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October 20, 2002
U.S. to Withdraw From Arms Accord With
North Korea
By DAVID E. SANGER
ASHINGTON,
Oct. 19 — The Bush administration has decided
to scrap the 1994 arms control accord with
North Korea that has provided Western energy
aid in return for the North's promise to
freeze the development of nuclear weapons,
senior administration officials said today.
North Korea admitted two weeks ago that it
was pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program,
and accused the United States of taking steps
that forced Pyongyang to nullify the accord.
The White House has since debated whether to
end the accord, with some aides warning such a
step could lead North Korea to even greater
nuclear violations.
For that reason, the administration plans
to caution North Korea of serious consequences
if it tries to remove nuclear material now
stored under international supervision at
Yongbyon, the reactor site that was the
centerpiece of a previous nuclear standoff
with North Korea in the early 1990's. American
diplomats visiting Beijing apparently asked
China this week to convey that warning, though
it is not clear whether the message has yet
been delivered to the North Koreans.
The immediate practical effect of the
decision to scrap the agreement is the halting
of the annual shipments of 500,000 tons of
fuel oil from the United States to North
Korea.
Even if the clandestine North Korean
program effectively suspended the accord, the
administration's decision to formally abandon
it sends a clear message: it signifies an
American effort to pose a stark choice for
North Korea, between abandoning all of its
nuclear weapons programs and facing near-total
economic isolation.
"We think the framework as we knew it is
dead," one senior administration official said
when questioned about the administration's
strategy. "The North Koreans already told us
they viewed it as `nullified,' " the official
added.
More immediately, abandoning the accord
also means that the United States will urge
its allies, Japan and South Korea, to suspend,
if not end, a multibillion dollar project to
provide modern nuclear power plants to the
North. Ground has already been broken for
proliferation-resistant reactors, designed to
help North Korea provide basic electricity
service to cities and towns that go dark every
night, and to World War II-era factories that
now barely operate. The reactors have not yet
been delivered.
Other officials described a lengthy debate
within the White House over the risks of
abandoning the agreement altogether.
"There are some who fear that it could
tempt the North Koreans into a rapid breakout,
to produce weapons as fast as they can," one
official involved in the debate said. But Mr.
Bush, who came to office deeply suspicious of
the usefulness of the accord, has concluded
that the North Korean admission, made in
defiant tones after the United States
presented evidence of the breach, proves that
the accord was fatally flawed all along, his
aides say.
In 1994, President Clinton had contingency
plans in place for a military strike at the
Yongbyon plant if North Korea tried to make
use of the reactor fuel for bombs, according
to several of his former national security
aides. The accord reached at the last minute
that year, as American forces were being
reinforced on the Korean Peninsula, defused
that crisis. Since disclosing Wednesday night
that North Korea has admitted to pursuing a
new nuclear project, Mr. Bush's aides have
played down any talk of a military response.
North Korea acknowledged the program in
defiant tones after the United States
presented evidence that it had breached the
accord.
Officials did not specify what consequences
North Korea might face if it ignored American
warnings, a sharp contrast to the approach
being taken with Iraq. They argued again that
the North, even if nuclear armed and
unpredictable, does not pose as great a threat
to the United States and its allies as does
Saddam Hussein, who does not appear to have
any nuclear weapons so far but is suspected of
having chemical and biological arms.
Several years ago the Central Intelligence
Agency estimated that North Korea already had
reprocessed enough plutonium at Yongbyon to
make one or 2 nuclear weapons, and that the
fuel in storage could be fabricated into 5 or
10 more.
American officials say there is no
indication so far that any of that material
has been removed from the storage facilities,
which the International Atomic Energy Agency
monitors.
The 1994 accord was specifically designed
to halt a sophisticated and well-advanced
nuclear program at Yongbyon that involved
extracting plutonium from reactor waste, and
using it to produce weapons. But under other
agreements, the North Koreans were also
forbidden other new projects, including the
one it now says it has been pursuing, using a
more easily hidden technology to produce a
bomb from highly enriched uranium.
Enforcing that isolation — the
administration would not use the word
"embargo" today, although that appears to be
what it has in mind — would require the
agreement and cooperation of China, Russia,
Japan, South Korea and Europe. Already the
administration is running into significant
resistance — chiefly from South Korea, which
has long argued for engagement with the North.
South Korean officials fear that the enigmatic
North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, will feel
backed into a corner by any American-led
effort at economic isolation.
"This is going to take some time, because a
lot of countries have different equities with
the North Koreans," said the senior official,
describing a slow and deliberate diplomatic
approach that contrasts with the short
timetable for disarmament it has given to
Iraq.
But South Korea wants to do everything it
can to tamp down any sense of crisis, for fear
that a repeat of the 1994 nuclear
confrontation could veer out of control. The
difference between the American and South
Korean approaches was evident tonight when
South Korea's unification minister — whose job
it is to smooth relations with the North —
arrived in Pyongyang, the capital, for an
official visit.
The minister, Jeong Se Hyun, raised the
nuclear problem in the most circumspect terms,
and a pool report distributed in Seoul quoted
Mr. Jeong as telling North Korea's prime
minister that it was "of paramount importance
to wisely resolve the concern recently
raised."
Before leaving Seoul this morning, Mr.
Jeong said he would ask the North Koreans "to
resolve the nuclear issue" while going ahead
with "the agreed-upon agenda for
reconciliation and exchange" between the North
and South.
The administration does not plan to
publicly announce its decision to abandon the
1994 agreement anytime soon, officials say, in
hopes of creating a unified front with its
allies.
The spokesman for the National Security
Council, Sean McCormack, said today, that
"North Korea, by its own declaration, has said
the agreed framework is `nullified' and their
actions have made them noncompliant with the
agreement."
Much of the technology for the new program
came from Pakistan, according to current and
former officials familiar with the
intelligence. Pakistan's military ruler, Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, said on Friday that a news
article in The New York Times describing the
American intelligence finding was "absolutely
baseless."
"There is no such thing as collaboration
with North Korea in the nuclear arena,"
General Musharraf said.
The White House, in a carefully worded
statement, said it hoped all nations would cut
off any nuclear aid to North Korea, and
neither confirmed nor disputed the Times
account.
In Seoul today, James A. Kelly, the
assistant secretary of state for Asia and the
Pacific, and the man to whom the North Koreans
revealed their clandestine effort in a heated
session two weeks ago, said the United States
wanted to bring "maximum international
pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear
weapons ambitions."
But he carefully avoided hinting that South
Korea supported a tough stand vis-à-vis the
North. Mr. Bush will meet South Korea's
president, Kim Dae Jung, who is about to leave
office, and Japan's prime minister, Junichiro
Koizumi, at a Pacific economic summit meeting
in Mexico next weekend.
Mr. Kelly's stop in Seoul was a prelude to
that meeting, and he moved on today to Tokyo
in search of a unified response to the
surprise North Korean announcement. He would
say only that he and South Korean officials
"discussed all aspects" of North Koreas
nuclear program but had "reached no decisions"
on what to do next.
Today, Mr. Kelly said that the North
Koreans "did not make any demands" during his
visit on Oct. 3 and 4, when the nuclear
program was revealed, but he added that they
"did suggest there were measures that might be
taken" to induce them to comply with the
American demand that they disarm and come back
into compliance with their past agreements.
North Korea has repeatedly accused the United
States of delays in construction of the twin
light water nuclear reactors.
"They indicated when all these good things
were done, we might be able to talk about
their covert enrichment program," Mr. Kelly
said. "The North got it upside down."
The senior administration official
interviewed about the White House's strategy
said that North Korea must end the highly
enriched uranium program "in a verifiable
way," a major task in a country known for its
skills at digging deep caves. The official
added: "This time we must also address other
problems — missile transfer, the conventional
forces the North has, and the abominable way
it treats its people." None of those issues
were covered in the 1994 framework accord.
"You can't have re-entry into the
international community of states and brandish
a nuclear weapon," said the official. |