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pp.365-
Strategically, seizure of the Ukraine would ensure support from the south for
the central group of German forces which was still charged with the paramount
task of capturing Moscow.
From the very first days of the war, the course of events in the Ukraine was
running contrary to what had been envisaged by Hitler’s plan of a blitzkrieg.
Pulling back under the impact of the German assault, the Red Army was putting
up a gallant resistance.
전략적으로, 우크라이나를 점령은 여전히 모스크바를 점령하는 가장 중요한 임무를 맡고 있는 독일군의 중앙 그룹에 대한 남부의 지원을 보장할 것이다.
전쟁 첫날부터 우크라이나의 일련의 과정은 히틀러의 전격전 계획에서 상상한 것과 반대로 진행되고 있었다.
독일군의 공격에 충격을 받아 후퇴하면서 붉은 군대는 용맹한 저항을 하고 있었다.
Fighting stoutly, with skill and courage, were the 5th Army under General
M. I. Potapov, the 26th Army under General F. Ya. Kostenko, and the 6th Army
under General I. N. Muzychenko.
It gives me special pleasure to mention these outstanding army commanders
because they had served as regimental commanders in the 4th Don Cossack
Division of the legendary First Mounted Army.
포타포프 장군 휘하의 제5군단, 코스텐코 장군 휘하의 제26군단, 무지첸코 장군 휘하의 제6군단은 기술과 용기로 당당히 싸웠다.
그들은 전설적인 제1기마군의 제4기마사단 돈코삭 연대장으로 근무한 경험이 있기 때문에 이 뛰어난 육군 지휘관들을 언급하게 되어 매우 기쁘다.
Meeting stiff resistance in the Kiev fortified area, the German troops
executed a sharp southward manoeuvre so as to envelop our 6th and 12th armies,
which were withdrawing from the Berdichev-Starokonstantinov-Proskurov line.
A part of the enemy force reached the sector of the 26th Army south of Kiev.
But this could have no substantial significance because the main enemy force,
Army Group South, was moving in a southerly direction at the time. Our 6th and
12th armies were in for a bitter clash with the enemy force that was seeking to
envelop them.
키예프 요새화 지역의 거센 저항을 만나 독일군은 베르디체프-스타로콘스탄티노프-프로스쿠로프 라인에서 철수하는 우리 6군과 12군을 포위하기 위해 날카로운 남쪽 작전을 수행했다.
적군의 일부가 키예프 남쪽 26군의 구역에 도달했다.
하지만 당시 주요 적 병력인 남부 집단군이 남쪽으로 이동하고 있었기 때문에 이는 중요한 의미가 없을 수도 있었다. 우리 6군과 12군은 포위를 시도하고 있던 적군과 심한 충돌을 벌이고 있었다.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the German 11th Army, having
broken through the defences of the Southern Front, was striking out through
Mogilev-Podolsky in order to outflank and envelop these three armies.
The troops of the South-Western Front, acting in cooperation with the
Southern Front, mounted counterattacks to hold up the enemy advance. They
inflicted sizeable losses on the enemy but failed to stop him. The Germans
carried out a partial regrouping and lashed out again at the withdrawing troops of
the 6th and 12th armies. This time the two armies found themselves in an even
graver situation.
남부전선의 방어 뚫고 들어온 독일 제11군이 모길레프 포돌스키를 통해 이들 3개 군을 포위하기 위해 나아가고 있었다는 사실로 인해 상황은 더욱 악화되었다.
남부전선과 협력한 남서부전선의 부대는 적의 진격을 막기 위해 반격에 나섰다. 그들은 적에게 상당한 손실을 입혔지만, 막지는 못했다. 독일군은 부분적인 재집결을 행했고, 6군과 12군의 철수하는 부대를 다시 맹렬히 공격했다. 이번에는 두 군이 더욱 심각한 상황에 처했다.
Because of the distance and the ensuing complexity of controlling them, the
South-Western Front Command asked that these two armies be reassigned to the
Southern Front, which was then under the command of General of the Army I.
V. Tyulenev. Its request was granted.
그들을 통제하는 거리와 그에 따른 복잡성 때문에, 남서부 전선 사령부는 이 두 군을 남부 전선으로 재배치할 것을 요청했고, 남부 전선은 당시 툴레네프 육군 장군의 지휘 하에 있었다. 그 요청은 승인됐다.
During this reallocation a considerable part of the retreating units of these
armies were surrounded. Lieutenant-General I. N. Muzychenko, Commander of
the 6th Army, was badly wounded and taken prisoner. The same fate befell the
commander of the 12th Army, General P. G. Ponedelin. A very grave situation
developed at this time on the Southern Front. Its 9th Army was fighting in semiencirclement, part of it moving back to the Ingulets river.
이 재배치 동안, 두 군의 후퇴하는 부대들 중 상당수가 포위되었다. 중장 무지첸코 6군 사령관은 중상을 입고 포로로 잡혔다. 같은 운명이 12군 사령관 포넬린에게도 닥쳤다. 매우 심각한 상황이 이 시기에 남부 전선에서 전개되었습니다. 9군은 반포위되어 싸우고 있었으며, 그 일부는 인굴츠 강으로 물러났다.
The enemy advance to the Dnieper and his breakthrough to Zaporozhye,
Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa, badly aggravated the situation of the Soviet troops
on the entire South-Western sector. Yet the German troops had paid a high price
for their victory here. They were badly mauled, fatigued, and had sustained
heavy losses.
적이 드네프르 강으로 진격하고, 자포로제, 드네프로페트롭스크, 오데사를 돌파해 남서쪽 전체 소련군의 상황을 크게 악화시켰다. 하지만 독일군은 여기서 승리한 대가를 톡톡히 치렀다. 그들은 박살났고, 피로했고, 큰 손실을 입었다.
Since the moment I had returned to Moscow from the South-Western Front,
I saw all the events I have described from the viewpoint of Chief of General
Staff because I took part in them in that particular capacity — sharing
responsibility, the bitterness of our setbacks and the joy of our infrequent
victories, with other members of the High Command. That is why, before going
any further, I want to dwell specially on the activity of the Supreme Command’s
Stavka, often referred to mistakenly as the General Headquarters, and to describe
as best I can its role and structure, and its manner of controlling the armed forces
during the war.
제가 남서부 전선에서 모스크바로 돌아온 그 시점 이후로, 나는 내가 설명한 모든 사건들을 총참모장의 관점에서 보았다. 왜냐하면 나는 특수한 지위에서 책임감, 우리의 후퇴에 대한 쓰라림, 그리고 드문 승리의 기쁨을 다른 고위 지휘부 일원들과 함께했기 때문이었다. 그렇기 때문에, 더 나아가기 전에, 나는 자주 총사령부로 잘못 언급된 최고 사령부 스타프카의 활동에 대해 특히 자세히 설명하고, 그것의 역할과 구조, 그리고 전쟁 중 군대를 통제하는 방식에 대해 최선을 다해 서술하고 싶다.
For understandable reasons, I am not going to touch upon anything that may,
if revealed, prejudice my country’s defences. Apart from the special chapter that
the reader will now come to, the activity of our top command and that of
Supreme Commander-in-Chief J. V. Stalin in charting and carrying out
operations and military campaigns, will also be described in other parts of the
book.
이해할 만한 이유로, 드러난 사실이라도 나는 조국의 방위에 편견을 줄 수 있는 어떤 것도 건드리지 않을 것이다. 독자들이 지금 보게 될 특별한 장 외에, 작전과 군사 작전을 계획하고 수행하는 우리의 최고 지휘부와 최고사령관 스탈린의 활동에 대해서도 책의 다른 부분에서 역시 설명할 것이다.
Stavka
소련군 최고사령부이다. 정식 명칭은 '최고중앙지휘사령부[1]'로 소련 국방인민위원회 산하 조직으로 출범했다. 스타프카라는 단어의 어원은 중세 러시아어의 막사로, 그것이 사령부라는 의미로 변한 것이다. 그래서 이후 제1차 세계대전 당시 제정 러시아에서 조직한 야전 총사령부의 명칭이 스타프카였던 것. 19세기 제정 러시아 때에는 참모본부를 의미하는 명칭이었다.
독소전쟁 개전 후 1941년 6월 23일, 먼저 '중앙지휘사령부'가 조직되어 세묜 티모셴코가 사령관에 임명되었다. 이후 7월 10일에 '최고지휘사령부(Stavka Verkhnogo Komandovaniya)'로 개칭되었으며, 이후 이오시프 스탈린이 사령관에 취임하고 8월 8일에 '최고중앙지휘사령부'로 명칭이 변경되어 종전까지 유지되었다.
Chapter 11
THE SUPREME COMMAND
GHQ
A Stavka of the High Command was formed on June 23, 1941. Differing
slightly from what we had envisaged in the Defence Commissariat’s project, its
composition was: Defence Commissar S. K. Timoshenko (Chairman), Chief of
General Staff G. K. Zhukov, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S.
M. Budenny, and N. G. Kuznetsov.
최고사령부
총사령부(General HeadQuarters)
1941년 6월 23일, 최고지휘사령부가 창설되었다. 국방위원회의 기획에서 우리가 상상했던 것과는 약간 다르지만, 그 구성은 국방위원회 위원장 티모셴코(위원장), 총참모장 주코프, 스탈린, 몰로토프, 보로실로프, 부데니, 그리고 쿠즈네초프였습니다.
It would have been far better if Stalin had been named Commander-in-Chief,
as we had envisaged in the original project. After all, with things as they were,
Timoshenko could take no basic decisions without Stalin approving them. As it
was, we had two commanders-in-chief — Timoshenko de jure, as put down in
the government decree, and Stalin de facto. This complicated troop control and
caused inevitable delays in drawing up and issuing orders.
We had also suggested having N. F. Vatutin, First Deputy Chief of General
Staff, in the High Command Stavka. But Stalin objected.
A group of advisers was formed to consult the High Command on various
topics. But it played no more than a nominal role, because all the advisers soon
received other appointments, and were not replaced.
The High Command GHQ was sited in Moscow all through the war. This
had an important effect on morale. Owing to enemy air raids, its seat was moved
from the Kremlin to a small detached house with reliable working premises and
good communications in the vicinity of Kirovskiye Vorota in the beginning of
July. And a month later, operators of the General Staff, which was an executive
appendage of the High Command, moved their desks to the platform of the
nearby Kirovskaya Station of the Moscow underground.
On June 30, 1941, the Party’s Politbureau formed a special body, the State
Defence Committee, with Stalin at its head, on the model of Lenin’s Council of
Worker-Peasant Defence which functioned during the Civil War and the foreign
armed intervention.
It held all power in its hands and was the top organ in charge of defence. All
civilian, Party, and government organizations were obliged to abide by all its
resolutions and orders. To control their fulfilment, the Committee had
representatives in all the territories and regions, the war-industry commissariats,
the biggest enterprises, and the building sites.
At its sittings, which might be called at any time of the day or night, usually
at the Kremlin or in Stalin’s country-house, the Committee discussed and took
decisions on all crucial issues. Military plans were examined by the Party’s
Politbureau and the State Defence Committee. People’s Commissars who were
to take part in supporting the operation, were invited. Whenever there was a
chance, this practice enabled us to concentrate vast material resources at key
points, to carry through a coordinated policy of strategic guidance, and, with the
organised rear helping out, to dovetail troop actions with the countrywide war
effort.
Heated debates at Committee meetings were frequent, the opinions firm and
couched in precise language. If no consensus was reached, a commission would
be formed at once, consisting of supporters of the opposite views who were
instructed to report an agreed proposal at the next meeting.
The State Defence Committee adopted some 10,000 resolutions and
decisions of a military and economic nature during the war. All of them were
carried out with precision and energy. They gave the start to assiduous work,
assuring a single Party line in the country’s administration during that rigorous
and arduous time.
On July 10, 1941, by decision of the State Defence Committee, the Stavka of
the High Command was converted into the Stavka of the Supreme Command,
and on August 8 into the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.
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From that moment on and until the end of the war Stalin was Supreme
Commander-in-Chief.
Once the State Defence Committee had been formed and the Supreme
Command established, with one and the same person — the General Secretary of
the Party’s Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of People’s
Commissars — at their head, the structure of the country’s wartime political and
military administration was complete. The Party’s Central Committee
coordinated the activity of all Party, government, military, and economic
agencies.
Now I was working directly with J. V. Stalin. I had never associated with
him as closely before, and initially felt a little awkward in his presence. Besides,
I knew I lacked experience in strategic matters and was never sure of the
accuracy of my forecasts.
In the early period of our association, Stalin did not have much to say to me.
I felt that he was sizing me up most attentively and had no fixed opinion of me
yet as Chief of General Staff.
But as experience accumulated, I became more confident, more bold, in
expressing my ideas. I noticed, too, that Stalin began to give them more heed.
On July 19, 1941, a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
appointed Stalin the People’s Commissar for Defence. And I must say that with
Stalin’s appointment as Chairman of the State Defence Committee, Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, and Commissar for Defence, all of us at the General Staff,
the central divisions of the Defence Commissariat, the USSR State Planning
Committee, and other governmental and economic bodies, instantly felt his firm
and sure hand.
Every member of the State Defence Committee had a concrete assignment
and was strictly responsible for the fulfilment of economic plans. One was
responsible for the output of tanks, another for guns and shells, a third for the
output of aircraft, and a fourth for logistics, food supplies, equipment, etc.
Commanders of arms of the service were ordered by Stalin personally to back up
the respective Committee members and help them in seeing to the fulfilment of
production programmes according to schedule and of requisite quality.
With the Party’s political work making the due impact and with us generals
improving our art of troop control through the accumulated combat experience,
our resistance to the enemy grew stronger. All soldiers of the armed forces
displayed heroism and dedication in battle. Military discipline tightened visibly.
Still, despite the energetic efforts of the Supreme Command and the various
Front commands, the situation continued to deteriorate. Under pressure of
superior enemy forces, our troops were rolling back to the country’s interior. I
have already said that in the early months of the war the most difficult situation
prevailed in the western and north-western sectors. The strategic defence put up
by the Soviet Armed Forces took shape in a most unfavourable military
situation, though it was most active and resolute.
The Party’s Central Committee and the State Defence Committee were
deeply concerned with the country’s air defences because Nazi aviation was
highly active. Indeed, the enemy pinned great hopes on the Luftwaffe. The Nazis
expected by their massive air raids to wreck the mobilization in the country’s
western regions, to disorganize transport and administration in the immediate
rear, and to undermine the people’s will to resist. Hitler showered privileges and
rewards on his air pirates and their chief, Goering.
Supreme Commander Stalin analyzed the situation, and took special note of
the deficient air defence of the country’s main objectives. Thereupon, with his
usual energy, he tackled the question of an anti-aircraft shield. He invited a
group of ranking commanders to offer ideas on how to improve the structure and
controls of the air defence machinery, and to do so within two days. General N.
N. Voronov, chief of Red Army artillery, and the generals M. S. Gromadin, D.
A. Zhuravlev, P. F. Zhigarev, N. D. Yakovlev, and others, helped him greatly
with their advice.
The main thing at the time was to put up an umbrella over Moscow,
Leningrad, and other large industrial centres producing tanks, aircraft, guns and
shells, and oil, and over leading railway junctions, and power-producing and
communication centres.
The biggest anti-aircraft defence unit was formed to protect Moscow. Before
the end of July it already had 585 fighter planes, 964 anti-aircraft guns, 166
large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, something like 1,000 searchlights, and a
large number of barrage balloons.
This structure paid off. The Nazi air force was unable to break through to
Moscow en masse despite enormous losses. Many thousands of Nazi bombers
took part in the raids, but only a few (not more than 2 or 3 per cent) managed to
reach the Soviet capital, and on reaching it were compelled to drop their deadly
load at random.
During the enemy air raids, the Supreme Commander often visited the
underground premises of the capital’s anti-aircraft command post, and watched
how the enemy aviation was driven off. The top man here was General D. A.
Zhuravlev, who supervised air defences with a cool head and efficiency. After
the raid, Stalin would usually stay on and talk to the operators. He asked them
what they thought the Supreme Command could still do to buttress air defences
and first of all the air defences of Moscow.
As the war went on, the air defence machinery continued to improve, and
made a memorable contribution to the common cause of crushing the Nazi
aggressors.
I can still remember the personnel of the Leningrad and Baltic Fleet air
defence units, and do so with deep respect and gratitude. They repulsed the
massive, almost daily, enemy raids heroically, with great skill.
The Soviet strategic leadership took some time to coalesce, going through a
succession of fundamental alterations prompted by the course of the war and the
general situation. Gradually, however, Soviet military science, acting on past
experience, made visible progress in troop control.
Commanders, political officers, and the personnel of tactical and strategic
staffs were essentially well selected from among young, energetic, and capable
officers and generals. They were eager and enthusiastic, and kept improving
their knowledge of strategy and their operational art. The General Staff, Naval
Headquarters, the Commissariat for Defence, Front commanders, commanders
of naval fleets and of military districts, and the respective staffs did everything
they could to make the armed forces more combatworthy to win a victory.
The absence of a top military body such as the Stavka of the Supreme
Command at the time when Nazi Germany attacked, naturally affected troop
control in the initial phase of the war, and had a detrimental effect on the general
strategic situation. Doubly so, because in his earlier ventures in Europe the
enemy had already acquired considerable experience in organizing warfare and
sudden invasions. Admittedly, too, the commanders-in-chief of the Directions
and the Front commanders were guilty of bad faults in troop control at the
beginning of the war. This naturally led to negative results.
I am often asked why we were not wholly prepared for the war when it
broke out and why our troop control was so faulty.
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