네이키드 케피탈리즘에 붙은 스크랩입니다..
앞으로 게시될 비됴에도 이런 스크랩이 제공될 것으로 기대합니다..
스크랩을 번역하는 것과....듣고 번역하는 것은 ...3-4배 정도 차이가 납니다.....다른소리에겐 그래요..
다른소리가 이들 진보라는 사람들의 주의 주장에 치우칠 수 밖에 없는 이유잇습니다.
세칭 주류의 주장중에서 공감할 수 잇는 것은 매우 적습니다....
다른소리의 지식, 정보가 넓고, 사고가 심오 하고 잘낫다는 말이 아니고.....사실이 그렇다는 것이지요....
편견을 버리고 조금만 생각해 보변...바로 ..이게 말 장난 말고 또 머냐???...쉽게 지겨워저 버립니다..
진보들에게서는 이들 주류들의 주장에 없는 것들이 막 나온다는 것이지요.
주류의 주장이라 하여 일부러 편견을 갖고 보고 듣고 하는 것은 아닙니다..
그런데 몇줄 읽어 보면 바로 느껴지는 것들이 잇지요.........또 개소리 지져되고 잇구나...
주류의 주장이라 하여 다 그렇다는 것도 아닙니다.
그렇지 않는 것은 서술 방식 부터 달라요....이런것은 읽어 볼 만 합니다.
여러분들도 다른소리가 격엇던 경험을 격거 봣쓰면 참 좋겟습니다.
https://youtu.be/6adqdNCSVhU?t=5
RADHIKA DESAI: Hi everyone, and welcome to this Geopolitical Economy Hour. I’m Radhika Desai.
MICHAEL HUDSON: And I’m Michael Hudson.
RADHIKA DESAI: Every fortnight we are going to meet for an hour to discuss major development in the fast-changing geopolitical economy of our 21st-century world.
We’ll discuss international developments. We’ll discuss their roots in individual countries and regions. We will try to uncover the reality beneath the usually distorting representation of these developments in the dominant Western media.
We plan to discuss many subjects: inflation, oil prices, de-dollarization, the outcome of the war over Ukraine which is going to determine so many things, the threats the U.S. is making against China about Taiwan, China’s increasingly prominent role in the world, how China’s Belt and Road Initiative is going to reshape it, how Western alliances and the Western-dominated world that was built over the past couple of centuries is so rapidly fracturing.
We’ll discuss financialization, the West’s productive decline. Many important things. Michael, am I leaving any important things out?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well we have been talking about this for many decades. Already in 1978(이때는 전 세계가 글로발라이제이션으로 치달리기 시작 할 때입니다....그런데 허드슨은 정반대로 시스탬의 분열을 이야기 햇습니다) I wrote a book, Global Fracture, about how the world is dividing into two parts. But that time, other countries were trying to break free so they could follow their own developments.
And today it’s the United States that is isolating other countries – not only China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, but now the Global South – so the United States has ended up isolating itself from the rest.(오히려 미국이 고립이 된 결과를 남겻다)
What we’re going to talk about is how this is not only a geographic split, but a split of economic systems and economic philosophies. We’re going to talk about what the characteristics and the policies [are] that are shaping this new global fracture.
RADHIKA DESAI: Indeed, Michael and my collaboration goes back a couple of decades. In fact, even before we met I had read books like Global Fracture and Super Imperialism, which were quite prescient, and with which I agreed.
[Unlike] all those people talking about globalization and U.S. hegemony, Michael could see, and I also could see, the fractures underlying the system. My own approach has been characterized by such skepticism about enduring Western dominance, U.S. hegemony, dollar dominance, etc.
And after thinking and writing about small bits of it for a couple of decades I eventually came up with this book, Geopolitical Economy, from which Ben [Norton] has also taken the title of Geopolitical Economy Report, with which of course we are collaborating.
In Geopolitical Economy, I question the dominant cosmopolitan understandings of the world. In ‘globalization discourse’ the world is seamlessly united by markets. In ‘American hegemony discourse’, or ‘hegemony-stability discourse’, the world is united by a single leading power.
None of these narratives are really true, and the advance of multipolarity, which I’ve argued goes back at least to the 1870s, continues apace. Of course today multipolarity is in a very rapidly advancing phase, and we are looking at some major changes in the world order.
We are going to be discussing all these things, but today, for our opening show, what Michael and I thought we might do is to introduce the big idea that frames our thinking, which is the advance of multipolarity – that is, the difficulty of retaining Western dominance.
The difficulty is so great that not only are the West’s attempts to preserve this dominance futile, but they are even counter-productive, like the conflict over Ukraine or many other things that are actually boomeranging back on the West, like financial sanctions against Russia.
So we basically want to talk about this big idea, the emergence of the multipolar — or some might even say a bipolar — world order. Michael, do you want to start off with some reflections on that?
MICHAEL HUDSON: I think the most obvious driving force that’s splitting the world is the U.S. attempt to create a unipolar world under its control, [particularly] its national security diplomats and financial interests. They insist on monopolizing the international finance system so that if countries try to follow a policy that supports their own development, the United States can simply pull the plug and block their financial transactions.
The U.S. tries to control the oil trade. Oil has always been, for the last century, a centerpiece of American diplomacy, because if the American oil companies (along with British Petroleum and Dutch Shell) can control the oil, then they can turn off the power, and the lights, and the transportation, of any country that is not following the U.S. plans for a world order.
And also food. The United States, from the time that the World Bank was formed, has blocked other countries from developing their own food production, and has steered them into producing export crops (non-food crops, tropical crops) remaining dependent on the United States for its grain, so the United States can starve them out if they try to go their own way.
(식량의 무기화.....마오쩌둥 시절의 대 기근때 미국은 주체할 수 없이 많은 잉여 농산물을 보유하고 잇엇지만....이들 굶어 죽어가는 사람들에 보급되지 않고 패기 햇습니다....그들은 중국의 공산주의가 중국의 대 기근을 만들엇다고 햇지요...이 말이 맞는지 틀린지는 모르겟지만...이 말이 맞다면 1930년대의 미국 중부의 대 기근은 미국의 민주주의 때문인가요??...공산주의가 없던 시절에도 중국은 끊임 없이 자연재해와 기근에 시달려왓다는 사실은 어떻게 설명 할 것이며...마오 이후 중국에서는 더 이상 기근이 발생하지 않앗다는 것은 또 어떻게 설명 할 수 잇는지 모를 일 입니다...또 무엇보다도....남아 도는 식량을 바다에다 던저 버린 미국이 그런 비판을 할 자격이나 잇는지 모르겟습니다..)
So the United States approach to leading the world order is to lead by being the aggressor — to threaten, to hurt other countries — not by providing mutual gains [or] by helping them [develop], but by saying, “If you don’t do what we want, we will overthrow you. We’ll have a coup d’état. We’ll do to you what we did with Pinochet in Chile. We’ll do to you what w did with Boris Yeltsin in Russia. We’ll interfere.”
This has been easiest of all in probably the most corrupt region of the world, Western Europe, where the United States Treasury officials have told me that all they need to do is give little white envelopes filled with dollar bills and they’ve been able to control European politics.
The United States is essentially trying to use its threats and its sanctions, and it believes that it can hurt another country.
Behind it all, of course, is the military threat, as you were saying, in Ukraine. But it turns out there isn’t really any military threat by the United States. Not only have the U.S. and NATO run out of normal military arms, but America really can’t mount a land war anymore.
There will never be another Vietnam. There will never be the United States invading another country, or Europe invading any other country, because you’ll never get a population willing to be drafted, since the anti-war movement.
And without that, America has only one military leader against other countries: the hydrogen bomb. There is nothing in between a targeted assassination attempt and an atom bomb.
That basically is what has enabled other countries, for the first time, to break away. They couldn’t do this back in the 1970s, when Radhika and I were first noticing it, because at that point, Indonesia and the Caribbean and Latin America didn’t have the critical mass to go it alone.
Now they do have the critical mass to go it alone, thanks to Russia, China, Iran, India. They are able to go it alone.
There is only one part of the world that is not able to go it alone, and that’s the United States and Western Europe. They de-industrialized.(우크라인 전쟁을 기화로 미국과 유럽과의 관계도 이제는 함께 갈 수 없는 관계로 변하고 잇습니다)
In their class war against labor, looking for lower-priced labor abroad, they have cut their own industrial labor force, but they’ve also shifted the center of manufacturing, technology, agriculture — everything has shifted to Eurasia and the southern hemisphere.
The United States turns out to have left itself alone [i.e. isolated itself]. The problem that is frustrating American diplomats is: How are they going to dominate the world without industrial leadership, with debt deflation, with a debt that is much higher than other countries. How on earth can they lead, in a weakening position, without any military?
RADHIKA DESAI: Absolutely. I think this whole point you’re making — that the United States’ attempt to dominate the world is increasingly failing — the United States turns out to be essentially a giant with clay feet.
From the point of view of today, it becomes much more credible to say so. But I’ve been saying, and I think also with a lot of help from Michael’s writings, that in reality, when people talk about ‘American hegemony’, ‘American dominance’, ‘American imperialism’ — what we have to realize is that what we are looking at, what the United States has attempted to do for more than a century, is attempt to dominate the world. But this attempt has actually never been successful.
The story that I tell in my [book] Geopolitical Economy is actually a rather different story, which does not try to deny the huge extent of the harm the United States has done by its wars, by its economic coercion, by its suppression of attempts of countries to develop.
[The book] acknowledges that all these things have happened, but the key point is that the United States has never actually succeeded in exerting its dominance. What we are looking at today, what we are calling multipolarity, in fact shows the failure of America to dominate.
What I argue in Geopolitical Economy is that, in the early 20th century, it was very clear to many observers that British dominance over the world economy was weakening, and the United States felt that it was going to take over the torch from Great Britain and be the dominant power in the world.
But they knew, of course, even then, it was very clear that they would never be able to match the scale of British dominance; they could never acquire an empire, a formal empire, of the size that Britain had. Remember, Britain had an empire on which the sun never set.
So what [the U.S. ruling elites] decided to do was, instead, lower their sights and say, “We can’t have an empire of this size, but we are going to try to make the dollar the world’s money.”
The way they tried to do so after the First World War, and the financial mayhem they caused is a really interesting story that I’ve written about, Michael has also written about, and so on.
But, after the Second World War, we are told that the dollar became the world’s currency, but the fact of the matter was, that the first attempt to try to make the dollar the world’s currency fell afoul of the very famous Triffin dilemma(트리핀 딜레마) – which is to say that, since the United States could not export capital, since it had no capacity to do so – Britain could export capital because it had an empire, it had an empire from which it drew surpluses – the United States had no such empire, no such surpluses, so it created dollar liquidity by running deficits.
And Robert Triffin pointed out, the bigger the deficits, the lower will be the value of the dollar, and the lower will be the attractions of the dollar.
---미국이 무역흑자 많이 내면 그만큼 다른나라에서의 달러는 줄어듭니다...이는 그 나라의 경제 침체(세계 경제의 침체)을 의미하며...미국이 무역적자를 많이 그 만큼 다른나라에 달러가 많이 풀립니다...이는 그 나라의 경제의 활성화를 의미 하며 기축통화가 갖게되는 모순되는 양면성을 트리핀 딜레마는 설명하고 잇습니다...
기축통화로써의 달러가 누릴 수 잇는 이득이 미국의 무역적자로 잃어버린 손해보다 더 크다고 판단하기 때문에 미국의 기축통화는 유지하는 것입니다.
그런데 이 이득이 무엇을 위한 이득이냐....그 이득이 미국의 국제적인 영향력과 지배력를 제고 하는 것이라면 그것이 미국내의 각각의 계층에 어떤 영향을 주느냐?? ..등을 따져 물엇을때는....판단이 달라질 수 잇습니다.
중국의 위안화의 패권을 이야기 하는 사람들은...기축통화로써의 달러의 역할을 꼭 같이 대신하는 위안화를 이야기 합니다....
중국은 그럴 의도도 없고...그럴 이유도 없다고 햇지요??..
미래의 일이야 신도 알 수 없는 것이고 ....최소한 지금까지는 그렇습니다...
중국은 공산주의 국가이고 ...세계를 지배 하겟다는 미국식 제국주의 패권 따위는 전혀 이야기 하고 잇지 않습니다...
또한
순수 공산주의자들이 주장하는 세계공산주의 따위의 원대한 꿈 따위도 공식적으로 버렷습니다...
핸리 키신저가 갑자기 몸이 아프다며 사라졋다 중국에서 쑥 튀어 나왓을때....그때 이미 세계 공산주의의 원대한 이상은 사실상 쫑 낫습니다.
중국은 공산주의 확산이나 타국의 내정간섭 따위를 하지 않겟다는 것을 거듭 거듭 분명하게 하고 잇고...
각 나라는 가 나라의 문화와 역사와 환경에 맞는 자신들의 체체를 만들어 발전해야 한다는 자결주의를 거듭 거듭 천명하고 잇습니다....
민주주의와 인권이라는 서구적인 가치를 추구 하지 않는 나라는 -좀더 정확하게 한다면 미국스타일을 따라하지 않는 나라, 미국의 지시를 따르지 않는 나라- 반드시 짓 뭉겨 버리는...미국식 방식의 그 어떤 조짐 조차도 보이지 않고 않습니다.
이런 나라의 정책과 행보는 당연히 미국과 다를 수 밖에 없습니다.
중국이 원하는 것은 세계 지배나 패권이 아니고....인민들의 물질적인 풍요입니다...
힘들에 이루어 놓은 자신들의 경제성과를 위안화을 달러을 대신하는 기축통화로 만들어...던저 버릴 이유가 전혀 없다는 것이지요.
중국이 원하는 것은 월가놈들의 돈 놀이 도박판으로 부터 자유로운 안정된 통화이지...
그 도박판의 판돈을 대체할 통화가 아닙니다.
아......씨발..
다른소리가 왜 이런것 까지 다 나발거려줘야 하나...
짱꼴라 약을 처 먹은 것도 아니고..
This logic finally worked itself out, and the United States was forced to break the dollar’s link with gold, because people were ditching the dollar in favor of gold. Countries were ditching dollars in favor of gold, including famous Western allies, European allies.
And since then – what Michael and I argued in a recent paper we did called “Beyond the Dollar Creditocracy” – and by the way, this is also my argument in Geopolitical Economy – [since 1971], the dollar has become reliant on a series of financializations, or a series of expansions of purely financial activity(순수한 금융활동-즉 도박의 거대한 확장을 의미 합니다), so that the unattractiveness of the dollar for normal economic use, for trade use, and so on, is counteracted by vastly expanding the financial demand for the dollar.
(달러가 통화로써의 달러가 아닌 도박판 코인으로 사용되기 시작한 것이지요......달러의 코인화는 financialization(금융화, 증권화)를 통해 가능해 졋고....도박판은 누가 돈을 따던 말던 간에 판돈이 유입되면 운영이 됩니다....이 판돈이 마르는 것이 금융위기이고....이 금융위기는 도박판의 특성상 어쩔 수 없이 반복되게 되어 잇습니다.......
노무현이 꿈꿧던 아세아 금융허브도...바로 이런 거대한 도박판을 만드는 것이엇고...노무현의 소원대로 이명박 정부때 파생시장은 세계 기록-세계최대 연 3년 기록 갱신)을 경신하며 현기증 나게 팽창 햇지요....
거듭 거듭 이야기 하지만...이 금융은 그 자체로 가치를 만들지 못 합니다...누군가 벌면, 누군가 털리는 제로 썸 개임이지요..
찌지리 노무현은 월가에서 누군가 버는 것만 보앗고...그런것이 자신의 거대한 공으로 치장 할 수 잇을 것이다고 판단을 하엿을 것이고, 이런 판단을 하게 속삭엿던 것들이 하버드와 예일등 미국의 으리으리한 초 인류 대학을 나오고 노무현이 알아들을 수 도 없는 본토 발음 석어가며 씨불려 되던 삼성의 해골들이엿을 것입니다.
자신의 지지 기반이던 노동자들을 향해 ....잇는 대로 온갖 저주와 욕설을 다 퍼 부어 됫던 마당에...
그런것이라도 만들어 -노무현이 덕분에 쉽게 돈 벌엇다는 찬사라도 들어 보고 싶엇던 간절한 욕구도 잇엇겟지요....
이미 부동산 투기질로 그 정도 공돈 벌게 해 주엇는데.....뭐가 또 부족하다고 생각 햇을 까요??
혀튼 노무현이란 이자는 생각하면 생각 할 수록 ...알면 알수록 확실히 미친놈이엇다는 것 말고,,,진정한 개 쐣끼엿다는 것 말고
그 어떤 긍정적인 것도 찾아 볼 수 없는 참 희안한.....증말도 두번 다시 격어 보고 싶지 않는 괴인 이엇던 것 같습니다..
생겨 처 먹은 것이나...추종자들이나....어째 한결 같이 그런것들만 그리 그러는지....증말.....
And that is why this (post-1971) age of alleged dollar dominance has in fact rested on a series of financializations, one after another. It has also been an age of recurring financial crises.
To emphasize: What we are looking at are American attempts to dominate the world, but they are all attempts that have failed. And this is another story that we will tell.
MICHAEL HUDSON: It’s interesting that when President Biden and the State Department and the media talk about what’s happening in the world, and [when] they describe policy, they don’t talk about anything that Radhika has just said.
And they don’t even talk about the fight between unipolar and multipolar world. President Putin talks about that, and [Russian Foreign Minister] Lavrov talks about that, but not the U.S.
If you listen to what President Biden and the State Department say, this global fracture is “between democracy and autocracy“. That is how they characterize it. This is Orwellian Doublespeak.
[To them,] ‘democracy’ means a financial oligarchy. Aristotle, 2500 years ago, wrote a book on constitutions of Greece. He wrote, “All these constitutions call themselves democracies, but they are really oligarchies.”
Democracy tends to turn into oligarchy. So by ‘democracy’, what President Biden means, is a financial oligarchy in control of policy.
And what Biden means by ‘autocracy’ is a mixed public-private economy with strong government support for industry, for technological research and development, for rising living standards, and most of all for providing basic needs: public health, public education, retirement income, transportation – all subsidized to minimize the cost of living for labor, so that the economic surplus can go to upgrade education, improve the productivity of the labor force, and do essentially what China has done and what other countries are doing, and what everyone expected industrial capitalism(산업자본주의) to do in the United States and Europe, but which finance capitalism is not doing.
So you have to go beyond this rhetoric to ask what is really happening. To the Americans, public spending, anti-monopoly regulation, and protection of consumer rights is ‘socialism’.
Well, it is socialism, and that’s why in the United States, they’ve done polls, and find that most people prefer the world ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’. Many people in the United States claim to be socialist, but finance capitalism is not socialism.
This distinction, which Rosa Luxembourg called the fight between barbarism and civilization, that’s really the fight between democracy and autocracy, with a different vocabulary.
--)) 요즘들어 대화가 어려워진 이유중에 하나는 ...단어 본래의 뜻은 묻어 버리고..본인이 임의적은 의미를 부여 하여 단어를 사용합니다....이런것은 대화를 한참 진행한 이후에 들어나는 경우가 태반이고...그 만큼 시간과 정열이 낭비 되는 것이지요..
사과를 사과라는 단어로 표현하고 나는 사과를 싫어 한다는 것과
배를 사과라고 단어로 표현하고 나는 사과를 싫어 한다고 말을 한다면....당연히 혼란스러울 수 밖에 없습니다..
노무현이 진보입니까??....박그뇌가 보수 입니까??.....
야들은 그냥 미친년놈들이지요...죶 달린것과 보지 구멍 뚫린 차이 말고는 없습니다
노무현교 쥐쇄끼들이 민주주의자들입니까??.....
삶은 돼야지 돼가리가 벌떡일어나 웃을 일입니다.
진보, 보수, 민주주의...이런 단어가 ..사용자들의 편의에 따라 지 멋대로 의미를 바꿔 사용하기 때문에..
말 꼬리를 잡고...돌고 돌아...지겨운 대화만 반복되는 것이지요..
정확한 단어의 정의와 사용은 ...논쟁의 필수적인 조건입니다..
워싱턴의 권력자들은 작금의 세상의 분화를 민주주의와 독제로 구분하엿습니다..
지들이 하는 것은 민주주의이고...지들 이외의 자들이 하는 것은 독제라는 것이지요.
그런데 이들이 말 하는 그 민주주의를 가만 들여다 보니....민주주의는 커녕 금융 올리아키 체제라는 것이고
이들이 빈정거리는 중국이나 다른 독제체제를 가만히 들여다 봣더니.....바로 산업자본주의 체제 시절의 미국이나 유럽에서 햇던짓을 하고 잇더라는 것이지요...지금의 금융자본주의 체체에서는 되저라고 하지 않는..
그래서 작금 벌어지고 잇는 현실을 보다 더 정확하게 설명하기 위해서는 ...민주주의와 독제 따위의 구분 따위 다른 것이 필요하다는 것입니다..
마이클 허드슨은 미국이나 중국 모두 산업자본주의를 통해 물질적인 풍요를 만들어 내는데 성공햇다고 분석햇습니다.
이런 분석은 전통 막스주의자들 입장과도 다른것이고...이런것으로 전통이다 아류다 따위 적자 서자를 구분따위는 하지 말앗쓰면 좋겟습니다.
막스는 자본주의 이후엔 사회주의가 사회주의 이후엔 공산주의가 도래 할 것임을 이야기 햇습니다.
그런데 미국은 정 반대로 다시 봉건 사회로 되 돌아갓다는 분석한 것입니다...
미국의 금융자본주의를 신 봉건체제로 분석한 것입니다....
허드슨은 이를 렌탈 자본주의 라고 하엿습니다...
중세 봉건 제도가 봉건영지를 중심으로 만들어진 계층사회라면 지금의 렌탈 자본주의는 금융을 중심으로 하여 만들어진 계층 사회라는 것이지요.....미국을 발전하고 이는 체제가 아닌 퇴생 체체로 본 것이고..
재미나는 것은 중국은 사회주의를 지향 하고 잇다...........고 주장 한 것입니다..
막스의 역사 발전론을 따라가고 잇다고 한 것이지요.
중국이 개혁 개방으로 치 달릴때..서구 학자들..심지어는 좌파들 사이에서도 냉소가 지배적이엇습니다..
중국도 시장에 무릎을 꿇엇다...이미 사회주의가 아닌 국가자본주의 체제가 되엇다 등등
+ 중국은 자본주의 시장도 아니고 이것도 저것도 아닌 엉성한 짬뽕 체체라서 훨씬 더 많은 모순이 노정되어 조만간 붕괴할 것이다...
이런 냉소는 특히 전통 적자를 고집하는 서구 좌파들 사이에서 더욱 심햇고...이들에게 중국을 언급 하는 것은 사회주의 사꾸라 취급을 받는 분위기 엿습니다..
이것이 지금이라도 크게 다를것은 없지만....현실에서 중국 말고 성공한 사회주의 체체는 없습니다.
인류의 문명은 최근 3,40년간 인류사에 없는 엄청난 빈곤추방을 이루어 냇고....가장 큰 물질적인 풍요로를 만들엇습니다.
여기서 중국을 빼 버리면 이런 서술을 할 수 없습니다.
중국에서만 8억명의 중산층이 만들어 졋습니다.
중국의 gdp를 제외 시키면...세계경제는 참 초라해져 버립니다.
이런 인류사적 절대 공헌이 자본주의가 아닌 중국식 사회주의에 의해 만들어 졋다는 fact를 어떡합니까??
그들이 중국을 연구하지 않을 수 없는 환경이 되어 버린 것이지요.
그들이 서구인들 특유의 분석적인 사고로 중국을 들이파기 시작 하다 보니...다른것을 보게 되는 것은 당연히 보입니다.
비로써 중국에 대한 새로운 해석이 나오게 되는 것이지요.
이런것으로 싸울 필요는 없어 보입니다...
다른소리가 정상적인 수명을 살다 되진다면...그때쯤이면 이들의 주장 무엇이 맞는지..틀린지 정도는 알 수 잇을 것입니다.
다른소리가 두고보자 하나는 참 잘 한다고 햇지요?
두고 봅시다.....씨얄때기 없이 토닥 거리지 말고.....
RADHIKA DESAI: Let me take one or two of those points. First, the United States’ claim to lead the ‘democratic world’, to stand for humans rights and democracy, sounds increasingly hollow.
And this is also really interesting to reflect on why, because the policies that the United States has had to follow in order to exert dollar dominance, in order to create the financializations on which dollar dominance rests, have tended to undermine the United States’ productive economy.
They have tended to divide society because they have created astronomical levels of inequality in the United States, and other countries that follow that kind of policy paradigm.
And as a consequence they have essentially created the present political breakdown that we witness in the United States, where a character like Trump can get elected president. And then when Biden is elected, he must more or less continue Trump’s policies.
So you’re looking at a serious breakdown of democracy in Western countries themselves.
(한두 가지를 짚어보겠다. 첫째, '민주적인 세계'를 주도하고, 인권과 민주주의를 대표한다는 미국의 주장은 점점 공허하게 들린다. 그리고 왜 미국이 달러 지배력을 발휘하기 위해 따라야 했던 정책, 달러 지배력이 의존하는 금융화를 만들기 위해 따라야 만했던 정책이 미국의 생산적인 경제를 약화시켜왓는지를 되 돌아 보는 것은 정말 흥미로운 일이다. 미국이나 미국과 같은 정책 패러다임을 따르는 다른 나라들에서는 현기증 나는 수준의 불평등 때문에 사회가 분열되어왓다. 그리고 결과적으로 우리가 미국에서 목격하고 잇는 본질적인 현재의 정치적 붕괴를 만들엇다. 트럼프와 같은 인물이 대통령으로 선출 될 수 있엇다. 그리고 바이든이 당선되엇을때 트럼프의 정책을 어느 정도 지속해야 햇다. 서구 국가들 자체에서 심각한 민주주의 붕괴를 보게 된 것이다.))
이 문단을 한국에 적용해 보세요.
미국을 보면 한국을 알수 잇다고 햇지요??
다른소리에게 미국의 트럼프는 박그뇌가 아닌 노무현입니다.
노무현 정권때 가장 많은 빈부격차가 벌어졋고, 가장 많은 부동산 투기질이 일어낫고, 가장 많은 비 정규직이 발생 햇고..
가장 많은 노무현교 똥파리때들이 번식하여 어찌할 수 없을 만큼 사회분열을 만들엇습니다...그 결과가 지금의 정치 실종을 만들엇지요.....김건희 씨는것 말고..이재명 조지는 것 말고...정치에서 무엇을 하고 잇나요??
정치를 통해서 우리의 무엇을 풀엇나요??
이미 정치실종을 넘어 민주주의 붕괴가 완성되엇다고 보는 이유 입니다.
[Second], this is going to be a show about world affairs, and it’s interesting to explain to you how our approach to world affairs differs from the ones that you normally see.
So in the study of international relations, some people take a liberal point of view, which is essentially what I was earlier criticizing, [characterized by] globalization, U.S. hegemony, cosmopolitan views of the world economy, with the world economy seamlessly united.
[In the liberal view,] nations don’t matter, nation-states have become irrelevant, etc. etc. You can take that point of view. Or, you can take a so-called ‘realist’ point of view in which all nations are out to ‘do down’ other nations.
But in reality, the point of view that we take comes from a very strong tradition of critical thinking that goes back to Marx and Engels, but has continued to develop in a big way since then, which is to understand world affairs as the contest between imperialism and anti-imperialism.(한국의 민족주의자들 만큼이나 이 제국주의에 대한 인식이 결핖된 집단도 없어 보입니다...
이 사람들이 말하는 그 민족주의는 수구 꼴통들이 빈정거리는 반일 종자주의에서 눈꼽만큼도 진화하지 못 햇습니다....그 어떤놈도....명성황우, 독도, 일본해.....몇개 던져 주면 다 똑 같아집니다.....철쩌한 종자감별사로 돌변하지요....여기에 또 영남 패권주의 까지 쥐약으로 뿌려 주면.....가히 ...꼴갑질의 극치를 다합니다...
그래도 도적놈이 강도들 보다 낫다는 개소리 말고.....노무현교 쥐쇄끼들을 좋아 할 수 잇는 이유 단 한가지라도 잇다면 다른소리가 이렇게 까지 막가는 글은 올리지 않앗을 것 같습니다.....)
Trotsky used to call this uneven and combined development, which is to say that the countries that are already developed, the imperialist countries, want to retain the uneven configuration of development in the world, with some countries being developed and other countries less so.
But the ones who are less developed, the ones who are left behind, contest this by promoting their own development through policies that are designed to improve their productive capacities and so on.
So what Michael is trying to say when he says that the United States is always trying to prevent development, is basically, for all the talk of Western countries trying to help the development of Third World countries, in reality when Third World countries develop in the only way they can, which is by focusing on productive activity, controlling trade and financial flows and so on, as all successful developers have done, including the United States in its own time, when they try to do this, the United States tries to force them open.
They talk a lot about ‘free markets’, ‘free trade’, ‘openness’ – what does this ‘openness’ really mean? It means that countries should lay themselves open to being dominated by, penetrated by, Western capital, Western corporations, and be open to supplying, cheaply, what the West needs – namely, commodities, labor, low-cost goods, etc.
So this is really a contest of anti-imperialism and imperialism in which, today, the cracks of multipolarity is that the forces of anti-imperialism are winning.
MICHAEL HUDSON: What Radhika said that is most radical is America really is trying to stop the development of other countries.
This may seem surprising to some people – not to listeners of this show – but those very words were set into stone in America’s national security report, saying that “any other country’s development, to the point where it is independent of the United States, is a threat to the United States.”(미국이 다른나라의 발전을 정지 시켯다는 주장이 수사학적 주장이 아니고..실제 미국의 안보 보도서에 서술된 내용입니다.....)
And the reason that China is the number-one opponent and “systemic” rival, as they put it, to the United States is that it is developing, and the United States really is against any development except that which American financial interests control and receive the rental earnings and the profits from turning this development into a U.S. monopoly.
(미국이 왜 미국식 발전이 아닌 발전-중국식 발전-에 그리도 신경질 적인 근본적인 이유입니다.....
한국의 발전이 미국식 발전일까요??...만약에 미국식 발전이 아닌 다른 발전이라면 미국은 왜 한국을 가만 두는 것일까요??..
이런것은 판단하는 것이 아니고...결정되는 것입니다...그리고 그 결정은 미국 백압관이 하지요..)
So, I guess what is going to be really unfolding, in this show and the future, is, we know the aim of other countries is to develop, we know what they want to do, but how are they going to actually implement this in policies?
Radhika mentioned my book Global Fracture, back in the 1970s, and that was right after the Vietnam War had forced the United States off gold and Saudi Arabia had taken ownership of its oil reserves.
And U.S. diplomats already at that time were [concerned to] make sure all the development was U.S.-centered, not foreign-centered. They were in the dark as to how to navigate, because, as ironic as it might seem, I was hired by Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute [of no relation] to go to the State Department, and the White House, and the Defense Department, to explain how super imperialism worked.
The largest purchase of my book [Super Imperialism], 2,000 copies, was by the CIA, [where it was] an operations manual.
The United States thought that, well, if we can continue to make other countries keep their savings in the United States by buying U.S. Treasury bills, if we can tell Saudi Arabia and the oil countries that they can charge whatever they want for their oil, [they could] quadruple the price of oil, but they have to keep all of their earnings in the United States, in the U.S. stock market.
They cannot buy a major U.S. corporation – but the U.S. can buy control of other economies, but no other countries’ investors can buy control of critical U.S. industries. Saudi Arabia can buy minority stock holdings, can buy Treasury bills; the Japanese were allowed to buy golf courses, that they lost a billion dollars on; they were able to buy the land under Rockefeller Center, that they lost a billion dollars on. But they couldn’t really buy American industry.
So you had the whole plan for what seemed to be making other countries dependent on the United States and U.S. satellites, and getting very little for their dollars.
But the fact is, the United States found that it had developed a new kind of imperialism. It wasn’t the old kind of colonial imperialism.
They looked at what happened to Haiti. When it bought itself independence from France in 1804, France said, “Yes, we will give you the independence, but you have to reimburse our military invaders for having conquered you. You have to pay them the current value of what they took for free when they took you over.”
Haiti for the last 200 years has been a debt peon of France and the international financial community.
The United States said, “We can do the same with other countries. We can make them borrow, base their monetary systems on creating their own credit by U.S. banks, creating their own credit in dollars, and all the interest payments and the capital gains on all of this will be remitted to the United States. We don’t need military colonialism anymore. We know that we can’t have another Vietnam. What we can have is dollar dependency.”
That is a system that they put in place, and that is the focus of talks between China, Russia, Iran, and the Global South, has been de-dollarization. And that is what both Radhika and I have been writing about and focusing on for the last few years.
RADHIKA DESAI: Absolutely. And one of the things I was also reminded [of] by what you were saying: the United States has changed its economic structures very radically over the post-Second World War period, because if you – I remember when I was researching my book Geopolitical Economy, I came across this quote from a major American official [George Kennan] at the end of the Second World War, where he says, ‘Today we account for half of the world’s production, and our aim should be to retain that position of relative dominance’ – that is to say, that the United States must continue to account for half of the world’s production.
So the rest of the world can only grow insofar as its growth does not outpace that of the United States. But of course that is exactly what happened. It was impossible.
One of the things people forget, you know, even major historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, for example, when you read the books The Age of Extremes(극단의 시대), in which he writes about the history of the 20th century, he talks as though the United States started growing from the late 19th century onward.
By the eve of the First World War, it was a really major producer, and so when [the US] came to become such a dominant producer, when it came to account for half the world’s economy at the end of the Second World War, this was [portrayed as] some kind of a completely natural process.
What people entirely forget is that the United States acquired this position of dominance not through some secular process of growth, but because of the war.
During the war, the United States essentially grew, as the so-called ‘arsenal of democracy, its economy boomed. Between 1939 and 1945, U.S. GDP doubled.
It would not double again for another 22 years, even though these were the years of the so-called ‘golden age of capitalism,’ and growth was relatively high.
So you can imagine the sort of boost that the war gave the U.S. economy.
Plus, of course, if you’re talking in relative terms, the war is boosting the U.S. economy while it is destroying productive capacity in the rest of the world, where the war is actually occurring, where the fighting is actually happening.
So it was the complex result of this. So there was nothing natural about the U.S. position of dominance.
There are a couple of things one can add to this.
[The first thing is that] you know, today, when people are once again celebrating the United States’ role as ‘the arsenal of democracy,’ it’s really ironic because the United States, both in the First World War and the Second World War, profited in this manner.
Many countries have only recently finished paying off the war debt, etc. So the United States essentially has been indebting other countries simply by posing as an ally, when in fact it was not an ally.
The second thing is that, of course this also should tell us, give some background to how the U.S. economy has become so reliant on military production [and] armaments production, why the military-industrial complex is such a large part of the U.S. economy.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well you pointed, quite rightly, to the role of debt in all of this. During WWII, the United States used its position of supplying arms to the Allies to force the creation of two institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – along lines that were opposed by Europe – designed to, number one, break up the British Empire.
Under Lend-Lease of WWII, and under the terms of the IMF, they make Britain [overvalue] the pound at 5 pounds-per-dollar, and promise not to devalue it until 1949.
They also insisted that Britain could not maintain its sterling area. Britain had a sterling area that was much like the dollar area today.
During the war, India and other former colonies had exported raw materials and built up huge government savings in exchange for these raw materials. And, as [part of] the sterling area, they were obliged to spend all of these savings on British manufactures.
But America said, “We want free markets! Free markets means you can spend your money anywhere.” They broke open the British sterling area and said, “You can buy goods anywhere”, meaning, from the United States.
Because with Britain being committed to an [overvalued] pound sterling, and the United States having the industrial capacity, the United States ended up with all of these savings that the British Empire had accumulated.
And the United States, under Franklin Roosevelt, signaled that Britain was America’s number-one rival. Britain was in the position that China is in today.
So the [British] empire was broken up, and basically forced into debt in the balance of payments(무역수지 적자), because Britain could no longer earn its way to dominate the sterling area by exporting. It was on the road to deindustrialization.
Meanwhile, the second thing that was important, is that the United States emerged from the war with almost no domestic debt at all.
The [Great] Depression had wiped out domestic personal lending and corporate lending. There was nothing to buy in WWII, in the civilian economy, because it was war production. So there was hardly any debt.
So, since WWII, [for] every recovery there has been a business cycle in America, Europe, all over the world. Every business cycle recovery has started from a larger and larger proportion of debt-to-GDP, a larger proportion of personal debt to personal income, and corporate debt to corporate income.
This is what has essentially made America spend so much money on domestic debt service, that neither its labor compete with other countries – if you have to pay mortgage debt, and personal debt, credit card debt – but American industry is debt-ridden.
Suppose, now, you’re China, Russia, and the Global South. How can they develop their economies in a way that does not simply replicate the American debt overhead?
How can China develop its real estate without following the American real estate [model], that, what people thought was increasing middle-class wealth by the price of housing going up and up, all of a sudden, you’re house poor – you’re spending so much money on your mortgage that you don’t have enough money to buy goods and services.
How are China, Russia, and the Global South going to create an alternative economic system that doesn’t simply replicate what the United States has done since WWII?
And how are they going to create, to help this, an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF, that is quite different, and with different principles?
RADHIKA DESAI: And that brings us to another theme that Michael and I have both collaborated on and written independently about, which is really: What should the structures of finance ideally be?
And when Michael poses all these questions – how China can organize its financial sector and its economy in such a way as to promote production without creating these debt overheads?
In one sense, of course, these are always new questions, because economic circumstances change. But in another way, we have models going back at least a century, century and a half.
That is to say, that in their own industrialization, major industrial countries, including the United States, Germany, Japan, China today, they have all had financial sectors in the period of their most rapid development.
For the United States, we are talking about the 19th and early 20th centuries. In this period they had a very different model of finance. It was, the financial sector was structured in such a way as to aid production.
Finance was the handmaiden of production. Finance facilitated long-term investment in productive capacity. Finance did not focus on consumer lending and so on. In fact there was hardly any consumer lending.
So in all of these ways, finance has actually powered the development of these countries, and finance was subordinated to production.
By contrast, Britain has always had a very different financial model which — ironically, for the home of the first industrial revolution — actually was not geared to promoting production. It was rather geared to short-term credit for commercial purposes, eventually for speculative purposes, and so on.
So this short-term financial model, which was originally British but has been adopted by the United States through a creeping process of financial deregulation that began in the 1970s and 1980s, and reached a peak in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999(빌 클린턴 대통령 시절....흔히 미국의 골수 신 자유주의자로 영화배우 출신 공화당 대통령 도널드 리이건을 이야기 합니다...리이건이 신 자유주의를 시작한 대통령은 맞씁니다...그런데 민주당 대통령 빌 클린턴의 공로도 만만쟎지요.....편견을 버리고 내용과 실질로 판단하면 전혀 다른 결론이 나올 수 잇습니다......미국의 개혁의 시대를 연 대통령은 민주당의 우드르 윌슨 대통령입니다....혹자는 이자가 이승만 박사논문 지도교수 엿다고 주장 하기도 합니다....그런데 윌슨의 개혁 조치를 따저 들어가 보면 이것이 과연 개혁인가 보수화인가....혼동 스러운 것이 한두가지가 아닙니다....현재 월가 금융 체제를 완성 시킨 대통령이 바로 우드르 윌슨 입니다....같은 방식으로 노무현도 분석해 보시기 바랍니다....노무현 만큼 수구 꼴통은 없다는 다른소리 주장을 쉽게 이해 할 수 잇을 것입니다....)under the supervision of none other than the so-called “Maestro,” Alan Greenspan.
I’m sure we will have an episode discussing the role of central banking as well.
So anyway, this model of finance, which the United States has adopted over the last many decades, is actually the opposite of the sort of financial structures that you need.
You need financial structures that are going to aid production, whereas these financial structures actually strangle production. These financial structures actually create the economic inequality which we have seen scaling new heights.
--영국은 산업혁명을 리드한 국가 엿지만,,,영국의 금융은 처음 부터 철쩌하게 이윤중심의 단기실적 기준의 영업을 하엿습니다..
하지만 후발 자본주의 국가...미국, 독일, 일본,,그리고 사회주의 국가 지금의 중국에서의 금융은 생산을 보완하는 보조적 기능을 하엿습니다...소비자 금융 따윈 꿈도 꾸지 않앗다는 것이지요....이 금융의 기능이 지금의 미국에선 완전히 바꿔버린 것입니다...진보 학자들이 말하는 금융의 문제란 ..금융 자체가 아닌 ..바로 이런 잘못 사용되는 금융을 말 하는 것입니다....
노무현이 꿈꿧던 금융도...머리 존 놈들이 ,,,촉감이 좋은 놈들이 ...궂이 어렵고 힘들게 땀 흘려 일 하지 않고도...투기질을 통해 편하게 돈을 벌 수 잇는 선진국형 소비 금융입니다...마약이지요...
주가 5000 포인트 시대을 약속 햇던 이재명..
다른소린 이자의 이 공약을 듣고는 ...차라리 전국 땅값을 평당 5000만원으로 만들어 주겟다고 공약 하라고 햇습니다.
다른소린 이 자에게 투표 햇습니다....다른소리 선거중에서 가장 후회스런 선거라고 햇지요?
이자의 쌍판에선 왜 노무현이 겹처 보이는지 모를 일 입니다.
다른소리가 국힘당이던 민주당이던 이 양당과 관련된 투표를 한다면 손가락을 짤라 버린다고 햇습니다.
다른소리가 손가락을 자를 일이 일어난다면 차라리 좋겟습니다.
그런데 다른소리 되질때 까지 그런일은 결코 일어나지 않을 것입니다.
And the opposition of the interest of finance and production is so great that we saw, for example, during the pandemic over the last two or three years, while the economy was tanking, stock markets were doing nothing but scaling new heights, and increased the wealth of those with the greatest number of financial assets.
These contrasting models of finance, historically and today, will be another theme that Michael and I will be addressing.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, what’s so remarkable, is that the point that Radhika has just made was well understood in 1914.
After WWI broke out, the British press began to write articles about how they thought that they were probably going to lose WWI because of British banking.
They said, “Germany has a great advantage over the United States. In Germany, the banking is for long-term. There is a three-way [relationship] between the German government, the banks, and the large corporations — especially the steel-making and heavy industry for the militaries.”
And there was a belief that German industrial banking, that they had been able to industrialize, and that the banking in England was post-feudal; it was short-term banking, the financial time frame was only short-term, and the British stock market especially was hit-and-run.
It was like a brokerage in the United States today. They’d put clients into a stock [and] pump-and-dump. That was the British way of making money.
But when the British were creating the industrial corporations, they were run by financial managers, just like has happened in the United States with General Electric and other financialized firms.(ge뿐만 아니라 미국을 대표 하는 제조업, 심지어 it기업도 금융회사로 변신 햇습니다.....지금의 미국의 꼬라가지가 딱 1차 대전때의 영국 금융의 꼬라가지와 같다는 것이지요....
독일의 나찌즘과 이탈리아의 파시즘, 미국의 뉴딜은 같은 개념과 같은 구조를 갖고 잇다고 햇습니다..
이런 말을 씩씩거리면 하는 사람들은 대부분 자유주의자들입니다,,,,
이들의 이런 말에는 국가와 전체에 대한 냉소와 빈정거림을 담고 잇습니다...그런데 이들이 추구 하는 자유와 개인의 존엄은 철쩌하게 자본가들만을 위한 것이지요.....
자신들이 자본가 이거나 또는 자본가라고 착각 하고 사는 사람들일 것이니....이들에게 자기일이 아닌것 만큼 무관심한 것은 없을 것이며 누군가의 간섭만큼 싫은 것도 없을 것입니다..
이자들은 자신들이 조국이라고 지저 됫습니다.
이자들은 자신들의 무엇이 조국과 닮앗다고 생각 하고 ...이리도 역겹게 지저 되엇던 것일까요..
They didn’t take their profits and reinvest in new industrial capital formation; they paid them out in dividends. Instead of industrial engineering, they had financial engineering.
And the result was that finance in Britain was predatory.(오늘날 국제금융자본의 모습입니다)
All of this was understood. And it was believed that, in the aftermath of WWI, you were going to have what Marx had described in volume three of Capital, that finance was going to be industrialized.
And Marx said the revolutionary role of industrial capitalism was to get rid of the landlord class and make land rent and natural resource rent part of the public domain, and not for private absentee owners, and to get rid of predatory finance, English style, and replace it with productive finance.
And he [Marx] believed that this would lead naturally into socialism, with the banks being, if anything, the model of socialist planning and government planning for the economy.
And that was actually what was happening in Germany under the Reichsbank. I described this in my book Killing the Host.
And instead, what happened was, with America’s victory [in World War One], you had the Anglo-American financialization policy that, as you know, brought on the 1929 stock market crash and the 1931 debt cancellation of inter-Allied debts and German reparations.
So there were two opposing financial systems. And what Radhika is saying is that the Global South and China and Russia are doing today is finally a recognition, a replay, of this same debate between finance capitalism and industrial socialism that you had a century ago.
--))) 여기서 한숨 돌리고 갑시다
파시즘이나 포디즘을 퉁처서 죶 같은 것들.....식으로 접근하지 맙시다..
단순화 만큼 그들(?)이 만들어 준 프레임에 따라 춤춰주는 멍청한 짓은 없다고 햇지요.
파시즘 포디즘 뉴딜 따위가 좋다 나쁘다...식으로 접근하지 말고...그 내용을 보고 복합적으로 판단 하자는 것이지요.
인간사의 모든 것이 다 복합적입니다....따라서 그런것에 대한 판단도 복합적으로 하자는 것이지요.
좋은 것이라면 무엇이 좋은 것이다 말 하고...싫은 것이다면 무엇이 싫다 라고 말 하는 버릇을 들이자고.....요.
이도 저도 모르겟다 싶으면 ...분위기나 누군가의 충동질에 따라 휘둘리지 말고 아닧 하자고...욤...
RADHIKA DESAI: Yes, and there’s another point worth making in connection with the history you were recalling, Michael.
So in the United States, like I said, in the late 19th and into the early 20th century you had very different banking structures.
And then, yes, as Michael said, in the 1920s, the financial structure sort of began to evolve towards this British-style predatory short term.
Of course, you also had this enormous boom in consumer lending in the United States in the 1920s. These were the “roaring twenties”(요란한 20세기) as we remember them. And a large part of what made them “roar” was debt-fueled consumption in the United States.
So anyway, so there was a brief period, but then you got the 1929 crash, you got the Great Depression, and you got the depression-era banking legislation — Glass-Steagall chief among them — which really made American banking, U.S. banking, among the most regulated banking sectors in the world.
-))1929년의 경제 붕괴의 한 원인으로써 금융을 지목한 것입니다.
영국은 산업혁명을 리드한 나라엿씀에도 불구 하고...금융산업은 단기 이익을 추구 하는 투기 금융체체엿습니다..
이 금융이 초기 미국의 산업자본주의와 잘 어울렷던 미국의 금융체체를 대체 햇습니다.
영국식 해적 금융으로 바뀐것이지요...소비자 대출이 늘어나고,,빛을 통한 소비가 주도하는 이른바 "요란한 20세기" 가 열린 것입니다...그리고 경제공황이 왓습니다.,,,공황을 극복하는 많은 조치가 취해 졋고...영국식 해적 금융에 제갈을 물리는 글래스 시걸 법안이 발의 되엇습니다....상업은행과 투자은행(투기은행)을 구분 하여 ....상업은행에는 은행 본연의 업무를 하게 강제하고 국가가 예금을 보장햇습니다....투기 은행은 지들 멋대로 처 하라고 그냥 뒤엇지요...도박은 이곳에서만 하게 물을 갈라 버린 것입니다..
글래스 시걸법하의 상업은행이 ..현재의 중국 은행입니다..
이 글래스 시걸법은 알칸소의 미친개 빌 클린턴에 의해 최종적으로 패기 되엇습니다.....공항이전의 금융체체로 되 돌아간 것입니다....그리고 얼마되지 않아,,,2007년 금융붕괴가 왓습니다...미국 자신의 금고가 금융마피아에 의해 털려 버린 것이지요
한국에서는 봉화가 낳은 세계적인 쥐쇄끼 노무현이 아세아 금융허브를 씨불리며...빌 클린턴의 역할을 하엿지요.,,
그런데 왜 한국에서는 2007년 금융붕괴 같은 것이 또 다시 일어나지 않앗을까요??
우리는 이미 imf로 한던 털렷고...도적놈은 한번 턴 집에 다시 오지 않습니다..
도적놈들은 한국 말고도 봐둔 곳이 너무 많앗고,,그중 가장 눈독을 둔 곳은 두말 할 것도 없이 중국입니다.
그런데 중국 공산당은 노무현과 같은 쥐쇄끼와는 근본에서 달랏지요.
중국 공산당은 중국의 gdp(PPP기준)가 미국을 초과 할때까지도 ..이 금융시장을 개방하지 않앗습니다...일부 개방된 금융에서도
중국의 기간산업에 대한 투기질을 아예 근본적으로 불 가능하게 이중 구조로 운영 하엿지요.
이 ...생산력 제고에 정책 목표를 설정 하고 개혁개방을 몰아 붙혓을때,,,,,아무생각없이 햇던 것이 아닙니다,,
그들은 어마 어마한 고급인력을 서방국가에 보네(특히 미국)...자본주의 경제을 연구 하게 하엿지요.
막스의 자본론의 비판을 현실 경제에서 찾아내게 한 것이지요.
한국의 쥐쇄끼들과 다른 것은 ...모두 머리 좋기로만 따지만 둘째가라면 서러울 해골들은 갖엇지만
한국의 쥐쇄끼들은 자기돈을 들여 미국에서 공부하고 그 본전을 뽑아 처 먹어야 하기 때문에
미국것이 무조건 왓다다.....라는 염봉질을 떨엇지만
중국의 관료들은 자본주의 시장을 중국에 이식 시켯을때 어떤 문제가 발생 할 것인가...그런 문제를 극복 할 수 잇는 중국식 방식은 무엇인가....등등에 촛점을 맞췃습니다.............이른바 중국식 사회주의 시장 경제가 만들어 진 것이지요.
이것이 하늘에서 뚝 떨어진 것도 아니고....믿어지지 않을 어떤 천재의 시대를 앞서가는 아이디어도 아닙니다.
선진하고 잇는 자본주의 국가들에서 쓸 만한 것은 갖어다 쓰고 ,,,고처써야 하는 것은 고쳐쓰고,, 쓰지 말 아야 할것은 무시한 것입니다
중국의 금융은 미국의 산업자본주의 시절의 금융을 쓸 만한 것으로 판단하고 갖어다 쓴 것입니다......
중국의 금융의 후진성을 비판 하며...나 잘낫다고 희열을 느끼는 사람이 잇다면...미국의 가장 이상적인 금융을 비판 하는 븅쉰짓을 처 한것이나 알고 ....희열을 느끼던 말던 하시기 바랍니다.
Because you had a system of essentially state regulation of banks, and a sharp distinction between banks that were commercial banks that took the deposits of ordinary customers like you and me, and enjoyed federal deposit insurance, which was the new institution that was created by this depression-era banking legislation.
So if you enjoyed federal deposit insurance, which basically allowed ordinary depositors like you and me, trust that if we put a few thousand dollars in the bank, that it would not disappear if the bank went bust.
But, banks that enjoyed this deposit insurance were heavily regulated in terms of how much they could lend, at what interest rate they could lend, what purposes they could lend for, and they were forbidden from speculating in financial markets; whereas, banks that did so – banks that speculated in financial markets – the so-called investment banks – were not given federal deposit insurance.
And this structure of US banking, which allowed US banks to play a positive role in the economy, continued into the 1970s.
And it was then, particularly after the dollar’s gold link was broken(닉슨의 달러 금태완 중지 선언), and it became gradually clear that expanding dollar-denominated financial activity would be able to counteract the Triffin dilemma to a considerable extent.
That’s when the financialization really took off, so you saw vast increases in financial activity in terms of government borrowing, in terms of lending to Third World countries – eventually the stock market bubble, the dot-com bubble, the East Asian financial bubble, and finally the mother of all bubbles, which broke in 2008: the housing and credit bubbles.(소방서에 불이 난 것이지요)
And of course now, nothing has been done in all of these decades, despite repeated financial crises, to regulate American banking structures, or very little has been done.(이것은 서구식 민주주의에 대한 근본적이 불신을 낳앗습니다...민주주의는 아무책임도 지지 않는다....민주주의로는 아무것도 바꿀 수 없다....라는 냉소가 만들어 진 것이지요....그런데 이것이 냉소일까요????
민주주의 자체가 본래 책임도 지지 않고, 민주주의로는 아무것도 할 수 없엇던 것은 아니엇을까??
왜 과거의 민주주의는 어쩟던 위기를 극복하고 재생 할 수 잇엇는데...
왜 지금의 민주주의는 이렇게도 이가 갈릴만큼 무기력 하기만 한 것일까??
우리가 책을 읽고 토론을 하는 것은 ,,,,김건희가 오드리 헵번 흉내내는 사진을 찍엇다....따위나 씨불거려 보자는 것은 아니지요.
그깐 짓은 노무현교 쥐쇄끼들이나 실컷 처 하시라고 냄 두고,,
나는 잘 모르겟지만 석학들의 책을 통해서는 영감을 얻을 수 잇습니다.
과거의 자본주의는 성숙한 자본주의가 아닙니다...이 단계에서는 얼마든지 상부구조의 제도나 체계를 통해 치류와 본원이 가능합니다....그런데 지금의 자본주의는 성숙한 자본주의입니다.....여기서는 다릅니다...토대와 상부구조는 보완관계가 아니고 갈등관계입니다..민주주의가 할 수 잇는 것은 없습니다..여기서는 토대가 바꿔야 합니다,,,
그런데 누가 토대를 바꿉니까??........누가 이 혁명을 하려 할까요??...그들은(?) 이 혁명을 구경만 할까요??........
-사회주의이냐??...파멸이냐???..
로사 룩셈부르크나 다른소리나...그 속내는 다르지 않습니다.
And as a consequence, we today have an even bigger so-called “everything bubble.” Anything that even remotely smacks of any lucrativeness is an asset to be acquired.
So the United States has undergone quite a transition. And this is important to remember as well.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, what the implication of what you’re saying is: What are other countries going to do to avoid this same problem? Because many other countries followed the US [banking] philosophy.
What we’ve been discussing is not at the center of economic discussion, either here or abroad.
Well, what has made China so successful, and what is so unique about Chinese socialism, is they have treated money creation, banking, and credit as a public utility.(다시 한번 중국입니다....중국도 미국과 꼭 같은 자본주의 시장 경제다??.....겉만 보지 마세요....어차피 여자들의 젖통이나 궁둥이 다 꼭 같아 보입니다...갈보들 좆 구멍과 당신 마누라 좆 구멍이 어떻게 같어??)
That means that, if the United States cannot really cure the debt bubble it’s built up really since the 1980s, because if it writes down the debt there will be huge defaults, and in 2008 the head of the FDIC, [Sheila Bair] said that Citibank was the most corrupt bank, and incompetent bank, in the country; it was in negative equity,(자본잠식) it had wiped out the entire stockholder wealth.
But fortunately, President Obama had appointed a treasury secretary, Robert Rubin, who worked for Obama’s sponsor, Goldman Sachs.And Obama was the political lobby of Citibank. They bailed out Citibank, instead of letting it go under – instead of letting it go under and turning it into a government bank, to actually loan money for productive reasons.( 노무현이 꿈꿧던 아세아 금융허브의 세상입니다..)Obama sponsored the super-financialization(극단적 금융화) of the United States, and, since 2008, has traded $9 trillion(허스든은 이 금액을 이야기 하지만, 범위를 어떻게 잡느냐에 따라 이 금액은 얼마든지 달라집니다...다른소리가 27trillions 달러 라고 하는 것은 ...가장 보수적인 주장이기 때문에 인용한 것입니다) in subsidies to the financial sector, that is used – this $9 trillion – to buy control of the industrial sector, to financialize corporations, to [deindustrialize] them, and essentially the financial sector has helped destroy industry in the United States.
Well, China is not in this position. It doesn’t have a powerful financial interest to take over the government; just the opposite.
China has a very large corporate debt, now, and especially a real estate debt. But when its corporations get insolvent, China does not say, “Well we’re going to break you up and you’ll have to be sold to foreign buyers and anyone who can buy them.”(이는 imf때 김대중 정부가 당햇던 방식이지요),, China essentially writes down the debt.
And it’s easy for it to write down the debt, because it’s writing down debt that is owed to itself. There is no private bank to fight it and to lobby against it.
The same situation occurs in Chinese real estate right now. There are a lot of complaints in China that families have to go into long-term debt in order to borrow the money to buy their housing, because their housing has been bid up – like the United States – on credit.
How can China lower the price of housing to keep its labor force with low housing overhead, so that it can remain competitive, and so that it can use labor’s income to buy the goods and services that labor produces instead of paying the banks?
--헝다 사태을 보는 시각의 차이 입니다.
미국과는 전혀 다른 중국의 체체를 미국의 시각에서 보니....중국 망한다는 말만 씨불리지요..
이 말만 30년이 넘게 들어왓습니다....헝다 사태가 터지자...드디어 이번에는 진짜로 망한다고 햇습니다...
그런데 말짱합니다..오히려 콜로나로 인해 미국이 또 망하게 생겻고...또 다시 돈을 찍어 막앗습니다..
미국은 중국에 절대 이길 수 없다고 햇지요??..........왜??
바로 소프트웨어을 차이 입니다...하드 웨어가 아닙니다..
중국의 인건비가 미국과 같아진다 하더라도....중국의 체체는 미국 상품 보다 훨씬 더 경쟁력잇는 상품을 만들어 낼 수 잇습니다.
자본주의 소유권과 시장은 시장가격에 모든 비용이 다 반영 되는 체체입니다.
중국식 사회주의 시장은 생산비만 반영됩니다...사회인프라는 공공재로 가격에서 빠저 버리지요.
중국 공산당은 인류사에 존재 해온 가장 유능한 정치집단입니다......
노무현이 같은 것들이 대통령이 되고 처 먹은 뇌물이 뽀록나자 좆 같다고 입 앙당 처 물고 되지는 그런 체체가 아닙니다.
도널드 트럼프나 ,,,조지 부시 같은 ...찌지리 쥐쇗끼들이 설칠 수 잇는 그런 체체가 아닙니다.
그들은 끊임없이 공부하고, 변증합니다.
다른소리가 읽어 본 중국관련 연구물에서...서구 학자들이 한결 같이 지적하는 것도 중국식 전체주의 적합화된 공산당의 인민들을 향한 노력과 열정입니다...
중국 공산당은 서구 민주정치체제의 관료들과는 모든 것에서 다릅니다.
그들의 중국에 대한 추측이 계속 틀릴 수 밖에 없는 이유입니다.
절대 권력은 반드시 부패 한다.??
반드시 부패 하는 절대 권력은 자본주의 체체의 자본가이지요....민주주의는 이들의 부패에 그럴싸한 거죽만 씨워준 것입니다.
월가를 보세요....대장동 보세요...썩을 수 밖에 없는 절대 권력입니다.
9trillions(27 trillions)달러를 찍어서 던저 줘야 하는 전대미문의 금융붕괴에 ....단 한명도 처벌 되지 않는 절대 부패는
자본주의 - 민주주의 에서나 가능 하지요............중국 공산당에서는 꿈도 꿀 수 없는 일입니다.
RADHIKA DESAI: These contrasts that you’re drawing, Michael, between Chinese financial structures and what American financial structures have become over the last several decades, this is very pertinent for talking about de-dollarization, on the one hand, and the rise of the renminbi, or the yuan – the Chinese currency has two different names – as a major world currency.
Now, there are a couple of things one should say about this. First of all, as far as the de-dollarization is concerned, the fact of the matter is that this is happening because the rest of the world is increasingly becoming aware that participating in the dollar financial system has many disadvantages, including the tendency of the dollar system to incur increasing financial crises and so on.
But in addition, there is another point one must make, which is that the dollar system, which rests on the structures of financialization, have been strangling the American economy.
They have been making the American economy less productive. They have been increasing social inequality in the United States. And of course, all of this has also had repercussions for politics.
But of course, the way American politics works, you know, it’s “the best democracy money can buy.”(미국의 민주주의는 돈으로 살수 잇는 최고의 민주주다......권력은 시장으로 넘어갓다........같은 말 입니다) So essentially the extremely wealthy interests, which are also those interests which have an interest in financialization, are keeping the system going – even though it is having these bad effects on the American population, and even though the dollar system is actually decreasingly attractive to the rest of the world. And therefore we are going to see its demise very soon. So, these interests are keeping it going.
By contrast, in China what you have — people say that the Chinese yuan must be internationalized in the same way as the dollar — and this is where they are making a mistake.(중국의 위안화 기축통화 에 대한 근본적인 몰 이해)
Yes, there will be increasing use of the Chinese yuan in international trade, but also you are seeing that the new structures that are emerging are not just about yuan domination.
On the contrary, China is signing more and more agreements to trade with other countries’ currencies. So it will also enable the currencies of, say, Iran or India, to become used in a limited, regulated way, nevertheless, but nevertheless used in international trade.
But this will be about trade. As long as you don’t have a vast investment in the financial bubbles regularly blown up by the American financial system, you don’t need the dollar system, basically.
So the yuan will be internationalized in an extremely different way. It will not look the same as dollar internationalization has looked over the last many decades, reliant on financialization.
So China, we will see that, but it will look very different. That’s a clarification that must be made.
--)) 달러 체체에서 벋어나고자 하는 이유와 기축 통화로써의 위안화는 무엇을 의미 하는가?? 에 대한 간단한 설명입니다.
다른소리가 놀란것은....사람들이 이런 간단한 것에 대한 이해도 없고......이런것도 미중간의 패권전쟁으로 접근 하더라는 겁니다...
아마도 그런식으로 씨불거려야 더 많은 사람들의 관심을 모을 수 잇다고 생각하는 가 보지요..
여자의 보지 이야기가 더 많은 관심을 끌어 모으는 원리입니다.
여자 보지 말고도 여자에 대해 할 이야기는 무긍무진 하지요.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well the question is, how are they going to create an international bank to oversee international reserves that do not really contain the dollar, except some dollars for foreign-exchange stabilization.
Certainly the first step is going to be bilateral and multilateral currency swaps. China will hold Saudi Arabian riyal, and Saudi Arabia will hold Chinese yuan, and the result will be the petroyuan that people have talked about.
The members of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and the allies of China, Russia, Iran, are going to develop mutual currency swaps. And at some point they will join together and create an international bank that will be able to create credit to finance the huge investment in infrastructure, port development, transportation, that we’re so far seeing China take the lead in developing along the old Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative.
This is going to be coordinated by an international bank, so that they can essentially have their economy without much contact with the dollar and the euro.--탈 달러의 목표입니다...즉 자신들의 거래와 아무 관련이 없는 미국의 의해 자신들의 거래가 영향을 받는 것을 배재 하는 것이지요.....탈 달러가 중요한 것이 아니고...그들이 왜 달러에서 벗어 나고자 하는지 그 이유를 알게 되면 그들이 추구하는 방향이 무엇인지도 쉽게 이해 할 수 잇습니다.
Because the dollar and euro have very little to offer – not raw materials, not much technology. They can make specialized machinery for producing computer chips, but basically it requires a whole institutional development.
And I’m sure that’s what they are discussing right now. And this is going to be unfolding in future programs that we’ll be discussing.
RADHIKA DESAI: Exactly. We’re nearly at one hour, Michael, so let’s wind down this conversation. Maybe I’ll wind it down by underlining something that you and I argued in our article “Beyond the Dollar Creditocracy.”
The dollar system has operated with a carrot and a stick. The carrot has of course been the vast financialization bubbles that the United States has blown up regularly in order to invite the rest of the world to buy dollar-denominated assets, and thereby increase demand for dollars.(달러중에서 거래의 결제에 사용되는 달러는 극히 일 부분일 뿐입니다...나머지는 다 투기질을 위한 것이고....이것이 과거에는 관리가 되는 것 처럼 보엿지만 2007년 금융붕괴는 그런것이 착시 엿다는 것을 보여주엇습니다..
실물이 받처 주지 않는 거래는 투기질 이지요..
And that also has of course been running into increasing contradictions, to such an extent that today, Michael mentioned earlier the Federal Reserve’s expanded balance sheet.
It went from about $1 trillion in the early years of this century to about $2 trillion, then $4 trillion after the 2008 Financial Crisis, and now it is over $9 trillion dollars.
The bulk of this money is there because essentially foreigners are not crowding into American asset markets to buy dollar-denominated assets. So those asset markets have to be supported by the Federal Reserve.(즉 투기판을 유지하기 위해 끊임 없이 달러를 찍어 공급해 주는 것이지요.....즉 폰지사기질을 frb가 하고 잇다는 것입니다)
Of course, eventually it can become a sort of self-contained system, in which the Federal Reserve continues to inflate the wealth of some Americans, but the rest of the world is decreasingly interested in it.
The other – the stick – has of course been control over commodities. Michael mentioned control over oil.
Of course today many other commodities are becoming important – food of course is becoming important.
Various resources connected with the production of various ‘green’ technologies, like lithium is becoming important, so there will be a big attempt to control this.
But American attempts to try to keep control over oil has also been slipping over the last many decades. Oil prices take a turn of their own.
And of course as commodity prices go up, the value of the dollar falls. And so this is another – essentially the reason why commodity prices are going up is because the rest of the world is demanding more, because the rest of the world is also developing.
And so the development of the rest of the world itself is going to have a negative effect on American attempts to retain purchase.
So the sooner the United States realizes the folly of trying to dominate the world, and focuses on being a productive national economy, the better it will be for Americans themselves.
Because Americans have also paid a big price. The world has paid a big price, but so in a lesser way Americans have paid a price for the U.S.’s vain attempts to retain dominance over the world, even if it is only by keeping the dollar as the world’s money.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Radhika, we could have gotten a million dollars from the State Department by keeping this to ourselves and just telling them how the world works.
RADHIKA DESAI: Well I hope instead we get a million viewers. This would be far more rewarding for us.
So please watch out for our next show, which we will record in two weeks time, and you will see in two weeks time.
Meanwhile, please also give us your reactions, your suggestions, for topics we might cover. We’ll try to do that as much as we can, and we look forward to talking with you every fortnight from here on.
Thanks very much, and see you next time.