pp.284-287

[빛살무늬2]

pp.284-

This was why Marshal Kulik, Deputy Defence Commissar for Armaments,
Marshal Shaposhnikov, Deputy Defence Commissar for FAs, and Zhdanov,
member of the Chief Military Council, proposed that part of the required
armaments be transferred from some old FAs to those under construction.
Marshal Timoshenko and I objected, pointing out that the old FAs might still be
needed. Besides, the guns in the old FAs did not fit the new fortifications in
design.
이것이 쿨리크 원수, 군비 방위위원 부사령관, 샤포쉬니코프 원수, 요새화지역 방위위원 부사령관, 그리고 즈다노프 최고군사위원회 위원이 필요한 군비의 일부를 오래된 요새화 지역에서 건설중인 요새화지역으로 이전하자고 제안한 이유였다. 티모셴코 원수와 나는 오래된 요새화지역이 여전히 필요할 수 있다고 지적하며 반대했다. 게다가 오래된 요새화지역의 총기는 설계상 새 요새와 맞지 않았다.
Because of the controversy among Chief Military Council members the issue
was reported to Stalin. The latter supported Kulik, Shaposhnikov and Zhdanov,
and accordingly gave orders to dismantle part of the artillery on second-rate
sectors and move it to the western and south-western areas, adapting the
constructively outdated guns to the new fortifications, at least temporarily.
최고군사위원회 위원들간의 논쟁 때문에 이 문제는 스탈린에게 보고되었다. 후자(스탈린?)는 쿨리크, 샤포쉬니코프, 즈다노프를 지지했고 따라서 열등한 지역의 포병 일부를 해체하고 서부와 남서부 지역으로 이동시켜 최소한 당분간만이라도 새 요새에 구조적으로 구식인 총기를  적응시키라고 명령을 내렸다.
The old FAs had been built in 1929-1935. The permanent emplacements
were mostly provided with machine-guns only. In 1938-1939 some of them were
reinforced with artillery systems. By decision of the Red Army Chief Military
Council of November 15, 1939, the authorized strength of the old fortified areas
was to be reduced by more than one-third. And now it was decided to remove
artillery from some sectors.
오래된 요새화지역은 1929년에서 1935년에 지어졌다. 영구적인 설치장소에는 대부분 기관총만 있었다. 1938년에서 1939년에 그 중 일부가 포명 시스템으로 강화되었다. 1939년 11월 15일 붉은군대 군사위원회의 결정에 따라 오래된 요새화지역의 공인된 군사력은 1/3 이상 감소되었다. 그리고 이제 일부 지역에서 포병을 없애기로 결정했다.
After another report to Stalin, however, we were given permission to keep
part of the artillery in the sectors in question.
In connection with the FAs whose construction began in 1938 and 1939, the
General Staff dispatched directives on April 8, 1941, to the Western and Kiev
Special Military Districts, which read in part:
그러나 스탈린에게 또다른 보고 후, 우리는 문제가 되는 지역의 포병 일부를 남기도록 허가를 받았다. 
1938년과 1939년에 건설을 시작한 요새화지역과 관련하여 총참모부는 1941년 4월 8일 서부와 키에프 특별군구에 지령을 보냈다. 그 일부는 다음과 같다.
“Pending special intructions the Slutsk, Sebezh, Shepetovka, Izyaslavl,
Starokonstantinovka, and Ostropolye fortified areas are to be maintained in their
present state.
“In order to ensure operability of the above areas in wartime, the following
measures are to be implemented:
“Train commanding personnel for fortified areas.
"긴급특별지시, 슬루츠크, 세베즈, 셰페토프카, 이지아슬라블, 스타로콘스탄티노프카, 오스트로폴리 요새화지역은 현재 상태를 유지할 것."
"전시에 상기 지역의 운용성 확보를 위해, 다음 조치가 실행될 것임."
"요새화지역의 지휘관들을 훈련시킬 것"
“In order to complete the system of artillery and machine-gun fire, determine
in each defence centre and strongpoint the sites of log-and-earth or stone-andconcrete emplacements to be built within the first ten days of war by field
forces…
포병과 기관총 사격 체계를 완성하기위해 각 방어 거점을 결정하고 야전병력이 전쟁 시작 10일 안에 지을 통나무-흙 또는 돌-콘크리트 설치 장소를 강화한다..."
“On the basis of designs and technical specifications issued by the Red
Army Defensive Works Department, calculate the required amount of weapons
and elementary interior equipment.
"붉은군대 방위 사업부에서 발행한 설계서와 기술사양서를 토대로 무기와 기본 내부장비의 필요한 양을 계산한다."
“In calculating manpower, means and the scale of work, take into account
the ferro-concrete structures set up in 1938-1939 in the Letichev, Mogilev,
Yampol, Novograd-Volynsky, Minsk, Polotsk, and Mozyr fortified areas.
“The Head of the Defensive Works Department is to work out and dispatch
to the districts by May I, 1941, technical specifications on the installation of the
artillery pieces and elementary interior equipment in the 1938-1939
fortifications.”
"인력, 수단, 작업규모를 계산할 때, 1938-1939년 레티체프, 모길레프, 얌폴, 노보그라드-발린스키, 민스크, 폴로츠크, 모지르 요새화 지역에 설치된 철골 콘크리트 구조물을 고려하라"
"방위산업부 장관은 1938-1939년 요새에서 포문과 기본내부장비의 설치에대한 기술사양을 계산해서 1941년 5월 1일까지 지역에 보낸다."

It follows from the aforesaid that an error in timing occurred in bringing the
weaponry of the fortifications on the old state frontier to readiness for combat.
The General Staff directive required them to be combatworthy by the tenth day
of the war, whereas in fact many points in the old FAs were captured by the
enemy before the tenth day.
앞서 말한바에 따르면 옛 국경에 있던 요새의 무기를 전투준비를 위해 가져오는데 시기상의 오류가 발생했다.
총참모부의 지령은 전쟁 10일째 날까지 전투준비가 필요하다고 했지만, 사실 오래된 오새화지역의 많은 지점들이 10일 전에 적에게 점령당했다.
The FAs along the old frontier had not been dismantled and wholly
disarmed, as claimed in some war memoirs and historical works. They had been
essentially kept intact in the more important sectors and, what is more, were to
have been reinforced. But the developments in the first few days of the war
prevented us from carrying out all the contemplated measures and using the old
FAs more effectively.
옛 전선을 따라 있던 요새화지역은 해체되지 않았고 완전히 무장해제 되었다. 일부 전쟁회고록과 역사 저작물에서 주장한 바 대로다. 그것들은 본질적으로 더 중요한 부문에서 온전히 유지되었고, 더군더나 더 강화되어야했다. 하지만 개전 며칠간의 전개는 우리가 숙고햇던 모든 조치를 시행하고 오래된 요새화지역을 더 효과적으로 이용하는 것을 막았다.
As regards the new fortified areas, the People’s Commissariat for Defence
and the General Staff repeatedly urged the military districts to intensify their
construction. Some 140,000 people were engaged daily in putting up
fortifications along the new frontier.
I would like to quote a General Staff directive of April 14, 1941, on this
matter:
새로운 요새화 지역과 관련하여, 국방 인민 위원회와 총참모부는 군 지역에 건설을 강화할 것을 거듭 촉구했다. 매일 약 14만 명의 사람들이 새로운 국경을 따라 요새를 건설하는 데 참여했다.
나는 이 문제에 대해 1941년 4월 14일자 총참모부 지시를 인용하고 싶다:
“Despite a number of instructions issued by the Red Army General Staff, the
work of installing casemate artillery in hardened emplacements and putting said??
emplacements in combat readiness is proceeding at an impermissibly slow pace.
“The People’s Commissar for Defence orders that:
"붉은군대 총참모부가 발표한 많은 지시에도 불구하고, 강화된 장소에 포대를 설치하고 전투 준비태세에 있는 장소에 배치하는 작업은 허용할 수 없을 정도로 느린 속도로 진행되고 있다." 국방인민위원회는 다음과 같이 명령했다:
“I. All the available FA weaponry in the given District be immediately
mounted in combat emplacements and the latter be put in combat readiness.

1.해당 지역에서 사용 가능한 모든 요새화 지역 무기는 즉시 전투 시설에 탑재되고, 후자는 전투 준비 태세에 들어갈 것.
“2. In the absence of special armaments, it is essential that machine-guns on
field mounts and, where possible, guns be installed temporarily in embrasure
openings and portholes.
 2. 특별한 무장이 없는 경우에는 필수적으로 야전에 기관총을 장착하고 가능한 장소에 포를 임시로 취입구와 포문에 설치할 것.
“3. Emplacements be put in combat readiness even if the rest of the
authorized equipment is not available, but mounting armoured, metal and grated
doors is absolutely necessary.

3.나머지 승인된 장비를 사용할 수 없더라도 배치는 전투 준비 상태에 있어야 하지만 장갑, 금속 및 쇠격자 문을 장착하는 것이 절대적으로 필요함.
“4. Proper care and maintenance of armaments installed in emplacements be
provided for.
4. 시설에 설치된 무기에 적절한 관리와 유지보수가 제공돼야 함
“5. The Head of the Red Army Defensive Works Department shall
immediately dispatch to the Districts technical specifications on the installation
of provisional armaments in ferro-concrete bunkers.

5. 붉은 군대 국방 작업부 장관은 즉시 지역에  철골 콘크리트 벙커에 임시 무기를 설치하는 것에 관한 기술 사양서를 보내야 한다.
“Progress reports are to be sent to the Red Army General Staff by April 25,
1941.
진행 보고서는 1941년 4월 25일까지 붉은군대 총참모부에 제출되어야한다.
Signed: General of the Army G. Zhukov,
Chief of the Red Army General Staff
Certified: Major-General S. Shiryaev,
Head of the Fortified Areas Department of the Red Army
General Staff.”
서명: 육군장군 주코프, 붉은군대 총참모총장

인증 : 시르야예프 소장, 붉은군대 총참모부 요새화 지역부 수장
In March 1941 the General Staff completed the mobilization plan for the
munition industry in the event of war. General Sokolovsky, Deputy Chief of
General Staff, and myself submitted this plan to the Chairman of the Defence
Committee under the Council of People’s Commissars.

A special memorandum on ammunition was drawn up by the General Staff
and addressed to the Party Central Committee and the Council of People’s
Commissars. The memorandum concerned the supply of shells and mines. There
was a shortage of howitzer, anti-aircraft and anti-tank shells. Shells for the latest
artillery systems were disastrously low.

Stalin handed on our memorandum for the Ammunition Commissariat and
the Commissariat for Defence to examine, and to deliver an opinion.
N. A. Voznesensky and other comrades found our demands somewhat
exaggerated and told Stalin that the request for 1941 should be met to the extent
of 20 per cent at the most. Stalin agreed.

After several more memos, however, Stalin issued a special decision on considerably extending the manufacture of ammunition in the second half of 1941 and in early 1942. During the spring of 1941 the central supply bodies under the People’s Commissariat for Defence were working hard to increase at the expense of the state reserves the emergency stock of fuel, foodstuffs, clothing and equipment in all the western frontier districts. The district ammunition depots were substantially replenished from Defence Commissariat stocks. The People’s Commissar for Defence and the General Staff, myself included, thought it necessary in view of the imminent war to bring the materiel closer to the troops. What was seemingly correct, however, turned out to be a mistake owing to the developments of the first few weeks of the war. The enemy breached our defences and swiftly seized the depots of the districts with all that was stored in them, which badly complicated the supply of troops and the activation of reserves. In revising the operational plans in spring 1941, little attention was given to the new methods of warfare at the initial stage of hostilities. The People’s Commissar for Defence and the General Staff believed that war between countries as big as Germany and the Soviet Union would follow the old scheme: the main forces engage in battle after several days of frontier fighting. As regards concentration and deployment deadlines, it was assumed that conditions for the two countries were the same. In fact, however, the forces and conditions proved to be far from equal. What was Germany’s economic potential when it attacked the Soviet Union? Having seized control over practically all economic and military strategic resources of Europe, Germany had given its armed forces modern weapons and combat equipment, and sufficient material facilities. The absence of actively operating forces in Western Europe at the time, gave the Nazis a chance to concentrate the bulk of their troops against the Soviet Union. On the eve of the war, Germany was putting out 31.8 million tons of steel a year (together with the occupied countries) and 257.4 million tons of coal (439 million together with its satellites). The Soviet Union’s output amounted to 18.3 million and 165.9 million tons respectively. Germany’s weak point was oil production, although this was somewhat compensated by importing Romanian oil and by previously built up reserves, and by synthetic fuels. Unscrupulously trampling the Versailles limitations, the Hitler leadership, in pursuance of its aggressive plans, subordinated the country’s economic policy to the interests of its contemplated aggressive war. German industry was completely attuned to war. All other considerations receded to the background. Germany build up a mighty military and economic potential. In a relatively short period more than 300 large munition works went up. The war industry output in 1940 rose by two-thirds over 1939, and 22 times over 1932. In 1941 German industry turned out over 11,000 planes, 5,200 tanks and armoured vehicles, more than 7,000 guns of 75-mm and more, and some 1.7 million carbines, rifles and submachine guns. One should remember the big stocks of armaments requisitioned in other countries and the industrial power of Germany’s satellites and the occupied countries. At the end of March 1941, the Soviet Government learned that Japan’s Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was having highly secret talks with Ribbentrop and the military leaders of the Nazi Reich in Berlin. Nothing was simpler than guessing the nature of these negotiations. Hitler was trying to encircle the USSR militarily by forming a bloc of Germany and imperialist Japan. 1 This meant, in effect, that the Soviet Union would have to fight on two fronts. Hence, seeing to the Soviet Union’s security in the Far East became an issue of extraordinary importance. In April 1941, I forget on what day, Stalin telephoned me. “Matsuoka is on his way home from Germany,” he said. “Receive him cordially.” (He spoke the word “cordially” with a special stress.) “Have you any specific orders?” I asked. “All Matsuoka wants is to make your acquaintance.” It was immaterial to me what had motivated the Japanese Foreign Minister. Most likely, the Khalkhin Gol events were still fresh in Matsuoka’s memory.