102,103 : 욕망과 국가, 헤겔 법철학의 해석

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철학의 항해 102 : 욕망과 국가, 헤겔 법철학의 일부 해석

독일의 관념주의 철학자 헤겔(G.W.F.Hegel, 1770-1830)은 그의 저서 “법철학”에서 근대 사회와 관련하여 욕망 혹은 욕구의 문제를 새롭게 부각시켰습니다. 헤겔의 “법철학”은 법과 도덕 그리고 인륜성 등을 종합하여 법의 체계로 다루는 방대한 사회학 내지 국가철학의 대작입니다. 헤겔은 종래의 철학가들이 보지 못한 영역, 즉 경제학의 영역과 그 중요성을 철학적으로 파악한 최초의 철학자라고 할 수 있습니다. 루카치(G.Lukács)사 쓴 “청년헤겔”이란 책은 헤겔 철학에 대한 발전사적 연구로 유명한 책인데, 이 책의 부제가 “변증법과 경제학의 관계에 관하여”입니다. 루카치는 헤겔의 변증법(Dialectics)사상이 근대 경제학의 알맹이를 사상적으로 파악한 것이라고 봅니다. 그만큼 헤겔은 당시대 자본주의 발전과 그의 학술적인 표현인 근대 경제학의 의미를 시대적으로, 철학적으로 파악하고 있었다는 말입니다.

헤겔의 인륜성(人倫性)이란 쉽게는 이해가 안됩니다. 이것은 단순한 윤리, 도덕은 아닙니다. 독일어로는 Sittlichkeit이고 영어로는 Ethical Life라고 합니다. 도덕은 개인적인 각성과 행동의 원리를 말합니다. 여기에 비해서 인륜성 개념의 가장 기초적인 의미는 공통체입니다. 인륜성은 보통은 도덕성을 포함하기는 합니다. 그러나 헤겔의 법철학에서는 인륜성은 도덕과는 구분이 됩니다. 인륜성은 개인의 차원을 넘어선 인간, 즉 집단으로서의 인간을 다룹니다. 인륜성은 가족, 시민사회 그리고 국가를 포함합니다.

도덕에서 인륜성으로 나아가는 것이 헤겔의 법철학의 중요한 원리입니다.

이런 맥락에서 인륜성은 경제 생활을 포함합니다. 경제 생활을 헤겔은 시민사회라고 규정합니다. 더 나아가 인륜성은 근대의 경제 생활 즉 자본주의적인 요소까지 포함하게 됩니다. 이런 관점에서 헤겔의 법철학은 법학, 도덕학 그리고 경제학을 섭렵합니다. 본 방송은 인륜성 중에서도 욕망과 경제활동을 주로 고찰하겠습니다.

1) 근대 시민사회와 욕망의 체계

헤겔의 법철학 제3부 인륜성에서 시민사회를 다루고 있습니다. 헤겔의 시민사회 Civil Society란 다시 말하면, 더 이상 신분제 사회의 지배를 받지 않는 자유로운 시민들의 활동으로서의 사회를 말합니다. 헤겔은 우선 시민사회를 경제 사회로 보고 있습니다. 이는 자본주의적인 요소를 강조합니다. 즉 경제활동의 원리로서 욕구 혹은 욕망을 강조합니다. 이런 점 때문에 헤겔의 법철학은 오늘날까지 많은 주목을 받고 있습니다. 더욱이 그런 욕망의 활동이 도덕과 법 그리고 국가 사이에 끼어 있어서 더욱 매력을 가진다고 할 수 있습니다.

헤겔은 시민사회를 욕망 개념을 통해서 밝히고 있습니다. 이것이 훌륭한 식견입니다.

어떻게 보면 자본주의 사회의 본질인데 이를 처음으로 철학의 차원에서 규명한 것입니다.

따라서 시민사회란 것은 자본주의 경제에 대한 인간적인 측면을 의미합니다. 자본주의의 가장 큰 특징인 욕망 혹은 욕구 개념도 단순하지는 않습니다. 인간이 동물이기 때문에 지니고 있는 욕망 즉 식욕, 성욕 혹은 의복의 욕구 등을 가진 시민들이 그 욕구를 달성하기 위하여 노동과 그 밖의 경제 활동을 하는 체계로 보고 있습니다. 그리고 더 나아가서 욕망이 그냥 본능적으로 주어지는 것이 아니라 때로는 문화와 사회를 통해서 형성되어지는 것임을 밝히고 있습니다. 즉 나의 욕망도 타자나 공동체를 통해서 결정된다는 것을 밝히고 있습니다.

그 다음에는 그런 경제활동과 시장활동을 규제하기 위한 사법의 체계로 다루고 있습니다. 그 다음에는 이런 활동을 더 구체적으로, 효율적으로 통제하고 활성화하기 위한 제도로서 행정조직과 직업조합 등을 다루고 있습니다. 헤겔의 글을 보겠습니다.

§ 188 서론

시민사회에는 세 개의 요소가 포함된다.

A. 개개인의 욕구의 만족이 자기의 노동과 다른 모든 사람의 노동 그리고 욕구의 만족과 매개되어 있는 것 – 욕구의 체계 (System der Bedürfnisse)

B. 욕구의 체계에 포함되어 있는 자유라는 보편적인 것의 현실성, 즉 사법기구에 의한 소유물의 보호.

C. 욕구의 체계 속에 잔존하는 우연성을 배려하며 특수한 이익을 공동의 이익으로 증진시키기 위해 힘쓰는 복지행정과 직능집단의 업무 (헤겔 “법철학” 임석진 번역 365f)

여기서 우리가 주목할 부분은 특히 A 부분입니다. B와 C는 A를 보호하거나 혹은 규제하기 위한 외부적인 기구들을 말합니다. 특히 C에 나타난 복지행정은 독일어로는 경찰(Polizei)이라고 되어 있습니다. 다시 말하면 개인들의 욕망과 이를 만족하기 위한 경제적 삶을 유지하기 위해서는 재판 제도와 또 욕망의 체제에 숨어있는 부정적인 것들을 규제하는 행정, 경찰, 그리고 조합을 말합니다. 이를 위의 글은 “욕구의 체계 속에 잔존하는 우연성”이라고 표현합니다. 즉 욕구가 항상 옳다는 것은 아닙니다. 욕망이 선을 넘을 때는 범죄가 됩니다. 이를 규제하고 예방하는 수단이 필요합니다. 이를 위한 조직이 경찰입니다.

개인이 자기의 욕구를 만족시키는데 자신의 노동뿐만 아니라 다른 사람의 노동과 만족이 필요하다는 사상입니다. 즉 나의 욕구의 만족에 타자의 만족이 개입되어 있다는 것입니다. 즉 노동을 통해서 욕구나 필요성이 채워집니다. 더 나아가서 타인의 욕구와 노동이 나의 욕구를 만족시켜 줍니다. 헤겔의 욕구 개념은 항상 타자의 욕구와 결부됩니다.

스스로 먹고 살기 위해서 일을 하여 돈을 벌지만 이 돈으로 상품을 사야 합니다. 그리고 거의 대부분의 상품들은 다른 사람들이 만듭니다. 헤겔이 상세히 공부한 애덤 스미스의 “국부론”에 이런 내용들이 나와 있습니다.

‘경제학의 아버지’ 애덤 스미스는 자신의 저서 “국부론”에서 제조업자들의 욕심 때문에 내가 만족할 수 있다는 것을 다음과 같이 설명했습니다. “우리가 저녁 식사를 기대할 수 있는 건 푸줏간 주인, 양조장 주인, 빵집 주인의 자비심 덕분이 아니라 그들의 돈벌이에 대한 관심 덕분이다. 우리는 그들의 박애심이 아니라 자기애에 호소하며, 우리의 필요가 아니라 그들의 이익만을 그들에게 이야기할 뿐이다.”

즉 다른 사람들의 욕구 때문에 나의 욕구가 채워집니다. 혹은 나의 욕구와 타인들의 욕구가 매개되어, 연결되어 있다는 사실입니다. 이는 자본주의 경제의 특징이라고도 할 수 있습니다. 타인들의 욕구가 나의 욕구에 보탬이 된다는 것입니다. 물론 불법적인 욕구도 있지만 그런 경우는 국가나 행정 혹은 경찰 등에 의해서 방지가 되고 있습니다.

이런 방식으로 나의 욕망과 필요가 타인들의 욕망과 필요에 얽매여 있습니다. 이를 “보이지 않는 손” invisible hand 이라고도 합니다.

그리고 개인은 자신의 필요 혹은 욕구를 채울 뿐만 아니라 조정한다는 사상입니다. 이는 개인의 욕구 혹은 필요성이 절대로 필요한 것, 예를 들면 먹고 마시는 것 혹은 주택과 의복 등 뿐만 아니라 기타 취미생활이나 특별한 기호 혹은 사치, 유행까지도 포함한다는 것입니다. 이런 헤겔의 구분은 경제학의 시조 애덤 스미스(A.Smith)에 따르는 것입니다.

애덤 스미스는 그의 저서 “국부론”에서 속성이 전혀 다른 두 가지 범주의 재화가 있다고 기술합니다. 아담 스미스는 재화를 필수품과 사치품으로 구분하여 생활필수품에 대한 욕망은 제한적이지만 편리품 및 사치품에 대한 욕망은 거의 무한정하다고 말합니다. 이는 다시 말해 노동의 분업과 시장을 통한 교환경제를 의미하는 것입니다.

따라서 헤겔은 나의 욕망은 다른 사람의 욕망의 충족을 통해서 조절되거나 충족된다고 말합니다. 이런 현상은 가정에서도 흔히 볼 수 있는 만족의 형태입니다. 즉, 부모는 자녀의 욕구의 충족을 통해서 자신의 만족을 봅니다. 때로 부모들은 자녀의 필요나 욕구의 충족을 위해서 자신의 필요나 욕구를 포기, 희생합니다.

2) 인간의 욕구는 무한하다.

헤겔은 인간의 욕구 내지 욕망이 동물들과는 달리 무한할 수 있음을 지적하고 있습니다. 동물은 그 욕망의 범위와 그 충족 수단에 있어서 제한적입니다. 가령 사자는 용맹스러운 짐승이지만 배가 부르면 다 이상 사냥하지 않습니다. 동물들이 그들의 본능적인 욕망을 채우는 방식은 지극히 단조롭습니다. 예를 들어 동물은 육식성, 채식성의 구분이 있습니다. 그러나 인간은 아무거나 먹을 수 있습니다. 이를 인간의 욕구의 보편성이라고 합니다. 다시 말해 인간의 욕망은 비단 먹는 것에 있어만 아니라 정신적, 지성적, 도덕적 욕망으로까지 발전합니다. 인간의 욕망은 그 종류가 무한하고 끝이 없습니다. 인간의 욕망은 그 정신성 때문에 욕망의 범위도 불확정적이고 욕망 충족의 수단도 무한히 발전할 수 있습니다. 그래서 우리는 흔히 욕망은 끝이 없다고 말합니다. 내가 남보다 편하고 부유한 생활을 한다고 해도 나는 거기 만족하지 않고 더 편하고 더 부유한 생활을 바랍니다. 또한 인간의 욕망의 특징은 기존의 욕망에 만족하지 않고 새로운 욕망을 발견하고 또 욕망을 세분화시키고 특수화시킨다는 것입니다. 이는 예를 들어 옷이나 신발들의 디자인이나 기능의 다양성과 무한한 변화에서 알 수 있습니다. 이를 헤겔은 직접 말하고 있습니다.

a. 욕구와 충족의 양식

§190 인간과 동물의 욕망충족; 자유의 형태화로서의 인간

동물은 제한된 범위의 수단과 방법을 가지고 있는 만큼 역시 마찬가지의 제한된 욕구를 충족시킨다. 인간 역시 이러한 의존상태에 있지만 동시에 그는 이 의존성을 초탈하여 공동성의 경지로 들어서 있음을 입증하기도 한다. 인간에게서 이것이 입증되는 것은 첫째, 욕구의 수단의 다양화에 의해서, 그 다음으로는 구체적인 욕구가 개개의 부분이나 측면으로 세분화되어 욕구가 한층 특수화하고 추상화함으로써이다. (헤겔 “법철학” 368)

헤겔이 말하는 욕망의 무한적인 발전과 세분화 혹은 추상화 등은 뒤의 자본주의 물질문명의 발전과 더불어 인간의 물질적인, 사회적 종속성을 야기하는 원인이 되기도 합니다.

여기서 추상적인 욕망이란 식욕이나 성욕같은 구체적이고 본능적인 욕망을 떠난 다른 종류의 욕망, 가령 자아실현의 욕망이나 교육의 욕망 등을 말합니다. 또는 사회개혁의 욕망도 가능합니다. 이런 종류의 정신적, 도덕적 혹은 개인의 취향에 관련된 욕망이 인간의 욕망을 무한하게 만드는 것입니다. 특히 취미 생활의 다양성이 욕망의 무한성과 연결됩니다.

그런데 이런 욕망의 무한정한 증폭은 부정적인 결과를 초래하기도 합니다. 헤겔은 19세기초에 살면서도 벌써 21세기 사회의 모순마저도 미리 보고 있습니다. 대중사회에서는 개인들의 욕망마저도 경제적으로 이용하고 광고와 매스컴을 통해서 교묘하게 조작하는 일이 빈번하여 여기에 대한 각별한 관심과 이해가 필요합니다. 헤겔은 이런 맥락에서 욕망의 증폭을 이용한 상업과 자본주의 문화의 병폐를 선구적으로 지적하고 있습니다.

(추가) 영국인이 쾌적한(comfortable)이라고 일컫는 것은 좀처럼 그 속뜻을 알 수 없는 것으로, 밑도 끝도 없이 그렇게 일컬어지는 것이다. 왜냐하면 아무리 쾌적하다고 해도 이는 다시금 어떤 불편함을 드러낼 수 있어서, 그 편리함을 따지고 들면 끝이 없는 노릇이기 때문이다. 이런 점에서 욕구라는 것은 직접 그 무언가를 욕구하는 사람들에 의해서 안출된다기보다는 오히려 그 욕구가 생겨남으로 해서 이익을 얻으려는 사람들에 의해 안출된다. (“법철학” 370)

욕구의 원초성이 사라지고 물질문명과 시장경제가 발전함에 따라서 욕구 자체가 생성된다는 말입니다. 특히 최근 인터넷과 전자기술의 발달에 따라 예전에는 없었던 갖가지 욕망이 탄생하였습니다. TV나 핸드폰의 보급에 따라서 숱한 취미생활과 욕구가 나타났습니다. 또한 유튜브 영상이 보급되어 엄청난 취미 생활이 증폭되고 있습니다. 혹은 화장품 등이 새로 개발됨에 따라서 거기에 맞는 욕구가 따라옵니다. 헤겔의 말처럼 이런 욕구들은 원초적인 욕구는 아니고 사회를 통해서 매개되어 지는 것입니다. 이런 면에서 욕구는 세분화, 전문화되어 집니다. 그리고 쾌적함의 경우에서 보는 것처럼 그 의미마저 애매하게 됩니다. 즉 무엇이 쾌적한 것인지도 모르게 되는 수가 있습니다. 욕구가 본능적인 것에 한정되지 않고 무한히 뻗어 가는 면이 있습니다. 욕구는 위에서 말한 것처럼 새로운 욕구 창조를 통해서 이익을 얻으려는 사람들 혹은 기업들에 의해서 창안됩니다. 예를 들어서 유튜브 창조를 통해서 숱한 욕구가 나타납니다. 혹은 그 전에는 없었던 페이스 북의 출시를 통해서 이제는 페이스북을 욕구하는 사람들이 수 없이 많아졌습니다. 이런 욕구는 식욕이나 성욕, 수면욕같은 본래적인 욕구가 아니라 창안된 욕구, 새로운 욕구입니다. 이처럼 자본주의 사회에서는 숱한 새로운 욕구들이 하루가 멀다하고 창출되고 있습니다.

헤겔은 이런 근대 자본주의 사회의 추동력으로서의 타산(打算)적 욕망 개념을 최초로 철학적으로 다루었습니다. 본능적인 욕구 혹은 원초적인 욕구와 비교되는 타산적인 욕구가 있습니다. 즉 어떤 욕구들은 타산적입니다. 즉 그 욕구가 꼭 필요한 것은 아니고 오히려 다른 욕구에 도움이 되는 욕구 혹은 자기에게 도움이 되는 욕구입니다.

3) 욕구에서 노동으로

위에서 헤겔은 자본주의, 시장주의 하에서의 욕망의 개념을 밝혔습니다. 즉 인간의 욕망은 무한한 부분이 있습니다. 나의 욕망의 충족은 타자의 욕망에 의존한다고 합니다. 이제는 그런 욕망을 채우기 위한 수단으로서 노동의 문제를 살펴봅니다.

b. 노동의 양식

§196 욕구와 욕구충족의 수단을 매개하는 노동

세분화된 욕구를 충족시키기에 합당하고 마찬가지로 세분화된 수단을 조달하는 매개작용을 하는 것이 노동이다. 노동은 자연에서 직접 제공된 소재를 다양한 목적을 위하여 복잡하기 이를데 없는 과정을 거쳐서 가공한다. 이러한 형성작용은 욕구를 충족시키는 수단에 가치와 합목적성을 부여하는데, 이로써 인간이 소비하는 것은 주로 인간에 의한 생산물이며 인간이 소비하는 것은 인간의 노력의 산물이 된다.

(“법철학” 374)

욕구의 세분화는 인간 욕구의 한 특징입니다. 특히 산업혁명과 자본주의 경제 형성 이후에는 이런 현상이 두드려 집니다. 예를 들어 술의 종류가 얼마나 많이 있습니까?

욕구도 세분화되고 이에 따라 그 수단도 세분화됩니다. 욕구의 세분화를 위해서 노동 역시 세분화됩니다. 이 때 노동은 기술이라고 해야 하겠죠? 이런 기술은 노동에 가치와 합목적성을 부여합니다. 합목적성이란 목적에 부합한다는 말입니다. 영어로는 유용성(utility)라고 합니다. “인간이 소비하는 것은 주로 인간에 의한 생산물이며 인간이 소비하는 것은 인간의 노력의 산물이 된다” 라는 말은 결국 인간의 소비는 자연물의 채취보다는 인간들을 만든 것, 가공한 것을 시장에서 사고 팔아서 한다는 것입니다. 이는 또한 분업과도 관련이 있습니다. 이를 헤겔은 “노동이 추상화된다”고 합니다. “동시에 타인의 욕구를 충족시키기 위하여 사람들이 서로 의존하고 관계한다” 는 말도 합니다. (“법철학” 375) “노동이 추상화됨에 따라 노동은 더욱 기계화되고 종국에 가서는 인간이 노동에 의해 유린당하고 그 자리를 기계가 차지하는 일이 벌어지게 만든다”고도 합니다. 이런 현상이 이미 헤겔의 시대에도 있었다는 것이 놀라운 사실입니다. 우리 시대에는 로봇화, 자동화, AI등에 의해서 인간들은 더욱 기계에 의해서 유린을 당합니다. 많은 일자리들이 새로운 생산방식이 도입됨에 따라서 소멸되고 또 생성될 수 있습니다.

4) 개인적인 욕구와 노동이 공익을 창출한다.

욕구의 분석을 통해서 헤겔은 원론적으로 나의 욕구가 타인의 욕구와 매개된다는 점을 밝혔습니다. 이는 실은 애덤 스미스의 자유방임주의 경제학을 반영하는 것입니다. 즉 개인들이 자신의 행복을 위해서 열심히 일하는 것이 사회적인 부(富)를 축적한다는 것입니다. 따라서 개인들로 하여금 가능하면 자유롭게 경제활동을 하도록 허용하는 것이 국가의 발전을 위해서 가장 좋다는 것입니다. 이런 사실을 헤겔은 다음과 같이 표현합니다.

c.재산

§199 사회적 생산의 분점

이상과 같이 노동과 욕구의 충족이 상호의존적으로 관계하는 가운데 주관적인 이기심이 만인의 욕구 충족에 기여하는 것으로 전화한다. - 특수한 것이 보편적인 것에 의해 매개된다는 이 변증법적 운동 속에서 각자가 자기를 위하여 취득하고 향유하는 행위가 동시에 타인의 향유를 위하여 생산하고 취득하는 것이 된다. 만인이 만인에 의존한다는 생산과 향유의 전면적인 착종(錯綜)상태는 각자에게 공동의 지속적인 재산이 되는바, 이것은 누구나가 그의 교량과 기량에 따라서 거기에 참여하며 자기의 생계를 확보할 수 있도록 해주게 된다. - 그런가 하면 또 각자가 저마다의 노동에 의해 취득한 것이 이 공동의 재산을 유지하고 증대시켜준다. (“법철학” 376)

“주관적인 이기심이 만인의 욕구 충족에 기여하는 것으로 전화한다”는 말은 경쟁 사회에 진입하는 청년들에게는 쉽게 들어오지 않습니다. 요즘은 무한한 경쟁이란 말을 많이 듣습니다. 취업도 잘 안되고 결혼도 어려운 현실에서 나의 이기심은 사회적인 부(富)와 다른 것으로 보입니다. 사회적인 부는 상위층만 가지고 있는 것으로 보입니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 주관적인 이기심이 공적인 이익과 일치한다는 원리가 경쟁 사회의 바닥에 깔려 있습니다. 만약 사익과 공익이 불일치한다면 우리들은 잘살기 위해서 노력할 필요가 없습니다. 현재 사회적인 부패와 가난으로 들끓고 있는 남미의 국가들은 이런 믿음을 상실합니다. 그래서 마약 사업으로 많은 청년들이 뛰어 듭니다. 사회의 재산이 나와 무관하다고 생각한다면 그런 사회는 불법과 불공평이 넘치는 사회일 것입니다. 따라서 “주관적인 이기심이 만인의 욕구 충족에 기여하는 것으로 전화하는” 사회란 결국 전체와 부분이 일치하는 사회입니다. 즉 내가 열심히 일하면 그것이 타자에게도 이익이 되는 그런 상태입니다. 그래서 일하는 만큼 보답도 받습니다. 예를 들어서 소나 돼지를 잡아서 뼈를 발골하는 그런 직업에서 기술을 연마하여 돈도 벌고 소비자들에게도 좋은 고기를 제공하는 경우입니다. 혹은 노래를 잘불러 돈도 많이 벌고 남들에게도 큰 기쁨을 제공하는 가수들이 있습니다. 하여간 나와 타자의 이익의 일치가 자본주의 사회의 근간을 이루고 있습니다.

이를 헤겔은 “특수한 것이 보편적인 것에 의해 매개된다는 이 변증법적 운동 속에서 각자가 자기를 위하여 취득하고 향유하는 행위가 동시에 타인의 향유를 위하여 생산하고 취득하는 것이 된다” 라고 표현합니다. 그러나 보통은 특수한 이익의 추구와 보편적인 이익은 서로 대립되는 것으로 봅니다. 이기주의는 이타주의와 반대가 됩니다. 또 개인들의 이기주의적인 활동과 사회봉사활동은 반대로 봅니다. 그러나 애덤 스미스의 자유방임주의 경제학과 헤겔의 법철학은 이 양자를 근본적으로 같은 것으로 봅니다. 내가 열심히 사는 것이 사회발전에 기여한다는 것입니다. 이런 현상을 헤겔은 변증법이라고도 합니다. 즉 겉으로 볼 때는 반대적인 것들이 속으로는 같다는 것입니다. 즉 좋은 제품을 만들어 돈을 많이 번 사람이 애국자라는 논리입니다. 돈을 많이 벌고 또 많은 노동자들에게 일자리를 만들어 주는 기업가는 애국자가 맞습니다.

그런 면에서 헤겔은 “각자가 저마다의 노동에 의해 취득한 것이 이 공동의 재산을 유지하고 증대시켜준다” 라고 합니다. 국가의 자산 역시 개인들의 자산의 총합에 불과합니다. 이런 면에서 국가에 대한 너무 큰 기대는 잘못입니다. 나 없이는 국가도 없습니다. 국가의 주인을 왕으로 보는 군주주의나, 국가가 국민들을 먹여 살린다는 공산주의 등은 이런 자유주의와 다릅니다.

그래서 헤겔은 국가를 욕구의 체계라고 한 것입니다. 물론 시민사회는 국가 형성의 전 단계 혹은 국가의 기초라고 할 수 있습니다.

ii Civil Society

§ 182

THE concrete person, who is himself the object of his particular aims, is, as a totality and a mixture of

caprice and physical necessity, one principle of civil society. But the particular person is essentially so

related to other particular persons that each establishes himself and finds satisfaction by means of the

others, and at the same time purely and simply by means of the form of universality, the second

principle here.

Addition: Civil society is the [stage of] difference which intervenes between the family and

the state, even if its formation follows later in time than that of the state, because, as [the stage

of] difference, it presupposes the state; to subsist itself, it must have the state before its eyes as

something self-subsistent. Moreover, the creation of civil society is the achievement of the

modern world which has for the first time given all determinations of the Idea their due. If the

state is represented as a unity of different persons, as a unity which is only a partnership, then

what is really meant is only civil society. Many modern constitutional lawyers have been able

to bring within their purview no theory of the state but this. In civil society each member is his

own end, everything else is nothing to him. But except in contact with others he cannot attain

the whole compass of his ends, and therefore these others are means to the end of the

particular member. A particular end, however, assumes the form of universality through this

relation to other people, and it is attained in the simultaneous attainment of the welfare of

others. Since particularity is inevitably conditioned by universality, the whole sphere of civil

society is the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every

talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where waves of every passion gush forth,

regulated only by reason glinting through them. Particularity, restricted by universality, is the

only standard whereby each particular member promotes his welfare.

§ 183

In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends – an attainment conditioned in this way by

universality – there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood,

happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.

On this system, individual happiness, &c., depend, and only in this connected system are they

actualised and secured. This system may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based

on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it.

§ 184

The Idea in this its stage of division imparts to each of its moments a characteristic embodiment; to

particularity it gives the right to develop and launch forth in all directions; and to universality the right

to prove itself not only the ground and necessary form of particularity, but also the authority standing

over it and its final end. It is the system of the ethical order, split into its extremes and lost, which

constitutes the Idea’s abstract moment, its moment of reality. Here the Idea is present only as a

relative totality and as the inner necessity behind this outward appearance.

Addition: Here ethical life is split into its extremes and lost; the immediate unity of the family

has fallen apart into a plurality. Reality here is externality, the decomposing of the concept,

the self-subsistence of its moments which have now won their freedom and their determinate

existence. Though in civil society universal and particular have fallen apart, yet both are still

reciprocally bound together and conditioned. While each of them seems to do just the opposite

to the other and supposes that it can exist only by keeping the other at arm’s length, none the

less each still conditions the other. Thus, for example, most people regard the paying of taxes

as injurious to their particular interest, as something inimical and obstructive of their own

ends. Yet, however true this seems, particular ends cannot be attained without the help of the

universal, and a country where no taxes were paid could not be singled out as invigorating its

citizens. Similarly, it might seem that universal ends would be more readily attainable if the

universal absorbed the strength of the particulars in the way described, for instance, in Plato’s

Republic. But this, too, is only an illusion, since both universal and particular turn into one

another and exist only for and by means of one another. If I further my ends, I further the ends

of the universal, and this in turn furthers my end.

§ 185

Particularity by itself, given free rein in every direction to satisfy its needs, accidental caprices, and

subjective desires, destroys itself and its substantive concept in this process of gratification. At the

same time, the satisfaction of need, necessary and accidental alike, is accidental because it breeds new

desires without end, is in thoroughgoing dependence on caprice and external accident, and is held in

check by the power of universality. In these contrasts and their complexity, civil society affords a

spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to

them both.

Remark: The development of particularity to self-subsistence (compare Remark to § 124) is

the moment which appeared in the ancient world as an invasion of ethical corruption and as

the ultimate cause of that world’s downfall. Some of these ancient states were built on the

patriarchal and religious principle, others on the principle of an ethical order which was more

explicitly intellectual, though still comparatively simple; in either case they rested on

primitive unsophisticated intuition. Hence they could not withstand the disruption of this state

of mind when self-consciousness was infinitely reflected into itself; when this reflection began

to emerge, they succumbed to it, first in spirit and then in substance, because the simple

principle underlying them lacked the truly infinite power to be found only in that unity which

allows both sides of the antithesis of reason to develop themselves separately in all their

strength and which has so overcome the antithesis that it maintains itself in it and integrates it

in itself.

In his Republic, Plato displays the substance of ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth; but he

could only cope with the principle of self-subsistent particularity, which in his day had forced

its way into Greek ethical life, by setting up in opposition to it his purely substantial state. He

absolutely excluded it from his state, even in its very beginnings in private property (see

Remark to § 46) and the family, as well as in its more mature form as the subjective will, the

choice of a social position, and so forth. It is this defect which is responsible both for the

misunderstanding of the deep and substantial truth of Plato’s state and also for the usual view

of it as a dream of abstract thinking, as what is often called a ‘mere ideal’. The principle of the

self-subsistent inherently infinite personality of the individual, the principle of subjective

freedom, is denied its right in the purely substantial form which Plato gave to mind in its

actuality. This principle dawned in an inward form in the Christian religion and in an external

form (and therefore in one linked with abstract universality) in the Roman world. It is

historically subsequent to the Greek world, and the philosophic reflection which descends to

its depth is likewise subsequent to the substantial Idea of Greek philosophy.

Addition: Particularity by itself is measureless excess, and the forms of this excess are

themselves measureless. By means of his ideas and reflections man expands his desires, which

are not a closed circle like animal instinct, and carries them on to the false infinite. At the

other end of the scale, however, want and destitution are measureless too, and the discord of

this situation can be brought into a harmony only by the state which has powers over it. Plato

wished to exclude particularity from his state, but this is no help, since help on these lines

would contravene the infinite right of the Idea to allow freedom to the particular.

It was in the Christian religion in the first place that the right of subjectivity arose, together

with the infinity of self-awareness, and while granting this right, the whole order must at the

same time retain strength enough to put particularity in harmony with the unity of ethical life.

§ 186

But in developing itself independently to totality, the principle of particularity passes over into

universality, and only there does it attain its truth and the right to which its positive actuality is

entitled. This unity is not the identity which the ethical order requires, because at this level, that of

division (see § 184), both principles are self-subsistent. It follows that this unity is present here not as

freedom but as necessity, since it is by compulsion that the particular rises to the form of universality

and seeks and gains its stability in that form.

§ 187

Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose end is their own

interest. This end is mediated through the universal which thus appears as a means to its realisation.

Consequently, individuals can attain their ends only in so far as they themselves determine their

knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way and make themselves links in this chain of social

connections. In these circumstances, the interest of the Idea – an interest of which these members of

civil society are as such unconscious – lies in the process whereby their singularity and their natural

condition are raised, as a result of the necessities imposed by nature as well as of arbitrary needs, to

formal freedom and formal universality of knowing and willing – the process whereby their

particularity is educated up to subjectivity.

Remark: The idea that the state of nature is one of innocence and that there is a simplicity of

manners in uncivilised (ungebildeter) peoples, implies treating education (Bildung) as

something purely external, the ally of corruption. Similarly, the feeling that needs, their

satisfaction, the pleasures and comforts of private life, and so forth, are absolute ends, implies

treating education as a mere means to these ends. Both these views display lack of

acquaintance with the nature of mind and the end of reason. Mind attains its actuality only by

creating a dualism within itself, by submitting itself to physical needs and the chain of these

external necessities, and so imposing on itself this barrier and this finitude, and finally by

maturing (bildet) itself inwardly even when under this barrier until it overcomes it and attains

its objective reality in the finite. The end of reason, therefore, is neither the manners of an

unsophisticated state of nature, nor, as particularity develops, the pleasure for pleasure’s sake

which education procures. On the contrary, its end is to banish natural simplicity, whether the

passivity which is the absence of the self, or the crude type of knowing and willing, i.e.

immediacy and singularity, in which mind is absorbed. It aims in the first instance at securing

for this, its external condition, the rationality of which it is capable, i.e. the form of

universality or the Understanding (Verständigkeit). By this means alone does mind become at

home with itself within this pure externality.

There, then, mind’s freedom is existent and mind becomes objective to itself in this element

which is implicitly inimical to mind’s appointed end, freedom; it has to do there only with

what it has itself produced and stamped with its seal. It is in this way then that the form of

universality comes explicitly into existence in thought, and this form is the only worthy

element for the existence of the Idea. The final purpose of education, therefore, is liberation

and the struggle for a higher liberation still; education is the absolute transition from an ethical

substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both

infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form. In the individual

subject, this liberation is the hard struggle against pure subjectivity of demeanour, against the

immediacy of desire, against the empty subjectivity of feeling and the caprice of inclination.

The disfavour showered on education is due in part to its being this hard struggle; but it is

through this educational struggle that the subjective will itself attains objectivity within, an

objectivity in which alone it is for its part capable and worthy of being the actuality of the

Idea.

Moreover, this form of universality – the Understanding, to which particularity has worked its

way and developed itself, brings it about at the same time that particularity becomes

individuality genuinely existent in its own eyes. And since it is from this particularity that the

universal derives the content which fills it as well as its character as infinite selfdetermination, particularity itself is present in ethical life as infinitely independent free

subjectivity. This is the position which reveals education as a moment immanent in the

Absolute and which makes plain its infinite value.

Addition: By educated men, we may prima facie understand those who without the obtrusion

of personal idiosyncrasy can do what others do. It is precisely this idiosyncrasy, however,

which uneducated men display, since their behaviour is not governed by the universal

characteristics of the situation. Similarly, an uneducated man is apt to hurt the feelings of his

neighbours. He simply lets himself go and does not reflect on the susceptibilities of others. It

is not that he intends to hurt them, but his conduct is not consonant with his intention. Thus

education rubs the edges off particular characteristics until a man conducts himself in

accordance with the nature of the thing. Genuine originality, which produces the real thing,

demands genuine education, while bastard originality adopts eccentricities which only enter

the heads of the uneducated.

§ 188

Civil society contains three moments:

(A) The mediation of need and one man’s satisfaction through his labour and the satisfaction of the

needs of all others – the System of Needs.

(B) The actuality of the universal principle of freedom therein contained – the protection of property

through the Administration of Justice.

(C) Provision against contingencies still lurking in systems (A) and (B), and care for particular

interest, as a common interest, by means of the Public Authority and the Corporation.

A. The System of Needs

§ 189

Particularity is in the first instance characterised in general by its contrast with the universal

principle of the will and thus is subjective need (see § 59). This attains its objectivity i.e. its

satisfaction, by means of [a] external things, which at this stage are likewise the property and product

of the needs and wills of others, and [b] labour and effort, the middle term between the subjective and

the objective. The aim here is the satisfaction of subjective particularity, but the universal asserts itself

in the bearing which this satisfaction has on the needs of others and their free arbitrary wills. The

show of rationality thus produced in this sphere of finitude is the Understanding, and this is the aspect

which is of most importance in considering this sphere and which itself constitutes the reconciling

element within it.

Remark: Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs and labour but

then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-movements in their complexity

and their qualitative and quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which have arisen

out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords the interesting spectacle

(as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which

confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the

Understanding effective in the thing and directing it. It is to find reconciliation here to

discover in the sphere of needs this show of rationality lying in the thing and effective there;

but if we look at it from the opposite point of view, this is the field in which the

Understanding with its subjective aims and moral fancies vents its discontent and moral

frustration.

Addition: There are certain universal needs such as food, drink, clothing, &c., and it depends

entirely on accidental circumstances how these are satisfied. The fertility of the soil varies

from place to place, harvests vary from year to year, one man is industrious, another indolent.

But this medley of arbitrariness generates universal characteristics by its own working; and

this apparently scattered and thoughtless sphere is upheld by a necessity which automatically

enters it. To discover this necessary element here is the object of political economy, a science

which is a credit to thought because it finds laws for a mass of accidents. It is an interesting

spectacle here to see all chains of activity leading back to the same point; particular spheres of

action fall into groups, influence others, and are helped or hindered by others. The most

remarkable thing here is this mutual interlocking of particulars, which is what one would least

expect because at first sight everything seems to be given over to the arbitrariness of the

individual, and it has a parallel in the solar system which displays to the eye only irregular

movements, though its laws may none the less be ascertained.

(a) The Kind of Need and Satisfaction [typical of civil society]

The Kind of Need and Satisfaction [typical of civil society]

§ 190

An animal’s needs and its ways and means of satisfying them are both alike restricted in scope.

Though man is subject to this restriction too, yet at the same time he evinces his transcendence of it

and his universality, first by the multiplication of needs and means of satisfying them, and secondly

by the differentiation and division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn become

different needs, particularised and so more abstract.

Remark: In [abstract] right, what we had before us was the person; in the sphere of morality,

the subject; in the family, the family-member; in civil society as a whole, the burgher or

bourgeois. Here at the standpoint of needs (compare Remark to § 123) what we have before us

is the composite idea which we call man. Thus this is the first time, and indeed properly the

only time, to speak of man in this sense.

Addition: An animal is restricted to particularity. It has its instincts and means of satisfying

them, means which are limited and which it cannot overstep. Some insects are parasitic on a

certain kind of plant; some animals have a wider range and can live in different climates, but

there is always a restriction preventing them from having the range open to man. The need of

shelter and clothing, the necessity of cooking his food to make it fit to eat and to overcome its

natural rawness, both mean that man has less comfort than an animal, and indeed, as mind, he

ought to have less. Intelligence, with its grasp of distinctions, multiplies these human needs,

and since taste and utility become criteria of judgment, even the needs themselves are affected

thereby. Finally, it is no longer need but opinion which has to be satisfied, and it is just the

educated man who analyses the concrete into its particulars. The very multiplication of needs

involves a check on desire, because when many things are in use, the urge to obtain any one

thing which might be needed is less strong, and this is a sign that want altogether is not so

imperious.

§ 191

Similarly, the means to particularised needs and all the ways of satisfying these are themselves

divided and multiplied and so in turn become proximate ends and abstract needs. This multiplication

goes on ad infinitum; taken as a whole, it is refinement, i.e. a discrimination between these multiplied

needs, and judgment on the suitability of means to their ends.

Addition: What the English call ‘comfort’ is something inexhaustible and illimitable. [Others

can discover to you that what you take to be] comfort at any stage is discomfort, and these

discoveries never come to an end. Hence the need for greater comfort does not exactly arise

within you directly; it is suggested to you by those who hope to make a profit from its

creation.

§ 192

Needs and means, as things existent realiter, become something which has being for others by

whose needs and labour satisfaction for all alike is conditioned. When needs and means become

abstract in quality (see § 191), abstraction is also a character of the reciprocal relation of individuals

to one another. This abstract character, universality, is the character of being recognised and is the

moment which makes concrete, i.e. social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways and means

of satisfaction.

Addition: The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference to others introduces here the

form of universality. It is from others that I acquire the means of satisfaction and I must

accordingly accept their views. At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce means

for the satisfaction of others. We play into each other’s hands and so hang together. To this

extent everything private becomes something social. In dress fashions and hours of meals,

there are certain conventions which we have to accept because in these things it is not worth

the trouble to insist on displaying one’s own discernment. The wisest thing here is to do as

others do.

§ 193

This social moment thus becomes a particular end-determinant for means in themselves and their

acquisition, as well as for the manner in which needs are satisfied. Further, it directly involves the

demand for equality of satisfaction with others. The need for this equality and for emulation, which is

the equalising of oneself with others, as well as the other need also present here, the need of the

particular to assert itself in some distinctive way, become themselves a fruitful source of the

multiplication of needs and their expansion.

§ 194

Since in social needs, as the conjunction of immediate or natural needs with mental needs arising

from ideas, it is needs of the latter type which because of their universality make themselves

preponderant, this social moment has in it the aspect of liberation, i.e. the strict natural necessity of

need is obscured and man is concerned with his own opinion, indeed with an opinion which is

universal, and with a necessity of his own making alone, instead of with an external necessity, an

inner contingency, and mere caprice.

Remark: The idea has been advanced that in respect of his needs man lived in freedom in the

so-called ‘state of nature’ when his needs were supposed to be confined to what are known as

the simple necessities of nature, and when he required for their satisfaction only the means

which the accidents of nature directly assured to him. This view takes no account of the

moment of liberation intrinsic to labour, on which see the following Paragraphs. And apart

from this, it is false, because to be confined to mere physical needs as such and their direct

satisfaction would simply be the condition in which the mental is plunged in the natural and so

would be one of savagery and unfreedom, while freedom itself is to be found only in the

reflection of mind into itself, in mind’s distinction from nature, and in the reflex of mind in

nature.

§ 195

This liberation is abstract since the particularity of the ends remains their basic content. When

social conditions tend to multiply and subdivide needs, means, and enjoyments indefinitely – a

process which, like the distinction between natural and refined needs, has no qualitative limits – this is

luxury. In this same process, however, dependence and want increase ad infinitum, and the material to

meet these is permanently barred to the needy man because it consists of external objects with the

special character of being property, the embodiment of the free will of others, and hence from his

point of view its recalcitrance is absolute.

Addition: The entire Cynical mode of life adopted by Diogenes was nothing more or less than

a product of Athenian social life, and what determined it was the way of thinking against

which his whole manner protested. Hence it was not independent of social conditions but

simply their result; it was itself a rude product of luxury. When luxury is at its height, distress

and depravity are equally extreme, and in such circumstances Cynicism is the outcome of

opposition to refinement.

(b) The Kind of Labour [typical of civil society]

§ 196

The means of acquiring and preparing the particularised means appropriate to our similarly

particularised needs is labour. Through labour the raw material directly supplied by nature is

specifically adapted to these numerous ends by all sorts of different processes. Now this formative

change confers value on means and gives them their utility, and hence man in what he consumes is

mainly concerned with the products of men. It is the products of human effort which man consumes.

Addition: There is hardly any raw material which does not need to be worked on before use.

Even air has to be worked for because we have to warm it. Water is perhaps the only

exception, because we can drink it as we find it. It is by the sweat of his brow and the toil of

his hands that man obtains the means to satisfy his needs.

§ 197

The multiplicity of objects and situations which excite interest is the stage on which theoretical

education develops. This education consists in possessing not simply a multiplicity of ideas and facts,

but also a flexibility and rapidity of mind, ability to pass from one idea to another, to grasp complex

and general relations, and so on. It is the education of the understanding in every way, and so also the

building up of language. Practical education, acquired through working, consists first in the

automatically recurrent need for something to do and the habit of simply being busy; next, in the strict

adaptation of one’s activity according not only to the nature of the material worked on, but also, and

especially, to the pleasure of other workers; and finally, in a habit, produced by this discipline, of

objective activity and universally recognised aptitudes.

Addition: The savage is lazy and is distinguished from the educated man by his brooding

stupidity, because practical education is just education in the need and habit of being busy. A

clumsy man always produces a result he does not intend; he is not master of his own job. The

skilled worker, on the other hand, may be said to be the man who produces the thing as it

ought to be and who hits the nail on the head without shrinking (keine Sprödigkeit in seinem

subjektiven Tun gegen den Zweck findet).

§ 198

The universal and objective element in labour, on the other hand, lies in the abstracting process

which effects the subdivision of needs and means and thereby eo ipso subdivides production and

brings about the division of labour. By this division, the labour of the individual becomes less

complex, and consequently his skill at his section of the job increases, like his output. At the same

time, this abstraction of one man’s skill and means of production from another’s completes and makes

necessary everywhere the dependence of men on one another and their reciprocal relation in the

satisfaction of their other needs. Further, the abstraction of one man’s production from another’s

makes labour more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install machines

in his place.

(c) Capital [and class-divisions]

§ 199

When men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally related to one another in their

labour and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the

satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective selfseeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man

in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the

enjoyment of everyone else. The compulsion which brings this about is rooted in the complex

interdependence of each on all, and it now presents itself to each as the universal permanent capital

(see § 170) which gives each the opportunity, by the exercise of his education and skill, to draw a

share from it and so be assured of his livelihood, while what he thus earns by means of his labour

maintains and increases the general capital.

§ 200

A particular man’s resources, or in other words his opportunity of sharing in the general resources,

are conditioned, however, partly by his own unearned principal (his capital), and partly by his skill;

this in turn is itself dependent not only on his capital, but also on accidental circumstances whose

multiplicity introduces differences in the development of natural, bodily, and mental characteristics,

which were already in themselves dissimilar. In this sphere of particularity, these differences are

conspicuous in every direction and on every level, and, together with the arbitrariness and accident

which this sphere contains as well, they have as their inevitable consequence disparities of individual

resources and ability.

Remark: The objective right of the particularity of mind is contained in the Idea. Men are

made unequal by nature, where inequality is in its element, and in civil society the right of

particularity is so far from annulling this natural inequality that it produces it out of mind and

raises it to an inequality of skill and resources, and even to one of moral and intellectual

attainment. To oppose to this right a demand for equality is a folly of the Understanding which

takes as real and rational its abstract equality and its ‘ought-to-be’.

This sphere of particularity, which fancies itself the universal, is still only relatively identical

with the universal, and consequently it still retains in itself the particularity of nature, i.e.

arbitrariness, or in other words the relics of the state of nature. Further, it is reason, immanent

in the restless system of human needs, which articulates it into an organic whole with different

members (see the following §).

§ 201

The infinitely complex, criss-cross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the

equally infinite multiplicity of means therein employed, become crystallised, owing to the universality

inherent in their content, and distinguished into general groups. As a result, the entire complex is built

up into particular systems of needs, means, and types of work relative to these needs, modes of

satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which

individuals are assigned – in other words, into class-divisions.

Addition: The ways and means of sharing in the capital of society are left to each man’s

particular choice, but the subdivision of civil society into different general branches is a

necessity. The family is the first precondition of the state, but class divisions are the second.

The importance of the latter is due to the fact that although private persons are self-seeking,

they are compelled to direct their attention to others. Here then is the root which connects selfseeking to the universal, i.e. to the state, whose care it must be that this tie is a hard and fast

one.

§ 202

The classes are specifically determined in accordance with the concept as

(a) the substantial or immediate [or agricultural] class;

(b) the reflecting or formal [or business] class; and finally,

(c) the universal class [the class of civil servants].

§ 203

(a) The substantial [or agricultural] class has its capital in the natural products of the soil which it

cultivates – soil which is capable of exclusively private ownership and which demands formation in

an objective way and not mere haphazard exploitation. In face of the connection of [agricultural]

labour and its fruits with separate and fixed times of the year, and the dependence of harvests on the

variability of natural processes, the aim of need in this class turns into provision for the future; but

owing to the conditions here, the agricultural mode of subsistence remains one which owes

comparatively little to reflection and independence of will, and this mode of life is in general such that

this class has the substantial disposition of an ethical life which is immediate, resting on family

relationship and trust.

Remark: The real beginning and original foundation of states has been rightly ascribed to the

introduction of agriculture along with marriage, because the principle of agriculture brings

with it the formation of the land and consequentially exclusively private property (compare

Remark to § 170); the nomadic life of savages, who seek their livelihood from place to place,

it brings back to the tranquillity of private rights and the assured satisfaction of their needs.

Along with these changes, sexual love is restricted to marriage, and this bond in turn grows

into an enduring league, inherently universal, while needs expand into care for a family, and

personal possessions into family goods. Security, consolidation, lasting satisfaction of needs,

and so forth – things which are the most obvious recommendations of marriage and

agriculture – are nothing but forms of universality, modes in which rationality, the final end

and aim, asserts itself in these spheres.

In this matter, nothing is of more interest than the ingenious and learned explanations which

my distinguished friend, Herr Creuzer, has given of the agrarian festivals, images, and

sanctuaries of the ancients. He shows that it was because the ancients themselves had become

conscious of the divine origin of agriculture and other institutions associated with it that they

held them in such religious veneration.

In course of time, the character of this class as ‘substantial’ undergoes modifications through

the working of the civil law, in particular the administration of justice, as well as through the

working of education, instruction, and religion. These modifications, which occur in the other

classes also, do not affect the substantial content of the class but only its form and the

development of its power of reflection.

Addition: In our day agriculture is conducted on methods devised by reflective thinking, i.e.

like a factory. This has given it a character like that of industry and contrary to its natural one.

Still, the agricultural class will always retain a mode of life which is patriarchal and the

substantial frame of mind proper to such a life. The member of this class accepts

unreflectively what is given him and takes what he gets, thanking God for it and living in faith

and confidence that this goodness will continue. What comes to him suffices him; once it is

consumed, more comes again. This is the simple attitude of mind not concentrated on the

struggle for riches. It may be described as the attitude of the old nobility which just ate what

there was. So far as this class is concerned, nature does the major part, while individual effort

is secondary. In the business class, however, it is intelligence which is the essential thing, and

natural products can be treated only as raw materials.

§ 204

(b) The business class has for its task the adaptation of raw materials, and for its means of

livelihood it is thrown back on its work, on reflection and intelligence, and essentially on the

mediation of one man’s needs and labour with those of others. For what this class produces and

enjoys, it has mainly itself, its own industry, to thank. The task of this class is subdivided into:

[a] work to satisfy single needs in a comparatively concrete way and to supply single orders –

craftsmanship;

[b] work of a more abstract kind, mass-production to satisfy single needs, but needs in more

universal demand – manufacture;

[c] the business of exchange, whereby separate utilities are exchanged the one for the other,

principally through the use of the universal medium of exchange, money, which actualises the abstract

value of all commodities – trade.

Addition: In the business class, the individual is thrown back on himself, and this feeling of

self-hood is most intimately connected with the demand for law and order. The sense of

freedom and order has therefore arisen above all in towns. The agricultural class, on the other

hand, has little occasion to think of itself; what it obtains is the gift of a stranger, of nature. Its

feeling of dependence is fundamental to it, and with this feeling there is readily associated a

willingness to submit to whatever may befall it at other men’s hands. The agricultural class is

thus more inclined to subservience, the business class to freedom.

§ 205

(c) The universal class [the class of civil servants] has for its task the universal interests of the

community. It must therefore be relieved from direct labour to supply its needs, either by having

private means or by receiving an allowance from the state which claims its industry, with the result

that private interest finds its satisfaction in its work for the universal.

§ 206

It is in accordance with the concept that class-organisation, as particularity become objective to

itself, is split in this way into its general divisions. But the question of the particular class to which an

individual is to belong is one on which natural capacity, birth, and other circumstances have their

influence, though the essential and final determining factors are subjective opinion and the

individual’s arbitrary will, which win in this sphere their right, their merit, and their dignity. Hence

what happens here by inner necessity occurs at the same time by the mediation of the arbitrary will,

and to the conscious subject it has the shape of being the work of his own will.

Remark: In this respect too there is a conspicuous difference, in relation to the principle of

particularity and the subject’s arbitrary will, between the political life of the east and the west,

and also between that of the ancient and the modern world. In the former, the division of the

whole into classes came about objectively of itself, because it is inherently rational; but the

principle of subjective particularity was at the same time denied its rights, in that, for example,

the allotment of individuals to classes was left to the ruling class, as in Plato’s Republic, or to

the accident of birth, as in the Indian caste-system. Thus subjective particularity was not

incorporated into the organisation of society as a whole; it was not reconciled in the whole,

and therefore – since as an essential moment it emerges there in any event – it shows itself

there as something hostile, as a corruption of the social order (see Remark to § 185)Either it

overthrows society, as happened in the Greek states and in the Roman Republic; or else,

should society preserve itself in being as a force or as a religious authority, for instance, it

appears as inner corruption and complete degeneration, as was the case to some extent in

Sparta and is now altogether the case in India.

But when subjective particularity is upheld by the objective order in conformity with it and is

at the same time allowed its rights, then it becomes the animating principle of the entire civil

society, of the development alike of mental activity, merit, and dignity. The recognition and

the right that what is brought about by reason of necessity in civil society and the state shall at

the same time be effected by the mediation of the arbitrary will is the more precise definition

of what is primarily meant by freedom in common parlance (see § 121).

§ 207

A man actualises himself only in becoming something definite, i.e. something specifically

particularised; this means restricting himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need. In

this class-system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps, i.e. the

disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by one’s own act,

through one’s energy, industry, and skill, to maintain oneself in this position, and to fend for oneself

only through this process of mediating oneself with the universal, while in this way gaining

recognition both in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others. Morality has its proper place in this

sphere where the paramount thing is reflection on one’s doings, and the quest of happiness and private

wants, and where the contingency in satisfying these makes into a duty even a single and contingent

act of assistance.

Remark: At first (i.e. especially in youth) a man chafes at the idea of resolving on a particular

social position, and looks upon this as a restriction on his universal character and as a

necessity imposed on him purely ab extra. This is because his thinking is still of that abstract

kind which refuses to move beyond the universal and so never reaches the actual. It does not

realise that if the concept is to be determinate, it must first of all advance into the distinction

between the concept and its real existence and thereby into determinacy and particularity (see

§ 7) – It is only thus that the concept can win actuality and ethical objectivity.

Addition: When we say that a man must be a ‘somebody’, we mean that he should belong to

some specific social class, since to be a somebody means to have substantive being. A man

with no class is a mere private person and his universality is not actualised. On the other hand,

the individual in his particularity may take himself as the universal and presume that by

entering a class he is surrendering himself to an indignity. This is the false idea that in

attaining a determinacy necessary to it, a thing is restricting and surrendering itself.

§ 208

As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this system of needs contains

absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstractly and therefore as the right of

property. At this point, however, this right is no longer merely implicit but has attained its recognised

actuality as the protection of property through the administration of justice.