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BookStudyVol.I: IX. The Citizen and the Political Process
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_48
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Of Elections (1959)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_584
Richardson v. Ramirez (1974)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_1589
Oregon v. Mitchell (1970)
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/43-orig
Burdick v. Takushi (1992)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_535
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_32
Baker v. Carr (1962)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_6
Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_23
Shaw v. Reno (1993)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_357
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_204
California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_401
Bullock v. Carter (1972)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_128
Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1635
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party (1986)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_656
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_436
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_963
McIntyre v. Ohio (1995)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_986
McConnell v. FEC (2003)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1674
Randall v. Sorrell (2006)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_1528
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1872
Burson v. Freeman (1992)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1056
Bush v. Gore (2000)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966)
Facts of the case
Virginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states.
Question
Did the Virginia poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice William Douglas, the Court held the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. Overruling its own precedent in Breedlove v. Suttles (1937), the majority reasoned that the eligibility to vote has no rational connection to the wealth of an individual. Thus, the poll tax could not meet the heightened standard of review applied to restrictions on voting, which is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is important to note that there was no textual basis for this stark reversal, since the Twenty-fourth Amendment applied only to federal elections. This was an example of a situation in which the changing membership of the Court and changing attitudes in society propelled a change in the law.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the poll tax did pass the rational basis test. Harlan found that the state had a legitimate interest in collecting revenue. He felt that it was reasonable to think that people who were willing to pay to vote would have a greater interest in directing the course of state policy. According to Harlan, this type of classification was no less rational than the literacy test that the Court had upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1959).
Justice Hugo Black also dissented, arguing for a stricter adherence to precedent and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. He articulated a more traditional understanding of the Constitution as susceptible to extension only by the legislative process.
사건의 사실 버지니아 주민 애니 하퍼(Annie Harper)는 주에서 부과하는 인두세 $1.50를 납부할 수 없었습니다. 그녀는 인두세가 제14차 수정안의 평등 보호 조항에 따라 가난한 버지니아 주민들의 권리를 박탈했다고 주장하면서 소송을 제기했습니다. 연방 지방 법원은 인두세가 주의 권한 내에 있다고 판결한 1937년 미국 대법원의 결정에 부분적으로 근거하여 그녀의 주장을 기각했습니다.
질문 버지니아 인두세가 제14차 수정안의 평등 보호 조항을 위반했습니까?
결론 윌리엄 더글라스(William Douglas) 대법관이 작성한 6-3 결정에서 법원은 인두세가 평등 보호 조항을 위반했다고 판결했습니다. Breedlove v. Suttles (1937), 대다수는 투표 자격이 개인의 부와 합리적으로 연결되어 있지 않다고 추론했습니다. 따라서 인두세는 제14차 헌법 수정안에 따른 기본권인 투표 제한에 적용되는 강화된 심사 기준을 충족할 수 없었습니다. 24차 수정안이 연방 선거에만 적용되었기 때문에 이 극명한 반전에 대한 텍스트 근거가 없었다는 점에 유의하는 것이 중요합니다. 이것은 법원의 구성원 변화와 사회의 태도 변화가 법의 변화를 추진하는 상황의 한 예입니다. 존 마샬 할란 2세 대법관은 인두세가 합리적 근거 테스트를 통과했다고 주장하면서 반대했다. Harlan은 주정부가 수입을 징수하는 데 정당한 이해관계가 있음을 발견했습니다. 그는 투표를 위해 기꺼이 돈을 지불할 의향이 있는 사람들이 국가 정책의 과정을 지시하는 데 더 큰 관심을 가질 것이라고 생각하는 것이 합리적이라고 생각했습니다. Harlan에 따르면 이러한 유형의 분류는 법원이 Lassiter 대 Northampton 카운티 선거 관리 위원회(1959)에서 지지한 문해력 테스트보다 덜 합리적이었습니다. 휴고 블랙 (Hugo Black) 판사는 또한 판례와 제 14 차 수정안의 내용을보다 엄격하게 준수 할 것을 주장하면서 반대했다. 그는 헌법에 대한 보다 전통적인 이해가 입법 과정에 의해서만 확장될 수 있다고 분명히 밝혔습니다.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Of Elections (1959)
https://www.quimbee.com/cases/lassiter-v-northampton-county-board-of-elections
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lassiter_v._Northampton_County_Board_of_Elections
Syllabus
1. A State may, consistently with the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, apply a literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or color. Gunn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. Pp. 360 U. S. 50-53.
2. The North Carolina requirement here involved, which is applicable to members of all races and requires that the prospective voter "be able to read an write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language," does not, on its face, violate the Fifteenth Amendment . Pp. 360 U. S. 53-54.
248 N.C. 102,102 S.E.2d 853, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy started in a Federal District Court. Appellant, a Negro citizen of North Carolina, sued to have the literacy test for voters prescribed by that State declared unconstitutional and void. A three-judge court was convened. That court noted that the literacy test was part of a provision of the North Carolina Constitution that also included a grandfather clause. It said that
Page 360 U. S. 46
the grandfather clause plainly would be unconstitutional under Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. It noted, however, that the North Carolina statute which enforced the registration requirements contained in the State Constitution had been superseded by a 1957 Act, and that the 1957 Act does not contain the grandfather clause or any reference to it. But being uncertain as to the significance of the 1957 Act, and deeming it wise to have all administrative remedies under that Act exhausted before the federal court acted, it stayed its action, retaining jurisdiction for a reasonable time to enable appellant to exhaust her administrative remedies and obtain from the state courts an interpretation of the statute in light of the State Constitution. Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295.
Thereupon, the instant case was commenced. It started as an administrative proceeding. Appellant applied for registration as a voter. Her registration was denied by the registrar because she refused to submit to a literacy test as required by the North Carolina statute. [Footnote 1] She appealed to the County Board of Elections. On the de novo hearing before that Board, appellant again refused to take the literacy test, and she was again denied registration for that reason. She appealed to the Superior Court, which sustained the Board against the claim that the requirement of the literacy test violated the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Preserving her federal question, she appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court. 248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853.
Page 360 U. S. 47
The case came here by appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U.S. 916.
The literacy test is a part of § 4 of Art. VI of the North Carolina Constitution. That test is contained in the first sentence of § 4. The second sentence contains a so-called grandfather clause. The entire § 4 reads as follows:
"Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution in the English language. But no male person who was, on January 1, 1867, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under the laws of any state in the United states wherein he then resided, and no lineal descendant of any such person, shall be denied the right to register and vote at any election in this State by reason of his failure to possess the educational qualifications herein prescribed: Provided, he shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this section prior to December 1, 1908. The General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons, entitled to vote without the educational qualifications herein prescribed, and shall, on or before November 1, 1908, provide for the making of a permanent record of such registration, and all persons so registered shall forever thereafter have the right to vote in all elections by the people in this State, unless disqualified under section 2 of this article."
Originally, Art. VI contained in § 5 the following provision:
"That this amendment to the Constitution is presented and adopted as one indivisible plan for the regulation of the suffrage, with the intent and purpose to so connect the different parts, and to make them so dependent upon each other, that the whole shall stand or fall together. "
Page 360 U. S. 48
But the North Carolina Supreme Court in the instant case held that a 1945 amendment to Article VI freed it of the indivisibility clause. That amendment rephrased § 1 of Art. VI to read as follows:
"Every person born in the United States, and every person who has been naturalized, twenty-one years of age, and possessing the qualifications set out in this Article, shall be entitled to vote."
That court said that "one of those qualifications" was the literacy test contained in § 4 of Art. VI; and that the 1945 amendment
"had the effect of incorporating and adopting anew the provisions as to the qualifications required of a voter as set out in Article VI, freed of the indivisibility clause of the 1902 amendment. And the way was made clear for the General Assembly to act."
248 N.C. at 112, 102 S.E.2d at 860.
In 1957, the Legislature rewrote General Statutes § 163-28 as we have noted. [Footnote 2] Prior to that 1957 amendment, § 163-28 perpetuated the grandfather clause contained in § 4 of Art. VI of the Constitution, and § 163-32 established a procedure for registration to effectuate it. [Footnote 3] But
Page 360 U. S. 49
the 1957 amendment contained a provision that "[a]ll laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed." [Footnote 4] The federal three-judge court ruled that this 1957 amendment eliminated the grandfather clause from the statute. 152 F. Supp. at 296.
The Attorney General of North Carolina, in an amicus brief, agrees that the grandfather clause contained in Art. VI is in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment. Appellee maintains that the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the invalidity of that part of Art. VI does not impair the remainder of Art. VI, since the 1945 amendment to Art. VI freed it of its indivisibility clause. Under that view, Art. VI would impose the same literacy test as that imposed by the 1957 statute, and neither would be linked with the grandfather clause, which, though present in print, is separable from the rest, and void. We so read the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Appellant argues that that is not the end of the problem presented by the grandfather clause. There is a provision in the General Statutes for permanent registration in some counties. [Footnote 5] Appellant points out that,
Page 360 U. S. 50
although the cut-off date in the grandfather clause was December 1, 1908, those who registered before then might still be voting. If they were allowed to vote without taking a literacy test, and if appellant were denied the right to vote unless she passed it, members of the white race would receive preferential privileges of the ballot contrary to the command of the Fifteenth Amendment. That would be analogous to the problem posed in the classic case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, where an ordinance unimpeachable on its face was applied in such a way as to violate the guarantee of equal protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. But this issue of discrimination in the actual operation of the ballot laws of North Carolina has not been framed in the issues presented for the state court litigation. Cf. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 170 U. S. 225. So we do not reach it. But we mention it in passing so that it may be clear that nothing we say or do here will prejudice appellant in tendering that issue in the federal proceedings which await the termination of this state court litigation.
We come then to the question whether a State may, consistently with the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, apply a literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or color. The Court in Guinn v. United States, supra, at 238 U. S. 366, disposed of the question in a few words:
"No time need be spent on the question of the validity of the literacy test, considered alone, since, as we have seen, its establishment was but the exercise by the state of a lawful power vested in it not subject to our supervision, and, indeed, its validity is admitted."
The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 193 U. S. 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 179 U. S. 335, absent, of course, the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.
Page 360 U. S. 51
Article I, § 2 of the Constitution in its provision for the election of members of the House of Representatives and the Seventeenth Amendment in its provision for the election of Senators provide that officials will be chosen "by the People." Each provision goes on to state that "the Electors in each State shall the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." So, while the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed by the Constitution (Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 110 U. S. 663-665; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 661-662), it is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory, and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 313 U. S. 315. While § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for apportionment of Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers counting the whole number of persons in each State (except Indians not taxed), speaks of "the right to vote," the right protected "refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the state." McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 146 U. S. 39.
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record (Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 133 U. S. 345-347) are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show. [Footnote 6] Literacy
Page 360 U. S. 52
and intelligence are obviously not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet, in our society, where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise. Cf. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 946. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an "independent and intelligent" exercise of the right of suffrage. [Footnote 7] Stone v.
Page 360 U. S. 53
Smith, 159 Mass. 413-414, 34 N.E. 521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, however, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional standards.
Of course, a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot. No such influence is charged here. On the other hand, a literacy test may be unconstitutional on its face. In Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 873, affirmed, 336 U.S. 933, the test was the citizen's ability to "understand and explain" an article of the Federal Constitution. The legislative setting of that provision and the great discretion it vested in the registrar made clear that a literacy requirement was merely a device to make racial discrimination easy. We cannot make the same inference here. The present requirement, applicable to members of all races, is that the prospective voter "be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English
Page 360 U. S. 54
language." That seems to us to be one fair way of determining whether a person is literate, not a calculated scheme to lay springes for the citizen. Certainly we cannot condemn it on its face as a device unrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot.
Affirmed.
Richardson v. Ramirez (1974)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richardson_v._Ramirez
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_-GqiPanaU
Syllabus
After the three individual respondents, who had been convicted of felonies and had completed their sentences and paroles, were refused registration to vote in three different California counties respectively because of their felony convictions, they brought a class petition, on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated, for a writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court, naming as defendants the Secretary of State and the three county election officials who had denied them registration "individually and as representatives of the class of all other" county election officials in the State, and challenging the constitutionality of respondents' disenfranchisement on the ground, inter alia, that provisions of the California Constitution and the implementing statutes that disenfranchised ex-felons denied them equal protection. The three county officials named as defendants decided not to contest the action, and told the court they would henceforth register to vote ex-felons, including respondents, whose sentences and paroles had expired. Prior to the return date of the writ, the court added to the named defendants (instead of allowing her to intervene) another county election official (petitioner here) who was the defendant in a similar action by an ex-felon pending in the State Court of Appeal. After holding that the three first-named county officials' acquiescence did not render the case moot, the California Supreme Court went on to hold that the constitutional and statutory provisions in question, as applied to ex-felons whose sentences and paroles had expired, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but did not issue the peremptory writ.
Held:
1. In view of its unusual procedural history in the Supreme Court of California, the case is not moot. Pp. 418 U. S. 34-40.
(a) The State Supreme Court's action in adding petitioner as a named defendant after the other named county officials decided not to contest the action, and at a time when the Secretary of
Page 418 U. S. 25
State (who did not join in the petition to this Court) was still a party defendant who had answered the complaint, indicates that the court considered the suit to be not only on behalf of the three named plaintiffs, but also on behalf of all ex-felons in California similarly situated, and also that the court regarded petitioner's opponent in the Court of Appeal suit, both as an unnamed member of the class of ex-felons referred to in the complaint and as one of a class actually seeking to register in petitioner's county, as a party to the Supreme Court action. Pp. 418 U. S. 38-40.
(b) Being rendered in a class action in which relief in the nature of declaratory relief was granted, the decision below is not only binding on petitioner, and thus dispositive of her other suit, but also decides the federal constitutional question presented for the unnamed members of the classes represented below by petitioner and respondents, whose continuing controversy in the State Supreme Court still continues in this Court. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, distinguished. P. 418 U. S. 40.
2. California, in disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 418 U. S. 41-56.
(a) The understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 of the Amendment, which exempts from the sanction of reduced congressional representation resulting from the denial of citizens' right to vote the denial of such right for "participation in rebellion, or other crime," and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the franchise that this Court has held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 418 U. S. 54-55.
(b) Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection Clause, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement that was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation that § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement. P. 418 U. S. 55.
(c) Even if § 2 was made part of the Amendment "largely through the accident of political exigency, rather than for the relation which it bore to the other sections of Amendment,'" as respondents contend, this does not preclude looking to it for guidance in interpreting § 1, since § 2 is as much a part of the Amendment
Page 418 U. S. 26
as any of the other sections, and how it became part of the Amendment is less important than what it says and what it means. P. 418 U. S. 55.
9 Cal. 3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, reversed and remanded.
Richardson v. Ramirez
Opinion Announcement - June 24, 1974
Warren E. Burger
The disposition of number 72-1589, Richardson against Ramirez and 73-507 Hamling against the United States, 73-557, Jenkins against Georgia will each be announced by Mr. Justice Rehnquist.
William H. Rehnquist
In Richardson versus Ramirez, the three individual respondents in the case had been convicted of felonies and had completed the service of their sentences and paroles.
When they sought to register to vote, county election officials in three California counties in which they resided, refused to register them because the California Constitution and implementing legislation prohibited voting by ex-felons.
The individual respondents then brought this mandamus action in the Supreme Court of California against the election officials, individually and as representatives of the class of all such election officials.
They claimed on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felon similarly situated that the California provisions disenfranchising ex-felons denied them equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The California Supreme Court held that the challenged California constitutional and statutory provisions as applied to ex-felons whose sentences and paroles had expired did violate the Equal Protection Clause.
We reverse that holding.
We hold first that in view of the unusual procedural history of this case in the Supreme Court of California, it is not moot.
We further hold that the California does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection Clause could not have been meant to bar outright the disenfranchisement of felons when their disenfranchisement is expressly exempted by Section 2 of the same amendment from the less drastic sanction imposed by that Section for other forms of disenfranchisement.
We further refer to contemporaneous historical materials illuminating understanding of the framers of the amendment in an opinion filed with the clerk today.
Mr. Justice Douglas has filed a dissenting statement.
Mr. Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan has joined and in Part 1 (a) of which Mr. Justice Douglas joins.
Oregon v. Mitchell (1970)
Facts of the case
In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.
사건의 사실 1970년 의회는 주 및 연방 선거의 투표 연령을 21세에서 18세로 낮추고, 투표소에서 문맹 퇴치 테스트를 사용하는 것을 금지하고, 주 거주 요건에 따라 대통령 및 부통령 선거에서 유권자의 자격을 박탈하는 것을 금지하는 투표권법 수정안을 통과시켰습니다. 오레곤 주, 애리조나 주, 아이다호 주, 텍사스 주는 소송을 제기했으며 이 수정안이 헌법이 주에 대해 보유하고 있는 권리를 침해한다고 주장했습니다.
Question
Does the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 infringe on the rights the Constitution reserves for the states?
질문 1970년 투표권법 수정안은 헌법이 주에 대해 보유하는 권리를 침해합니까?
Conclusion
Yes, in part and no in part. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress had the power to enact the amendments that changed the voting age for federal elections, abolish literary tests at the polling station, and abolish state residency requirements for presidential and vice presidential election. However, the Court held that lowering the voting age for state and local election was beyond Congressional purview.
The Court held that the Framers intended for Article I Section 4 of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant the States the power to make the laws that govern elections and for Congress to have the power to alter the laws if necessary. The Court also held that the legislative history surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments support the role that Congress plays in preventing racial discrimination in the electorate without denying the states their rights. Without evidence that the states use the 21-year-old voting requirement to discriminate based on race in state and local elections, Congress does not have the right to intervene. The Court held that the literacy test bans were constitutional under the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority’s ruling in regards to reducing the voting age in state and local elections. He argued that, because voting is a “fundamental right,” which Congress ensures under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress could legislate voting age at the state level as well as the federal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could prohibit literacy tests but disagreed on the issue of Congress’ ability to impose regulations on voting age and state residency requirements. He argued that the legislative history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment supported the preeminence of the right of the states to legislate voting. Since the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the right to legislate voting requirements, the right is reserved to the states. Without evidence that people between 18 and 21 and people who do not meet state residency requirements are being unconstitutionally discriminated against, Congress cannot intervene.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress cannot legislate voting age in state and local elections. They argued that, while the states have the right to determine qualifications for voting, Congress has the right to legislate the exercise of this power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 18-year-olds are treated as full adults under other aspects of the law, there is evidence that 18- to 21-year-olds are being denied voting rights to which they are entitled, and Congress has every right to intervene.
Justice Potter Stewart also wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could legislate voting laws in federal elections. He wrote that the Framers clearly intended the right to legislate voting to be reserved for the states and that the Constitution does not allow Congress to supersede that right without a compelling interest. He argued that the age qualification did not represent a compelling interest to allow Congress to enact legislation on the issue.
예, 부분적으로, 부분적으로는 아니오. Hugo L. Black 판사는 5-4 다수결의 의견을 전달했습니다. 대법원은 연방 선거의 투표 연령을 변경하고, 투표소에서의 문학 시험을 폐지하고, 대통령 및 부통령 선거에 대한 주 거주 요건을 폐지하는 수정안을 제정할 권한이 의회에 있다고 판결했습니다. 그러나 법원은 주 및 지방 선거의 투표 연령을 낮추는 것은 의회의 권한을 벗어난다고 판결했습니다. 법원은 헌법 제정자들이 헌법 제1조 제4항과 필요하고 적절한 조항을 통해 주에 선거를 규율하는 법률을 제정할 수 있는 권한을 부여하고 필요한 경우 의회가 법률을 변경할 수 있는 권한을 갖도록 의도했다고 판결했습니다. 법원은 또한 제13차, 제14차, 제15차 및 제19차 수정안의 제정 및 시행을 둘러싼 입법 역사가 의회가 주의 권리를 부정하지 않으면서 유권자의 인종 차별을 방지하는 역할을 지지한다고 판결했습니다. 주정부가 주 및 지방 선거에서 인종에 따라 차별하기 위해 21세의 투표 요건을 사용한다는 증거가 없으면 의회는 개입할 권리가 없습니다. 법원은 문맹 퇴치 시험 금지가 제 15 차 수정안의 시행 조항에 따라 합헌이라고 판결했다. 윌리엄 O. 더글라스 대법관은 부분적으로 동의하고 부분적으로 반대했다. 그는 주 및 지방 선거에서 투표 연령을 낮추는 것과 관련하여 다수결의 판결에 동의하지 않았습니다. 그는 투표가 의회가 평등 보호 조항에 따라 보장하는 "기본권"이기 때문에 의회는 연방 차원뿐만 아니라 주 차원에서도 투표 연령을 입법화할 수 있다고 주장했습니다. 존 M. 할런 대법관은 부분적으로 동의하고 부분적으로 반대했다. 그는 의회가 문맹 퇴치 시험을 금지할 수 있다는 다수의견에 동의했지만 투표 연령 및 주 거주 요건에 대한 규정을 부과할 수 있는 의회의 능력 문제에 대해서는 동의하지 않았습니다. 그는 제 14 차 수정안을 둘러싼 입법 역사가 투표권을 입법화하는 주정부의 우월성을 뒷받침한다고 주장했다. 헌법은 의회에 투표 요건을 입법화할 권리를 명시적으로 부여하지 않기 때문에 그 권리는 주에 있습니다. 18세에서 21세 사이의 사람들과 주 거주 요건을 충족하지 못하는 사람들이 위헌적으로 차별을 받고 있다는 증거가 없으면 의회는 개입할 수 없습니다.
윌리엄 J. 브레넌 주니어 대법관, 바이런 R. 화이트 대법관, 서굿 마샬 대법관은 일부는 동의하고 일부는 반대하는 의견을 작성했습니다. 그들은 의회가 주 및 지방 선거에서 투표 연령을 입법화할 수 없다는 다수파의 의견에 동의하지 않았습니다. 그들은 주정부가 투표 자격을 결정할 권리가 있지만 의회는 제 14 차 수정안의 평등 보호 조항에 따라이 권한의 행사를 입법 할 권리가 있다고 주장했다. 18세는 법의 다른 측면에 따라 완전한 성인으로 취급되기 때문에 18세에서 21세 사이의 청소년이 자신이 받을 수 있는 투표권을 거부당하고 있으며 의회가 개입할 모든 권리가 있다는 증거가 있습니다. 포터 스튜어트(Potter Stewart) 대법관도 일부는 동의하고 일부는 반대하는 의견을 썼다. 그는 의회가 연방 선거에서 투표법을 제정할 수 있다는 다수의견에 동의하지 않았습니다. 그는 헌법 제정자들이 투표권을 입법화할 수 있는 권리를 주를 위해 유보할 것을 분명히 의도했으며 헌법은 의회가 강력한 이해 관계 없이 그 권리를 대체하는 것을 허용하지 않는다고 썼습니다. 그는 연령 자격이 의회가 이 문제에 대한 법안을 제정할 수 있도록 하는 강력한 관심을 나타내지 않는다고 주장했습니다.
Burdick v. Takushi (1992)
Syllabus
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
BURDICK v. TAKUSHI, DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS OF HAWAII, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-535. Argued March 24, 1992-Decided June 8, 1992
Petitioner, a registered Honolulu voter, filed suit against respondent state officials, claiming that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting violated his rights of expression and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court ultimately granted his motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prohibition, taken as part of the State's comprehensive election scheme, does not impermissibly burden the right to vote.
Held: Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 432-442.
(a) Petitioner assumes erroneously that a law that imposes any burden on the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. This Court's cases have applied a more flexible standard: A court considering a state election law challenge must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justification for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788-789. Under this standard, a regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance only when it subjects the voters' rights to "severe" restrictions. Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 289. If it imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon those rights, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Anderson, supra, at 788. Pp. 432-434.
(b) Hawaii's write-in vote prohibition imposes a very limited burden upon voters' rights to associate politically through the vote and to have candidates of their choice placed on the ballot. Because the State's election laws provide easy access to the primary ballot until the cutoff date for the filing of nominating petitions, two months before the primary, any burden on the voters' rights is borne only by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until shortly before the primary. An
429
interest in making a late rather than an early decision is entitled to little weight. Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736. Pp. 434-439.
(c) Hawaii's asserted interests in avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election and in guarding against "party raiding" during the primaries are legitimate and are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting ban imposes upon voters. Pp. 439-440.
(d) Indeed, the foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that where, as here, a State's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, a write-in voting prohibition will be presumptively valid, since any burden on the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice will be light and normally will be counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme. Pp.441-442.
937 F.2d 415, affirmed.
Burdick v. Takushi Opinion Announcement - June 08, 1992 William H. Rehnquist
I have the opinion of the Court to announce in No. 91-535 Burdick against Takushi.
This case involves Hawaii's prohibition against Write-in voting and its primaries.
In an opinion authored by Justice White, we hold that this provision does not infringe on petitioner's rights to vote under the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Kennedy has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens concur.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)
Facts of the case
An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.
Question
Did the redrawing of Tuskegee's electoral district boundaries violate the Fifteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans.
The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.
사건의 사실 앨라배마 주의회의 법안은 Tuskegee의 선거구 경계를 다시 그려 지역이었던 지역을 28면의 정사각형 모양으로 대체했습니다. 새로운 구역의 효과는 본질적으로 모든 흑인을 터스키기의 도시 경계에서 배제하고 백인이 살지 않는 구역에 배치하는 것이었습니다.
질문 Tuskegee의 선거구 경계를 다시 그리는 것이 제15차 수정안을 위반했습니까?
결론 주정부는 아프리카 계 미국인에 대한 평등 한 대표성을 거부 할 목적으로 선거구 사이에 경계선을 구성 할 때 제 15 차 수정안을 위반합니다. 만장일치로 법원은 앨라배마 주의회가 제 15 차 수정안을 위반했다고 판결했습니다. 프랑크푸르터 판사는 국가가 "전적으로 국가 이익의 영역 내에서" 권력을 행사할 때 사법 심사로부터 격리된다는 점을 인정했습니다. 그러나 이 경우 앨라배마의 대표자들은 이 법이 제공하도록 설계된 "상쇄되는 지방 자치 단체 기능"을 식별할 수 없었습니다. 법원은 불규칙한 모양의 선거구가 흑인의 정치 권력을 박탈하는 단 하나의 목적을 염두에 두고 그려졌다고 믿었습니다.
Baker v. Carr (1962)
Facts of the case
Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.
Question
Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?
Conclusion
In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.
Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart filed separate concurring opinions.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented.
사건의 사실 Charles W. Baker와 다른 테네시 시민들은 주 총회 의석을 할당하기 위해 고안된 1901년 법이 사실상 무시되었다고 주장했습니다. 베이커의 소송은 테네시주의 재할당 노력이 어떻게 테네시주 내의 상당한 경제 성장과 인구 이동을 무시했는지 자세히 설명했습니다.
질문 대법원은 입법 배분 문제에 대한 관할권을 가지고 있었습니까?
결론 "정치적 문제"의 성격과 그에 대한 법원 조치의 적절성을 탐구한 의견에서 법원은 이 사건에서 답변해야 할 그러한 질문이 없으며 입법 배분이 정당한 문제라고 판결했습니다. 브레넌 대법관은 다수의견에서 대법원이 국가 행정 및 국정을 수행하는 공무원과 관련된 문제에 대한 헌법 위반을 시정하기 위해 개입한 과거 사례를 제시했습니다. Brennan은 Baker와 다른 사람들이 이 사건에서 제기한 제14차 수정헌법 평등 보호 문제가 사법 평가를 받을 가치가 있다고 결론지었습니다. 더글러스, 클라크, 스튜어트 대법관은 별도의 동의 의견을 제출했습니다. 프랑크푸르터 대법관은 할런 대법관과 함께 반대 의견을 냈다.
Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
Facts of the case
In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.
Question
Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances?
Conclusion
Equal protection requires that state legislative districts should be comprised of roughly equal populations if possible.
In an 8-to-1 decision authored by Justice Earl Warren, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.
Justice Stewart concurred, agreeing with Warren that the Court could intervene to address egregious situations of misapportionment, Stewart sought to limit the application of this decision to clear violations of equal protection. He felt wary of imposing specific guidelines on states for how to redraw the district lines or setting a certain range of ratios that would be acceptable.
Justice Harlan dissented, applying an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in his opinion had not been meant by the drafters to protect voting rights. He suggested that the Court was intruding on federalism principles protecting the states in their control of local matters.
Justice Clark concurred in a separate opinion.
사건의 사실 1961년 M.O. Sims, David J. Vann(Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell(McConnell v. Baggett) 및 앨라배마주 Jefferson 카운티의 다른 유권자들은 주 의회의 할당에 이의를 제기했습니다. 선거구를 나누는 선은 선거구 간에 극적인 인구 불일치를 초래했습니다. 주 헌법은 카운티와 상원 선거구당 최소 한 명의 하원의원을 요구했습니다. 그러나 버밍엄 근처에 있는 제퍼슨 카운티의 선거구에는 주의 다른 선거구보다 41배나 많은 유권자가 있었습니다. 심스와 다른 유권자들은 이러한 비례성의 결여가 공화당 정부 형태에 효과적으로 참여하는 것을 방해한다고 주장했다.
질문 앨라배마의 배분 계획은 인구 차이에 관계없이 카운티 당 최소 한 명의 대표를 의무화하고 상원 의원만큼 많은 상원 선거구를 만들어 제 14 차 수정안의 평등 보호 조항을 위반 했습니까?
결론 평등한 보호를 위해서는 주 입법부 선거구가 가능하면 거의 동일한 인구로 구성되어야 합니다. 얼 워렌(Earl Warren) 대법관이 작성한 8대 1 판결에서 법원은 평등 보호 조항이 "모든 시민을 위한 실질적으로 평등한 주 입법 대표성"을 요구한다고 주장하면서 앨라배마 시스템에 대한 도전을 지지했습니다. 대법원은 직접 대표권이 "우리 정치 체제의 기반"이라는 점을 지적하면서 양원제 주 입법부의 양원이 인구 기준으로 배분되어야 한다고 판결했습니다. 국가는 가능한 한 인구가 거의 동일한 지구를 건설하기 위해 "정직하고 선의의의" 노력을 기울여야 했습니다. 스튜어트 대법관은 법원이 심각한 배당 부정 상황을 해결하기 위해 개입할 수 있다는 워렌의 의견에 동의하면서 평등한 보호에 대한 위반을 명확히 하기 위해 이 결정의 적용을 제한하려고 했습니다. 그는 선거구 경계선을 다시 그리는 방법에 대한 특정 지침을 주에 부과하거나 수용 가능한 특정 비율 범위를 설정하는 것을 경계했습니다. Harlan 판사는 반대 의견을 표명하여 제14차 헌법 수정안에 대한 독창적인 해석을 적용했는데, 그의 의견으로는 초안 작성자가 투표권을 보호하기 위한 의도가 아니었습니다. 그는 법원이 지역 문제를 통제하는 주를 보호하는 연방주의 원칙을 침해하고 있다고 제안했습니다. 클라크 대법관은 별도의 의견에 동의했다.
Shaw v. Reno (1993)
Facts of the case
The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Question
Did the North Carolina residents' claim, that the State created a racially gerrymandered district, raise a valid constitutional issue under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
Conclusion
Yes. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan.
사건의 사실 미국 법무장관은 노스캐롤라이나 의회 재할당 계획이 흑인이 다수인 선거구를 단 한 곳만 만들었기 때문에 거부했습니다. 노스캐롤라이나주는 흑인이 다수인 두 개의 선거구를 만드는 두 번째 계획을 제출했습니다. 이 지역 중 하나는 부분적으로 뻗어 있는 주간 도로보다 넓지 않았습니다. 노스캐롤라이나 주민 5명은 이 특이한 모양의 선거구의 합헌성에 이의를 제기하면서 이 선거구의 유일한 목적이 추가 흑인 대표의 선출을 확보하는 것이라고 주장했습니다. 3명의 판사로 구성된 지방 법원이 헌법 주장을 진술하지 않았다고 판결한 후 주민들은 항소했고 대법원은 증명서를 승인했습니다.
질문 노스캐롤라이나 주가 인종적으로 게리맨더링된 지역을 만들었다는 노스캐롤라이나 주민들의 주장이 제14차 수정안의 평등 보호 조항에 따라 유효한 헌법 문제를 제기했습니까?
결론 예. 법원은 노스캐롤라이나의 재할당 계획이 겉보기에는 인종적으로 중립적이었지만 그 결과 선거구 모양이 인종에 따라 유권자를 다른 선거구로 분리하려는 노력을 구성했음을 시사할 만큼 기이하다고 판결했습니다. 특이한 지역은 아마도 고귀한 의도에 의해 만들어졌지만 인종 불균형을 피하기 위해 합리적으로 필요한 것을 초과하는 것 같았습니다. 주민들의 주장이 평등한 보호 문제를 야기했다고 결론을 내린 후, 법원은 모순되는 증거가 없는 경우 지방 법원은 일부 강력한 정부 이익이 노스캐롤라이나의 계획을 정당화하는지 여부를 결정해야 한다고 덧붙였습니다.
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)
Facts of the case
In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.
The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.
Question
Did the Texas legislature violate the Constitution and and the Voting Rights Act when it used 2000 census data to redistrict in 2003 for partisan advantage, resulting in districts that (by 2003 numbers) did not conform to the one person, one vote standard?
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at least once every ten years.
사건의 사실 2003년 텍사스 주 의회는 2000년 인구 조사 이후 연방 판사가 만든 계획을 대체하는 선거구 재조정 계획을 통과시켰습니다. 이 계획에 대한 비평가들은 이 계획이 소수 인종의 투표력을 희석시키고 당파적 이점을 극대화하기 위해 고안되었기 때문에 위헌이며 투표권법 섹션 2를 위반했다고 비난했습니다. 3명의 판사로 구성된 지방 법원 패널은 이 계획이 합헌이며 입법부가 2000년의 인구 조사 데이터를 사용하여 2003년에 선거구를 재조정할 권리가 있다고 판단하여 동의하지 않았습니다. 이 사건은 미국 대법원에 상소되었지만 계류 중인 동안 법원은 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 펜실베니아의 또 다른 선거구 재조정 사례. 이 사건의 결정적인 투표자인 앤서니 케네디 대법관은 법원이 선거구 재조정 사건에서 당파적 차별에 대한 주장을 들을 수 있지만 그러한 주장이 받게 될 시험에 대한 질문은 열어두었다고 썼습니다. 이 사건의 3개 선거구 패널은 텍사스 선거구 재조정 계획이 실질적으로 불공정하지 않다는 것을 발견하여 이전 결정을 확인했습니다.
질문 텍사스 주의회가 2000년 인구 조사 데이터를 사용하여 2003년에 당파적 이익을 위해 선거구를 재조정하여 (2003년 수치로) 1인 1표 기준을 준수하지 않는 선거구를 만들었을 때 헌법과 투표권법을 위반했습니까?
결론 대법원은 텍사스 주의회의 선거구 재조정 계획이 헌법을 위반한 것은 아니지만 계획의 일부가 투표권법을 위반했다고 판결했습니다. 앤서니 케네디(Anthony Kennedy) 대법관은 대법관 과반수를 대변하여 라틴계 유권자들이 자신이 선택한 후보자를 선출할 기회를 거부하는 방식으로 23지구가 다시 그려졌다고 말했습니다. 따라서 투표권법을 위반했습니다. 그러나 케네디 대법관은 또한 헌법의 어떤 조항도 주가 적어도 10년에 한 번 선거 경계를 원하는 만큼 다시 그리는 것을 막지 못한다고 썼습니다.
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry Opinion Announcement - June 28, 2006 John G. Roberts, Jr.
Justice Kennedy has the opinion in 05-204, League of United Latin American Citizens versus Perry, and the consolidated cases.
Anthony M. Kennedy
These are consolidated cases that come to us on appeal on the appellants’ challenge, a Congressional redistricting map that the Texas Legislature enacted in 2003.
That 2003 legislative plan replaced a 2001 map.
The 2001 map had been drawn by the United States District Court in earlier litigation.
As the Court has organized the cases, we address three main issues that are presented on the appeals: as to some of the issues there is a judgment on the Court, as to other … of the Court, as to other issues there is an opinion for the Court, and I’ll proceed through those three in order.
First, the appellants contend that the new plan is an unconstitutional statewide political gerrymander.
They attack the congressional districting statewide.
Second, they argue that the plan’s elimination of Congressional District 24 dilutes the Voting Rights Act -- the voting rights of African-Americans in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
The Section 2 prohibits district lines being drawn in a manner that dilutes the votes of the minority group, so long as that group can satisfy the criteria known as the Gingles factors or, you know, jurisprudence.
The third claim is also a Section 2 claim.
There, the appellants challenge the plan’s alteration to District 23 as an unlawful dilution of the voting rights of Latinos in that district.
The District Court ruled against the appellants on all of these three claims.
First, as to the statewide gerrymandering, two terms ago in a case named Vieth versus Jubelirer, five members of this Court agreed that such a claim presents a controversy capable of judicial resolution.
We do not revisit that question, but we do conclude that the appellant’s statewide partisan gerrymandering claims must fail in this case.
The appellants argue this case is different than Vieth and point to the mid-decade character of the plan’s enactment.
They assert the plan was solely motivated by partisan objectives that serve no legitimate purpose and burdened one political group.
Neither the Constitution nor Federal Statutes indicate that it is inherently suspect for a legislature to replace a court-ordered plan with one of its own, and the fact of a mid-decade redistricting alone is no sure indication of an unlawful political gerrymandering.
At the very end of this claim, the appellants contend that the 2003 plan violates the Constitution’s one person/one vote requirement, and this argument, which depends entirely on reasoning that mirrors the attack on the mid-decade redistricting, similarly fails.
The challenge to the statewide redistricting as an unconstitutional gerrymandering therefore is rejected.
On this aspect of the case, the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Alito, concur in the judgment; Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, would dismiss these claims as nonjusticiable; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer join the portion of the judgment declining to revisit justiciability.
Justices Souter and Ginsburg join in rejecting the appellant’s one person/one vote claim; and Justice Stevens in a separate opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, would have found a statewide unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.
So the second claim refers to District 24.
The appellant’s contend that the new plan’s elimination of former District 24 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
They argue that because African-American voters control this Dallas district, its elimination unlawfully dilutes their voting rights.
Prior to the 2003 plan, District 24 voters had elected an Anglo Democrat by the name of Martin Frost in every election since 1978.
Even if African-Americans in the old District 24 can state a vote-dilution claim with only 25% of the voting population, they cannot surmount the District Court’s rejection of their questionable evidence about their ability to elect an African-American candidate of their choice.
The Chief Justice and Justice Alito join my opinion on this point; Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas rely on their position, stated in an earlier case of Holder v. Hall, concur in the judgment on the grounds that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to challenges such as these; in a separate opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter would have held that a minority group comprising less than 50% of a district’s voting population can state a Section 2 vote-dilution claim; Justice Souter also concluded that Congressman Frost’s support in the African-American community showed he was their candidate of choice, and for these reasons he would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings; Justice Stevens would have found the elimination of District 24 to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.
So the judgment of the Court on this issue is that the challenge to the drawing of the lines for the new District 24 is rejected.
That brings us to District 23.
In order to protect a Republican incumbent who was losing support from Latino voters, the effect of the new plan on District 23 was to bring in more Republican voting Anglos while reducing the number of Latinos.
These changes, of course, required an adjustment elsewhere.
This resulted in the new District 25, a long, thin strip of land stretching from Austin to the Mexican border.
The new District 23 is not a Latino-opportunity district, and appellants contend this change violates Section 2.
This part of the case is disposed of by an opinion of the Court, written by me and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Unlike in former District 24, the Gingles requirements for stating a threshold claim under Section 2 are satisfied for old District 23.
There is no dispute that old District 23’s Latinos are politically cohesive and that voting in the district was racially polarized.
The group of Latino voters in old District 23 is also sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.
The creation of a new District 25, we hold, does not offset this loss.
The District Court found that new District 25 would consistently elect a Latino candidate of choice, but in our view that does not suffice.
The District Court did not appreciate that creating a noncompact district fails to compensate for dismantling a compact-opportunity district.
Having found the threshold considerations for Section 2 claim satisfied, we look to the totality of the circumstances.
After doing so, we conclude that the elimination of the opportunity district violates Section 2.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Alito, would have found no Section 2 violation with respect to Section 23; he would have concluded that new District 25 was an effective minority-opportunity district and that, even if it were not, the totality of the circumstances weighed against finding a Section 2 violation; Justices Scalia and Thomas concur in that dissenting position, again for the reasons that they stated in Holder versus Hall.
In summary, because the 2003 Plan violates Section 2, the Court does not address the claim that use of race in politics in drawing District 23 violates equal protection under the First Amendment Clause.
The Court also does not address the claim of equal-protection violation in the drawing of District 25; Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito, would have concluded the Texas had a strong basis for believing that new District 25 was necessary to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
He has concluded that because compliance with Section 5 is a compelling State interest, the district popularly rejected the race-based equal-protection challenge to District 25.
In summary, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000)
Facts of the case
In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Question
Does California's voter approved Proposition 198, which changes its partisan primary from a closed primary to a blanket primary, violate political parties' First Amendment right of association?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States."
사건의 사실 캘리포니아에서 공직 후보자는 자격을 갖춘 정당의 예비선거에서 승리함으로써 일반 투표용지에 접근할 수 있습니다. 1996년 발의안 198호에 찬성한 발의안 198은 캘리포니아의 정당 예비선거를 정당 당원들만 후보자에게 투표할 수 있는 비공개 예비선거에서 각 유권자의 투표용지에 정당 소속에 관계없이 모든 후보자를 나열하고 유권자가 그 중에서 자유롭게 선택할 수 있도록 하는 포괄적인 예비선거로 변경했습니다. 가장 많은 표를 얻은 각 정당의 후보가 총선에서 그 정당의 후보입니다. 캘리포니아 민주당, 캘리포니아 공화당, 캘리포니아 자유당, 평화자유당은 역사적으로 비당원이 당의 예비선거에서 투표하는 것을 금지했습니다. 각 정당은 캘리포니아 주 국무 장관 인 빌 존스 (Bill Jones)를 상대로 소송을 제기하여 포괄적 인 예비 선거가 첫 번째 수정안의 결사의 권리를 침해했다고 주장했다. Jones는 포괄적인 예비선거가 선거를 강화하고 선출직에서 더 나은 대표성을 허용할 것이라고 반박했습니다. 존스의 편을 들면서 지방 법원은 당사자의 결사의 권리에 대한 예비선거의 부담이 심각하지 않으며 상당한 국가 이익에 의해 정당화된다고 판결했습니다. 항소 법원은 확인했다.
질문 캘리포니아 유권자가 승인한 발의안 198은 당파 예비선거를 비공개 예비선거에서 전면 예비선거로 변경하는 것이 정당의 수정헌법 제1조의 결사권을 침해합니까?
결론 예. Antonin Scalia 판사가 전달한 7-2 의견에서 법원은 캘리포니아의 전면 예비선거가 정당의 수정헌법 제1조의 결사의 권리를 침해한다고 판결했습니다. "발의안 198은 정당이 기껏해야 정당과의 제휴를 거부하고 최악의 경우 경쟁자와 명시적으로 제휴한 사람들과 연합하도록 강제합니다." 안토닌 스칼리아 대법관은 다수결을 위해 썼습니다. "당원이 아닌 사람들이 당 후보를 선출하는 단일 선거는 당을 파괴하기에 충분할 수 있습니다." 스캘리아 대법관은 계속해서 발의안 198이 정당의 지도자를 선출하는 "기본 기능"을 빼앗고 기능적으로 "심각하고 불필요하다"고 법원에 진술했습니다. 존 폴 스티븐스(John Paul Stevens) 대법관과 루스 베이더 긴즈버그(Ruth Bader Ginsburg) 대법관은 반대했다. 스티븐스 판사는 "이 법원이 3개 주의 기본 계획을 무효화하고 당사자의 요청에 따라 다른 29개 주의 계획에 심각한 헌법적 의심을 던지려는 의지는 복잡하고 변화하는 주의 선거법에 대한 이례적인 침해"라고 썼습니다.
California Democratic Party v. Jones Opinion Announcement - June 26, 2000 William H. Rehnquist
The opinion of the Court in No. 99-401, California Democratic Party versus Jones will be announced by Justice Scalia.
Antonin Scalia
This case comes to us on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
One way that candidate’s republic office in California gain access to the general ballot is by winning the primary of a qualified political party.
In 1996 Proposition 198 changed the State’s partisan primary system from a closed primary in which only a political party’s members can vote on its nominees to what is called a blanket primary in which each voter’s ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them.
The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party’s nominee for the general election.
A blanket primary, it should be noted is different from an open primary in which although the voter need not be a member of the party in order to participate, he is permitted to vote for the candidates of only one party and cannot as in the blanket primary vote for the candidate of one party for one office and of other parties for other offices.
Our holding today deals only with the blanket primary.
Petitioners are the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California and the Peace and Freedom Party, each of which prohibits nonmembers from voting in their primaries.
They filed suit against respondants alleging inter alia that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment rights of political association.
The District Court held that the primary's burden on the petitioner’s association rights was not severe and was justified by substantial State interest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In an opinion filed with a Clerk of Court today, we reverse.
It is true of course that States play a major role in structuring and monitoring the primary election process, but the procedures by which political parties select their nominees are not wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely.
To the contrary this Court has repeatedly held that States must act within limits imposed by the Constitution when regulating parties’ internal processes.
The First Amendment protects the freedom to join together to further common political beliefs, which presupposes the freedom to identify those who constitute the association and to limit the association to those people.
In no area is the political association’s right to exclude more important than in its candidate-selection process.
That process often determines the party’s position on significant public policy issues and it is the nominee who is the party’s ambassador charged with wining the general electorate over to the party’s views.
California’s blanket primary violates these principles.
Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-selection processes by opening them up to person wholly unaffiliated with the party, who may have wholly different views from those of the party faithful.
The evidence in this case demonstrates that under California’s blanket primary system the prospect of having a party’s nominee determined by adherence of an opposing party is far from remote.
Indeed it is a clear and present danger.
In 1997 survey of California voters, 37% of republicans said that they plan vote in the 1998 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary and 20% of democrats said that they plan to vote in the 1998 Republican United States Senate Primary and the impact upon minor parties such as the Libertarian Party and the Peace and Freedom Party is even greater.
In the first primary these parties conducted following California’s implementation of Proposition 198.
The total votes cast for party candidates in some races was more than double the total number of registered party members.
The effect of this system upon the party is not merely the occasional alternation of the identity of its nominee.
Even when the person favored by a majority of that party members prevails, he will have prevailed by taking somewhat different positions in order to appeal to non-party members and should he be elected, will continue to take somewhat different positions in order to be re-nominated.
In short Proposition 198 has the likely outcome indeed as respondents themselves admit the intended outcome of changing the party’s message.
Because there is no heavier burden on a political party’s associational freedom, Proposition 198 is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest.
None of the respondents’ seven proffered State interest is compelling.
The first two producing elected officials who better represent the electorate and expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns are simply circumlocution for producing nominees and nominee positions more favored by the majority than those the parties would choose if left to their own devices.
That is nothing more than stark repudiation of freedom of political association.
The third asserted interest is assuring that so-called disenfranchised persons by which is meant independents and members of the minority party in “safe” districts.
Enjoy the right to an effective vote.
This is simply re-characterizing non-party member’s keen desire to participate in selection of the party’s nominee as disenfranchisement if the desire is not fulfilled.
We have said in an earlier case however that “A nonmembers desire to participate in the party’s affairs is overborne by the counter veiling and legitimate right of the party to determine its own membership qualifications.”
Although respondents remaining asserted interests namely promoting fairness affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation and protecting privacy maybe compelling in some circumstances we hold that they are not in this case.
That determination is not be made in the abstract by asking whether fairness, privacy etcetera are highly significant values, but rather by asking whether the aspect of fairness, privacy etcetera addressed by the law at issue is highly significant and for all four of these asserted interest we find it not to be.
Finally, we observed that Proposition 198 is not being narrowly tailored means of furthering all of respondents asserted interests.
Respondents could protect each by resorting to a nonpartisan blanket primary.
Generally speaking, under such a system the State determines what qualifications it requires for a candidate to have place on the primary ballot, which may include nomination by a established parties and voter-petition requirements for independent candidates and then voters regardless of party affiliation may choose among these candidates, the top two vote getters or however many of the State prescribes then moving on to the general election.
This system has all the characteristics of partisan blanket primary, save the constitutionally crucial one, primary voters are not choosing a party’s nominee.
Justice Kennedy has filed a concurring opinion; Justice Stevens has filed the dissent in which Justice Ginsburg has joined as the part 1.
Bullock v. Carter (1972)
Syllabus
Appellees who sought to become candidates for local office in the Texas Democratic primary election challenged in the District Court the validity of the Texas statutory scheme which, without write-in or other alternative provisions, requires payment of fees ranging as high as $8,900. Appellees claimed that they were unable to pay the required fees, and were therefore barred from running. Under the Texas statute, the party committee estimates the total cost of the primary and apportions it among candidates according to its judgment of what is "just and equitable," in light of "the importance, emolument, and term of office." The fees for local candidates tend appreciably to exceed those for state-wide candidates. Following a hearing, the District Court declared the fee system invalid and enjoined its enforcement. Appellants contend that the filing fees are necessary both to regulate the primary ballot and to finance elections.
Held: The Texas primary election filing fee system contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 405 U. S. 140-149.
(a) Since the Texas statute imposes filing fees of such magnitude that numerous qualified candidates are precluded from filing, it falls with unequal weight on candidates and voters according to their ability to pay the fees, and therefore it must be "closely scrutinized" and can be sustained only if it is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate state objective, and not merely because it has some rational basis. Pp. 405 U. S. 140-144.
(b) Although a State has an interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot and eliminating those who are spurious, it cannot attain these objectives by arbitrary means such as those called for by the Texas statute, which eliminates legitimate potential candidates, like those involved here, who cannot afford the filing fees. Pp. 405 U. S. 144-147.
(c) The apportionment of costs among candidates is not the only means available to finance primary elections, and the State can identify certain bodies as political parties entitled to sponsorship if the State itself finances the primaries, as it does general
Page 405 U. S. 135
elections, both of which are important parts of the democratic process. Pp. 405 U. S. 147-149.
321 F. Supp. 1358, affirmed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983)
Syllabus
An Ohio statute requires an independent candidate for President to file a statement of candidacy and nominating petition in March in order to appear on the general election ballot in November. On April 24, 1980, petitioner Anderson announced that he was an independent candidate for President. Thereafter, on May 16, 1980, his supporters tendered a nominating petition and statement of candidacy, satisfying the substantive requirements for ballot eligibility, to respondent Ohio Secretary of State. Respondent refused to accept the documents because they had not been filed within the time required by the Ohio statute. Anderson and petitioner voters then filed an action in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners and ordered respondent to place Anderson's name on the general election ballot, holding that the statutory deadline was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the early deadline served the State's interest in voter education by giving voters a longer opportunity to see how Presidential candidates withstand the close scrutiny of a political campaign.
Held: Ohio's early filing deadline places an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of petitioner Anderson's supporters. Pp. 460 U. S. 786-806.
(a) In resolving constitutional challenges to a State's election laws, a court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the interests asserted by the State to justify the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of these interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. Pp. 460 U. S. 786-790.
Page 460 U. S. 781
(b) The Ohio filing deadline not only burdens the associational rights of independent voters and candidates, it also places a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral process. A burden that falls unequally on independent candidates or on new or small political parties impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment, and discriminates against those candidates and voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties. And in the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest, because the President and Vice President are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation, and the impact of the votes cast in each State affects the votes cast in other States. Pp. 460 U. S. 790-795.
(c) None of the three interests that Ohio seeks to further by its early filing deadline justifies that deadline. As to the State's asserted interest in voter education, it is unrealistic in the modern world to suggest that it takes more than seven months to inform the electorate about the qualifications of a particular candidate simply because he lacks a partisan label. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the interest in voter education is served at all by the early filing deadline. The State's asserted interest in equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates is not achieved by imposing the early filing deadline on both, since, although a candidate participating in a primary election must declare his candidacy on the same date as an independent, both the burdens and benefits of the respective requirements are materially different, and the reasons for early filing for a primary candidate are inapplicable to independent candidates in the general election. And the State's asserted interest in political stability amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition generated by independent candidates who have previously been affiliated with a party, an interest that conflicts with First Amendment values. The Ohio deadline does not serve any state interest "in maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" for the Presidency, because Ohio's Presidential preference primary does not serve to narrow the field for the general election. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, distinguished. The deadline is not drawn to protect the parties from "intraparty feuding," and may actually impair the State's interest in preserving party harmony. Pp. 460 U. S. 796-806.
664 F.2d 554, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 460 U. S. 806.
Anderson v. Celebrezze Opinion Announcement - April 19, 1983 Warren E. Burger
The judgement and opinion of the Court in Anderson against Celebrezze will be announced by Justice Stevens.
John Paul Stevens
This case involves the constitutionality of Ohio statute that requires an independent candidate for the office of presidency in the United States to file a statement of candidacy as it worked out in 1980 in March of, I think by March 20, 1980, in other words, several months in advance with the November election.
Petitioner, Anderson, announced that he was a candidate, an independent candidate for President on April 24, 1980, which was after the statutory deadline that already passed.
He assembled the necessary signatures and petitioners and sought to file them in May but the secretary of the State of Ohio rejected the filing because it was not timely.
He therefore brought suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the federal statute and the District Judge held the statute unconstitutional and entered an injunction requiring that his name be allowed to appear on the ballot.
The election was held without the injunction having been stayed and after the election, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the District Court decision and reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the statute principally on the ground that performed the function of allowing the voters adequate time to become informed about the qualifications of candidates.
Because two other Circuits had decided these similar questions in a different way involving similar state statutes, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and we hold that the statute unconstitutionally abridges the associational rights of the voters who seek to support the candidacy of the independent candidate which rights are protected by the First Amendment to the constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist has filed a dissenting opinion in which he is joined by Justice White, Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor.
Warren E. Burger
Thank you Justice Stevens.
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party (1986)
Syllabus
A Washington statute (§ 29.18.110) requires that a minor party candidate for office receive at least 1% of all votes cast for that office in the State's primary election before the candidate's name will be placed on the general election ballot. Appellee Peoples qualified to be placed on the primary election ballot as the nominee of appellee Socialist Workers Party (Party) for United States Senator. At the primary, he received less than 1% of the total votes cast for the office, and, accordingly, his name was not placed on the general election ballot. Peoples, the Party, and appellee registered voters then brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that § 29.18.110 violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 29.18.110, as applied to candidates for statewide offices, was unconstitutional.
Held: Section 29.18.110 is constitutional. Pp. 479 U. S. 193-199.
(a) States have a right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431; American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767. Pp. 479 U. S. 193-194.
(b) The fact that Washington's political history evidences no voter confusion from ballot overcrowding does not require invalidation of § 29.18.110. A State is not required to prove actual voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidates as a predicate to imposing reasonable ballot access restrictions. In any event, the record in this case discloses that enactment of § 29.18.110 was, in fact, linked to the legislature's perception that the general election ballot was becoming cluttered with minor party candidates who did not command significant voter support, and the State was clearly entitled to raise the ante for ballot access, to simplify the general election ballot, and to avoid the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election. Pp. 479 U. S. 194-196.
(c) The burdens imposed on appellees' First Amendment rights by § 29.18.110 are not too severe to be justified by the State's interest in restricting access to the general ballot. Pp. 479 U. S. 196-197.
Page 479 U. S. 190
(d) The differences between requiring primary votes to qualify for a position on the general election ballot and requiring signatures on nominating petitions are not of constitutional dimension. Pp. 479 U. S. 197-198.
(e) There is no merit to appellees' argument that, since voter turnout at primary elections is generally lower than the turnout at general elections, § 29.18.110 has reduced the pool of potential supporters from which appellee Party candidates can secure 1% of the vote. The statute creates no impediment to voting at primary elections, and does no more than require a candidate to show a "significant modicum" of voter support in primary elections. P. 479 U. S. 198.
(f) Section 29.18.110 serves to promote the very First Amendment values that are threatened by overly burdensome ballot access restrictions. Washington's voters are not denied freedom of association because they must channel their expressive activity into a campaign at the primary as opposed to the general election. Pp. 479 U. S. 198-199.
765 F.2d 1417, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 479 U. S. 200.
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
Facts of the case
In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.
Question
Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses?
Conclusion
In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.
사건의 사실 워터게이트 사건 이후, 의회는 후보자에 대한 재정적 기부를 제한함으로써 정치 캠페인의 부패를 척결하려고 시도했습니다. 무엇보다도 이 법은 개인이 단일 캠페인에 기부할 수 있는 금액에 제한을 두었고 특정 임계값 이상의 기부금을 보고하도록 요구했습니다. 연방 선거 관리위원회 (Federal Election Commission)는 법령을 집행하기 위해 창설되었습니다.
질문 1971년 연방 선거 운동법과 1954년 내국세법의 관련 조항에 의해 선거 지출에 대한 제한이 제1차 수정안의 언론 및 결사의 자유 조항을 위반했습니까?
결론 이 복잡한 사건에서 법원은 두 가지 중요한 결론에 도달했습니다. 첫째, FECA의 한계가 파렴치한 관행을 방지함으로써 "우리 대의 민주주의 시스템의 무결성"을 향상시키기 때문에 정치 캠페인 및 후보자에 대한 개인 기부에 대한 제한이 첫 번째 수정안을 위반하지 않는다고 주장했습니다. 둘째, 법원은 선거 운동에 대한 독립적 인 지출에 대한 정부의 제한, 후보자가 자신의 개인 또는 가족 자원에서 지출하는 제한, 총 선거 운동 지출에 대한 제한이 제 1 차 수정안을 위반했다고 판결했습니다. 이러한 관행이 후보자에 대한 개별 기부가 하는 부패 가능성을 반드시 높이는 것은 아니기 때문에 법원은 이를 제한하는 것이 언론과 결사의 자유에 대한 축소를 정당화할 만큼 큰 정부 이익에 도움이 되지 않는다고 판결했습니다.
Buckley v. Valeo Opinion Announcement - January 30, 1976 Warren E. Burger
I have the per curiam opinion and judgment to announce on behalf of the Court in Buckley against Valeo, 75-436 and 75-437.
The question before the Court in these cases is the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974.
The Federal Election Campaign Act governs financial aspects of campaigns for federal offices.
It limits contribution to candidates and committees.
It limits expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate.
It limits expenditures by a candidate from his personal or family funds.
It restricts overall general election and primary campaign expenditures.
It requires political committees to keep detailed records of contributions and expenditures including the names and addresses of each individual contributor in excess of $10 and the name, address, occupation and principal place of business of all contributors contributing in excessive $100.
Political committees must file quarterly reports with the Federal Election Commission, disclosing the source of every contribution exceeding $100 and the recipient and purpose of every expenditure in excess of $100.
Every individual or group other than a candidate or political committee making contributions or expenditures in excess of $100, other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate must file a statement with the Commission.
The Act creates an eight-member commission with record keeping, disclosure and investigatory functions and with rule making, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers.
The Commission consists of two members appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the President of the United States, all subject to confirmation by both Houses of the Congress.
The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House are ex officio nonvoting members of the Commission.
Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code as amended in 1974, provides for public financing of Presidential nominating conventions and general elections and primary campaigns from a fund created by an optional checkoff system under which each tax payer may on filing his or her tax return, indicate approval of placing $1 of general tax revenue into the fund for the purposes of the Act.
The resulting amount is allocated for the funding of conventions and presidential election campaigns.
Subtitle H establishes three categories of political parties; major parties, minor parties, and new parties.
Major parties as defined in Subtitle H and their candidates are entitled to funding for nominating conventions and general election campaigns.
Minor parties and candidates receive a percentage of the major party entitlement.
Candidates of new parties receive the funds only after the general election.
Primary candidate for the presidential nomination by a major political party who receives more than $5,000 from private sources, counting only the first $250 of each contribution, in each of 20 States, is eligible for matching public funds.
The appellants in these cases sought declaratory and injunctive relief against these statutory provisions on various constitutional grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on certified questions from the District Court, sustained in all but one of the statutory provisions.
The three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of Subtitle H.
I am authorized to announce on behalf of the Court the following judgment.
The Court holds that this litigation presents an Article III case or controversy since the complaint discloses that at least some of the appellants have a sufficient personal stake in the determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenge provisions, specifically now as to the contribution and expenditure limitations.
The Court holds that the Act's contribution provisions are constitutional as appropriate legislative measures to deal with the reality and appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions.
The Court holds that the contribution limits do not directly impinge upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion.
The Court holds that the expenditure provisions, the expenditure limitations are violative of First Amendment guarantees and they are unconstitutional.
Those provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, of citizens, and associations to engage in political expression that is protected by the First Amendment.
As to the disclosure provisions, the Court holds as follows.
The Act's disclosure and record keeping provisions are a constitutional exercise of legislative power.
They serve substantial governmental and public interests.
It was reasonable for the Congress to conclude that disclosure of contributions informs the public and serves a legitimate governmental and public interest in relation to the political processes.
The disclosure provisions challenged in this case are not overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates.
Congress, the Court holds, could appropriately conclude that a blanket exemption for minor parties was not warranted.
Minor parties, however, will be free to show the reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure required by the Act as to contributors' names will subject them to threats or harassment as a result of such disclosure.
As narrowly construed by the Court’s holding today, the Act's provisions for disclosure by those who make independent contributions and expenditures is also held constitutional.
In construing the provision, the Court limits it's application to narrow and precise circumstances, when contributions are either earmarked for political purposes or have been authorized or requested by a candidate or by his agent to be made to some person other than a candidate or a political committee and when expenditures are made for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
As construed, this provision is not unconstitutionally vague nor does it not constitute an unlawful prior restraint.
The Court holds that the particular dollar thresholds, selected by the Congress are related to the goals of the Act and constitute line drawing of a kind that is within legislative power.
Application of the record keeping and disclosure requirements to contributions of $10 and $100 is held not overbroad on this record.
As to public financing provisions, the Court holds Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code constitutional because Congress under the General Welfare Clause has power to decide what expenditures will promote the General Welfare.
Subtitle H is held a permissible congressional choice as a means to reform the electoral processes.
The Court holds also that the Subtitle, Subtitle H does not violate the First Amendment.
Rather it represents an effort on the part of the Congress to use public money to facilitate and enlarge the public discussion and participation in the electoral processes.
Being less burdensome than ballot access regulations and having been enacted in furtherance of governmental and public interests considered vital, Subtitle H does not invidiously discriminate against minor and new parties in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the Court’s invalidation of the spending limit provisions of the Act does not render Subtitle H unconstitutional.
That Subtitle is severable from those provisions.
As to the Federal Election Commission, the Court holds that the Commission's composition as to all, but it's investigatory and informative powers, violates Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution to the extent that a majority of the voting members of the Commission are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.
Therefore, although the Commission's past acts are by the Court’s holding accorded de facto validity and a stay is granted, permitting the Commission to function under the Act for not more than 30 days, the Court holds that the commission as presently constituted is in conflict with constitutional limitations and it may exercise only such investigatory and other powers as are of the same category that Congress may delegate to one of it's own committees.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 75-436 is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The judgment of the district court for the District of Columbia in 75-437 is affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and I have each filed separate opinions in which each of us has separately concurred in part and dissented in part from the opinion of the Court that I have just announced and described in summary.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000)
Facts of the case
In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.
Question
Does Buckley v. Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional?
Conclusion
Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.
사건의 사실 1976년 버클리 대 버클리 사건. Valeo는 연방 공직 후보자에 대한 개인의 기부금에 대해 $1,000 상한선을 설정했습니다. 미주리 주법은 주 공직 후보자에게 $250에서 $1,000 사이의 캠페인 기부 한도를 부과합니다. 이 법령은 주기적인 조정을 허용하여 주 감사관을 포함한 주 전체 공직 후보자에 대한 1998년 기부 한도를 $1,075로 늘렸습니다. 1998년, 미주리 주 감사관의 공화당 후보인 Zev David Fredman과 정치 행동 위원회인 Shrink Missouri Government PAC는 주 공직 후보자에 대한 기부금에 제한을 부과하는 미주리 법령이 그들의 1차 및 14차 수정안의 권리를 침해했다고 주장하면서 소송을 제기했습니다. PAC는 프레드먼에게 1,075달러를 기부했으며 제한 없이 프레드먼의 캠페인에 더 많은 기여를 할 것이라고 주장했습니다. 또한 Fredman은 더 관대한 기부금으로만 효과적으로 캠페인을 벌일 수 있다고 주장했습니다. 연방 지방 법원, Buckley v. Valeo는 법령을 지지했습니다. 법원은 버클리가 연방 $1,000 제한을 승인한 이후의 인플레이션으로 인해 주 전체 공직에 대한 주 한도인 $1,075가 오늘날 합헌이 될 수 없다는 Fredman과 PAC의 주장을 기각했습니다. 이를 뒤집으면서 항소 법원은 후보자가 대규모 캠페인 기부금을 수락함으로써 발생하는 부패 또는 부패에 대한 인식을 피하려는 미주리주의 관심이 버클리의 엄격한 조사 검토 기준을 충족하기에 충분하지 않다고 판결했습니다.
질문 버클리 대 Valeo는 주 정치 후보자에 대한 기부금에 대한 주 규정을 관리합니까? 인플레이션 조정 여부에 관계없이 버클리에서 승인된 연방 한도가 허용 가능한 주 제한 범위를 정의합니까? 캠페인 기부금에 대한 미주리주의 법적 제한은 위헌입니까?
결론 예, 아니오, 아니오. David H. Souter 판사가 전달한 6-3 의견에서 법원은 Buckley가 유사한 주 규제에 대한 권한이며 인플레이션 조정 여부에 관계없이 Buckley에서 승인된 연방 한도는 허용 가능한 주 제한의 범위를 정의하지 않는다고 판결했습니다. 법원은 미주리 주 법령이 첫 번째 수정안을 위반하지 않는다고 판결했습니다. "버클리의 권위가 없더라도 주장된 이익의 정당성에 대해 심각한 의문은 없을 것"이라며 "거액 기부자들이 곡이라고 부르는 냉소적인 가정은 유권자들이 민주적 거버넌스에 참여하려는 의지를 위태롭게 할 수 있다"고 썼다. 앤서니 케네디(Anthony Kennedy), 안토닌 스칼리아(Antonin Scalia), 클래런스 토마스(Clarence Thomas) 대법관은 버클리 판결을 수정헌법 제1차 수정안의 발언권 침해로 뒤집는 데 반대표를 던졌다.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC Opinion Announcement - January 24, 2000 John Paul Stevens
Justice Souter has an opinion to announce.
David H. Souter
I have the opinion to announce in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, No. 98-963.
This case comes to us on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The suit in this case was brought by respondents Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, and Fredman, a candidate for the 1998 Republican nomination for Missouri State Auditor.
They alleged that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by a Missouri statute that imposes limits ranging from $275 to $1,075 on contributions to candidates for state offices.
The District Court sustained the statute but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that under our 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, Missouri had failed to demonstrate a requisite compelling interest in the limits, it failed to make a necessary evidentiary showing of problems resulting from contributions in amounts in excess of those permitted by the statute, and it failed to show that the statute was closely enough tailored to serve the interest claimed by the state.
In an opinion filed with the Clerk today, we reverse.
Although, Buckley deals with federal contribution limits and federal candidates, it is authority for comparable state limits on contributions to state candidates.
Under Buckley a contribution limit involving significant interference with associational rights, survive scrutiny if the government demonstrates that regulating contributions is a means closely drawn to match an important interest.
The Missouri statute is adequately tied to an important state interest, Buckley found that the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption was a constitutionally sufficient justification for the contribution limits at issue, in that case, Missouri espouses the same interest and there can be no serious question about their legitimacy.
Likewise, the Missouri statute enjoys adequate evidentiary support which we cover in our opinion.
This case does not present a close call requiring further definition of a state's evidentiary obligation beyond what Buckley indicates.
Finally, there is no indication here that the Missouri limits have had an effective suppressing in the political speech necessary for an adequate campaign of workable political association, and thus there is no showing that the limitation prevented effective political advocacy.
Respondents argue that Buckley set a nominal minimum $1,000 constitutional threshold for contribution limits, which in dollars adjusted for loss of purchasing power is now well above even the $1,000 line drawn by Missouri.
This argument is a fundamental misunderstanding of Buckley.
There we specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or any other particular amount was a constitutional minimum, instead we asked whether the contribution limitation was so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.
Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opinion; Justice Breyer has filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joins; Justice Kennedy has filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Thomas has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joins.
McIntyre v. Ohio (1995)
Facts of the case
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.
Question
Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion
Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.
사건의 사실 1988년 4월 27일, 마가렛 매킨타이어는 오하이오에서 열린 공개 회의에 참석한 사람들에게 제안된 학교 세금 부과에 대한 반대 의사를 표명하는 전단지를 배포했습니다. 그것들은 독립적으로 제작되었지만 그녀는 "우려하는 부모 및 납세자"의 견해로 서명했습니다. McIntyre 여사는 이후 오하이오 선거관리위원회 코드 섹션 3599.09(A)를 위반하여 100달러의 벌금을 부과받았는데, 이는 출판물을 발행하는 사람이나 캠페인 담당자의 이름과 주소가 포함되지 않은 캠페인 문헌의 배포를 금지합니다.
질문 익명의 캠페인 문헌 배포 금지는 제 1 차 및 제 14 차 수정안에 의해 보호되는 언론의 자유를 제한합니까?
결론 예. 익명으로 출판 할 자유는 제 1 차 수정안에 의해 보호되며 "문학적 영역을 넘어 정치적 원인의 옹호로 확장됩니다." 법이 그러한 익명의 발언에 부담을 줄 때, 법원은 "엄격한 조사"를 적용하여, 그것이 최우선 국가 이익에
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission Opinion Announcement - April 19, 1995 William H. Rehnquist
The opinion of the court in number 93-986, McIntyre versus Ohio Elections Commission will be announced by Justice Stevens.
John Paul Stevens
Margaret McIntyre was fined $100 for distributing anonymous handbills outside the public meeting at the Blendon Middle School in Westerville Ohio, whether superintendent of schools was discussing an imminent referendum on a proposed school tax levy.
This is McIntyre leaflets were addressed to concern citizens and taxpayers, they criticize the tax proposal.
A school board official filed a complaint against Mrs. McIntyre, respondent the Ohio Election Commission for violating in Ohio statute that makes it a crime for anyone to distribute any writing designed to influence the voters in any election unless that person places her name and address on the writing.
The Ohio Supreme Court of upheld the fine.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Ohio statute is consistent with the first amendment.
For the reason stated in an opinion filed with the clerk today, we reverse.
The court has previously recognized that anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.
One of the best known examples is the federalist, a collection of papers that played an important role in the ratification of our constitution.
The Federalist Papers is resigned under the name Publius that were actually written by three of our greatest founding fathers, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay.
Many great literary figures have also published under assumed names.
Indeed, dumb skeptics believe William Shakespeare was not the true author of the place published under his name.
In this case we hold that the First Amendment recognizes an interest anonymity, whether it is used as a shield from prosecution as protection of privacy or merely as an element of the speakers message that like any other element, they speaker may include or exclude as she sees fit.
Ohio’s law because it placed as burden and core political speech and is not a mere regulation of the electro process, it subject to the most exacting First Amendment scrutiny.
The state takes the justified statute as a method of profaned fraud.
We are persuaded however that this interest is insufficient because the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Ohio also argues that it statute informs the electorate that like any other part of the speakers message, it is up to the peaker to decide whether to provide this information to the public.
She can not be force to inform simply for information sake.
Finally, we explained why our opinions in First National Bank v. Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo, do not command the different result in this case.
Bellotti’s concerned only the scope of First Amendment protection afforded to corporations, while Buckley concerned disclosure of campaign expenditures in support of a candidate.
Neither case decided whether government may force the speaker to identify herself as the proponent of a specific idea.
We therefore holding that Mrs. McIntyre ahead a First Amendment right to distribute her anonymous handbills and we reverse the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsberg has filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Thomas has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Scalia has filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice has joined.
McConnell v. FEC (2003)
Facts of the case
In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").
The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.
Question
1. Does the "soft money" ban of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?
2. Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?
사건의 사실 2002 년 초, 존 매케인 (John McCain) 상원 의원과 러셀 파인 골드 (Russell Feingold) 상원 의원이 정치 캠페인을 위해 돈을 모으고 지출하는 방식을 개혁하려는 수년간의 노력은 2002 년 초당적 캠페인 개혁법 (소위 McCain-Feingold 법안, 때로는 BCRA라고도 함). 주요 조항은 a) 정당(종종 기업, 노동 조합 또는 부유한 개인에 의해)에 직접 이루어지는 무제한 ("소프트 머니") 기부 및 선출직 공무원의 기부 권유를 금지하는 것이었습니다. b) 노동 조합, 기업 및 비영리 단체가 선거 전 최대 60일까지 참여할 수 있는 광고에 대한 제한; c) 정당이 후보자를 대신하여 광고하기 위해 자금을 사용하는 것에 대한 제한("이슈 광고" 또는 "조정 지출"의 형태). 선거 자금 개혁 법안에는 일반적인 연방 사법 절차를 우회하여 조기 연방 재판과 미국 대법원에 직접 항소할 수 있는 특이한 조항이 포함되어 있습니다. 지난 5월, 3명의 판사로 구성된 특별 패널은 선거 자금 개혁법의 소프트 머니 기부 금지 조항의 일부를 기각했지만 당사자가 참여할 수 있는 광고의 종류에 대한 법의 일부 제한 사항을 지지했습니다. 그 판결은 대법원이 그에 따른 항소를 심리하고 결정할 수 있을 때까지 유예되었습니다.
질문 2002년 초당적 선거 개혁법의 "소프트 머니" 금지는 미국 헌법 제1조 4항에 따라 선거를 규제하는 의회의 권한을 초과하거나 제1차 수정안의 발언의 자유 보호를 위반합니까? 2002년 선거 자금 개혁법(Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002)의 정치 광고의 출처, 내용 또는 시기에 대한 규정이 수정헌법 제1조의 언론의 자유 조항을 위반합니까?
Conclusion
With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.
In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.
[In total, the Court addressed 21 sections of federal law. We have distilled these disparate components into 12 separate votes which we detail at the end of this document.]
몇 가지 예외를 제외하고 법원은 Sandra Day O'Connor 판사와 John Paul Stevens 판사가 작성한 5 대 4 결정에서 두 질문에 모두 "아니오"라고 대답했습니다. 이 규정은 선거 운동 지출(정치적 가치에 대한 보다 명시적인 진술이므로 더 많은 보호를 받을 자격이 있음)이 아니라 유권자 등록과 투표 참여를 늘리는 데 사용되는 소프트 머니 기부를 주로 다루었기 때문에 법원은 언론의 자유에 대한 제한이 최소화되었다고 판결했습니다. 그런 다음 이러한 제한은 "막대한 재정적 기부로 위협받는 실제 부패와 부패의 출현"을 방지하려는 정부의 정당한 이익에 의해 정당화된다는 것을 발견했습니다. 법이 너무 광범위하고 부패를 유발하지 않는 것으로 밝혀진 불필요하게 규제되는 행위(예: 기업이나 노조가 비용을 지불하는 광고)에 대한 이의에 대응하여 법원은 해당 단체가 법을 우회하는 것을 방지하기 위해 그러한 규제가 필요하다고 판결했습니다. 오코너 대법관과 스티븐스 대법관은 "돈은 물과 마찬가지로 항상 배출구를 찾을 것"이라며 정부가 기부 한도를 우회하기 위해 개발된 계획을 방지하기 위한 조치를 취하는 것이 정당하다고 썼습니다. 법원은 또한 의회가 헌법 제1조 제4항에 따라 선거를 규제할 권한을 초과했다는 주장을 기각했습니다. 법원은 이 법이 연방 후보자가 참여한 주 선거에만 영향을 미치며 주에서 주 및 지방 선거를 위한 별도의 선거법을 만드는 것을 막지 못한다고 판결했습니다. [대법원은 연방법의 총 21개 조항을 다루었다. 우리는 이러한 이질적인 구성 요소를 12개의 개별 투표로 추출했으며, 이 문서의 끝 부분에 자세히 설명되어 있습니다.]
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission Opinion Announcement - December 10, 2003 William H. Rehnquist
I have the opinions of the Court to announce in all 300 pages of them in No. 02-1674 McConnell versus Federal Election Commission in eleven companion cases.
The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of numerous provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
A three-judge panel of the District Court held some provisions of the Act unconstitutional and upheld others.
After noting probable jurisdiction, we expedited the argument and decision of the cases.
Because the cases present so many issues, we have prepared three separate court opinions to explain our disposition.
Given the length of those opinions, my oral announcement will contain only an abbreviated outline of what we have decided.
In brief, the Court has concluded that with two relatively minor exceptions, the entire statute is constitutional.
Those two exceptions are Section 213 which requires political parties to choose between making coordinated or independent expenditures for their nominees, and Section 318 which prohibits minors from making contributions to political candidates or parties.
The first of the three Court opinions has two authors, Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor.
It covers Titles I and II of the Act.
I have authored the second Court opinion discussing Titles III and IV, and Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court covers Title V.
Title I of the Act restricts the use of soft money that is money raised outside the source and amount limitations established by the Federal Campaign Act to fund the activities that influence federal elections.
Title I's central provision numbered Section 323(a) in the amended version of the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits national political parties and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending soft money.
The joint opinion concludes that this prohibition is an appropriate response to Congress’ legitimate concerns with preventing the actual and apparent corruption threatened by large soft money contributions and preserving the integrity of the federal election process.
The joint opinion upholds both this provision and the remaining provisions of Title I, which as the court can excuse them, largely enforced Section 323(a) by preventing state parties form using soft money to fund the activities that influence federal election prohibiting both national and state parties from soliciting and donating soft money to tax-exempt organizations that engage in federal election activity and regulating federal and state candidates and office holder’s use of soft money in connection with certain election-related activities.
Title II of the BCRA primarily regulates the funding of electioneering communications that is communications that are intended to or have the effect of influencing the outcome of federal election.
The joint opinion upholds the Act’s primary definition of electioneering communications as it applies both in the context of the disclosure provision set forth in Section 201 of the Act and in the context of Section 203 which prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds to finance such communications.
Section 204 extends this prohibition to non-profit corporations.
The joint opinion construes Section 204 to exempt the subcategory of non-profits described in our decision in Massachusetts citizens for Life commonly called MCFL organization, and upholds it as so construed.
Title II also contains a number of provisions regulating independent and coordinative expenditures in connection with political campaigns.
The joint opinion upholds Sections 204 and 214 which provide that expenditures coordinated with political parties are treated as contributions to those parties, but find constitutional infirmities in Section 213 which requires political parties to choose between making unlimited independent expenditures or a limited coordinated expenditures in support of their nominees.
Title III and IV contains several amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Communications Act, and other provisions of the United States Code.
In my opinion for the Court, we conclude that several of the plaintiffs' challenges to this provision including Section 305 pertaining to so-called attack ads are not justiciable.
We do uphold however, Section 311 of the Act which requires that electioneering communications clearly identify either the candidate who authorized them or if they have not been so authorized, the individual who sponsored them without the candidate’s authorization.
On the other hand, we strike down Section 318 which prohibits minors from making contributions to candidates or political parties as an unconstitutional abridgment of minors’ First Amendment rights.
Finally, in the third Court opinion written by Justice Breyer we uphold the sole provision of Title V at issue in this case.
Section 504 which requires broadcasters to keep publicly available records of requests to purchase broadcast time for politically related communication.
There are several separate opinions.
I have written a dissent with respect to Titles I and V which Justices Scalia and Kennedy have joined.
Justice Stevens has written an opinion dissenting with respect to Section 305 which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have joined.
Justice Scalia has written an opinion dissenting with respect to Titles I and V concurring with respect to Titles III and IV, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect of Title II.
Justice Kennedy has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to Titles I and II which I have joined in its entirety and which Justices Scalia and Thomas have both joined in part.
Justice Thomas has written an opinion dissenting with respect to Titles I and V concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to Titles II, III, and IV; Justice Scalia has joined this opinion in part.
Randall v. Sorrell (2006)
Facts of the case
In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were "narrowly tailored" to the state's interests.
Question
(1) Do expenditure limits for political candidates violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech? (2) Are Vermont's contribution limits of $200-$400 per candidate for individuals, political groups, and political parties unconstitutionally low under the First Amendment?
사건의 사실 1997년 버몬트는 선거 기간 동안 공직 후보자의 지출과 개인, 정치 단체 및 정당의 기부금에 대해 엄격한 제한을 부과하는 선거 자금법인 Act 64를 통과시켰습니다. 주 의회 의원 인 닐 랜달 (Neil Randall)은 버몬트 주 법무 장관 윌리엄 소렐 (William Sorrell)을 고소하면서 그 제한은 제 1 차 수정안의 언론의 자유에 대한 위헌 침해라고 주장했다. Randall의 견해에 따르면 대법원은 Buckley v. Valeo와 Act 64의 기부 한도는 위헌적으로 낮았습니다. Sorrell은 법원이 버몬트주의 정당성 중 하나, 즉 지출 한도가 후보자가 돈을 모으는 데 너무 많은 시간을 소비하는 것을 방지한다는 것을 고려하지 않았기 때문에 버클리가 시대에 뒤떨어졌다고 반박했습니다. Sorrell은 또한 부패 퇴치와 공정한 선거 보장에 대한 버몬트주의 이익이 기부 한도를 정당화한다고 주장했습니다. 지방 법원은 지출 한도를 폐지했지만 기부 한도의 대부분을 유지했습니다. 국가, 주 및 지방 정당이 함께 주 전체 후보자에게 400달러만 줄 수 있는 정당의 기부금 한도만이 위헌적으로 낮았습니다. 양측은 이 판결에 대해 제2 순회 항소 법원에 항소했습니다. 순회 법원은 버몬트주의 모든 기부 한도가 합헌이라고 판결하면서 뒤집었습니다. 제2순회법원은 또한 지출 한도가 주의 이익에 "협소하게 조정"되는 한 합헌임을 발견했습니다.
질문 (1) 정치 후보자에 대한 지출 한도는 제 1 차 수정안의 언론의 자유 보장을 위반합니까? (2) 개인, 정치 단체 및 정당에 대한 후보자당 $200-$400의 버몬트주의 기부 한도는 첫 번째 수정안에 따라 위헌적으로 낮습니까?
Conclusion
Yes and yes. The Court reversed the Circuit Court and invalidated Vermont's Act 64 by a 6-3 vote. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Court should let stand the Buckley decision and its invalidation of expenditure limits. Vermont's argument that such limits prevent candidates from spending too much time fund-raising was deemed irrelevant because it was "perfectly obvious" and would not have changed the result in Buckley. The Court affirmed that some limits on political contributions are constitutional, but perceived "danger signs" indicating that Vermont's exceptionally low limits could prevent candidates from campaigning effectively. Applying a 5-part test, the Court held that Vermont's contribution limits were "disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance." Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, in which he argued that the contribution limits should be upheld and the expenditure limits should be referred to the lower courts for a determination of whether they were the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing Vermont's goals. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that Buckley should be overruled as it pertains to expenditure limits.
예, 그렇습니다. 법원은 순회 법원을 뒤집고 버몬트주의 법 64를 6-3으로 무효화했습니다. 스티븐 브라이어(Stephen Breyer) 판사의 의견은 대법원이 버클리 판결과 지출 한도 무효화를 보류해야 한다고 판결했습니다. 그러한 제한이 후보자가 기금 모금에 너무 많은 시간을 소비하는 것을 막는다는 버몬트의 주장은 "완벽하게 명백하고" 버클리의 결과를 바꾸지 않았을 것이기 때문에 관련이 없는 것으로 간주되었습니다. 법원은 정치 기부금에 대한 일부 제한이 합헌임을 확인했지만 버몬트주의 예외적으로 낮은 한도가 후보자의 효과적인 선거 운동을 방해할 수 있음을 나타내는 "위험 신호"로 인식되었습니다. 법원은 5부로 구성된 테스트를 적용하여 버몬트주의 기부 한도가 "발전을 위해 제정된 공공 목적에 불균형"하다고 판결했습니다. 소터 대법관은 긴즈버그 대법관과 스티븐스 대법관과 함께 반대 의견을 작성하여 기부 한도를 유지해야 하며 지출 한도가 버몬트주의 목표를 달성하는 데 "가장 제한적인 수단"인지 여부를 결정하기 위해 하급 법원에 회부되어야 한다고 주장했습니다. 스티븐스 대법관은 버클리가 지출 한도와 관련하여 기각되어야 한다고 주장하는 별도의 반대 의견을 작성했습니다.
Randall v. Sorrell Opinion Announcement - June 26, 2006 John G. Roberts, Jr.
Justice Breyer has the announcement in 04-1528, Randall versus Sorrell, and the consolidated cases.
Stephen G. Breyer
I am going to announce the judgment of the Court in this case, which is that Vermont's campaign-finance law violates the First Amendment.
There are six people who think that conclusion, but they think it for quite different reasons, and so I am announcing an opinion, in which the Chief Justice joins in whole and Justice Alito joins in part.
Now, there are two parts to this law.
The first part has to do with expenditure limits.
It tells the Governor, “You can’t spend more than $300,000,” and the limits go down so that for a state rep it is $2,000.
So the first part is expenditure limits; and the second part is contribution limits -- that is on individual and party contributions to a candidate -- and those limits vary from $400 for an individual or a party for a particular candidate for Governor down to $200 for a state rep.
Well, I overstate, because in fact those limits are not $400; they are for two elections, the primary and the final, so really it is closer to $200, depending on how you allocate it for Governor, and $100 for state rep.
And those limits apply also to political parties if they want to give some money to the candidate, and they also apply to contributions in kind.
Well, we first have to consider the expenditure limits, and on the expenditure limits -- but, remember, I am speaking just for the Chief Justice and myself -- we think there was a case, Buckley versus Valeo, a very well-known case, and that case said that expenditure limits violate the First Amendment, but contribution limits do not.
Well, we are considering expenditure limits, and in our view this Vermont statute on the expenditure-limit side is unconstitutional because of stare decisis, and we elaborate that a bit in the opinion and we see no good reason for departing from stare decisis in respect to expenditure limits.
Then the parties have argued another point in respect to expenditure limits.
That point is that, well, what they did not think of in Buckley v. Valeo is once you have contribution limits, it takes a lot more time for a candidate to raise money, and that is a problem; but we do not think it is a problem they did not think of; that is, at the time of Buckley v. Valeo, that was pointed out to the Court, and also we think it is fairly obvious that once you have low contribution limits, a candidate will have to spend more time to raise an equivalent amount of money.
So we do not really see anything new there.
And in that part of the opinion, I am joined by both the Chief Justice and Justice Alito.
Now, we turn to the contribution limits.
Now, contribution limits are difficult, and the reason they are difficult under Buckley v. Valeo and our cases is the following: with a contribution limit, it is not the case the lower the better, in our view.
The reason it is not the case the lower the better is because what you are trying to do is produce a fair electoral contest and to sort of ward off various things that might impede the fairness of that contest.
Well, no limits at all, in the judgment of the Legislature, would impede that because of corruption or appearance of corruption; but if you get too low, you can give the incumbent a major advantage, because the incumbent has name recognition, the incumbent is well-known to the press.
And therefore it is not the case, in our view, the lower the better.
Rather, if you really see First Amendment interests on both sides of this equation, there must be a lower limit somewhere.
Does this Vermont statute go below the lower limit?
Well, we think that -- and here, I am joined by the Chief and Justice Alito throughout -- we think that the Legislature has a lot of leeway in defining those lower limits, but at some point they go too far.
We have looked at this closely.
Why closely?
Because on its face, the limit in front of us, say, $200 or $100, depending on how you count it, that would be way, way, way lower than the limit in Buckley ever was.
That limit was $1,000 in the early 1970s for a Congressional seat.
$1,000 in 1970, if you translate the limits here back to the limits in Buckley, i.e., you adjust for inflation, you get about $56.
And so this is about 5% of what they were in Buckley.
That, it is the lowest in the nation if you look at it all in total, all in total, and certainly the lowest we have considered.
Lowest in the nation is arguable, but lowest we have considered is not arguable.
So we have looked at it carefully.
And here, basically, is what we found.
First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively prove, that the low contribution limits of $200 or $400 will significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns.
There were petitioner’s experts in the trial court, and they tried to show that there would be a dramatic lessening, particularly in the amounts that parties could give to the candidates; the amounts might be cut that they would have by a third to a half or more.
On the other side, what they did was try not to refute the competitive campaigns, but to look at average contributions to average campaigns, funding in average campaigns.
But the point here is competitive campaigns, because the problem here is insulating the incumbent from a competitive challenge.
And so we are concerned about that, and that counts as a factor against the constitutionality of the contribution limits.
Then turn to the limitation on political parties.
Well, here, unlike any other statute we have considered, the amount that a political party can give to a candidate from that party is the same as the amount of an individual; it is not some multiple of that.
Now, we know that there is a problem of circumventing individual limits by giving to parties; but this statute pays no attention to what is on the other side.
Well, what is on the other side?
Well, these limits are so low that, for example, if the Democratic Party or the Republican Party decides that it would like to have a couple of meet the candidate for Governor, meet our candidate for Governor, coffee and doughnuts, coffee and bagels maybe they could do it once or twice; but, I mean, even in Vermont -- I know Vermont is a terrific state -- but I suspect that coffee and doughnuts or coffee and bagels is going to eat up, if you have 100 and 200 people in that room, that $200 to $400 pretty quickly, and then the party will not be able to pay for an event to meet the candidate, let alone postage or other things.
But I’ll put that to the side, because maybe they can figure a way around that.
More importantly is this: suppose we have 6,000 people in the state of Vermont out of a population of, let’s say, 360,000.
Suppose we have 6,000 who reason as follows: I do not know who should be in the State Legislature, but I do know one thing.
I would like a Democrat.
I would like the Democrats to control that State Legislature.
So what I am going to do -- the same with Republicans on the other side -- I am going to give $1, $1 to the Democratic Party, 1.
That is not an enormous amount.
But with that dollar, I want them to put it in the key races, so we can have our party controlling the Legislature.
And now suppose that the party discovers there are three key races where challenges really matter.
Could it put that $6,000 in those three key races?
No.
2,000 in each?
It would be limited to $200 or $300.
Now, who have you hurt there?
You have hurt the 6,000 people, each of whom wanted to give $1 to make certain that its party controlled the State Legislature.
Now, we are not saying that there should be circumvention of individual limits; but we think interests like that, the State has to pay some attention to it, which it did not here.
And there are more problems.
The problem of contributions in kind is a serious one.
When you have very low limits and you have volunteers and those volunteers want to drive a candidate around the state use their own gasoline or maybe use their own stamps or maybe use their own postage, these low limits eat up that postage amount or the dollar for coffee and so forth pretty quickly, and the consequence of that is the risk of campaign violation; and the risk of campaign violation is a risk of very bad publicity, even if it is a minor violation.
So put those together and add one other thing: that it is not indexed for inflation.
So that means that even if we are wrong, eventually we would be right.
Further, we could not find any special justification for this.
So putting together the very low limits for the individual gifts, the same limits being on the political parties, the problem of contributions in kind, the fact that it is not indexed for inflation and the possibility that we could not find any possibility of special justification, putting those five things together, we think that this statute is lower than the Constitutional bound.
It is too low on the low side; therefore, it violates the First Amendment.
Well, as I said, that is just Justice Alito and myself … and the Chief Justice.
I don’t want to forget that.
All right.
Now, the other opinions, Justice Alito has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Justice Kennedy has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment; Justice Thomas has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Scalia joins; Justice Stevens has filed a dissenting opinion; and Justice Souter has filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joins and which Justice Stevens joins in part.
I did not forget anyone.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990)
Facts of the case
In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.
Question
Did Governor Thompson's practices in Illinois infringe upon the First Amendment rights of potential and current state employees?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."
사건의 사실 1980년 11월, 일리노이주 주지사 제임스 톰슨(James Thompson)은 주지사 인사실의 승인 없이 주 공무원이 신입 사원을 고용하거나, 주정부 직원을 승진시키거나, 해고 후 주 직원을 소환하는 것을 금지하는 명령을 내렸습니다. 인사부는 공화당에 대한 지원자의 공헌도, 공화당에 대한 지원자의 복무 기록, 지역 당 공무원의 지원과 같은 요인에 따라 채용 및 승진 결정을 내립니다. Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan과 다른 많은 잠재적 및 현직 공무원의 공동 결정 사건에서 주지사가 불공정 한 정치적 후원과 정당 기반 차별을 실천함으로써 첫 번째 수정안의 권리를 침해하고 있다고 주장하면서이 후원 시스템에 도전했습니다.
질문 일리노이 주에서 톰슨 주지사의 관행이 잠재적 및 현재 주정부 직원의 첫 번째 수정안의 권리를 침해 했습니까?
결론 5대 4의 결정에서 법원은 톰슨 주지사의 관행이 위헌적인 후원 시스템에 해당한다고 판결했습니다. 법원은 직원들이 경력 사다리를 오르기 위해 진정한 신념 대신 "상사가 보유한 정치적 지위를 지원해야 할 중대한 의무"를 느낄 것이라고 판결했습니다. 따라서 법원은 "정치적 성향이나 지원에 근거한 해고 후 승진, 전근 및 소환"은 공무원의 표현의 자유에 대한 용납할 수 없는 침해라고 판결했습니다. 법원은 제1차 헌법 수정안이 직원들을 "건설적인 해고"로부터 보호하는 "임기 조항"은 아니었지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 정부가 직원들의 "믿고 결사할 자유"를 방해하는 것을 막았다고 지적했습니다.
Burson v. Freeman (1992)
Facts of the case
Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.
Question
Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?
Conclusion
No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.
사건의 사실 테네시 정치 캠페인 재무인 Freeman은 투표 시설 입구에서 100피트 이내에서 투표 권유와 캠페인 자료의 전시 또는 배포를 금지하는 테네시 법의 합헌성에 이의를 제기했습니다. 하급 법원의 기각에 대한 항소에서 테네시 대법원은 100피트 금지령이 위헌이라고 판결하면서 뒤집었습니다. 대법원은 Burson에게 증명서를 부여했습니다.
질문 테네시의 100 피트 제한은 첫 번째 수정안의 언론의 자유를 침해 했습니까?
결론 아니요. 테네시주의 법령은 공개 포럼에서 정치적 발언에 대한 얼굴 내용 기반 제한을 구성했기 때문에 엄격한 조사를 거친 후 법원은 법령이 강력한 국가 이익에 봉사하기 위해 좁게 초안이 작성되었다고 판결했습니다. 투표소 주변에 안전 지대를 조성함으로써 이 법령은 시민의 자유롭고 효과적인 투표권을 보호하려는 주의 이익에 기여했습니다. 더욱이 100피트 구역은 정치적 메시지의 존재를 완전히 차단할 만큼 크지 않았기 때문에 수용 가능했습니다.
Burson v. Freeman Opinion Announcement - May 26, 1992 Harry A. Blackmun
The second case is No. 90-1056, Burson versus Freeman.
Tennessee has a statute which prohibits the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 Feet of the entrance to a polling place on Election Day.
Respondent, while she was the treasurer for a political campaign in Tennessee, brought this State Court action alleging that the statute limited her ability to communicate with voters and that this was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The State Court dismissed the suit but the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed.
It ruled that the state had a compelling interest in banning such activities within the polling place itself but not on the surrounding premises, and it therefore concluded that the 100-Foot limit was not narrowly tailored to protect the State's interest and was not the least restrictive means to serve those interests.
I have the judgment of this Court to announce.
We reverse the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court and remand the case.
The Chief Justice, Justice White, Justice Kennedy, and I conclude that the statute does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Kennedy has filed a concurring opinion; Justice Scalia has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment; Justice Stevens has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter have joined.
Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Bush v. Gore (2000)
Facts of the case
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.
Question
Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?
Conclusion
Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5).
Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.
사건의 사실 2000년 12월 8일 미국 대법원의 부시 대 팜 비치 카운티 캔버스 위원회 판결과 앨 고어 부통령의 플로리다 대통령 선거 결과 인증 경쟁과 동시에 플로리다 대법원은 레온 카운티의 순회 법원에 마이애미-데이드 카운티의 경합 투표용지 9000장을 수작업으로 집계하도록 명령했습니다. 또한 플로리다의 모든 카운티는 선거 결과를 의심할 만큼 충분한 경합 투표용지가 있었기 때문에 모든 "과소 투표"(대통령 투표를 나타내지 않은 투표용지)를 즉시 수동으로 재검표하기 시작해야 한다고 명령했습니다. 조지 부시 주지사와 그의 러닝메이트인 리처드 체니는 미국 대법원에 재심 요청서를 제출하고 플로리다 대법원의 결정을 유예하기 위한 긴급 청원서를 요청했습니다. 미국 대법원은 재심을 승인하고 12월 9일에 체류를 허가했습니다. 이틀 후 구두 변론을 들었다.
질문 플로리다 대법원이 새로운 선거법을 제정하여 미국 헌법 제2조 제1항 제2항을 위반했습니까? 표준 없는 수동 재검표는 헌법의 평등한 보호 및 적법 절차 조항을 위반합니까?
결론 평등 보호 조항이 개인에게 "나중에 자의적이고 이질적인 대우"로 투표용지를 평가절하할 수 없도록 보장한다는 점을 지적하면서, 플로리다 대법원의 투표용지 재검표 계획이 위헌이라는 7-2 판결을 내렸습니다. 재검표가 이론상으로는 공정했더라도 실제로는 불공평했다. 기록에 따르면 투표용지마다, 선거구마다, 카운티마다 다른 기준이 적용되었습니다. 이러한 절차상의 어려움 때문에 법원은 5대 4로 남은 시간 동안 헌법 재검표를 할 수 없다고 판결했습니다(플로리다 주의회는 3 USC 섹션 5에서 제공하는 "세이프 하버"를 이용하기를 원했기 때문에 짧았습니다). 광범위한 선례를 만드는 것을 싫어하는 per curiam 의견은 현재 사례에 대한 보유를 제한했습니다. Rehnquist(Scalia와 Thomas가 합류한 동의 의견에서)는 플로리다 대법원의 결정이 주 의회만이 할 수 있는 새로운 선거법을 만들었기 때문에 재검표 계획도 위헌이라고 주장했습니다. Breyer와 Souter(별도로 작성)는 플로리다 법원의 재검표 계획이 평등 보호 조항을 위반했다는 주장에 동의했지만 헌법적 재검표가 성립될 수 있다고 믿으며 구제책에 대해서는 반대했습니다. 헌법상의 권리가 위태로울 때는 시간이 부족합니다. 긴즈버그와 스티븐스(별도로 작성)는 연방주의의 이유로 플로리다 대법원의 결정이 존중되어야 한다고 주장했습니다. 더욱이 플로리다의 결정은 근본적으로 옳았습니다. 헌법은 모든 투표를 집계하도록 규정하고 있습니다.
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