최현함 취역이 보여주는 북한의 해양전략 변화

[위종민]

최현함 등 대형함 취역을, 북한이 적대적 2국가 선포에 따른 NLL 무력화 주장을 뒷받침하기 위해 해군의 역할을 강화하기 위한 시도라고 분석하는 38NORTH의 글입니다. 직접적인 도발보다는 대형 수상함을 정기적으로 활동시키면서 자신들의 주장을 백업하는데 쓸 거라고 보네요. 

김정은이 향후 북한해군은 대양에서 활동해야 한다고 떠들긴 했다던데, 그럴 수 있는지, 그럴 이유가 있는지는 사실 잘 모르겠네요.  

구축함 그 이상: 최현함이 보여주는 북한의 해양전략

김보미
2026년 7월 30일
군사

(출처: 조선중앙통신)

조선민주주의인민공화국(DPRK 또는 북한)은 6월 23일 남포에서 신형 다목적 구축함 최현함을 공식 취역시키고 이 함정을 서해함대에 배속했다. 북한 매체에 따르면 이 구축함은 현역 배치에 앞서 약 14개월간 운용평가와 해상시험을 마쳤으며, 앞으로 서해 방어 및 전시 억제와 관련된 임무를 수행할 예정이다.

해군력 증강과 현대화는 김정은 집권 초기부터 그의 의제에 포함돼 있었지만, 공개 행보를 기준으로 보면 2023년 중반 이후 우선순위가 더욱 높아진 것으로 보인다. 김정은은 최현함 취역식에서 조선인민군 내 해군의 상대적 취약성을 인정했으며, 2023년 12월 열린 조선로동당 제8기 중앙위원회 제9차 전원회의에서는 해군 함정 건조를 국가적 전략 우선과제로 규정하면서 “군함건조공업의 제2차 혁명”을 촉구했다. 김정은은 2026년 2월 열린 제9차 당대회에서도 이러한 우선순위를 재확인하며 해군 현대화를 국가의 5개년 국방발전계획의 핵심 요소로 다시 강조했고, 6월의 당 전원회의와 최현함 취역식에서는 모두 새로운 해군기지 건설을 지시했다.

이러한 더 넓은 맥락에서 볼 때, 신형 구축함과 현대적 해군시설의 건설은 노후 전력을 대체하려는 노력 이상의 의미를 지닌다. 이는 북한 군사전략에서 해군의 역할을 강화하려는 보다 광범위한 시도를 반영한다. 최현함의 배치는 또한 북한 해군이 주로 연안방어에 초점을 맞춘 전력에서 전략적 억제, 확대된 작전 범위, 한반도 너머의 보다 광범위한 군사목표를 지원하도록 설계된 전력으로 전환하는 가운데 북한의 해양전략이 어떻게 진화하고 있는지를 평가할 기회를 제공한다.

최현함

2025년 4월 진수식에서 김정은은 최현함이 방공, 대함, 대잠, 탄도미사일 방어, 지상공격 임무를 지원하는 미사일 체계를 갖춘 다목적 전투 플랫폼이라고 주장했다. 최현함 취역식에서 김정은은 이 구축함을 국가의 전반적인 경제력의 구현이자 국방과학기술, 무기 개발 및 생산능력의 집약체라고 묘사했다.

당초 진수 당시 많은 관측자들은 이 함정이 평양이 주장한 작전능력을 실제로 발휘할 수 있을지에 의문을 제기했다. 그러나 공식 취역은 북한의 수상함대 현대화가 수사적 선언을 넘어 실제 이행 단계로 진입했음을 시사한다.

약 5,000톤의 배수량을 지닌 최현급 선도함 최현함은 북한이 지금까지 건조한 수상전투함 가운데 단연 가장 크다.[1] 대한민국 해군의 11,000톤급 세종대왕급 구축함의 약 절반, 미 해군의 9,000~10,000톤급 알레이버크급 구축함보다 현저히 작지만, 그럼에도 북한 수상함대의 규모가 극적으로 확대됐음을 나타낸다. 이 함정은 전통적으로 조선인민군 해군의 주축을 이뤄온 호위함, 초계함, 미사일 고속정보다 상당히 크며, 기존의 연안방어 역할을 넘어 작전할 수 있는 대형 다목적 수상전투함을 배치하려는 평양의 노력을 반영한다.

김정은은 또한 단 한 척을 넘어 생산을 확대하겠다는 계획을 발표하면서 연간 5,000톤급 구축함 2척을 건조하고, 동시에 더 큰 10,000톤급 전략순양함을 개발하라고 지시했다.

이러한 발전을 종합하면, 북한의 해군 현대화에 대한 평가는 북방한계선(NLL)에만 초점을 맞춘 협소한 관점에서 벗어나야 한다. 더 중요한 질문은 최현함이 해양관할권, 해군 현대화, 통합된 재래식·핵 억제, 장기적인 작전 범위 확대 추구를 포괄하는 평양의 진화하는 해양전략에 어떻게 부합하는가이다.

북한의 “적대적 두 국가” 교리의 해양적 차원

최현함이 서해에 배치된 한 가지 개연성 있는 설명은 북한의 “적대적 두 국가” 교리를 해상에서 실행하는 데 활용하기 위한 것이라는 점이다.[2] 북한은 평화통일 목표를 공식적으로 포기한 이후 남북관계를 두 개의 별도 주권국가 간 관계로 재정의하려는 움직임을 점차 강화해 왔다. 이러한 논리를 해양영역에 적용하려면 평양은 분쟁해역에 대한 작전통제를 강화하고 보다 유능한 해군력의 존재를 통해 북한의 해양 주장을 강화할 필요가 있다.

최근 북한의 수사는 이러한 목표와 부합한다. 육상의 군사분계선(MDL)과 달리 북방한계선은 1953년 정전협정에 명시되지 않았고 남북 간 합의로 설정되지도 않았다. 한국은 북방한계선을 사실상의 해상경계선으로 유지해 왔지만, 북한은 오랫동안 그 정당성을 부정하며 대안적인 해양 주장을 제기해 왔다. 김정은 집권하에서 북방한계선에 대한 비판은 갈수록 노골적으로 변했다. 김정은은 이를 “유령” 선이라고 일축했으며, 2025년 4월 최현함 진수식에서는 “중간분계선 수역”이라는 새로운 표현을 도입했다. 이는 국제해양법과 밀접하게 연관된 언어를 활용해 북한의 해양 주장을 새롭게 구성하려는 시도로 보인다. 이러한 변화는 평양이 기존 해상경계를 부정하는 데 그치지 않고 자체적인 대안 개념체계를 제시하려 한다는 점을 시사한다.

이러한 맥락에서 최현함은 북한이 “적대적 두 국가” 교리를 육상에서 해양영역으로 확대하는 동시에 해양관할권과 수정된 지역 해양질서에 관한 평양의 주장을 강화하도록 지원할 수 있는 전략 플랫폼으로 이해하는 것이 가장 적절할 수 있다. 이러한 시나리오에서 이 함정은 북방한계선 인근에서 보다 빈번한 순찰과 군사작전을 지원하고, 분쟁해역에서 북한의 활동을 점진적으로 정상화할 수 있다. 이러한 작전은 필연적으로 한국이 북방한계선 일대의 감시, 정찰, 작전태세를 강화하도록 만들 것이며, 우발적 군사충돌의 위험을 높이고 서해의 지속적인 긴장을 유지할 것이다.

동시에 이 배치를 오직 북방한계선이라는 관점으로만 해석하는 것은 불완전하다. 북한이 군사적 수단으로 새로운 해상경계를 일방적으로 강요하려는 시도는 상당한 외교적 비용과 국제적 비판을 초래할 것이다. 평양 역시 북방한계선 인근에서 의도적으로 긴장을 고조시키는 것이 미국의 개입을 불러오고 당초 목표를 훨씬 넘어서는 위험을 만들어낼 수 있다는 점을 잘 알고 있는 것으로 보인다.

이 때문에 북한은 직접적인 군사충돌보다는 회색지대 전술에 의존할 가능성이 더 크다. 반복적인 순찰, 수위를 조절한 무력시위, 새로운 해상경계 개념의 점진적 도입을 통해 평양은 대규모 무력충돌의 문턱을 넘지 않으면서도 북방한계선의 정치적·법적 정당성에 도전할 수 있다. 이러한 접근은 북한이 노골적인 긴장 고조에 수반되는 위험을 제한하면서 전략적 환경을 점진적으로 재편하도록 해줄 것이다. 따라서 최현함은 기존 해양 현상유지에 도전할 수 있는 북한의 능력을 강화하려는 더 광범위한 노력의 한 요소로 보아야 한다.

변화하는 서해 환경

최현함의 배치는 서해 자체의 변화하는 전략환경 속에서도 이해해야 한다. 이 지역은 점차 남북 간 대립의 장을 넘어 주변국들이 개입하는 더 광범위한 해양관할권 경쟁의 무대로 발전하고 있다.

중국의 해양활동과 관련된 최근의 변화 역시 서해의 전략환경이 변화하고 있음을 보여준다. 중국 어선 활동의 확대와 보다 가시적인 중국 해경의 존재뿐 아니라, 중국은 한중 잠정조치수역(PMZ) 내에 해양구조물 3개를 설치함으로써 해양상 존재감을 강화하려 했다. 이러한 변화는 서해에서 해양관할권과 해양질서를 둘러싼 경쟁이 점차 두드러지고 있음을 보여준다.

중국의 활동이 최현함 배치 결정에 직접 영향을 미쳤다는 공개된 증거는 없지만, 주변국의 확대되는 해양활동은 평양이 보다 유능한 해군을 추구하는 더 광범위한 지역환경의 일부를 이룬다. 이러한 변화는 북한 해군 현대화의 전략적 중요성을 더욱 높일 수도 있다. 주변국들이 해양활동을 확대함에 따라 평양 역시 자국의 해양 주장을 보호하고 관철할 능력을 강화할 유인을 갖게 된다. 따라서 최현함의 배치는 한국과 관련된 군사적 고려뿐 아니라 변화하는 지역 해양환경에 대한 북한의 보다 광범위한 적응을 반영할 수 있다.

지역 해군 동향은 이러한 추세를 더욱 강화한다. 중국과 러시아는 칭다오 인근에서 실시된 “해상연합-2026” 훈련과 그 전해 블라디보스토크 인근 훈련을 포함해 정기적인 합동해상훈련을 계속해 왔다. 북한의 관점에서 중국과 러시아의 조율된 해군활동은 이제 북한의 서쪽과 동쪽 해상 접근로 모두에서 이루어지고 있다.

이것이 곧 북한이 중국·러시아와 3국 해군작전에 참여할 것임을 의미하는 것은 아니다. 그럼에도 변화하는 지역 안보환경은 보다 유능한 해군을 보유하는 가치를 높이고, 향후 해양안보 협력에서 평양의 전략적 선택지를 점진적으로 확대할 수 있다.

연안방어에서 해양 전력투사로

최현함을 둘러싼 북한의 발언은 평양이 해군 임무를 연안방어와 남북 간 우발사태를 넘어 확대하는 방향으로 점차 구상하고 있음을 보여준다. 따라서 신형 구축함은 북한이 즉각적인 주변해역을 넘어 작전을 수행할 수 있는 전력으로 전환하는 과정에서 등장한 첫 번째 주요 플랫폼이며, 보다 큰 해양 전력투사를 가능하게 한다. 김정은은 취역식에서 해군의 지위, 임무, 작전수역, 기대되는 성과가 달라졌다고 말하며 해군이 주로 연안방어부대로 존재하던 시대는 지나갔다고 덧붙였다. 2025년 10월 최현함을 방문했을 때 김정은은 또한 “우리 해군의 막강한 능력은 광활한 대양에서 발휘되어 적의 도발을 철저히 억제하거나 대응하고 징벌해야 한다”고 말하며 미래 해군력 발전을 원양작전과 명시적으로 연결했다.

북한은 또한 최현급 두 번째 구축함인 강건함의 취역과 더 큰 수상전투함 및 첨단 수중무기체계의 개발을 포함해 해군능력 확대 노력을 계속해 왔다. 경제적·산업적 제약으로 인해 북한이 밝힌 건조계획에도 불구하고 이러한 함대가 단기간 내 실현될 가능성은 낮지만, 이 계획의 중요성은 그것이 보여주는 전략적 방향에 있다. 이러한 계획들을 종합하면 평양이 해군력을 작전적 유연성과 전략적 영향력을 확대하는 수단으로 점차 인식하고 있음을 시사한다.

이 현대화 노력이 계속된다면 동해함대는 북한의 진화하는 해군전략에서 보다 두드러진 역할을 맡을 수 있으며, 이는 서해 작전에 대한 전통적 중점을 대체하기보다는 보완할 것이다. 서해는 남북 간 해양경쟁의 중심으로 남겠지만, 얕은 수심과 지리적 제약, 북방한계선을 둘러싼 지속적인 긴장은 대형 수상전투함의 작전 운용을 제한한다. 반면 동해는 북태평양으로 직접 이어지는 더 깊은 수역을 제공해 대형 군함과 잠수함의 지속적인 작전에 더 많은 기회를 제공한다. 북한이 장기적으로 해양작전 범위를 확대하려 한다면 러시아 극동 해역과의 지리적 근접성 역시 추가적인 전략적 이점을 제공할 수 있다.

앞서 언급한 지역 해군 동향은 북한의 해양전략이 향하는 방향의 중요성을 더욱 강화한다. 평양·베이징·모스크바 간 전면적인 해군협력이 가까운 미래에 이루어질 가능성은 낮지만, 경쟁이 심화되는 지역 해양환경은 유능한 해군 보유의 가치를 높이고 북한에 더 폭넓은 전략적 선택지를 제공한다.

전략적 함의

북한의 해군 현대화는 해양전략의 보다 광범위한 변화를 반영한다. 해군능력이 확대됨에 따라 평양의 전략적 의도는 갈수록 다면적으로 변하고 있다. 따라서 최현함의 서해 배치는 단일한 분석틀로 해석해서는 안 된다. 이 함정은 “적대적 두 국가” 교리하에서 북방한계선의 정치적 정당성에 도전하는 수단으로 기능하는 동시에, 한반도를 훨씬 넘어 작전할 수 있는 해군을 개발하려는 장기전략의 첫 단계 역할을 할 수 있다.

예측 가능한 미래에 북한이 헌법 개정이나 기타 법적 조치를 통해 새로운 해상경계를 공식화할 가능성은 낮다. 대신 북한은 대규모 군사충돌에 수반되는 비용과 위험을 피하면서 현상유지를 약화하기 위해 지속적인 해군순찰, 수위를 조절한 군사시위, 대안적 해상경계 개념의 점진적 확산을 포함한 회색지대 전술에 계속 의존할 가능성이 크다.

그러나 궁극적으로 최현함과 그 후속 구축함들이 어떻게 운용되는지가 북한이 여전히 북방한계선 주변의 회색지대 경쟁에 집중하고 있는지, 아니면 원양작전을 중심으로 한 더 광범위한 해양전략의 기반을 놓고 있는지를 보여줄 것이다.

[1]
이 글에서 최현함은 최현급의 선도함을 가리키며, 최현급은 강건함과 후속 함정들을 포함한 구축함 함급 전체를 의미한다.

[2]
2025년 4월 최현함 진수식에서 김정은은 동해함대 지휘관들에게 해군기를 수여했으며, 이는 이 함정이 서해가 아닌 동해에 배치될 것임을 시사했다. 

More Than a Destroyer: What Choe Hyon Reveals About North Korea's Maritime Strategy - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

More Than a Destroyer: What Choe Hyon Reveals About North Korea's Maritime Strategy - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

More Than a Destroyer: What Choe Hyon Reveals About North Korea’s Maritime Strategy

• By: Bomi Kim
• July 30, 2026
• Military Affairs

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(Source: Korean Central News Agency)

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) officially commissioned its new multipurpose destroyer, the Choe Hyon, at Nampo on June 23 and assigned the vessel to the West Sea (Yellow Sea) Fleet. According to North Korean media, the destroyer completed approximately 14 months of operational eval‎uations and sea trials before entering active service, and it will now undertake missions related to defense of the West Sea and wartime deterrence.

Naval build-up and modernization have been on Kim Jong Un’s agenda since the early days of his rule, but based on his public appearances, appears to have grown in priority since mid-2023. During the Choe Hyon’s commissioning ceremony, he acknowledged the navy’s relative weakness within the Korean People’s Army, and at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee in December 2023, he called for a “second revolution of the warship-building industry,” identifying naval construction as a national strategic priority. Kim reinforced these priorities at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026, where he again emphasized naval modernization as a key component of the country’s five-year defense development plan, and at both the Party plenary meeting and the Choe Hyon commissioning ceremony in June, he called for building new naval bases.

Viewed in this broader context, the construction of new destroyers and modern naval facilities represents more than an effort to replace aging platforms; it reflects a broader attempt to strengthen the navy’s role within North Korea’s military strategy. The destroyer’s deployment also offers an opportunity to assess how the country’s maritime strategy is evolving, as the navy shifts from a force focused primarily on coastal defense toward one intended to support strategic deterrence, greater operational reach, and broader military objectives beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The Choe Hyon

At its launch ceremony in April 2025, Kim Jong Un claimed the Choe Hyon to be a multi-role combat platform equipped with missile systems supporting air-defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, ballistic missile defense, and land-attack missions. At the ship’s commissioning ceremony, Kim described the destroyer as embodying the country’s overall economic strength and as the culmination of its defense science, technology, and weapons development and production capabilities.

Around its original launch, many observers questioned whether the vessel could deliver the operational capabilities Pyongyang claimed it possessed. Its formal commissioning, however, suggests that North Korea’s surface fleet modernization has moved beyond rhetoric into implementation.

Displacing approximately 5,000 tons, the class leader Choe Hyon is by far the largest surface combatant ever constructed by North Korea.[1] At roughly half the displacement of the Republic of Korea Navy’s 11,000-ton Sejong the Great-class destroyers and significantly smaller than the US Navy’s 9,000–10,000-ton Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, it nevertheless represents a dramatic increase in the size of North Korea’s surface fleet. The vessel is substantially larger than the frigates, corvettes, and missile craft that have traditionally formed the backbone of the Korean People’s Navy, reflecting Pyongyang’s effort to field larger multi-mission surface combatants capable of operating beyond its traditional coastal defense role.

Kim Jong Un also announced plans to expand production beyond a single ship, calling for the construction of two 5,000-ton-class destroyers annually while directing the development of an even larger 10,000-ton-class strategic cruiser.

Taken together, these developments suggest that assessments of North Korea’s naval modernization should move beyond a narrow focus on the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The more important question is how the Choe Hyon fits within Pyongyang’s evolving maritime strategy, encompassing maritime jurisdiction, naval modernization, integrated conventional-nuclear deterrence, and the long-term pursuit of greater operational reach.

The Maritime Dimension of North Korea’s “Hostile Two-State” Doctrine

One plausible explanation for the Choe Hyon’s deployment to the West Sea is that it is intended to help implement North Korea’s “hostile two-state” doctrine at sea.[2] Since formally abandoning the goal of peaceful reunification, Pyongyang has increasingly sought to redefine inter-Korean relations as those between two separate sovereign states. Applying this logic to the maritime domain necessitates Pyongyang’s strengthening of its operational control over contested waters and reinforcing North Korea’s maritime claims through a more capable naval presence.

Recent North Korean rhetoric is consistent with such an objective. Unlike the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) on land, the NLL was not stipulated in the 1953 Armistice Agreement or established through an inter-Korean agreement. While South Korea has maintained the NLL as the de facto maritime boundary, North Korea has long rejected its legitimacy and advanced alternative maritime claims. Under Kim Jong Un, criticism of the NLL has become increasingly explicit. Kim has dismissed it as a “ghost” line, and during the launch ceremony of Choe Hyon in April 2025, he introduced the new term “waters of middle demarcation lines,” apparently seeking to recast its maritime claims using language closely associated with international maritime law. This shift suggests that Pyongyang is attempting not only to reject the existing maritime boundary but also to promote its own alternative conceptual framework.

In this context, the Choe Hyon may best be understood as a strategic platform that could support North Korea’s effort to extend its “hostile two-state” doctrine from land into the maritime domain while reinforcing Pyongyang’s claims regarding maritime jurisdiction and a revised regional maritime order. Under this scenario, the ship could support more frequent patrols and military operations near the NLL, gradually normalizing North Korean activities in contested waters. Such operations would inevitably compel South Korea to strengthen its surveillance, reconnaissance, and operational posture around the NLL, increasing the risk of accidental military encounters and sustaining persistent tension in the West Sea.

At the same time, interpreting the deployment solely through the prism of the NLL would be incomplete. Any unilateral attempt by North Korea to impose a new maritime boundary through military means would generate significant diplomatic costs and international criticism. Pyongyang also appears well aware that deliberate escalation near the NLL could invite US involvement and create risks extending well beyond its original objectives.

For this reason, North Korea is more likely to rely on gray-zone tactics than direct military confrontation. Repeated patrols, calibrated demonstrations of force, and the gradual introduction of new maritime boundary concepts allow Pyongyang to challenge the political and legal legitimacy of the NLL without crossing the threshold into large-scale armed conflict. Such an approach would enable North Korea to reshape the strategic environment incrementally while limiting the risks associated with outright escalation. The Choe Hyon should therefore be viewed as one component of a broader effort to strengthen North Korea’s ability to contest the existing maritime status quo.

Changing Environment in the West Sea

The deployment of the Choe Hyon should also be understood within the changing strategic environment of the West Sea itself. The region is increasingly becoming more than an arena of inter-Korean confrontation—it is evolving into a broader theater of maritime jurisdictional competition involving neighboring powers.

Recent developments involving China’s maritime activities also reflect the changing strategic environment in the West Sea. Beyond the expansion of Chinese fishing operations and a more visible China Coast Guard presence, Beijing has sought to strengthen its maritime presence through the installation of three maritime structures within the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). These developments demonstrate that competition over maritime jurisdiction and maritime order in the West Sea is becoming progressively more pronounced.

Although there is no public evidence that Chinese activity directly influenced the deployment decision, the expanding maritime presence of neighboring states forms part of the broader regional environment in which Pyongyang appears to be pursuing a more capable navy. These developments may also increase the strategic relevance of North Korea’s naval modernization. As neighboring states expand their maritime presence, Pyongyang also has incentives to strengthen its ability to protect and assert its own maritime claims. The deployment of the Choe Hyon therefore may reflect not only military considerations involving South Korea but also North Korea’s broader adaptation to a changing regional maritime environment.

Regional naval dynamics further reinforce this trend. China and Russia have continued to conduct regular joint naval exercises, including the “Joint Sea-2026” exercise near Qingdao and the previous year’s drills near Vladivostok. From North Korea’s perspective, coordinated Chinese and Russian naval activities are now taking place on both its western and eastern maritime approaches.

This does not necessarily imply that North Korea will soon participate in trilateral naval operations with China and Russia. Nevertheless, a changing regional security environment increases the value of possessing a more capable navy and may gradually expand Pyongyang’s strategic options for future maritime security cooperation.

From Coastal Defense to Maritime Power Projection

North Korean statements surrounding the Choe Hyon indicate that Pyongyang increasingly envisions naval missions extending beyond coastal defense and inter-Korean contingencies. As such, the new destroyer represents the first major platform in North Korea’s transition toward a force capable of conducting operations beyond its immediate waters, enabling greater maritime power projection. During the commissioning ceremony, Kim Jong Un stated that the navy’s status, missions, operational waters, and expected outcomes had changed, adding that the era in which the navy existed primarily as a coastal defense force had passed. During his visit to the Choe Hyon in October 2025, Kim further stated that “the tremendous ability of our navy should be exercised in the vast ocean to thoroughly deter or counter and punish the enemy’s provocations,” explicitly linking future naval development to blue water operations.

North Korea has also continued efforts to expand its naval capabilities, including the commissioning of the Kang Kon (the second Choe Hyon-class destroyer) and the development of larger surface combatants and advanced underwater weapon systems. Although economic and industrial constraints make the near-term realization of such a fleet unlikely, despite its stated construction plans, the significance of these plans lies in the strategic direction they reveal. Taken together, these initiatives suggest that Pyongyang increasingly views naval power as an instrument for expanding operational flexibility and strategic influence.

If this modernization effort continues, the East Sea Fleet may assume a more prominent role in North Korea’s evolving naval strategy, complementing rather than replacing its traditional emphasis on operations in the West Sea. While the West Sea will remain central to inter-Korean maritime competition, its shallow waters, geographic constraints, and persistent tensions surrounding the NLL limit the operational employment of larger surface combatants. By contrast, the eastern sea provides deeper waters with direct access to the North Pacific, offering greater opportunities for sustained operations by larger warships and submarines. Geographic proximity to Russia’s Far Eastern waters may also offer additional strategic advantages should Pyongyang seek to expand its maritime reach over the longer term.

The aforementioned regional naval dynamics reinforce the significance of where the North Korean maritime strategy is headed. While full-scale naval cooperation among Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow remains unlikely in the near future, a more competitive regional maritime landscape increases the value of possessing a capable navy and provides North Korea with broader strategic options.

Strategic Implications

North Korea’s naval modernization reflects a broader transformation in its maritime strategy. As its naval capabilities expand, Pyongyang’s strategic intentions are becoming increasingly multifaceted. The deployment of the Choe Hyon to the West Sea should therefore not be interpreted through a single analytical lens. It may simultaneously serve as an instrument for challenging the political legitimacy of the NLL under the “hostile two-state” doctrine while also functioning as the first step in a longer-term strategy aimed at developing a navy capable of operating well beyond the Korean Peninsula.

For the foreseeable future, North Korea is unlikely to formalize a new maritime boundary through constitutional revision or other legal measures. Instead, it will probably continue relying on gray-zone tactics—including sustained naval patrols, calibrated military demonstrations, and the gradual promotion of alternative maritime boundary concepts—to weaken the status quo while avoiding the costs and risks associated with large-scale military confrontation.

Ultimately, however, how the Choe Hyon and its successor destroyers are employed will reveal whether North Korea remains focused on gray-zone competition around the NLL or is instead laying the foundations for a broader maritime strategy centered on blue-water operations.

---

1. [1]

   In this article, Choe Hyon refers to the lead ship of the class, whereas Choe Hyon-class refers to the class of destroyers, including Kang Kon and subsequent ships.

2. [2]

   During the Choe Hyon launch ceremony in April 2025, Kim Jong Un presented the naval ensign to the commanders of the East Sea Fleet, which suggested that the vessel would be deployed to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) rather than the West Sea.

[여행자김씨]

북한이 순양함 건조예정 중인데 우리 해군도 순양함 건조 가능성이 있을까요?

[위종민]

저게 1970년대 미-소 순양함 격차 논쟁처럼 북한도 순양함을 만들었는데 우리는 없다! 라는 식으로 정치적으로 소비된다면 더 큰 전투함을 만들 가능성도 없진 않을 것 같습니다. 근데 국민들이 해당 분야에 대한 관심들이 높진 않아서 이런 식으로 여론 조성이 될지 모르겠네요.

[여행자김씨]

북한이 분명 순양함 실물을 공개할텐데 우리도 곧 순양함 건조 이야기가 나오지 않을까 싶긴 하네요

[백선호]

대양으로 나갈 수 있는 위치 관점에서 남북한의 해군을 비교하면 마치 2차대전 이전 그리스와 터키의 해군처럼 보이네요. 우리가 그리스면 더 안쪽에 있는 북한은 터키.

[위종민]

전력차는 비교할 수 없이 우리가 압도적인데, 전시에 북한해군 함정이 대양으로 나갈 방법은... 없겠죠? 미리 나간 뒤에 전쟁이 터진다면 몰라도.

[백선호]

서해의 경우에는 중국 쪽에 바짝 붙어서 나올 수도 있지 않을까요?

[위종민]

갑자기 도버해협 돌파작전이 생각났습니다 ㅋㅋ

최서단 격렬비열도 기준 500km는 되야 중국 연안을 모두 사정거리에 넣을 수 있네요. 장사정 대함미사일이 필요할 수도 있겠습니다.