이란전쟁의 교훈; 희생할 각오가 돼 있는 적을 상대로 동맹 지원도 없이 전쟁을 시작한 미국

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CIMSEC에 인도 해군의 퇴역 소장이 기고한 글입니다. 이란은 국가적 생존이 걸린 전쟁을 수행하고 있어서 희생과 비용을 치를 각오가 돼 있는데, 이를 상대로 비용 감내 능력이 제한적이고 해상 접근이 비교적 자유로운 적을 상대로 구성된 전통적인 해양 전력투사 모델을 적용해서 실패했다고 평가하네요. 필수적인 동맹의 지지를 이끌어내는 데에도 실패했고.. 

연안 지형을 둘러싼 경쟁: 이란 전쟁과 해협전쟁에 대한 군사적 해법

2026년 8월 28일
객원 필자

인도 육군 퇴역 소장 람비르 싱 만 박사

미국-이란 전쟁은 미국 해양력에 대한 실전 시험을 제공했다. 막강한 해군 전력을 집결시키고 광범위한 타격 작전을 수행하며 지속적인 전술적 성공을 거두었음에도, 미국은 호르무즈 해협을 통제하거나 홍해에서 자유로운 이동을 지속적으로 보장하는 데 실패했다. 이슬람혁명수비대 해군(IRGCN)은 분산된 고속공격정, 지상 배치 대함미사일, 기뢰, 무인항공기(UAV), 배회탄약을 운용하고 후티와 함께 양쪽 수로를 효과적으로 다투고 있다. 미 항모강습단의 작전을 제한하는 것에 더해 상선 운항도 계속 차질을 빚으면서 세계 경제에 영향을 미치고 에너지 가격 급등과 공급망 지연, 국내 인플레이션을 초래하고 있으며, 이는 군사적 상황에 비해 불균형할 정도로 미국의 전쟁 수행에 대한 정치적 압력을 계속 누적시키고 있다.

이러한 딜레마로 이어진 핵심적인 실패는 전략적 이해의 실패였다. 미국은 비용 감내 능력이 제한적이고 해상 접근이 비교적 자유로운 적을 상대로 구축된 전통적인 해양 전력투사 모델을, 자국 연안에서 자신들이 실존적 충돌로 인식하는 전쟁을 수행하는 적에게 적용했다. 이란은 미 해군을 격파할 필요가 없었고 지금도 그럴 필요가 없다. 이란은 단지 경쟁을 너무 오래 지속시키고 비용을 너무 높여 결국 미국이 그만두는 쪽을 선택하게 만들면 된다. 여기에 더해 이란의 거부 능력을 그 근원에서 억제하려는 시도는 구조적으로 실패했으며, 처음부터 진정한 동맹 체계가 부재했던 탓에 미국의 비용 감내 능력을 집단적으로 유지할 수 있는 메커니즘도 존재하지 않았다. 아래에서는 이 전쟁의 핵심 교훈들을 논한다.

비용 감내 능력의 비대칭과 전통적 대응이 실패한 이유

해양 경쟁에서 결정적인 변수가 화력이 아니라 각 당사자가 비용을 감수하려는 상대적 의지라면, 전통적인 군사적 대응은 전술적 효과와 관계없이 기대 이하의 성과를 낼 것이다. 이것이 이란 전쟁의 가장 근본적인 교훈이다. 이슬람혁명수비대 해군의 비대칭 수단은 저렴하고 분산돼 있으며 신속하게 재구성될 수 있었기 때문에 효과적이었다. 개별적으로 파괴하기 어려웠을 뿐 아니라, 동시에 분쟁 상태의 해협으로 인한 경제적 역풍까지 감당해야 하는 체제가 이들을 상대하는 데 치러야 할 총비용이 무기한 감내할 수 있는 수준을 넘어섰기 때문이다. 실존적 전쟁을 수행하는 이란에는 이에 상응하는 제약이 없었다. 이러한 비용 교환 관계는 문제를 더욱 악화시켰다. 값싼 이란 드론 한 대를 요격하기 위해 사용된 모든 스탠더드 미사일은 수개월간 작전이 지속될 경우 미국의 정밀유도무기 비축량을 산업생산이 보충할 수 있는 속도보다 더 빠르게 소모시키는 교환비를 의미했다. 분산된 고속정 집단을 공격하기 위해 유인 전투기가 출격할 때마다, 무력화한 표적보다 몇 자릿수나 더 큰 비용이 들었다. 비대칭 해협전쟁에서 소모전의 수학은 시간이 지날수록 방어자에게 유리하도록 의도적으로 설계돼 있다. 분쟁 상태의 해협전쟁에 대한 군사적 해법은 이러한 교환 모델에 기반해서는 안 되며, 오히려 그 관계를 뒤집어야 한다.

분산된 거부 전력을 상대하는 가장 직접적인 군사적 대응은 지휘 거점, 군수망, 생산시설, 공급망을 타격해 그 근원에서 파괴하는 것이다. 미국과 이스라엘은 이를 포괄적으로 시도했지만 원하는 결과를 얻지 못했다. 이란은 바로 이런 작전을 예상하고 40년에 걸쳐 핵심 군사 인프라를 분산하고 강화하며 중복성을 구축해왔다. 이 점은 충분히 인식되지 않았다. 걸프전 당시 스커드 이동식 발사대를 추적하는 과정에서 나타났던 문제가 이슬람혁명수비대에 의해 제도적 규모로 확대 적용됐다. 분산되고 이동 가능하며 신속하게 재구성되는 체계는 투사되는 화력의 정밀도나 규모에 관계없이 구조적으로 타격을 통한 억제에 강하다.

동맹 구조 — 군사적 필수조건

미국은 지속적인 해협 작전에 필요한 동맹 구조 없이 해상 경쟁에 들어갔다. 호르무즈 해협의 운항 중단으로 가장 큰 영향을 받는 동맹국들과 사전 협의 없이 전쟁에 뛰어듦으로써, 미국은 해군력, 기지 접근권, 정치적 지지가 전쟁 지속에 필수적인 파트너들에게 경제적 불만을 만들어냈다. 그 작전상의 결과는 미국 전력이 압도적인 대부분의 비용을 부담하는 것이었다. 동맹국 해군 전력이 공동 지휘체계 아래 통합되고, 교전규칙을 공유하며, 작전 비용을 공평하게 분담했다면 비용 감내 능력의 방정식은 실질적으로 달라졌을 것이다. 따라서 동맹 구축은 지속적인 해협 작전을 위한 군사적 전제조건이다.

군사적 해법: 지형의 무력화

근원에 대한 억제가 실패하고 분쟁 지역에 전통적인 전력을 투사하는 것이 비용 측면에서 지속 불가능하다면, 군사적 해법은 완전히 다른 논리로 작동해야 한다. 이란 전쟁이 가리키는 해답은 적이 분쟁 지형 안에 구축한 지리적·비대칭적 이점을 능동적으로 무력화하는 것이다. 즉, 적이 강요한 것과 동일한 비용 교환 문제를 적에게 부과하는 수단으로 해협 자체를 둘러싼 경쟁에 나서는 것이다. 이란은 분산되고 탐지 신호가 적은 거부 전력을 해협 안과 그 주변에 배치함으로써 전략적 효과를 거뒀고, 미국이 그곳에서 작전을 수행하려는 모든 시도를 비싸게 만들었다. 군사적 해법은 이와 똑같은 일을 반대로 하는 것이다. 적이 그 지형을 이용하는 것을 비싸게 만들어야 한다.

비용 교환 관계의 역전: 지향성 에너지와 소모성 체계

현재의 전투 비용 교환 모델은 장기전이 될수록 재정적으로 적에게 유리하다. 두 가지 상호보완적 능력이 이 비율을 뒤집을 수 있다. 함정과 지상에 배치된 레이저 체계, 고출력 마이크로파 방사체 같은 지향성 에너지 무기는 일단 배치되고 나면 드론과 고속정 집단을 매우 낮은 한계비용으로 요격할 수 있으며 탄창 용량의 제약도 없다. 이슬람혁명수비대 해군 작전의 특징이었던 대량·저비용 위협을 상대로 지향성 에너지는 구조적으로 거부 전력이 아니라 이에 맞서는 전력에 유리한 최초의 비용 교환 모델을 제공한다. 이들 체계는 아직 초기 단계에 있지만, 이란 전쟁은 함대 전체와 분쟁 수로 인접 해안 거점에 이들 체계를 대규모로 배치해야 할 작전적 긴급성을 보여준다.

위협권 안에서 주된 마찰 흡수 수단으로 대규모 배치되는 소모성 무인수상정(USV)과 무인항공기(UAV)는 이러한 역전을 완성한다. 적의 화력을 흡수하는 플랫폼이 무인이고 진정으로 소모 가능하며 구축함이나 유인 항공기의 일부 비용에 불과하다면, 적이 갖고 있던 비용 교환상의 이점은 사라진다. 충분한 규모로, 그리고 동맹국과 생산을 분담하는 방식과 결합하면 이 모델은 적의 정밀유도무기 비축량을 보충 속도보다 빠르게 고갈시키며, 이 전쟁 내내 미국에 불리하게 작용해 온 소모전의 역학을 뒤집는다.

수중 영역: 지형이 통로를 강제할 수 없는 곳

수중 영역은 연안 방어자의 지리적 이점이 가장 효과적으로 무력화되는 유일한 환경이다. 해협과 그 접근로에서 작전하는 공격잠수함은 적의 반접근 체계를 활성화시키는 수상 신호를 드러내지 않고도 감시, 정밀타격, 기뢰 부설을 수행할 수 있다. 이란은 기뢰를 값싼 거부 수단으로 사용해 상선 운항 전체에 불확실성과 경제적 혼란을 강요했다. 미국 역시 이와 같은 수단을 더 큰 규모와 더 높은 정교함으로 사용할 수 있으며, 잠수함을 통해 이란 해군 접근로에 기뢰원을 설치함으로써 이슬람혁명수비대 고속정 작전을 복잡하게 만들고 이란이 다른 나라들에게 강요한 것과 동일한 불확실성의 비용을 이란에 부과할 수 있다. 무인잠수정(UUV)은 이 능력을 더 확장해 유인 잠수함이 쉽게 접근하기 어려운 해협의 가장 얕고 지리적으로 제약된 구역에서 작전할 수 있다.

수중 영역은 분쟁 상태의 해협 환경에서 제해작전의 주된 영역이 되어야 한다. 잠수함과 무인잠수정은 가장 효과적임이 입증된 비대칭 거부 체계에 실질적인 표적을 제공하지 않으며, 수중 작전의 비용은 수상 및 공중 작전에서 발생하는 파괴적인 교환비를 반복하지 않기 때문이다. 잠수함 생산능력을 확대하는 것은 이 전쟁이 제기한 해협 문제에 대한 가장 직접적이고 지속 가능한 군사적 대응이다. 적의 반접근/지역거부(A2/AD) 체계가 더 정교해질수록 그 가치가 더욱 커지는 대응이다.

지형을 둘러싼 경쟁: 지상 배치 전력

구조적으로 가장 중요한 군사적 해법은 동시에 이란 자신의 작전 사례에서 가장 직접적으로 도출되는 해법이기도 하다. 분쟁 해협 내부 또는 인접한 섬과 해안 지형에 소규모로, 탐지 신호를 낮춘 해병대와 특수작전부대를 배치하고 장거리 대함미사일, 드론 군집, 전자전 체계, 해안 감시망으로 무장시키는 것의 유용성은 분명하다. 이러한 전력은 적에게 지속적이고 재구성 가능한 위협을 가하며, 이를 억제하려면 비용이 많이 드는 작전이 필요하다. 이란 해군 항로 사정권 안의 지상에 이런 전력을 배치하면 이슬람혁명수비대 해군은 거부 작전 대신 이들을 억제하는 데 자원을 소모해야 한다. 해안 거점에서 발사되는 드론 군집은 적의 감시 능력을 약화시키고 전력을 집중하기보다 분산하도록 강요한다. 지형에 통합된 전자전 능력은 적의 정밀타격이 의존하는 표적획득 네트워크를 오염시킨다.

이 개념은 자유로운 해상 접근로에서 내륙 목표로 전력을 투사하는 것이 아니기 때문에 ‘해상으로부터의 작전기동(OMFTS)’을 그대로 재현하는 것이 아니다. 또한 원래의 인도·태평양 맥락에서의 ‘스탠드인 전력(SIF)’ 개념과도 다르다. 이것은 이란이 매우 효과적으로 활용해 온 것과 같은 지리적 논리를 이용한 지형 경쟁이다. 즉 해협 내에 존재하고, 보급선을 짧게 유지하며, 분산되고 재구성 가능한 배치를 하되, 이를 방어적 거부 수단이 아니라 공격적 거부 수단으로 사용하는 것이다. 해양 지형 자체를 무기로 만들어온 적은 그 지형이 더 이상 자신만의 이점이 아니라 함께 부담해야 하는 짐이 됐음을 깨닫게 되어야 한다.

이 세 요소를 결합하면 근원 억제에 의존하지 않고, 대체 불가능한 주력함을 최고위협 지역에 전진 배치할 필요도 없으며, 실존적 이해관계가 걸린 적을 상대로도 지속 가능한 비용 교환비를 만들어내는 통합된 해협전쟁 군사 접근법이 된다.

전력 구조에 대한 함의

항모강습단(CSG)은 여전히 지금까지 구성된 가장 강력한 해상 기동부대이며, 항모 항공전력은 자유롭거나 준자유로운 환경에서 여전히 결정적인 가치를 갖는다. 이란 전쟁은 그 가치를 부정하지 않지만 그 한계를 분명히 한다. 분쟁 상태의 해협에서 항모강습단은 주된 수단으로 적절하지 않다. 너무 쉽게 탐지되고, 위험을 감수하기에는 지나치게 가치가 크며, 비대칭 적이 애초부터 차단하도록 조직된 접근 조건에 지나치게 의존하기 때문이다. 항모강습단은 후방에 유지돼야 하며, 지형 경쟁 전력과 수중 전력이 적의 거부 능력에 충분한 비용을 강요해 위협이 낮아진 접근 통로를 만든 이후에만 투입돼야 한다. 항모강습단의 투입은 조건이 갖춰진 뒤 이뤄지는 것이지, 그 조건을 만들어내는 것이 아니다.

따라서 연안 또는 해협 전투를 위한 해군 전력 구조는 이 전쟁이 작전적으로 결정적임을 입증한 앞선 세 가지 우선순위를 중심으로 재조정돼야 한다. 진정으로 통합된 동맹 해군의 기여와 결합된 이 세 가지 능력은 지속 가능한 비용 교환 모델을 구성한다. 여러 세대에 걸쳐 미국 해군전략을 형성해 온 해상교통로(SLOC) 방어 임무 역시 이 모델을 중심으로 재구성돼야 한다. 미국의 경제적 이익에 직접 기여하는 해상교통로를 우선시하는 단계적 접근을 취하는 동시에, 어느 단일 해군도 이제 혼자 비용을 감당하며 보장할 수 없는 더 넓은 세계 해양공공재의 안보를 위해 진정한 동맹국 간 부담 분담을 구축해야 한다.

대만과의 유사성: 중국의 실존적 계산

이란 전쟁의 작전적 교훈이 가장 중대한 함의를 갖는 곳은 페르시아만이 아니라 서태평양이다. 베이징은 군사사가들이 전쟁의 성격을 바꾼 전쟁을 분석할 때와 같은 강도로 이 충돌을 관찰해왔다. 대만 문제는 중국에 구조적 유사성을 제시한다. 즉 지역의 적에게는 실존적인 충돌인 상황에서 한 강대국이 해양 전력투사를 시도하는 구조다.

그러나 그 반대 역시 사실이다. 대만은 중국공산당의 역사적 서사가 갖는 정당성, 인민해방군(PLA)의 정치적 정체성, 베이징 지도부의 국내 정치적 위상에서 핵심적인 위치를 차지한다. 충분한 도발이 있었음에도 대만 문제에 행동하지 못하는 중국 지도부는 최고 수준의 국내 정치 위기에 직면하게 될 것이다. 이는 대만을 둘러싼 심각한 충돌이 발생할 경우 중국의 비용 감내 능력이 구조적으로 높아지고, 이란 전쟁의 비용 교환 역학이 훨씬 더 큰 규모로 반복될 것임을 의미한다.

서태평양에서 중국의 반접근·지역거부(A2/AD) 구조는 규모와 정교함, 깊이에서 이슬람혁명수비대 해군의 능력을 크게 능가한다. 사거리가 1,000해리를 넘는 대함탄도미사일은 제1도련선 훨씬 바깥에서도 항모강습단을 위협한다. 인민해방군 해군(PLAN)의 잠수함 전력, 푸젠 해안에 대규모로 배치된 지상기반 항공전력, 우주·사이버·수중 센서를 결합한 통합 해양 감시망은 비교하면 호르무즈 해협이 관리 가능한 곳처럼 보일 정도의 위협 환경을 조성한다. 그리고 결정적으로, 이란 전쟁이 보여주었듯 이러한 능력의 근원을 타격한다고 해서 신뢰할 수 있을 정도로 그 능력이 저하되는 것은 아니다. 중국의 A2/AD 인프라는 바로 이런 종류의 억제 작전이 시도될 것에 대비해 수십 년간 준비해왔음을 반영하듯 분산되고 강화되며 중복성을 갖추고 있다.

이란 전쟁에서 도출되는 전략적 처방은 그대로 적용된다. 미국과 동맹국들은 제1도련선 안쪽에서 항모강습단을 전진 운용하는 것이 대체 불가능한 자산에 받아들일 수 없는 위험을 준다는 전제 아래 대만 유사사태에 대비해야 한다. 파국적 위험을 감수하지 않으면서도 신뢰할 수 있는 억제를 유지할 수 있는 유일한 선택지는 다음 요소들을 필요로 한다. 일본, 필리핀, 호주와 함께 지상기반 대함미사일을 전진 배치하는 분산 억제 모델, 제1도련선 내 수중 전력의 확대, 대규모 소모성 무인체계, 그리고 명시적으로 이란 모델에 따라 발전된 대만 자체의 비대칭 거부 능력이다.

대만이 지상기반 대함미사일, 해안방어체계, 기뢰, 드론 군집에 투자하는 것은 이란이 해협에서 불균형적인 지렛대를 확보하게 해준 바로 그 수단들이다. 이는 주력함이 지구상에서 가장 철저히 준비된 살상구역에 진입할 필요 없이 중국이 강압을 행사하는 비용을 높인다. 이란 전쟁은 올바른 비대칭 수단을 갖춘 결의에 찬 연안 방어자가 전통적으로 우월한 적에게 무엇을 강요할 수 있는지를 보여주었다. 대만 방어를 뒷받침하는 동맹 구조는 충돌이 시작된 뒤에 구축해서는 안 되며, 그 전에 마련돼야 한다.

결론: 전쟁을 있는 그대로 읽기

이란 전쟁은 실존적 연안 분쟁에서 비대칭적인 비용 감내 능력이 작동하는 역학을 전략적으로 이해하는 데 실패한 전쟁이었으며, 군사행동의 전제조건이 되었어야 할 동맹 구조의 부재가 이를 더욱 악화시켰다.

솔직한 분석에서 도출되는 군사적 해법은 구체적이고 실행 가능하다. 지향성 에너지와 소모성 무인체계는 이 전쟁 내내 미국에 불리하게 작용해온 비용 교환비를 뒤집는다. 수중 영역에서 작전하는 잠수함과 무인잠수정 전력은 수중 지형이 방어자에게 통로를 강제하는 이점을 제공하지 않기 때문에 해협을 효과적으로 둘러싸고 경쟁할 수 있다. 분쟁 지형 안에 배치된 지상 전력은 비대칭 논리를 뒤집어 적의 지리적 이점을 자신만의 무기가 아니라 함께 부담해야 하는 짐으로 만든다. 그리고 충돌이 진행되는 동안이 아니라 그 전에 구축된 진정한 동맹 구조는 비용 감내 부담을 연합 전체에 분산시켜, 실존적 이해관계가 걸린 적조차 쉽게 넘어설 수 없는 수준으로 끌어올린다.

이러한 처방은 대만 유사사태에 더욱 긴급하게 적용된다. 중국의 민족주의적 비용 감내 능력, 훨씬 우월한 A2/AD 구조, 동맹국의 억제 작전에 대비해 수십 년간 준비해온 상황은 이란 전쟁의 역학을 반복할 뿐 아니라 그 규모를 뛰어넘는 조건을 만들어낸다. 분산 억제 모델을 구축하고, 동맹국의 지상기반 타격 네트워크를 발전시키며, 수중 전력을 확대하고, 대만 자체의 비대칭 거부 능력을 확보해야 할 때는 충돌이 일어나기 전이다. 이란 전쟁은 그 틀과 경고, 작전 데이터를 제공했다. 이제 문제는 그것을 실행하는 것이다.

람비르 싱 만 퇴역 소장 박사는 37년 넘게 뛰어난 경력을 쌓은 인도 육군의 훈장을 받은 장교다. 그의 작전 경험에는 인도 아대륙에서의 상륙전과 연안전이 포함된다. 그는 인도 국방 체계에서 핵심적인 작전·전략·자문 보직을 수행했으며, 현재도 국토안보와 국제안보에 관한 논의에 영향을 미치고 있다. 그는 파리의 국방고등연구소(IHEDN)를 포함해 인도와 해외의 주요 군사교육기관을 졸업했다. 만 장군은 인도공과대학교 델리에서 박사학위를 받았으며, 그곳에서 방위산업정책과 절충교역, 그리고 이들이 국가안보에서 하는 역할을 연구했다.

대표 이미지: 알레이 버크급 유도미사일 구축함 USS 프랭크 E. 피터슨 주니어(DDG 121)가 2026년 2월 28일 ‘에픽 퓨리 작전’ 지원 작전 중 토마호크 지상공격미사일을 발사하고 있다. (미 해군 사진)

Contesting the Littoral Terrain: The Iran War and the Military Solution to Chokepoint Warfare | Center for International Maritime Security

Contesting the Littoral Terrain: The Iran War and the Military Solution to Chokepoint Warfare | Center for International Maritim

Warfighting

Contesting the Littoral Terrain: The Iran War and the Military Solution to Chokepoint Warfare

August 28, 2026 Guest Author 6 Comments

By Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired), Indian Army

The U.S.-Iran war has provided an operational test of American maritime power. Despite assembling a formidable naval force, conducting extensive strike campaigns and achieving consistent tactical success, the United States failed to control the Strait of Hormuz or sustain freedom of movement in the Red Sea. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), employing distributed fast attack craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, maritime mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munitions, along with the Houthis, effectively contest both waterways. In addition to restricting operations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, commercial shipping remains disrupted, generating global economic consequences, energy price spikes, supply chain delays and domestic inflation that continues to accumulate political pressure on the American war effort disproportionate to the military situation.

The core failure leading to this dilemma was one of strategic understanding. The United States applied a conventional maritime power-projection model built for adversaries with limited cost-tolerance and permissive maritime approaches, against an adversary fighting what it understood to be an existential conflict in its own littoral territory. Iran did and does not not need to defeat the U.S. Navy. It needs only to make the contest so long and costly that the United States will eventually choose to quit. Compounding this, the attempt to suppress Iran’s denial capability at its source failed structurally; the absence of a genuine alliance architecture from the outset removed the mechanism by which American cost-tolerance could have been collectively sustained. Below, this article discusses the  central lessons of the war.

The Cost-Tolerance Asymmetry and Why Conventional Responses Failed

When the decisive variable in a maritime contest is not firepower but the relative willingness of each party to absorb cost, conventional military responses will underperform regardless of their tactical effectiveness. This is the Iran war’s foundational lesson. The IRGCN’s asymmetric instruments –  cheap, dispersed, and rapidly reconstituting – were effective because they were difficult to destroy individually and because the aggregate cost of contesting them exceeded what the system, simultaneously absorbing the economic blowback of a contested strait, was prepared to sustain indefinitely. Iran, fighting existentially, had no equivalent constraint. This cost-exchange compounded the problem. Every Standard Missile which intercepted a cheap Iranian drone represented an exchange ratio that, sustained over months of operations, depleted American precision munitions stockpiles faster than industrial production can replenish. Every manned strike sortie against a dispersed fast boat concentration costed orders of magnitude more than the target it neutralized. The mathematics of attrition in asymmetric chokepoint warfare are designed deliberately, to favour the defender over time. A military solution to contested chokepoint warfare cannot be built on this exchange model but must seek to invert it.

The most direct military response to a distributed denial force is to destroy it at the source by striking command nodes, logistics networks, manufacturing facilities and supply chains. The United States and Israel attempted this comprehensively but did not achieve desired outcomes. Iran had spent four decades dispersing, hardening and building redundancy into its critical military infrastructure in anticipation of exactly this campaign. This was not adequately appreciated. The mobile launcher problem that frustrated Scud-hunting in the Gulf War was applied at institutional scale by the IRGCN: dispersed, mobile, and rapidly reconstituting systems are structurally resistant to suppression by strike, regardless of the precision or volume of fires applied.

Alliance Architecture – a Military Necessity

The United States entered the maritime contest without the alliance architecture that sustained chokepoint operations require. By committing to conflict without prior consultation with the allies most affected by the Hormuz Strait’s disruption, the United States created economic grievances among the partners whose naval capacity, basing access and political support were essential to sustaining the campaign. The operational consequence was an American force bearing the overwhelming majority of cost. The naval forces of allies, properly integrated under combined command with shared rules of engagement and equitable distribution of operational cost, would have materially changed the cost-tolerance equation. Alliance-building is therefore a military precondition for sustained chokepoint operations.

The Military Solution: Neutralising the Terrain

If suppression of the source fails and conventional power projection into the contested space is cost-unsustainable, the military solution must operate on a different logic entirely. The answer the Iran war points toward is the active neutralization of the geographic and asymmetric advantages the adversary has built within the contested terrain – contesting the chokepoint itself with instruments that impose on the adversary the same cost-exchange problem it has imposed. Iran achieved its strategic effects by positioning distributed, low-signature denial forces within and adjacent to the strait, making every American attempt to operate there expensive. The military solution is to do the same thing in reverse: make the adversary’s use of the terrain as costly.

Inverting the Cost Exchange: Directed Energy and Attritable Systems

The current exchange model of combat fiscally favours the adversary over any prolonged contest. Two complementary capabilities invert this ratio. Directed energy weapons, shipborne and shore-based laser systems and high-powered microwave emitters intercept drones and fast boat concentrations at a marginal cost once fielded, with no magazine depth constraint. Against the high-volume, low-cost threat that characterized IRGCN operations, directed energy offers the first cost-exchange model that structurally favours the contesting force rather than the denial force. Though these systems are still fledgling, the Iran war provides the operational urgency to field these systems at scale across the fleet and at shore-based positions adjacent to contested waterways.

Attritable unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and UAVs, deployed in large numbers as the primary friction-absorbers within the threat envelope, complete the inversion. When the platforms absorbing adversary fires are unmanned and genuinely expendable, costing a fraction of a destroyer or a manned aircraft, the adversary’s cost-exchange advantage disappears. At sufficient scale and combined with allied production-sharing, this model exhausts adversary precision munitions inventories faster than they can be replenished, reversing the attrition dynamic that has run against the United States throughout the conflict.

The Undersea Domain: Where Geography Cannot Canalize

The undersea domain is the one environment in which the littoral defender’s geographic advantage is most effectively neutralized. Attack submarines operating in the strait and its approaches can conduct surveillance, deliver precision strike and lay minefields without presenting the surface signature that activates adversary anti-access systems. Iran used maritime mines as a cheap denial instrument that imposed uncertainty and economic disruption across the entire commercial shipping community. The United States can apply the same instrument at greater scale and sophistication through submarine-delivered minefields contesting Iranian naval approach routes, complicating IRGCN fast boat operations, and imposing on Iran the same cost of uncertainty it has imposed on others. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) extend this capability further, operating in the shallowest and most geographically confined sections of the strait where manned submarines cannot easily go.

The undersea domain should be the primary domain of sea control operations in contested chokepoint environments. This is because submarines and UUVs present no viable target to the asymmetric denial systems that have proven most effective, and because the cost of undersea operations does not replicate the devastating exchange ratios that surface and air operations produce. Expanding submarine production capacity is the most direct and durable military response to the chokepoint problem this war has posed. It is a response whose value compounds as adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems become more sophisticated.

Contesting the Terrain: Land-Based Positioned Forces

The most structurally important military solution is also the one most directly derived from Iran’s own operational example. The relevance of small, low-signature Marine and special operations forces, positioned on islands and coastal terrain within or adjacent to contested chokepoints armed with long-range anti-ship missiles, drone swarms, electronic warfare systems and coastal surveillance networks is evident. These will impose a persistent, reconstituting threat on the adversary that cannot be suppressed without costly operations. Such forces positioned ashore within range of Iranian naval routes would cause the IRGCN to expend resources on suppression rather than on denial operations. Drone swarms launched from coastal positions degrade adversary surveillance and force dispersal rather than concentration. Electronic warfare embedded in the terrain contaminates the targeting networks on which adversary precision fires depend.

This concept does not replicate Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS) as it is not about projecting power onto inland objectives from a permissive maritime approach. Nor is it the Stand-in Forces (SIF) concept in its original Indo-Pacific framing. It is terrain contestation using the same geographic logic that Iran has exploited so effectively –  presence within the chokepoint, short supply lines, distributed and reconstitutable positioning, but as an offensive denial tool rather than a defensive one. The adversary that has made maritime terrain a weapon must find that terrain has become a shared burden rather than a private advantage.

Together, these three elements constitute an integrated military approach to chokepoint warfare that does not depend on suppressing the source, does not require forward-deploying irreplaceable capital ships into the highest-threat zones, and generates a cost-exchange ratio that can sustain even against an adversary with existential stakes.

Force Structure Implications

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains the most capable maritime task force ever assembled and carrier aviation retains decisive value in permissive and semi-permissive environments. The Iran war does not invalidate that value but it clarifies its limits. In contested chokepoints, the CSG is the wrong primary instrument: too detectable, too valuable to risk and too dependent on approach conditions that asymmetric adversaries are specifically organized to prevent. The CSG should be held in depth, committed only after terrain-contesting and undersea forces have imposed sufficient cost on the adversary’s denial capability to open a corridor of reduced-threat access. CSG employment follows conditions; it does not create them.

Naval force structure for littoral or choke point combat should therefore be rebalanced accordingly around the three priorities brought out above, that this war has validated as operationally decisive. These three capabilities, operating in combination with genuinely integrated allied naval contributions, constitute a cost-exchange model that can be sustained. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) security mission that has organized American naval strategy for generations must be restructured around this model with a tiered approach that prioritizes SLOCs directly serving American economic interests, while building genuine allied burden-sharing for the broader global maritime commons whose security no single navy can now afford to guarantee alone.

The Taiwan Parallel: China’s Existential Calculus

The operational lessons of the Iran war carry their most consequential implications not in the Persian Gulf but in the Western Pacific. Beijing has observed this conflict with the same analytical intensity that military historians apply to transformative wars. The Taiwan question presents a structural parallel for China: a great power attempting maritime force projection against a regional adversary for whom the conflict is existential.

However, the reverse is also true. Taiwan is central to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s historical narrative, to the political identity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to the domestic political standing of the leadership in Beijing. A Chinese leadership that fails to act on Taiwan under sufficient provocation would face an internal political crisis of the first order. This means that in any serious confrontation over Taiwan, China’s cost-tolerance would be structurally elevated and the cost-exchange dynamics of the Iran war would repeat at enormously greater scale.

China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) architecture in the Western Pacific vastly exceeds the IRGCN’s capabilities in scale, sophistication and depth. The anti-ship ballistic missiles, with ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, hold CSGs at risk well beyond the first island chain. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) submarine force, land-based aviation massed on the Fujian coast, and an integrated maritime surveillance network combining space, cyber and undersea sensors, create a threat environment that makes the Strait of Hormuz look manageable by comparison. And crucially, as the Iran war has demonstrated, striking the source of this capability will not reliably degrade it. Chinese A2/AD infrastructure is distributed, hardened and redundant in ways that reflect decades of preparation for exactly the kind of suppression campaign would be attempted.

The strategic prescription that flows from the Iran war applies directly: the United States and its allies must prepare for a Taiwan contingency on the basis that CSG-forward operations inside the first island chain represent an unacceptable risk to irreplaceable assets. The only option that does not accept catastrophic risk but maintains credible deterrence requires the following elements: the distributed deterrence model with forward-positioned land-based anti-ship missiles with Japan, the Philippines and Australia; expanded undersea presence within the first island chain; attritable unmanned systems at scale; and Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial capability developed explicitly on the Iranian model.

Taiwan’s investment in land-based anti-ship missiles, coastal defense systems, sea mines and drone swarms – the precise instruments that gave Iran disproportionate leverage in the strait – raises China’s cost of coercion without requiring capital ships to enter the most prepared kill zones on Earth. The Iran war has demonstrated what a determined littoral defender with the right asymmetric instruments can impose on a conventionally superior adversary. The alliance architecture supporting Taiwan’s defense must be built before any confrontation begins, not assembled in its aftermath.

Conclusion: Reading the War Honestly

The Iran war was a failure of strategic understanding of the dynamics of asymmetric cost-tolerance in existential littoral conflict compounded by the absence of an alliance architecture that should have been the precondition for military action.

The military solution that emerges from honest analysis is specific and actionable. Directed energy and attritable unmanned systems invert the cost-exchange ratio that has run against the United States throughout the conflict. Submarine and UUV forces operating in the undersea domain can effectively contest the chokepoint as undersea geography provides no canalization advantage to the defender. Land-based positioned forces within the contested terrain flip the asymmetric logic, making the adversary’s geographic advantage a shared burden rather than a private weapon. And genuine alliance architecture, built before conflict rather than during it, distributes cost-tolerance across the coalition to a level that an existential adversary’s threshold cannot easily exceed.

These prescriptions apply with even greater urgency to the Taiwan contingency, where China’s nationalist cost-tolerance, vastly superior A2/AD architecture and decades of preparation for allied suppression campaigns create conditions that will replicate and exceed the Iran war’s dynamics. The time to build the distributed deterrence model, develop allied land-based strike networks, expand undersea capacity and ensure Taiwan’s own asymmetric denial is the time before the confrontation. The Iran war has provided the template, the warning and the operational data.The question now is its implementation.

Major General (Dr.) Rambir Singh Mann (Retired) is a decorated Indian Army officer with over 37 years of distinguished service. His operational experience included amphibious and littoral warfare in the subcontinent. He has held pivotal operational, strategic and advisory roles in India’s defense establishment and continues to shape discourse in homeland and international security. He is a graduate of premier military education institutions in India and abroad, including the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHDEDN) in Paris. Gen. Mann is a Ph.D. from Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, where he researched defense industrial policy, defense offsets and their role in national security.

Featured image: Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121) fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy Photo)

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