets, and autonomous swarm drones, the military can transform traditional linear tracking into a dynamic, resilient network. AI-enabled sensor fusion algorithms must be utilized to enable real-time, automatic target recognition of high-value mobile targets, such as North Korean transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), thereby reducing sensor-to-shooter latency to near-zero. Additionally, the historical segregation between ROK conventional capabilities and US strategic networks must be bridged to achieve complete integration based on real-time data sharing and missile defense interoperability.

4. Rejecting Premature Arms Control Talks and Enforcing NPT Norms

Advocating for a rapid, uncoordinated US-DPRK arms control settlement via a sudden summit represents a severe strategic risk that threatens to undermine the global nonproliferation architecture. Washington and Seoul have no strategic interest in engaging in bilateral arms control negotiations that inadvertently legitimize an illegal nuclear state that defected from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any premature bargain trading a limited North Korean nuclear freeze for a drawdown of US Forces Korea (USFK) would be a severe diplomatic blunder. Instead, Seoul and Washington must strictly maintain unilateral and multilateral sanctions, rigorously execute secondary boycotts against entities trading with Pyongyang, and deploy sophisticated decoupling diplomacy to ensure that China maintains its longstanding commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization despite the growing strategic burden posed by the deepening Moscow-Pyongyang axis.

Moreover, preserving the existing sanctions architecture is strategically prudent, as it retains valuable leverage that can be employed in future negotiations with Pyongyang.

5. Deploying Indirect Normative Diplomacy for Responsible Nuclear Stewardship

Pyongyang likely views India’s historical trajectory—moving from its 1998 nuclear tests to de facto nuclear cooperation with the United States by 2005—as a viable blueprint for achieving gradual international recognition. However, the international community cannot tolerate or legitimize nuclear-state status for an aggressive, revisionist regime that routinely threatens offensive, first-use strikes. If North Korea wishes to claim the privileges of a mature nuclear power, it must be forced to face the normative costs and behavioral metrics of ‘Responsible Nuclear Stewardship.’

Seoul should orchestrate a targeted diplomatic offensive by enlisting Global South nations that maintain active diplomatic ties with Pyongyang (such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) alongside European nonproliferation expert groups.[7] This coalition should mount collective pressure on North Korea to accept minimum global standards, including: an official declaration of a no first se (NFU) policy; an announcement of intent to join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), implement a permanent halt to explosive testing, and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); a strict, verifiable prohibition on transferring nuclear material, enrichment facilities, and weapon technology to third countries or non-state actors in strict adherence with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines; and a practical commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Demanding adherence to these rigorous metrics effectively exposes the fiction of North Korea’s self-proclaimed status as a responsible nuclear power, turning international norms into a powerful instrument of strategic pressure.

Conclusion

North Korea’s revised constitution stands as a grim milestone, declaring that the security environment on the Korean Peninsula cannot simply revert to past, uncoordinated dialogue paradigms. Sustainable peace can no longer be bought with premature engagement; instead, it requires strengthening a comprehensive deterrence-by-denial posture to preemptively thwart Pyongyang’s nuclear warfighting intentions.

For South Korea and the United States, the strategic challenge is to balance robust military readiness, seamless alliance cohesion, technological adaptation, and sophisticated diplomatic flexibility. Safeguarding ROK sovereignty and ensuring long-term regional stability depends on an integrated, multi-pronged approach: transforming domestic strategic debates into sophisticated diplomatic leverage to ensure US nuclear assets are visibly integrated; designing an enhanced, operational ROK-US Nuclear Sharing Committee in tandem with a carefully sequenced OPCON transition; and maintaining an ironclad sanctions coalition while mobilizing global networks to compel North Korea to submit to international norms. The constitutional revisions should therefore be viewed not as the end of policy options, but as a critical catalyst for adapting the alliance to an evolving and volatile strategic landscape.

This article was originally drafted in Korean. The initial translation was produced using AI tools and subsequently reviewed word-for-word and refined to ensure accuracy and readability.

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1. [1]

   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2026: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026). pp. 259-260. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Report on the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. January 1, 2023.

2. [2]

   Bruce W. Bennett, Kang Choi, Cortez A Cooper III, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Myong-Hyun Go, Gregory S. Jones, Du-Hyeon Cha, Uk Yang, Options for Strengthening ROK Nuclear Assurance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation and The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, 2023). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2612-1.html.

3. [3]

   Van Diepen, Vann H., “Assessing North Korea’s Five-Year Effort to Develop 13 New Nuclear and Missile Systems,” 38 North, January 2026. https://www.38north.org/2026/01/assessing-north-koreas-five-year-effort-to-develop-13-new-nuclear-and-missile-systems/. See also the October 10, 2022, the March 20, 2023, issue of Rodong Sinmun of North Korea.

4. [4]

   US Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030, January. 2023. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-NIE-North-Korea-Scenarios-For-Leveraging-Nuclear-Weapons-June2023.pdf. In my earlier work, I argued that North Korea’s nuclear strategy includes an offensive dimension, at a time when most analyses focused primarily on defense, deterrence, and coercion. The US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is significant because it is the first official US intelligence assessment to explicitly recognize offense as a distinct strategic pillar. I therefore cite the NIE not because it originated this concept, but because it represents the first authoritative acknowledgment of North Korea’s offensive nuclear strategy within the US analytical community.

5. [5]

   Traditionally, the history of the nuclear era has been divided into two nuclear ages. The First Nuclear Age was characterized by strategic competition among the five recognized nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Second Nuclear Age emerged with the appearance of de facto nuclear-armed states, notably Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. However, North Korea’s emergence as a credible nuclear power has led some scholars to suggest that it represents the beginning of a Third Nuclear Age. They argue that North Korea has fundamentally altered the global nuclear landscape by demonstrating that a relatively weak state can acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent, directly threaten the United States, and proclaim nuclear weapons as the guarantor of peace and regime survival. Andrew Futter, The Third Nuclear Age: Complexity, Contestation, and the Evolution of Global Order. Oxford University Press, 2026.

6. [6]

   Polls tracking ROK policy anxiety and strategic alternatives are analyzed in: “South Korean Public Opinion on Autonomous Nuclear Armament and the ROK-US Alliance,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Annual Review.  Lee, Peter K. and Kang, Chungku, “Worth the Squeeze: A Conditions-based Analysis of South Korean Public Support for Nuclear Deterrence,” Asan Issue Brief, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, May 2025, https://asaninst.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=s1_1_eng&wr_id=236.

7. [7]

   Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, (New York: Routledge Global Security Studies, 2013). pp. 95-114.

[백선호]

서로 핵무기로 얻어맞고도 계속 싸우는 1950년대의 broken-backed war를 진지하게 생각해야 하는 것일까요???

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/536

[위종민]

일방적으로 두들겨 맞고 핵보복은 못하는 경우가 최악이겠네요