저가 장거리 비행 드론의 장시간 대규모 공격 대응; 숙련된 인력, 복합체계 구성, 체계 통합

[위종민]

아프리카 국가를 대상으로 한 우크라이나 업체의 홍보성 기사이긴 한데, 걸프 국가의 샤헤드 공습에 현지 국가와 함께 대응한 경험을 위주로 샤헤드 공격에 대응하기 위한 조건들을 풀어놨네요. 

**샤헤드 격추: 걸프 분쟁이 아프리카에 주는 교훈과 우크라이나의 대드론 역량 활용**

제임스 웨스트레이크(James Westlake), 빅토르 타란(Viktor Taran)

2026년 7월 31일 (2026년 8월 1일 업데이트)

읽는 시간: 약 8분

이란이 개발한 일회용 공격 드론(일반적으로 카미카제 또는 자폭 드론으로 불림)

이란발 장거리 드론 위협이 갑작스럽게 등장하자 많은 걸프 국가들은 우크라이나의 전문 장비와 교관, 자문단을 긴급히 도입했다. 목표는 기존 방공체계를 강화하는 것이었다. 기존 방공체계는 매우 고가일 뿐 아니라 원래 전투기와 탄도미사일을 방어하도록 설계돼 있었기 때문에 이러한 위협에는 적합하지 않았다.

성과는 충분히 긍정적이어서 협력은 계속되고 있지만, 초기 단계의 협력은 양측 모두가 기대했던 것보다 더 어려웠고, 효과도 낮았으며, 진행 속도도 느렸다.

이는 아프리카 국가들에게 중요한 경고가 되어야 한다. 장거리 드론은 이미 아프리카 대륙에서 등장했으며, 확산은 매우 빠르게 이루어질 수 있다. 샤헤드급 위협에 효과적으로 대응하기 위한 준비에는 실제 위협이 현실화되는 데 걸리는 시간보다 훨씬 더 오랜 시간이 필요하다.

## 위협

샤헤드형 드론(보다 정확하게는 장거리 일회용 공격 무인항공기)은 장거리 타격 능력을 값싸고 쉽게 이용할 수 있도록 만들었다. 그 결과 과거에는 항공기나 미사일을 운용할 수 없었던 국가와 비국가 행위자들까지도 심층 타격 능력을 갖게 되었다.

이러한 무기는 단독으로도 상당한 파괴력과 교란 효과를 낼 수 있지만, 무엇보다도 저렴하기 때문에 대량으로 동시 운용해 기존 방공망을 압도하고 전략적 효과를 달성할 수 있다.

이 위협은 고정된 형태가 아니다. 샤헤드형 플랫폼은 계속 발전하고 있으며, 최근에는 기동성과 속도 향상(제트 추진 방식 포함), 영상 송신을 이용한 원격 조종(기동 중인 방공부대와 차량뿐 아니라 고정 시설까지 표적으로 삼을 수 있음), 그리고 방어체계에 대응하기 위한 자체 대응수단 탑재 등의 발전이 나타나고 있다.

또한 이 위험은 우크라이나나 걸프 지역과 같은 '원래의 전장'에만 국한되지 않는다. 필요한 부품은 비교적 단순하며, 소형 상용차로 운반하거나 간단한 시설에서 직접 제작하는 것도 가능하다. 더욱 중요한 것은 이러한 기술을 보유한 생산자 집단이 이미 상당한 규모로 존재하며 이동성도 높다는 점이다. 이들 가운데 일부는 다른 국가로 이동해 기술을 제공할 의향도 있다.

이러한 플랫폼의 운용 역시 기존 장거리 유도무기만큼 높은 수준의 훈련을 요구하지 않는다. 최소한의 교육과 약간의 원격 지원만으로도 드론을 무장시키고, 프로그램을 입력한 뒤, 간이 발사장이나 픽업트럭 적재함에서도 발사할 수 있다.

위험 평가는 발생 가능성과 피해 규모라는 두 요소로 구성된다. 이미 여러 아프리카 전장에서 빠르게 확산되고 있는 소형 드론 위협은 발생 가능성 측면에서는 높은 점수를 받을 수 있다.

그러나 피해 규모 측면에서는 비교 자체가 어렵다. 샤헤드형 드론은 소형 FPV 전장의 드론보다 약 50배 많은 탄두를 탑재할 수 있으며, 소수만 운용되더라도 기반시설을 마비시키고 고가의 장비를 파괴하며 사회적 공포를 확산시킬 수 있다.

## 이 위협에 대응하기

우크라이나는 지속적인 샤헤드 공격을 경험한 세계 유일의 국가다.

러시아가 2022년 9월부터 이란제 샤헤드 드론을 운용하기 시작한 이후(단순화를 위해 러시아산 '게란(Geran)'도 같은 범주에 포함), 우크라이나에는 6만 기가 넘는 드론이 발사됐으며, 가장 심한 시기에는 일주일 동안 6,000기 이상이 공격에 투입됐다.

초기에는 대응 능력이 매우 제한적이었고, 패트리엇과 같은 고가의 요격미사일도 대부분 탄도미사일 대응에 우선 배치된 상황이었다. 동시에 대규모 동시 공격까지 감당해야 했지만, 우크라이나는 꾸준히 90% 이상의 요격률을 기록했으며, 일부 시기에는 98%에 가까운 요격 성공률을 달성했다.

2026년 초 미국과 협력 관계에 있는 중동 국가들이 이 무기에 의해 갑작스럽게 위협받게 되자, 이란이 미국과 이스라엘의 공습에 대응하면서 공격을 확대했고, 걸프 국가들은 우크라이나의 교관과 장비, 자문을 신속히 받아들이기로 결정했다.

이 경험은 우크라이나의 역량이 자국 전장을 벗어난 환경에서도 얼마나 효과적으로 적용될 수 있는지를 보여준 첫 사례였으며, 완벽하지 않았던 초기 경험은 앞으로 같은 기술을 도입하려는 국가들에게 중요한 교훈을 제공하고 있다.

## 최근 걸프 지역 경험에서 얻은 핵심 교훈

6개월이 지난 현재 무엇이 효과적이었고 무엇이 그렇지 않았는지에 대해 비교적 명확한 결론을 내릴 수 있게 됐다. 이러한 결론은 다른 국가들에게도 중요한 교훈으로 확장될 수 있다.

1. **우크라이나의 장비와 경험은 이 위협 분야에서 세계 최고 수준이다.** 기존 방공체계는 취약하고 비용이 많이 들며 이 위협에 적합하지 않다는 점이 드러났다. 걸프 국가들은 현재도 협력을 계속 확대하고 있으며, 미국 역시 비공식적으로 우크라이나의 역량을 활용하고 있다.

2. **현지 운용 인력은 요격 드론 운용 준비가 되어 있지 않았다.** 많은 경우 드론, 특히 FPV 드론 운용 경험이 거의 없었기 때문에 제공받은 능력을 제대로 활용하지 못했다.

3. **우크라이나의 역량은 단순한 제품이 아니라 복합적인 체계(System of Systems)다.** 제대로 작동하려면 충분한 시간과 준비가 필요하다. 초기에는 이러한 사실이 충분히 이해되지 않았고, 제한된 정보 속에서 운용된 우크라이나 팀은 기대 이하의 성과를 낼 수밖에 없었다.

4. **가장 큰 과제는 통합이었다.** 지휘통제 체계를 제대로 구축할 시간이 부족했던 탓에 드론 요격체계는 기존 방공망과의 충돌을 피하기 위해 대부분 육안 식별과 가시선 교전으로 제한되었으며, 그 결과 우크라이나에서와 같은 효과를 내지 못했다.

5. **그 다음 과제는 현지 환경이었다.** 걸프 지역의 극심한 고온과 습도, 그리고 금속 성분을 포함한 미세한 먼지는 장비 성능을 크게 떨어뜨렸으며, 경우에 따라서는 요격 드론이 정상적으로 작동하지 않는 일도 있었다. 이는 적절한 설정과 환경 적응으로 해결 가능한 문제였지만, 실시간 공격이 진행되는 상황에서는 대응할 시간이 없었다.

6. **우크라이나와 걸프 지역 인력은 항상 이상적인 협력 관계를 이루지는 못했다.** 양측 모두 최선을 다했지만 문화와 교리, 사고방식, 통합 방식의 차이 때문에 압박 상황에서는 협력이 쉽지 않았다.

## 다른 군대가 얻어야 할 교훈

* **대드론 체계는 완전한 자동화 장비가 아니며, 구매 즉시 바로 사용할 수 있는 것도 아니다.** 가장 뛰어난 체계라도 적절한 위치 선정과 운용을 담당할 숙련된 인력이 필요하다. 효과적인 대드론 방어는 올바른 설치와 설정, 체계 통합에 달려 있으며, 이는 일부 단축은 가능하지만 생략할 수는 없다.

* **효과적인 방어는 단일 기술이 아니라 다층 방어체계를 필요로 한다.** 탐지와 물리적 요격, 전자전, 물리적 방호, 사이버 보안을 하나의 통합된 방어체계로 결합해야 한다.

* **위협을 격퇴하려면 장비뿐 아니라 훈련도 필요하다.** 걸프 국가들은 우크라이나로부터 요격 드론을 빠르게 확보했지만 운용 인력이 충분히 훈련되지 않았고 전체 체계도 제대로 통합되지 않아 우크라이나에서보다 성능이 크게 떨어졌다.

* **현지 환경에서의 시험은 필수적이다.** 기후와 대기 조건은 소형 비행체의 성능에 큰 영향을 준다. 이는 장비 자체의 한계가 아니라 설정과 운용 방식의 문제이며, 충분한 시험과 반복 검증이 필요하다.

* **전문적인 전달 파트너는 우크라이나의 기술을 제3국으로 이전하는 데 매우 중요한 역할을 할 수 있다.** 수백 개에 이르는 우크라이나 방산 기업 가운데 적합한 파트너를 선정하고 이를 하나의 서비스로 통합하며, 현지 군의 교리와 훈련 체계에 맞게 조정할 수 있기 때문이다.

## 아프리카의 상황

이미 무장 위협에 직면한 아프리카 국가들은 샤헤드형 드론이 결국 등장할 것이라고 가정해야 한다. 그것도 매우 갑작스럽게 나타날 가능성이 높으며, 실제로 등장한 뒤에는 대응 준비를 시작하기에는 이미 늦다.

이는 먼 미래의 이야기가 아니다. 이란 또는 이란 계열의 대형 무인기는 이미 예멘과 중동, 수단, 그리고 2026년 7월에는 말리에서도 사용됐다.

추가 확산은 사실상 불가피하다. 가격이 비교적 저렴하거나 후원국을 통해 공급받을 수 있으며, 은밀하게 운송하기 쉽고, 운용도 비교적 간단하기 때문이다. 또한 이러한 확산을 적극적으로 지원하려는 국제 행위자들도 존재한다.

여기에 더해 대부분의 아프리카 국가는 걸프 국가 수준의 국방예산을 보유하고 있지 않다는 현실도 있다.

석유 부국들은 패트리엇 요격체계와 전투기, 우크라이나의 저비용 요격체계를 동시에 운용할 수 있지만, 대부분의 아프리카 국가는 선택을 해야 하며, 그 선택이 F-35가 될 가능성은 거의 없다.

## 취해야 할 조치

걸프 지역 경험이 주는 첫 번째 교훈은 **기다리지 말라**는 것이다.

위협은 며칠 만에 현실화될 수 있지만, 효과적인 대응 능력을 갖추는 데는 수개월이 걸린다.

샤헤드형 위협 가능성이 있는 국가들은 최소한 다음과 같은 조치를 취해야 한다.

1. **지휘관과 방공 인력, 정치 지도부에게 위협과 향후 발전 방향, 대응 수단에 대해 교육한다.**
2. **현재 장비의 사거리와 성능을 고려해 예상 발사 지역과 접근 경로, 취약 목표를 분석한다.**
3. **위협이 고조될 경우 즉시 시행할 수 있는 비상 대응계획을 마련한다.**
4. **탐지장비와 전자전 장비, 요격체계 등을 소규모로 우선 확보해 현지 시험을 실시하고 긴급 투입을 위한 예비 전력으로 유지한다.**
5. **방공부대와 레이더 운용요원, 군용 항공전력과의 통합 운용을 검증하기 위한 워게임과 훈련을 실시한다.**
6. **소수의 숙련된 운용 인력을 유지하거나 필요 시 신속히 대응할 수 있는 외부 전문업체와 협력 체계를 구축한다.**

우크라이나의 역량은 이러한 요구에 잘 부합한다. 실제 전장에서 검증된 저렴한 장비뿐 아니라, 이를 효과적인 방어체계로 운용하기 위한 교리와 교육, 실전 노하우까지 함께 제공할 수 있기 때문이다.

장거리 일회용 공격 드론은 이를 막기 위한 방어체계보다 더 빠르게 확산되고 있다.

걸프 지역의 경험은 첫 번째 공격이 발생한 뒤에야 운용 인력을 훈련시키고 장비를 시험하며 기존 방공체계와 통합하려 해서는 늦는다는 사실을 보여준다.

아프리카 국가들에게는 아직 준비할 시간이 남아 있지만, 그 시간이 생각보다 많지는 않을 수도 있다. 

Shooting down Shaheds: Lessons for Africa from the Gulf conflict on engaging Ukrainian capabilities * Military Africa

SKUA DEFENCE brings battlefield-proven Ukrainian defence capabilities to UK and allied partners, combining direct access to Ukraine’s defence technology sector with British military experience in integration, deployment and operational delivery.

Shooting down Shaheds: Lessons for Africa from the Gulf conflict on engaging Ukrainian capabilities

 by James Westlake and Viktor Taran

 July 31, 2026 - Updated on August 1, 2026

in FEATURED, Sponsored, Unmanned systems

Reading Time: 8 mins read

Iranian-designed one-way attack drone, commonly referred to as a kamikaze or suicide drone

In response to the sudden emergence of the long-range drone threat from Iran, many Gulf states scrambled to bring in specialist Ukrainian equipment, trainers and advisers. The goal was to enhance their existing air defence systems which were both very expensive and poorly matched to the threat, having been designed to defend against fast jets and ballistic missiles.

The results are promising enough for the collaboration to continue, but the initial engagement was more difficult, less effective and slower than both sides had hoped.

This should be a wake-up call for African states. The first long-range drones have already been seen on the continent, and proliferation could occur quickly. Preparing for effective defence against a Shahed-class threat takes much longer than it will take for the threat itself to materialise.

The threat

The emergence of Shahed-type drones (more correctly: long-range, one-way attack UAS) has made deep-strike cheap and accessible to states and non-state actors that could not previously have deployed aircraft or missiles. These weapons can be destructive and disruptive as single shots, but they are cheap enough to deploy in large salvos to overwhelm conventional air defences and achieve strategic effects.

This is not a static challenge. The capabilities of Shahed-type platforms are continuing to evolve. Current trends include greater manoeuvrability and speed (including jet propulsion); remote piloting through video feed (enabling the target of mobile air defence crews / vehicles, as well as static infrastructure), and on-board counter-measures to defensive systems.

Nor is this a risk that is somehow confined to their “home” theatres of Ukraine and the Gulf. The components required are comparatively simple, the parts can be transported in small commercial vehicles or constructed from scratch at fairly simple facilities and—just as importantly—there is now a large and mobile base of knowledgeable producers, some of whom will be willing to travel. Operation of these platforms does not require anything like the training of predecessor long-range munitions. With a minimum of training and a little remote support, the drones can be armed, programmed and launched from simple sites or from the back of pick-up trucks.

Any risk assessment consists of two parts: likelihood and severity. The small drones threat which is already rapidly maturing in multiple African theatres certainly scores more highly on likelihood. But when it comes to severity there is no contest: a Shahed-type drone carries approximately 50 times the payload of a small battlefield FPV UAS and has the potential to shut down infrastructure, destroy expensive hardware and spread panic in even small numbers.

Countering this threat

Ukraine is the only country in the world that has been forced to face a sustained Shahed threat. Since Russia started launching Iran-supplied Shaheds in September 2022, over 60,000 have been launched at Ukraine (counting the Russian-made “Geran” equivalent within the category for simplicity), with more than 6,000 in each of the worst weeks. Starting from very limited capabilities, working largely without Patriot-style interceptors (which are reserved for the missile threat), and faced with very large concentrations of attacks in simultaneous waves, Ukraine has nevertheless consistently neutralised more than 90%, and at times closer to 98%.

When US-aligned countries in the Middle East faced a sudden threat from these weapons earlier in 2026, as Iran reacted to US/Israeli bombing, Gulf countries were quick to accept Ukrainian offers of help in the form of trainers, equipment and advice.

This experience has provided the first look at how applicable Ukrainian capabilities can be when deployed outside the Ukrainian theatre, and the less-than-seamless experience can provide important lessons for other countries that should be engaging that same expertise.

Key learnings from recent Gulf experience

Six months on, some clear conclusions can be made on what has worked and not worked so far. These can then be extended into lessons that other countries can learn from.

1. Ukrainian systems and experience are world-leading against this category of threat. Legacy air defence practices were exposed as vulnerable, expensive and poorly suited. Gulf countries are actively continuing the collaboration. American users have also discreetly engaged Ukrainian capability.
2. Local teams were not prepared to operate interceptor drones. In many cases, they had little or no previous experience with drones, including FPV systems. As a result, they received capabilities that they could not effectively employ.
3. Ukrainian capability is not just a “product” that can be dropped in, but a complex system of systems that requires time and effort to function properly. This was not immediately recognised, and isolated Ukrainian teams operating blind initially under-performed against expectations.
4. The biggest challenge is integration. In the absence of time to properly organise command-and-control, specialist drone interceptor platforms were often restricted to visual target acquisition and line-of-sight engagement in order to deconflict with the legacy conventional defences. As a result they were less effective than in Ukraine.
5. The next challenge was local conditions. Extreme heat and humidity, and the fine, metallic dust of the Gulf impaired performance and meant sometimes interceptors simply didn’t work. This could have been overcome as a matter of configuration and set-up – but not at the pace demanded when responding to an ongoing live attack.
6. Ukrainian and local Gulf teams were not always effective working partners, despite the best intentions of both sides. There were significant differences in culture, doctrine, mindset and integration requirements that made collaboration under pressure difficult.

Lessons for other militaries

• Counter-UAS systems are not fully autonomous and out-of-the-box. Even the most advanced systems require trained operators to position and manage defences. Effective counter-UAS depends on proper set-up, configuration and integration. This can be accelerated to a degree, but not bypassed and not replaced with just more technology.
• Effective protection requires a layered approach rather than reliance on a single technology. It should integrate detection, kinetic countermeasures, electronic warfare, physical security, and cybersecurity into a single defensive architecture under a unified control system.
• Defeating the threat requires training as well as integrated systems. The Gulf states were able to quickly acquire interceptors from Ukraine, but they performed much worse than in Ukraine because the operating teams weren’t properly drilled, and the full system was not prepared to coordinate.
• Testing of systems for local conditions is vital. Atmospheric and weather conditions have a large effect on small aerial systems. This is a matter of configuration and set-up rather than overall potential, but it requires testing and iteration time.
• A specialist delivery partner could be a powerful enabler of the capability transfer from the leaders in Ukraine to third countries: able to select the right partners from the hundreds of Ukrainian entities in the sector, coordinate them as a single service, and adapt to doctrine and training that makes sense to partners.

The Africa context

African states already facing armed threats should assume that Shahed-type drones will eventually appear, probably suddenly – and when they do it will be too late to start getting ready.

This is not a distant scenario. Iranian or Iranian-derived large UAS platforms have already been used in Yemen, the wider Middle East, Sudan and, in July 2026, Mali. Further spread is inevitable. There is little to stop their diffusion across the region – they are relatively cheap or available from sponsors, simple to transport covertly, and relatively easy to operate. There are also international actors actively interested in encouraging their wider deployment.

Alongside that, there is the reality that African states lack the defence budgets of many Gulf states. While a small oil-rich state might be able to simultaneously deploy Patriot-interceptor batteries, squadrons of jet interceptors, and low-cost Ukrainian gun and interceptor systems, most African states will have to choose—and it’s unlikely to be the F35s.

Steps to take

The first lesson from the Gulf is do not wait. The emergence of the threat can occur in days, while the effective preparation of counter-measures requires months.

At a minimum, countries facing the possibility of a Shahed-type threat, should take the following steps:

1. Brief commanders, air-defence personnel and political leaders on the threat, its likely evolution and the available defensive measures
2. Map likely launch areas, approach routes and vulnerable targets based on the range and performance of current systems
3. Prepare contingency plans that are ready to swiftly activate in line with an escalating threat.
4. Acquire key defensive systems in small numbers (particularly detection systems, electronic warfare systems and interceptors) to (a) test in local conditions, and (b) hold in reserve for rapid deployment.
5. Conduct wargames or exercises to test effective integration with other systems, particularly air-defence units, radar operators and military aviation.
6. Maintain a small cadre of trained operators and/or establish a relationship with external contractors who could rapidly respond when needed.

Ukrainian capabilities are a good match for these requirements: affordable systems developed against the live threat, combined with the doctrine, training and operational know-how required to turn hardware into an effective defensive architecture.

Long-range one-way attack drones are spreading faster than the defences needed to stop them. The Gulf experience shows that countries cannot wait for the first attack before training operators, testing equipment and integrating it with existing systems. African states still have time to prepare, but perhaps less than they think.

---

SKUA DEFENCE brings battlefield-proven Ukrainian defence capabilities to UK and allied partners, combining direct access to Ukraine’s defence technology sector with British military experience in integration, deployment and operational delivery.

James Westlake is a former British Army officer and the founder/CEO of Skua Defence. He will be at Afridex in October and welcomes opportunities to engage further on this topic.

Viktor Taran is a veteran of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a director at Skua Defence, and the founder of Skua’s partner, the Kruk Training Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine.