유도탄 북한이 현재 10발 이하의 ICBM을 보유? 아마도 그보다는 많을 것.

[위종민]

5월 13일 DIA가 적대국의 전략미사일 전력을 추정한 보고서를 발간한 모양이네요. 북한이 2035년에 ICBM 50발을 보유할 것이라고 전망하면서 현재 ICBM 보유수는 10기 이하로 추정했는데, 그 추정이 너무 낮다고 주장하는 38north의 기사입니다. 생산된 TEL만 17~21대, 추가생산된 TEL만 27대라고... 

요청하신 기준에 따라 기사 전문을 자연스럽고 중립적인 한국어로 번역하였습니다. (원문 순서를 그대로 유지하며, 본문 편집이나 주석 없이 번역하였습니다.)



북한의 ICBM이 정말 그렇게 적은가? 반 H. 반 디펜 2025년 7월 1일

2025년 5월 13일, 미국 국방정보국(DIA)은 행정부의 ‘골든 돔(Golden Dome)’ 미사일 방어 시스템 공개의 일환으로 잠재적 적대국의 전략 미사일 전력의 현재와 2035년 규모를 추정했다. 대부분의 논평은 북한이 2035년에 50기의 대륙간탄도미사일(ICBM)을 배치할 것이라는 DIA의 전망에 초점을 맞췄지만, 현재 북한이 “10기 이하”의 ICBM만 배치하고 있다는 평가에는 거의 주목하지 않았다.

이렇게 낮은 현재 ICBM 배치 추정치는 놀랍다. 북한은 오랜 기간 ICBM 시험 발사를 해왔고, 그 기간 동안 이미 세 가지 다른 ICBM 체계가 배치되었다고 시사했으며, 17~21기의 완성된 이동식 ICBM 발사차량(TEL)이 존재하는 것으로 보이고, 최소 27기의 TEL이 계속 생산되고 있기 때문이다.

DIA 추정의 근거는 알려지지 않았으나, 기밀 정보, 관측된 발사대와 미사일의 상태에 대한 가정, 북한의 허위 배치 주장, 제한된 미사일이나 탄두 수량, 혹은 작전 배치로 간주하는 기준의 차이 등이 포함되었을 수 있다.

만약 북한의 ICBM 전력이 현재 그렇게 작다면 미국과 역내 안보, 특히 미국 본토 미사일 방어망에는 확실히 유리하다. 그러나 현재 상황과 무관하게, 공개 정보는 북한이 원한다면 2035년까지 50기 이상의 ICBM 전력을 보유할 잠재력이 있음을 더욱 강하게 시사한다. 예를 들어, 미국 미사일 방어망 확대에 대응하기 위해서이다.



공개 정보가 보여주는 ICBM 전력 규모

DIA의 상대적으로 작은 추정치를 의아하게 만드는 공개 정보는 다음과 같다.

ICBM 개발 연혁 북한은 8년 동안 ICBM을 시험 발사해왔으며, 2018년부터 ICBM 배치를 시사해왔다. 2024년까지 북한은 세 가지 다른 ICBM 체계가 배치되었다고 주장했다.

화성-15형(HS-15): 2017년 처음 시험 발사된 액체연료 ICBM으로, 김정은은 2018년 4월 “핵탄두 장착과 타격 수단 개발이 과학적으로 완료됐다”며 ICBM 시험이 더 이상 필요 없다고 선언했다. 그는 며칠 뒤 “미국 본토 전역이 핵타격 범위 안에 있으며, 핵 단추는 내 책상 위에 있다”고 강조했다. DIA는 2021년 10월 북한이 ICBM을 배치했다고 평가했는데, 당시 이는 사실상 HS-15를 의미했다. 북한 외무성은 2022년 2월과 4월 HS-15가 미국 본토를 타격권에 두고 있다고 언급했고, 2017년 김정은이 “군대를 이 시스템으로 무장시켰다”고 발표했다. 2023년 2월의 HS-15 발사는 부대 훈련으로 알려져, 여전히 작전 배치 상태임을 시사했다.

화성-17형(HS-17): 2022년 3월 처음 시험 발사된 대형 액체연료 ICBM으로, 2022년 11월 “배치 전 최종 시험 발사”를 완료했다고 보도됐다. 2023년 2월 열병식에서 HS-17 부대가 창설되었다는 징후가 포착되었으며, 같은 해 3월 발사는 “ICBM 부대의 전투 태세를 확인”했다고 전했다.

화성-18형(HS-18): 2023년 4월 처음 발사된 고체연료 ICBM으로, 2023년 12월 세 번째 발사에서 “ICBM 부대의 전투 능력을 입증”했다고 발표했다. 2024년 10월 김정은의 방문 당시 “전략 미사일 기지”에 최소 4기의 HS-18 TEL이 미사일 캔니스터와 함께 전투 대기 상태로 유지되고 있는 모습이 포착되었다.

이 모든 점을 고려하면, 현재 10기 이하의 ICBM만 배치되었다는 평가는 놀랍다.



이동식 발사차량(TEL) 생산

북한은 최근 몇 년간 10기 이상의 ICBM TEL이 존재하며, TEL 자체의 국산 생산이 진행되고 있음을 보여주는 사진과 영상을 공개해왔다.

HS-15 TEL 4기는 2018년, 2020년, 2022년의 열병식에서 동시에 포착되었으며, 2023년 2월 발사 당시에도 단일 TEL이 확인됐다. HS-17 TEL 12기는 2023년 2월 열병식에서 동시에 포착되었고, 이는 북한이 2010년 중국에서 도입한 WS-51200 6기보다 많은 ICBM TEL 섀시를 보유하고 있음을 시사한다. TEL 8기는 2023년 8월 평성 제316공장에서 건조 중인 모습이 공개되었으며, 2024년 1월과 5월에도 TEL 8기가 건조 중이었다. HS-18 TEL 5기는 2023년 2월 열병식에서, 4기는 2023년 7월 열병식과 2024년 10월 전략 미사일 기지 방문 때 포착됐다. TEL 19기는 2024년 5월 평성 공장에서 건조 중인 모습이 보도됐다.



작은 배치 추정의 근거

DIA는 “10기 이하” 배치 추정의 근거를 공개하지 않았다. 그러나 다음과 같은 이유가 고려될 수 있다.

모형 가능성: 일부 TEL이나 미사일은 발사 능력이 없는 열병식용 모형일 수 있다. 미국 정보는 2023년 2월 열병식에서 “비작전 체계”가 사용되었다고 평가했다.
미사일 생산 속도: TEL 생산이 미사일 생산보다 빠를 수 있다. 북한의 ICBM 생산 속도는 매우 느린 것으로 보인다.
배치 지연: 북한이 주장한 배치 시점이 부정확할 수 있다.
핵탄두 부족: 현재 약 50기의 핵탄두가 있으며, 이는 ICBM보다 전술핵 등 다른 무기체계에 우선 배분될 수 있다.
기준 차이: 미국 정보기관이 작전 배치로 간주하는 기준이 북한의 주장보다 더 엄격할 수 있다.



결론

북한의 미사일 및 핵활동에 대한 미국 정보 평가가 가장 권위 있는 것으로 간주되어야 하지만, 폐쇄적인 북한에 대한 정보 공백은 여전히 크다. 그러나 지난 8년간의 ICBM 시험, 세 가지 ICBM 체계 배치 주장, 17~21기의 TEL 존재, 27기의 추가 TEL 생산 등을 고려하면 현재 배치 수가 “10기 이하”라는 추정은 놀랍다. DIA가 기밀 정보를 보유하고 있을 가능성은 있지만, 북한은 2035년까지 원한다면 50기 이상의 ICBM 전력을 보유할 잠재력이 충분하다.



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Does North Korea Really Have So Few ICBMs? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

Does North Korea Really Have So Few ICBMs? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

Does North Korea Really Have So Few ICBMs?

• By: Vann H. Van Diepen
• July 1, 2025
• WMD

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Kim Jong Un oversees launch of Hwasong-17 ICBM in November 2022. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)

On May 13, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as part of the unveiling of the Administration’s “Golden Dome” anti-missile system, estimated the current and 2035 sizes of potential adversaries’ strategic missile forces. While much commentary focused on DIA’s projection that North Korea would deploy 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2035, little notice was given to the assessment that the North currently only deploys “10 or fewer” ICBMs.

Such a low estimate of current ICBM deployments is surprising given how long North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs, its suggestions that three different ICBM systems have already been deployed over that period, the apparent existence of some 17-21 potentially complete road-mobile ICBM launchers, and the apparent ongoing production of at least 27 others.

The basis for DIA’s estimate is unknown, but may have included factors such as classified intelligence, assumptions about the status of launchers and missiles observed, false North Korean claims about deployment status, limited missile or warhead availability, or even different standards of what is deemed operational.

US and regional security would certainly be better off if the North’s ICBM force was currently so small, not to mention US homeland missile defenses. Regardless of the current situation, open-source information points even more strongly to North Korea’s potential to have an ICBM force well in excess of 50 in 2035 if it so chooses—for example, to cope with expanding US missile defenses.

Open-Source Indications of ICBM Force Size

There are a number of open-source factors that make DIA’s relatively small estimate of the size of North Korea’s ICBM force surprising. They include:

ICBM development timeline. North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs for eight years, and indicating since 2018 that it has deployed ICBMs—allowing plenty of time for building up the ICBM force. By 2024, Pyongyang had suggested that three different ICBM systems had been deployed over those years.

• The liquid-propellant Hwasong-15 (HS-15), first flight-tested in 2017, is almost certainly the missile Kim Jong Un had in mind when declaring in April 2018 that ICBM tests were no longer necessary for the DPRK, “given that the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets was finished…and the development of delivery and strike means was also made scientifically.” Kim announced a few days later that “the whole of its [the US’s] mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.” DIA apparently assessed in October 2021 that the North had deployed ICBMs,[1] which at that time basically had to be HS-15s,[2] although an October 2024 DIA report listed North Korea as not having deployed ICBMs. The North’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically cited the Hwasong-15 in February and April 2022 in saying that its missiles were “putting the US mainland in the firing range.” A November 2022 press statement noted that in 2017 Kim “let the armed forces of the country be equipped with” the system. An HS-15 launch in February 2023 reportedly was a short-notice unit training drill, indicating that the missile was still operational.
• The large, liquid Hwasong-17 (HS-17), first flight-tested in March 2022, reportedly completed its “final test-fire” before deployment in November 2022. Various aspects of the parading of Hwasong-17s in February 2023 suggested the North considered the system deployed, including indications that an HS-17 unit had been created in November 2022 (as well as another possible ICBM unit). A March 2023 HS-17 launch, which reportedly “confirmed the war readiness” of the “ICBM unit” conducting the launch, further indicated that the North considered the system to be operational.
• The solid-propellant Hwasong-18 (HS-18), first launched in April 2023, apparently was considered operational by the North Koreans after the successful conduct of its third launch in December 2023. This reportedly was the “launching drill of an ICBM unit” that demonstrated the unit’s “combat capability.” The apparent presence of at least four HS-18 road-mobile launchers (transporter-erector-launchers, or TELs) w ith missile canisters at what North Korean media in October 2024 termed during a visit by Kim Jong Un a “strategic missile base” kept on “combat duty,” further indicates the North considers the system operational.

All of this makes it surprising that only as many as 10 ICBMs are currently deployed.

Mobile launcher (TEL) production. North Korea has released photos and videos over the past several years indicating more than 10 ICBM TELs exist, and that indigenous production of such TELs has been underway – suggesting that even more launchers exist and would be available for deployment by now.

• Four HS-15 TELs with apparent missiles have been seen at one time during North Korean military parades in February 2018, October 2020, and April 2022. The North has not released images of the HS-15 since showing a single TEL at the February 2023 launch noted above.
• Twelve HS-17 TELs with apparent missiles have been seen at one time during the February 2023 military parade, underscoring the fact that Pyongyang has more ICBM-sized TEL chassis available to it than the six Chinese-made WS-51200s reported to have been transferred to the North in 2010. Eight presumably additional TELs without missiles were shown under construction in August 2023 at the March 16 Factory in Phyongsong, an ICBM TEL production facility reportedly visited by Kim Jong Un; it is unclear whether these are the same eight TELs seen there in January and May
• Five HS-18 TELs with apparent missile canisters were seen during that same parade (for a total of 16 ICBM-sized TELs at one time), with four seen at the July 2023 parade and during Kim’s October 2024 visit to a “strategic missile base.” Nineteen presumably additional HS-18 TELs without canisters were seen under construction at the Phyongsong facility during another visit by Kim Jong Un, reported by the North Korean press in May 2024—up from 10 seen in January of that year.

Rationale for a Smaller Deployment Assessment

DIA did not disclose what type(s) of ICBM(s) were included in the “10 or fewer” deployed missiles, or the basis for its assessment. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the US has explicit intelligence on the size of North Korea’s ICBM force. In the absence of such data, DIA probably performed an all-source assessment drawing inferences from various indirect indicators. The following could be among the possible reasons that such an assessment might have resulted in a deployed ICBM number of “10 or fewer” despite the open-source ICBM development and TEL production factors noted above:

Some of what we saw were mock-ups. Some of the TELs (and/or the missiles or canisters they were carrying) seen in the various instances noted above could have been parade mock-ups or training items without launch capability. Media reporting of purported US intelligence documents claimed the North probably paraded “nonoperational systems” in February 2023 to exaggerate the size of its missile force. That said, the North has had over two years since then to build more operational TELs and missiles; it has not released photos of ICBM TEL production since May 2024.

Missile production lags TEL production. That same media reporting also claimed US intelligence assessed North Korea would probably be unable to produce enough operational ICBMs during the next year to equip all the launchers seen in February 2023. If this is the case, Pyongyang’s ICBM production is extremely slow, as it has had eight years from first flight-test to series-produce HS-15s, three years for HS-17s, and two years for HS-18s. There is no open-source information on North Korean ICBM production capacities or rates, but Pyongyang appears to be expanding its capability to produce rocket engines suitable for liquid-propellant ICBMs.

Deployment takes longer than the North suggests. North Korea has not directly announced the initial deployment of any of its ICBM types, and its media suggestions that deployment has commenced may be incorrect or misleading. If initial deployment of a given ICBM system took longer than the North suggested or has not yet occurred, then series production of the associated missiles has also lagged.

There may not be enough nuclear ICBM warheads yet. Open-source estimates generally credit North Korea with about 50 deployable nuclear warheads right now, with enough additional fissile material currently on hand to build some 40 more. There is no open-source information on its rate of warhead (as opposed to fissile material) production, and outside assessments of the amount of fissile material per warhead range substantially. Ten to twenty of those warheads are estimated to have been produced by 2017; these presumably were for other types of delivery systems because North Korea had not flight-tested ICBMs until then. Since 2017, Pyongyang has only expanded the numbers and types of non-ICBM systems it claims are associated with nuclear weapons, increasing the competition with ICBMs for the North’s relatively scarce nuclear warheads. The increasing profile since 2021 of “tactical nukes” was a clear motivation for Kim Jong Un’s December 2022 call for “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” and since then North Korea has expanded its weapons-grade plutonium and uranium production capabilities, and currently appears to be expanding its uranium enrichment capacity even further.

Methodological issues. During the Cold War, the US Intelligence Community (IC) used very strict criteria to determine when it considered Soviet ICBM systems had reached “initial operational capability” (IOC).[3] But the US had deep insight into a USSR that generally followed set and systematic missile development and deployment practices. North Korea historically has pursued a much less extensive and regularized development approach. Although the US IC certainly understands this, it is possible that the IC might take a stricter view than North Korea of what is necessary to regard missile systems as “deployed” or what adds to the deployed ICBM count.

The Bottom Line

US intelligence assessments generally should be regarded as the most authoritative on matters relating to Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear activities, although substantial intelligence gaps must almost certainly exist for the IC about the secretive “hard target” that is North Korea. Nonetheless, the available open-source information—the eight years North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs, its suggestions over that time that three different ICBM systems have already been deployed, the apparent existence of some 17-21 potentially complete ICBM TELs through February 2023, and the apparent ongoing production of at least 27 others through May 2024—makes it surprising that only “10 or fewer” North Korean ICBMs are estimated currently to be deployed. Several factors could explain DIA’s lower estimate, including the possibility it has pretty clear classified intelligence. Certainly, US and regional security would be better off if the North’s ICBM force was currently so small, not to mention US homeland missile defenses  Regardless of the current situation, open-source information on ICBM development, TEL production, and fissile material production point even more strongly to North Korea’s potential to have an ICBM force well in excess of 50 by 2035 if it so chooses—for example, to cope with expanding US missile defenses.

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1. [1]

   For example, page 20 refers to “ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory”; page 22 states that “The Strategic Force includes units operating…ICBMs…”; and page 41 states that “North Korea’s ballistic missile units control a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs.”

2. [2]

   The Hwasong-14 ICBM was flight-tested once in 2017 and has not been shown or mentioned by North Korea since being paraded on non-TEL towed launchers in February 2018. Analysts generally assess it had never been deployed.

3. [3]

   In the 1980s, the author was a member of the Ballistic Missile Systems Subcommittee (BMSS) of the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), the IC organization that, inter alia, declared Soviet (mostly) and other foreign missile systems operational.

[백선호]

20발 정도면 선제 공격 + 많은 요격 미사일로 무력화시킬 수도 있을 숫자일라나요?

[위종민]

발사를 허용하면, 방호가 안된 대도시엔 1, 2발이 떨어질 수도 있을 것 같긴 합니다. 물론 그 순간 평양 + @는 지도에서 지워지긴 할 텐데 위협용으론 의미있는 전력 수준일 것 같네요.