시간은 이란의 편이다. 그걸 어떻게 뒤집을 것인가?

[위종민]

데이빗 뎁툴라 예비역 미공군 중장의 기고문입니다. 미국도 이란을 상대로 장기전을 수행해야 하고, 이란이 저항을 계속할 수록 손해를 볼 거라고 인식시키며 미국도 이란에 검증가능한 합의가 가능하다는 점을 분명히 보여줘야 한다고 주장하는데, 중간선거 앞두고 대통령이 트럼프인 지금 이런 변화가 가능할런지. 

이란의 가장 강력한 무기는 시간이다—그 시간을 어떻게 이란에 불리하게 돌릴 것인가

데이비드 A. 뎁툴라

기고자.

나는 국방, 전략, 군인이라는 직업, 항공우주 분야에 관해 글을 쓴다.

2026년 8월 3일 오후 2시 29분 EDT
2026년 8월 3일 오후 3시 06분 EDT

요약

미국과 이란의 분쟁은 이란이 ‘시간’을 주된 무기로 활용하는 전략을 취한다는 점이 특징이다. 이란은 공격과 제재를 견뎌내면서, 특히 선거를 앞둔 미국 정치권의 조급함에 기대를 걸고 있다. 이 글은 이란의 공격 능력에 대한 지속적인 군사적 압박과 핵심적인 석유 수입을 차단하는 강력한 경제적 공세를 결합한 ‘장기전’ 접근법을 주장한다. 미국은 자국의 전략을 선거 주기와 분리해야 하며, 이란이 저항을 계속할수록 점점 더 큰 대가를 치르게 만드는 동시에 외교적 통로는 열어두어야 한다. 궁극적으로 성공의 핵심은 미국의 전략적 인내와 결의다.

시간이 무기로 사용되고 있다

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미국이 이란의 공격, 그에 뒤따르는 미국의 공습, 다시 그에 이어지는 단기간의 평화회담이라는 반복적인 순환에 자리 잡아가면서, 모두의 머릿속에 떠오르는 절박한 질문은 이 분쟁을 어떻게 끝낼 것인가 하는 것이다.

일부 분석가들은 핵심적인 문제를 기술적·경제적 문제로 본다. 이란의 드론과 저가 순항미사일은 미국과 그 동맹국이 이를 격퇴하기 위해 사용하는 고급 요격체계보다 훨씬 저렴한 경우가 많다. 따라서 이들은 이처럼 불리한 비용 교환비를 뒤집기 위해 저가 요격체계의 대규모 비축, 자율형 방어체계, 전자전 능력, 지향성 에너지 무기의 확대를 주장한다. 그러나 당장의 문제는 이러한 기술이 필요한가가 아니라, 미국이 앞으로 몇 달 안에 현재 분쟁의 궤도를 바꿀 만큼 충분한 수량을 배치하고 이를 작전적으로 통합할 수 있는가이다.

그러나 더 중요한 문제는 이란의 무기고에서 가장 중요한 무기, 즉 시간을 어떻게 무력화할 것인가이다. 이란 지도부는 자신들이 재래식 군사 대결에서 미국을 이길 수 없다는 사실을 알고 있다. 하지만 그들은 그럴 필요가 없다고 보고 있다. 대신 그들의 목표는 단순히 버텨내는 것이다.

트럼프 대통령이 2026년 11월 중간선거 전에 합의를 이루지 못하도록 하는 것이 전략적 승리가 될 것이라는 계산 아래, 이란 정권의 당면 목표는 앞으로 몇 달 동안 살아남는 동시에 미국에 비용을 부과하고 미국의 외교를 좌절시켜, 행정부가 분쟁을 결정적으로 해결했다는 공을 주장하지 못하도록 하는 것이다.

이러한 맥락에서 미국의 군사행동으로 또 하나의 시설을 파괴하거나 새로운 제재를 부과하는 것은 이란에 누적된 결과를 초래할 수 있지만, 그것만으로는 이란 정권이 노선을 바꾸도록 설득하지 못할 것이다.

문제는 이것이다. 미국은 파괴한 표적, 사용한 무기, 가한 경제적 피해로 진전을 측정한다. 이란은 살아남은 날짜로 진전을 측정한다.

이란의 전략

테헤란과 그 대리세력들은 비교적 저렴한 미사일, 공격용 드론, 기뢰, 소형 보트와 기타 무기를 사용해 미군, 역내 파트너, 상업 해운을 위협한다. 이 무기들 가운데 상당수는 개별적으로 보면 정교하지 않으며, 대부분은 실패하거나 요격된다.

그럼에도 이들은 전략적 효과를 거두고 있다. 미국과 그 동맹국을 비교적 저렴한 무기로 집중 공격하면 미국과 동맹국은 그보다 몇 배나 비싼 요격체계를 사용하도록 강요받는다. 또한 해상 교통을 방해하고, 에너지 시장에 압력을 가하며, 역내 방공망에 부담을 주고, 미국의 지속적인 군사행동을 요구하게 만든다. 이란의 지원을 받는 공격은 상업 해운의 비용과 운송 시간을 증가시키고 있다. 사용된 무기의 규모에 비해 훨씬 큰 경제적 불안과 정치적 압박을 만들어내기 위해서는 공격의 극히 일부만 성공해도 충분하다.

이란은 이란 정권이 절박한 상황에 몰리기 전에 미국이 먼저 포기할 것이며, 요격무기 재고 감소와 경제적 비용 증가, 분쟁 피로감에 대한 대중의 우려가 중간선거가 다가올수록 테헤란보다 워싱턴에 더 큰 조급함을 만들어낼 것이라고 내다보고 있다.

반복되는 휴전, 재개되는 공격, 교착된 협상은 양측이 서로의 버티는 힘을 시험하고 있다는 인식을 강화한다. 그동안 미군은 이란의 미사일, 드론, 감시체계, 해상 표적에 대한 공격을 계속하면서 이란 정권의 행동의 자유를 제약해왔다.

트럼프 행정부는 이란의 도전이 핵 문제를 훨씬 넘어선다는 사실을 인식했다는 점에서 평가받을 만하다. 행정부의 최대 압박 정책은 지속적인 제재 집행, 이슬람혁명수비대 자원의 차단, 이란의 역내 공격행위 무력화를 요구한다. 이제 전략적으로 필요한 것은 이러한 수단들이 테헤란의 계산을 바꿀 만큼 충분히 긴 시간에 걸쳐 적용되도록 하는 것이다.

이란이 엄청난 피해를 감수하려는 듯한 태도는 그 정치체제의 성격과 일치한다. 이란 지도부는 정권을 보존하기 위해 이란 국민에게 심각한 고통을 감수시킬 준비가 되어 있음을 반복해서 보여왔다. 수년간 이란을 약화시키는 피해조차도, 그것을 견디는 것이 미국의 단기적인 정치적 성공을 막아줄 것이라고 지도부가 믿는 한 테헤란에는 여전히 감내할 수 있는 수준일 수 있다.

기술적 만능 해결책은 없다

미국이 저가 대드론 체계, 자율형 요격체계, 고출력 마이크로파 무기, 전자전 능력, 지향성 에너지 체계의 개발과 배치를 가속해 저렴한 드론과 순항미사일에 대응하는 것은 옳다. 그렇게 하면 이러한 무기와의 비용 교환비를 다시 조정할 수 있다. 그리고 고무적인 진전도 나타나고 있다. 미 육군은 수천 기의 메롭스 대드론 요격체계를 신속하게 배치했으며, 미군 각 군종은 레이저, 고출력 마이크로파 체계와 기타 방어 능력의 개발과 배치를 계속하고 있다. 이러한 지향성 에너지 무기는 사용 1회당 비용이 낮고 드론과 미사일을 격퇴할 수 있다는 점을 포함해 잠재적으로 상당한 이점을 제공한다.

지향성 에너지 무기는 방어 능력을 높이고 탄도미사일과 순항미사일 위협에 대비해 고급 요격체계를 보존할 수 있게 해준다. 인공지능은 탐지와 교전 결정을 가속할 수 있다. 무인 수상·수중·공중체계는 감시 범위를 확대하고, 해상 항로를 보호하며, 이란의 작전을 더욱 복잡하게 만들 수 있다.

그러나 이러한 기술 가운데 어느 것도 그 자체로 전략적 해결책은 아니다.

유망한 체계라 해도 충분한 수량으로 생산되어야 하고, 센서 및 지휘 네트워크와 통합되어야 하며, 광대한 전구 전체에 배치되어야 하고, 작전 환경에서 유지되어야 하며, 적응하는 적을 상대로 성능을 입증해야 한다. 성공적인 기술이라 해도 모든 미사일이나 드론을 제거하거나, 모든 시설을 보호하거나, 테헤란을 협상하도록 강제할 수는 없다.

기술은 경쟁의 조건을 개선할 수 있다. 그러나 정치적 목표를 결정하거나 그 목표를 달성하는 데 필요한 인내를 제공할 수는 없다.

미국은 또한 이란의 비대칭전쟁을 신비롭거나 혁명적인 것으로 취급해서는 안 된다. 이란의 접근법이 효과를 발휘하는 것은 그 무기들이 혁신적이기 때문이 아니라, 미국의 정치적 조급함과 방어 비용, 확전에 대한 우려를 이용하도록 설계된 일관된 전략의 일부로 운용되기 때문이다.

따라서 적절한 대응은 단순히 더 나은 요격체계를 마련하는 것이 아니라, 시간이 테헤란에 불리하게 작용하도록 만드는 전략이다.

파괴는 지렛대와 같은 것이 아니다

미국의 공군력은 이란의 군사조직에 치명적인 피해를 줄 수 있지만, 그것만으로는 전략이 되지 않는다. 생산적인 결과를 내려면 군사적 효과가 명확히 규정된 정치적 목적과 연결되어야 한다.

이란이 미국의 정치적 환경이 변할 때까지만 버티면 된다고 믿는다면, 보복 공격만으로는 이란이 기다리며 버텨낼 수 있다. 효과를 거두려면 미국은 테헤란에 기다릴수록 자신들의 상황이 나아지는 것이 아니라 점점 더 악화될 것이라는 확신을 심어줘야 한다.

그러기 위해서는 이란 정권의 공격 능력과 이를 재생산하는 능력에 대한 지속적인 군사적 압박이 필요하다. 미국은 이란의 미사일·드론·해상작전을 지원하는 생산, 저장, 지휘통제, 발사 체계를 계속 공격해야 한다. 이러한 군사 능력을 직접적이고 효과적으로 지원하는 전력 기반시설은 구별 원칙, 비례성 원칙, 실행 가능한 예방조치에 따라 표적화될 경우 합법적인 군사목표에 해당하며, 무력충돌법에 부합하면서도 이를 무력화할 수 있는 매우 효과적인 수단을 제공한다. 해상 제한조치는 지속적이고 일관되게 집행되어야 하며, 명확하게 규정된 인도주의적 예외와 위반에 따른 결과가 마련되어야 한다.

무엇보다도 군사적 압박은 정권과 그 군사력 재건에 자금을 제공하는 수입원을 겨냥한 지속적인 경제 공세와 통합되어야 한다.

이란의 석유 교역은 여전히 이란 경제의 핵심 생명선이다. 테헤란은 수출품의 출발지와 목적지를 위장하기 위해 위장회사, 금융 중개업체, 외국 정유시설, 선박 간 환적, 그림자 선단에 의존하고 있다.

미 재무부와 국무부는 이미 이러한 네트워크를 상대로 상당한 조치를 취했다. 최근 재무부의 조치는 이란의 석유 판매, 미사일 생산, 무인항공기 프로그램을 지원하는 선박, 기업, 금융 중개업체, 조달 네트워크를 겨냥하고 있다. 이러한 조치들은 경제적 압박을 군사적·외교적 목표와 직접 연결하는 캠페인의 강력한 토대를 제공한다.

워싱턴은 이란의 수입을 가능하게 하는 은행, 보험사, 항만 운영업체, 중개업체, 정유업체, 해운 네트워크를 계속해서 체계적으로 억제해야 한다. 이렇게 하면 외국 기업과 정부는 선택을 강요받는다. 미국 금융시스템에 접근할 것인지, 아니면 이란의 제재 회피 경제를 지원할 것인지 선택해야 한다. 둘 다 할 수는 없다는 점을 분명히 해야 한다.

발표보다 중요한 것은 집행이다. 제재 대상 유조선이 계속해서 석유를 운송한다면, 그것은 아직 활용되지 않은 압박 수단이 있다는 뜻이다. 제재 지정과 실제 집행 사이의 격차를 좁히는 것은 압박과 전략적 효과를 극대화하는 데 필수적이다.

장기전이 지속 가능한 승리로 가는 길이다

트럼프 대통령은 오랫동안 속도, 시한, 측정 가능한 결과를 강조해왔다. 이러한 접근법은 유용한 긴박감을 조성하고 관료조직의 표류를 방지할 수 있다. 그러나 이란은 좁은 정치적 시간 안에 합의가 이루어져야 한다고 주장함으로써, 신속한 결과를 선호하는 이러한 성향을 자신들에게 유리하게 이용하려 하고 있다.

행정부는 이에 저항하고, 중간선거 일정과 이란과의 협상을 분리해야 한다.

100일이라는 기준은 유용한 관리 및 대외소통의 이정표가 될 수 있지만, 수십 년 동안 제재를 견디고 국내 반대세력을 억압하며 대리세력과 비대칭 수단을 통해 전쟁을 수행해온 혁명 정권으로 하여금 기존 노선을 포기하도록 강제하기에는 충분하지 않다.

트럼프 대통령이 지속 가능한 승리를 확보하려면 미국은 장기전을 수행할 준비가 되어 있어야 한다. 이것이 끝없는 전쟁을 받아들인다는 뜻은 아니다. 이란이 선택할 수 있는 방안은 지속적으로 줄어드는 반면 미국의 선택지는 유지되는 조건을 구축한다는 뜻이다.

행정부는 경제적·군사적 압박이 중간선거 이후에도 계속될 것임을 분명히 함으로써 자신의 입장을 강화할 수 있다. 긴급 조치로 요격체계와 대드론 체계 생산을 확대하고, 역내 비축량을 늘리며, 파트너 국가들의 방어력을 강화하고, 비용 교환비를 미국에 유리한 방향으로 전환해야 한다. 이란이 공격용 무기를 제조하고 운용할 수 있는 능력을 계속 약화시키는 동시에 정권의 석유, 해운, 금융 네트워크에 대한 제재 집행을 강화해야 한다.

목표는 파괴 그 자체여서는 안 되며, 상당한 경제적 완화를 일시적이거나 검증할 수 없는 약속과 맞바꾸는 합의여서도 안 된다.

목표는 이란의 전략적 계산을 바꾸는 것이어야 한다.

이란은 저항을 한 달 더 지속할 때마다 비용이 점점 더 커져 수입이 감소하고, 군사적 선택지가 줄어들며, 고립이 심화되고, 군사 능력이 약화되며, 협상 입지가 불리해질 것이라고 믿게 되어야 한다. 동시에 미국은 이란이 위기를 만들어낸 행동을 포기한다면 검증 가능한 합의가 여전히 가능하다는 점을 분명히 해야 한다.

이러한 결합, 즉 끊임없는 압박과 신뢰할 수 있는 외교적 해결책은 행정부의 목표를 달성할 수 있는 가장 좋은 가능성을 제공한다.

결정적인 문제는 미 국방부가 아직 공개하지 않은 비밀스러운 기술적 돌파구를 갖고 있는가가 아니다. 미국이 이란이 단순히 미국보다 오래 버티는 방식으로 승리하지 못하도록 할 만큼의 전략적 인내, 경제적 규율, 정치적 결의를 갖고 있는가이다.

워싱턴이 그러한 결의를 보여준다면, 시간은 더 이상 이란의 가장 강력한 무기가 아니라 미국의 무기가 될 것이다.

Iran’s Most Powerful Weapon Is Time—Here’s How To Turn It Against Them

Iran’s Most Powerful Weapon Is Time—Here’s How To Turn It Against Them

Iran’s Most Powerful Weapon Is Time—Here’s How To Turn It Against Them

ByDavid A. Deptula,

Contributor.

 I write on defense, strategy, the profession of arms, and aerospace.

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Aug 03, 2026, 02:29pm EDTAug 03, 2026, 03:06pm EDT

1

Summary

The US-Iran conflict is characterized by Iran's strategy of leveraging "time" as its primary weapon, enduring attacks and sanctions while banking on American political impatience, particularly before elections. The article advocates for a "long game" approach: sustained military pressure against Iran's offensive capabilities, coupled with a robust economic campaign halting its vital oil revenues. The US must detach its strategy from election cycles, ensuring Iran faces escalating costs for continued resistance, while maintaining diplomatic avenues. Ultimately, US strategic patience and resolve are crucial for success.

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Time is being used as a weapon

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As the United States settles into a recurring cycle of Iranian attacks followed by American airstrikes followed by short-lived peace talks, the burning question on everyone’s minds is how to bring the conflict to an end.

Some analysts see the central challenge as technological and economic: Iran’s drones and inexpensive cruise missiles often cost far less than the high-end interceptors the United States and its allies use to defeat them. They therefore advocate larger inventories of low-cost interceptors, autonomous defensive systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and directed-energy weapons to reverse that unfavorable cost exchange. The immediate question, however, is not whether these technologies are needed, but whether the United States can field them in sufficient numbers—and integrate them operationally—within the coming months to alter the current conflict’s trajectory.

The more significant question, however, is how to defeat the most important weapon in Iran’s arsenal: time. Iran’s leaders know they cannot defeat the United States in a conventional military contest. But they are betting they don’t need to. Instead, their objective is to simply endure.

Betting that denying President Trump an agreement before the November 2026 midterm elections would constitute a strategic victory, the regime’s immediate objective is to survive the next several months, while imposing costs and frustrating American diplomacy in order to prevent the administration from claiming credit for resolving the conflict conclusively.

In that context, U.S. military action destroying another facility or issuing a new round of sanctions may impose cumulative consequences on Iran, but it will not convince the regime to alter its course.

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This is the problem: The United States is measuring progress in targets destroyed, weapons expended, and economic damage imposed. Iran is measuring progress in days survived.

Iran’s Strategy

Tehran and its proxies employ relatively inexpensive missiles, attack drones, mines, small boats, and other weapons to threaten American forces, regional partners, and commercial shipping. Many of these weapons are individually unsophisticated, and the majority fail or are intercepted.

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Yet they do achieve strategic effects. Bombarding the U.S. and allies with comparatively inexpensive weapons compels the America and its allies employ interceptors at many times their cost. It also disrupts maritime traffic, pressures energy markets, strains regional air defenses, and creates continuing demands for U.S. military action. Iranian-supported attacks are increasing the cost and transit times associated with commercial shipping. Only a small percentage of attacks need be successful to create economic anxiety and political pressure disproportionate to the weapons employed.

Iran is betting that the America will give up before the Iranian regime becomes desperate, and that public concern over declining interceptor inventories, growing economic costs, and conflict fatigue will, with the approach of the midterm elections, create greater urgency in Washington than in Tehran.

Repeated pauses, renewed attacks, and stalled negotiations reinforce the perception that each side is testing the other’s staying power. Meanwhile, U.S. forces have continued striking Iranian missile, drone, surveillance, and maritime targets while constraining the regime’s freedom of action.

The Trump administration deserves credit for recognizing that the Iranian challenge extends well beyond the nuclear file. Its policy of maximum pressure calls for sustained sanctions enforcement, the disruption of IRGC resources, and the neutralization of Iran’s regional aggression. The strategic requirement now is to ensure that these instruments are applied over a time horizon long enough to alter Tehran’s calculations.

Iran’s apparent willingness to absorb extraordinary punishment is consistent with the character of its political system. Its leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it is prepared to impose severe hardship on the Iranian population to preserve the regime. Even damage that weakens for years may still be tolerable to Tehran as long as its leaders believe enduring it will deny the United States a short-term political success.

There Is No Technological Silver Bullet

The United States is right to accelerate development and deployment of lower-cost counter-drone systems, autonomous interceptors, high-powered microwave weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and directed-energy systems to counter cheap drone and cruise missiles. Doing so can recalibrate the cost-exchange ratio with these weapons. And there is encouraging progress. The Army has rapidly deployed thousands of Merops counter-drone interceptors, and the U.S. military services continue developing and fielding lasers, high-powered microwave systems, and other defensive capabilities. These directed-energy weapons offer potentially significant advantages, including lower per-use costs and the ability to defeat drones and missiles.

Directed-energy weapons can increase defensive capacity and preserve high-end interceptors for ballistic and cruise missile threats. Artificial intelligence can accelerate detection and engagement decisions. Uninhabited surface, subsurface, and airborne systems can extend surveillance, protect maritime routes, and complicate Iranian operations.

But none of these technologies is a strategic solution by itself.

A promising system must still be produced in sufficient quantities, integrated with sensors and command networks, deployed throughout a vast theater, maintained under operational conditions, and proven against an adaptive enemy. Even successful technologies will not eliminate every missile or drone, protect every installation, or compel Tehran to negotiate.

Technology can improve the terms of the contest. It cannot determine the political objective or supply the patience required to achieve it.

The United States should also avoid treating Iranian asymmetric warfare as mysterious or revolutionary. Iran’s approach works not because its weapons are innovative , but because they are employed as part of a coherent strategy designed to exploit American political impatience, defensive costs, and concerns about escalation.

The appropriate response is therefore not simply a better interceptor, but rather a strategy that makes time work against Tehran.

Destruction Is Not the Same as Leverage

American airpower can inflict devastating damage on Iran’s military establishment, but that does not constitute a strategy. To be productive, military effects must be connected to a defined political purpose.

If Iran believes it only needs to survive until the American political environment changes, then retaliatory strikes alone can be waited out. To be effective, the U.S. must convince Tehran that waiting will make its position progressively worse—not better.

This requires persistent military pressure against the regime’s ability to attack and regenerate. The United States should continue attacking the production, storage, command-and-control, and launch architecture supporting Iran’s missile, drone, and maritime operations. Electrical-power infrastructure that directly and effectively supports those military capabilities constitute a lawful military objective when targeted in accordance with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions, and provide a highly leveraged means of neutralizing them consistent with the law of armed conflict. Maritime restrictions should be sustained and enforced consistently, with clearly defined humanitarian provisions and consequences for violations.

Most importantly, military pressure must be integrated with a sustained economic campaign directed at the revenue streams that finance the regime and its military reconstruction.

Iran’s petroleum trade remains its central economic lifeline. Tehran depends on front companies, financial intermediaries, foreign refineries, ship-to-ship transfers, and a shadow fleet to disguise the origin and destination of its exports.

The Treasury and State Departments have already taken significant action against these networks. Recent Treasury measures target vessels, companies, financial intermediaries, and procurement networks supporting Iranian petroleum sales, missile production, and unmanned aircraft programs. Those actions provide a strong foundation for a campaign that connects economic pressure directly to military and diplomatic objectives.

Washington should continue systematically inhibiting the banks, insurers, port operators, brokers, refiners, and shipping networks that enable Iranian revenue. This forces foreign companies and governments to choose: access to the American financial system or assist in Iran’s sanctions-evasion economy. It must be clear you cannot do both.

Enforcement matters more than announcements. A sanctioned tanker that continues delivering oil represents unrealized leverage. Closing the gap between designation and enforcement is essential to maximizing pressure and strategic effect.

The Long Game Is the Path to a Durable Win

President Trump has long emphasized speed, deadlines, and measurable results. That approach can create valuable urgency and prevent bureaucratic drift. Iran, however, is attempting to turn that preference for rapid results to its advantage by arguing an agreement must be reached within a narrow political window.

The administration should resist and decouple the midterm election calendar from Iranian negotiations.

A 100-day benchmark can be a useful management and communications milestone, but it is insufficient for compelling a revolutionary regime to turn its back on decades spent absorbing sanctions, suppressing domestic opposition, and waging war through proxies and asymmetric means.

For President Trump to secure a durable victory, the United States must be prepared to play the long game. This does not mean accepting an endless war. It means establishing conditions under which Iran’s choices are steadily reduced while America’s are preserved.

The administration can reinforce its position by making clear that economic and military pressure will continue beyond the midterm elections. It should expand interceptor and counter-drone production on an emergency basis, build regional stockpiles, strengthen partner defenses, and shift the cost-exchange ratio in America’s favor. It should continue degrading Iran’s capacity to manufacture and employ offensive weapons while tightening enforcement against the regime’s oil, shipping, and financial networks.

The objective should not be destruction for its own sake or an agreement that trades substantial economic relief for temporary or unverifiable promises.

The objective should be to change Iran’s strategic calculation.

Iran must come to believe that each additional month of resistance will carry increasing cost, resulting in less revenue, fewer military options, greater isolation, diminished military capability, and a weaker negotiating position. At the same time, the United States should make clear that a verifiable agreement remains available if Iran abandons the behavior that created the crisis.

This combination—relentless pressure and a credible diplomatic solution—offers the best prospect for achieving the administration’s objectives.

The decisive question is not whether the Pentagon has a secret technological breakthrough waiting in the wings. It is whether the United States has the strategic patience, economic discipline, and political determination to ensure that Iran cannot simply outlast it.

If Washington demonstrates that determination, time will cease to be Iran’s most powerful weapon and become America’s.

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[백선호]

역시 "군사적 압박은 정권과 그 군사력 재건에 자금을 제공하는 수입원을 겨냥한 지속적인 경제 공세와 통합되어야 한다"...

[위종민]

short, sharp war에 대한 유혹은 누구에게나 있겠지만, 트럼프는 특히 그 유혹에 빠지기 쉬운 타입 같습니다. 민주주의 국가에서 장기전 수행하려면 좌우 폭넓게 수용하는 리더십이 있어야 되는데 그런 타입도 아니고..