Boethius 보에티우스 (480-524)
보에티우스는 서기 6세기의 다작 로마 학자로, 그리스 과학과 철학을 중세 라틴 세계에 전달하는 데 중요한 역할을 했습니다. 그의 가장 영향력 있는 작품은 철학의 위안입니다. 보에티우스는 기독교 신학에 깊은 족적을 남겼으며 중세 라틴어 학교에서 수학, 음악, 논리학, 변증법 발전의 기초를 제공했습니다. 그는 이탈리아의 테오도리쿠스 동고트족 정권의 초대 장관으로서 정치 문제에 평생을 바쳤으며, 독실한 번역, 주석, 논문에서 그리스의 지혜를 찾았습니다.
20세기 동안 그의 학문적 방식과 기독교 신앙은 새로운 논의의 대상이 되었다. 그의 학문적 업적이 그리스어 자료의 비굴한 번역이 아니었다고 믿을 만한 많은 이유들이 있다
Contra Eutychen은 Boethius의 가장 독창적 인 작품입니다. 그것은 사변적 해결책과 용어, 명제 및 주장을 분석할 때 가설적이고 범주적인 논리를 사용하는 방법론에서 독창적입니다. 『철학의 위안』 역시 독창적이지만, 많은 저자들이 그의 방법론과 요소들을 처리하는 방식에 국한시키지만, 그 내용은 그렇지 않은데, 이는 신플라톤주의 이암블리쿠스, 시리아누스, 프로클로스 학파를 대표한다. 보에티우스는 주로 플라톤, 아리스토텔레스, 피타고라스로부터 영감을 받았습니다. 그의 과학적, 수학적, 논리적 연구는 그가 인정했듯이 독창적이지 않습니다.
목차
1. 생명
아니시우스 만리우스 세베리누스 보에티우스 (480-524 AD), 보에티우스는 공화정과 로마 제국의 삶에서 강한 존재감을 가진 가족 인 아니시아 (Anicia) 속의 저명한 구성원이었습니다. 콘스탄티누스 시대부터 그 회원들은 개종하여 로마 기독교 교회의 교리를 옹호했습니다. 라틴어 서사에 대한 연구(Martindale 1980, p. 232 비교)와 보에티우스 자신이 전달한 그의 어린 시절에 대한 전기적 세부 사항(철학의 위안 ii, 3, 5)은 그의 아버지가 또 다른 보에티우스, 나리우스 만리우스 보에티우스(Narius Manlius Boethius)였다고 믿을 수 있게 해주는데, 그는 집정관 장관이었고, 그 다음에는 이탈리아 지사였으며, 마지막으로 서기 487년에 집정관과 귀족이었다(Cameron 1981, 비교, 181-183쪽). 이 보에티우스가 서기 457년에 알렉산드리아의 총독이었는지는 분명하지 않지만, 쿠르셀(Courcelle, 1970, p. 299, n.1)은 보에티우스가 자신의 사회적 상황을 이용하여 아테네나 알렉산드리아로 가서 그리스어를 배우고 철학과 신학에 대한 연구를 심화할 수 있었다는 가설에 더 많은 무게를 실어주기 위해 그렇게 제안했다. 보에티우스의 할아버지는 서기 454년에 발렌티니아누스 3세에 의해 살해된 바로 그 보에티우스였다 (비교 Martindale 1980, p. 231).
보에티우스가 어렸을 때 일어난 아버지의 죽음 이후, 그는 로마 귀족의 매우 영향력 있는 가문에 속한 퀸투스 아우렐리우스 심마쿠스 멤미우스의 보호를 받았습니다. 나중에 보에티우스는 심마코스의 딸 루스티키아나와 결혼하여 동로마 황제 플라비우스 제노의 요청에 따라 붕괴된 서로마 제국에 권위와 통치를 부과하기 위해 이탈리아에 있던 동고트족 왕 테오도리쿠스를 방해하는 가족 동맹을 맺었습니다. 보에티우스가 로마에 대해 가졌던 정치적 헌신은 테오도리쿠스의 통치 기간 동안 행사할 수 있었던 가장 높은 정치적 지위인 집정관직(magister officiorum)의 공직뿐만 아니라, 원로원 의원이 된 그의 두 아들 심마쿠스와 보에티우스의 교육과 쿠르수스 호노룸(cursus honorum)에 의해서도 증명된다(철학의 위안 ii, 3,8; 4,7).
6세기 로마에서 보에티우스의 명성은 그가 젊었을 때 받았던 영예들(그 중 일부는 그의 나이 많은 동료들에게 허락되지 않았다. 철학의 위안 ii, 3과 비교하라)에 의해서만 증명되는 것이 아니라, 몇몇 어려운 문제들을 설명하기 위해 주석과 논문을 써 달라는 친구와 친척들의 요청에 의해서도 증명된다. 또한 서기 529년에 비바리움 수도원을 설립한 것으로 잘 알려진 카시오도루스(Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus)는 테오도리쿠스가 그에게 맡긴 과학적 임무를 보고하는데, 이는 측정된 물의 흐름에 의해 조절되는 시계인 시계를 부르고뉴의 왕 군도바드(Gundobad)에게 주는 것과 관련하여 테오도리쿠스가 그에게 맡긴 과학적 임무에 대해 보고한다. 바리아에 나, 45세, 나, 10세. Mommsen ed. 1894)를 참조하십시오.
2. 시간
테오도리쿠스는 로마인들에게 불길한 인물이었음에 틀림없으며, 어쩌면 덜 악한 인물이었을지도 모른다. 로마의 순수한 이상에서 테오도리쿠스의 초기 절충주의 문화로 옮겨가는 데 수반되는 어려움은 보에티우스가 살았던 상황이었음에 틀림없다. 이 무렵 서로마 제국의 통일성은 취약해졌고, 서기 455년 반달족 왕 겐세리크부터 서기 526년 동고트족 왕 테오도리쿠스까지 다양한 게르만 군벌들이 정치 권력을 놓고 끊임없이 논쟁을 벌였다.
테오도리쿠스는 보다 안정된 정부를 조직하고 지배적인 두 민족 집단인 로마인과 동고트족의 지도자들 사이에 더 큰 정치적 단결을 이끌어 냈습니다. 493년 테오도리쿠스는 콘스탄티노플의 플라비우스 제노 황제가 주최국인 동로마 제국의 권위를 존중하지 않은 것에 대한 처벌로 계획한 대로 오도아케르를 물리친 후 이탈리아 북부의 라벤나에 자신의 정치 및 외교 수도를 세웠다.
테오도리쿠스의 짧은 통치 기간(그는 보에티우스보다 2년 후인 526년에 사망)은 로마 제국의 행정 구조를 유지했고, 두 개의 주요 민족 및 정치 집단 간의 공동 정부를 유지했다. 테오도리쿠스는 전혀 교육을 받지 못한 사람은 아니었다(발췌 발레시아나 II, 79쪽 참조). Moreau ed. 1968) 8 세의 나이에 인질로 콘스탄티노플에 머물면서 그리스 문화에 익숙했을 것입니다. 그의 동기가 무엇이었든 간에, 그는 정기적으로 로마의 시민 제도를 존중한 것으로 알려져 있다(그러나 Anderson 1990, pp. 111-115의 견해를 보라). 보에티우스 자신은 보에티우스의 두 자녀가 집정관으로 선출되는 의식에서 테오도리쿠스에게 파네기릭을 주었다(Consolation of Philosophy ii, 3, 30).
그러나 테오도리쿠스의 군대와 로마의 정치 세력이라는 두 정치 세력의 연합은 불리할 만한 많은 이유들을 가지고 있었다. 이 무렵 보에티우스는 동고트 정부에서 가장 영향력 있는 로마 정치가였을 뿐만 아니라 로마 계급에서 가장 저명한 공인이었음에 틀림없습니다. 어쨌든 개인적, 정치적 대립은 깊고 화해할 수 없는 것이었다. 테오도리쿠스의 아리우스주의와 보에티우스의 가톨릭교는 518년 유스티누스가 동방의 로마 황제로 임명되었을 때 충돌했다. 그는 헤노티콘을 폐지하고 칼케돈 공의회의 가톨릭 신앙 회복 정책에 착수했으며, 로마에 접근하기 위한 계획을 세웠다(Matthews 1981, p. 35). 가장 어려웠던 시기는 테오도리쿠스가 비가톨릭 동방 동맹국들의 운명을 걱정하고 이탈리아에서 자신의 안정을 염려하기 시작했을 때였다. 서기 524년경, 보에티우스는 테오도리쿠스에 의해 반역죄로 기소되었는데, 로마 원로원은 역시 반역죄로 기소되었다(Valesiana II, 85-87. Mommsen ed. 1984)를 참조하십시오. 그는 곧 파비아 근처에 투옥되어 처형될 때까지 그곳에 머물렀다.
고발의 자세한 정황은 보에티우스가 그의 『철학의 위안』 i, 4에서 요약한 것이라 할지라도 후세에 완전히 명확하지 않다. 본질적으로, 그 혐의는 콘스탄티노플에서 유스티누스의 동맹을 추구함으로써 동고트 정부에 대한 반역이었다. 이 혐의에 대한 증거에는 보에티우스가 원로원 의원 알비누스(이전에 같은 혐의로 기소된 적이 있음)를 보호하는 데 관여한 원로원을 변호하려는 의도와 테오도리쿠스와 그의 정권에 불리한 표현이 포함된 유스티누스에게 보낸 편지 몇 통의 전시가 포함됩니다. 보에티우스는 이 편지들을 외경(apocryphal)이라고 부른다(Consolation of Philosophy i, 4). 아마도 알비누스는 동방 제국과 비밀 협상을 하고 있지 않았을 것이고, 보에티우스는 반역과 은폐를 저지른 원로원을 옹호하고 싶었던 것에 대해 결백했을 것이다. 그러나 그는 자신의 음모에 대해 고발되어 처벌을 받았는데, 폭력적인 전제 군주 왕의 자비로 인해 적절한 변호를 확립하거나 그에 대한 혐의를 입증하지 못했습니다. 보에티우스의 처형은 신속히 이루어졌고, 그의 장인 심마쿠스의 살인과 교황 요한 1세의 학대와 죽음이 뒤따랐다. 투옥 기간 동안 보에티우스는 그의 걸작 철학의 위안을 썼는데, 이 작품은 중세와 르네상스에 큰 영향을 미쳤을 뿐만 아니라 인간의 창의성에 대한 가장 존경받는 작품 중 하나였습니다.
3. 저서
보에티우스의 저술은 철학적, 신학적, 과학적, 세 종류로 나뉩니다. 과학 저술은 수학과 논리로 나뉩니다. 보에티우스와 그의 작품 사이의 관계는 여전히 복잡하다. 그의 완성된 작품은 전통적으로 독창적인 것으로 여겨집니다. 그의 작품 중 일부, 특히 그의 과학 논문의 무질서하고 불완전한 형태는 그의 처형과 죽음으로 설명됩니다. 그러나 20세기의 많은 학자들은 이 고전적 묘사가 보에티우스의 신학 논문에만 적용되고 부분적으로는 철학의 위안에만 적용된다고 믿는데, 이는 보에티우스가 독창적인 저작보다 그의 자료에 더 의존하기 때문이다. 그러나 이 의견은 어쨌든 과학 저술을 둘러싼 상황을 일반화한 것이며 진실은 그 중간에 더 가깝습니다.
a. 문학 작품i. 철학의 위안
보에티우스의 철학적 작업은 아리스토텔레스의 신플라톤주의적 해석에 기초한 개념적 틀 내에서 산문과 시의 구성을 통한 문체적 세련미와 철학적 아이디어를 결합한 그의 Consolatio Philosophiae와 동일시됩니다. 보에티우스는 철학의 부인이 진리의 빛을 알리는 사람일 뿐이라고 말하지만, 철학의 부인이 그의 감옥에 예기치 않게 찾아온 것은 인간의 의견과 철학의 지혜 사이의 훌륭한 대위법과의 대화를 가능하게 한다(IV, 1, 5). 『철학의 위안』이 제기한 주제들, 이를테면 행운의 본질, 인간의 행복, 신과 악의 존재, 인간의 자유와 신의 섭리 등은 라틴 중세 기독교 형이상학의 관심의 초점이 되었다.
제1권에서 보에티우스는 자신의 정치 생활과 고발과 투옥의 이유를 간략하게 회고하면서 자신을 고발한 사람들에 대해 충분히 알고 있음을 보여준다. 제2권에서 그는 행운의 본질과 아무도 그것을 믿어서는 안 되는 이유에 대해 논의한다. 제3권에서 그는 이미 우리가 플라톤과 아리스토텔레스의 철학에서 기대할 수 있는 것과는 다른 의미에서, 참된 행복(지복)은 신성 그 자체와 동일시되며, 신성의 본질은 독특하고 단순하다고 주장한다. 그는 최고선(perfectus bonum)을 만물의 아버지와 동일시하며(III, 10, 43), 먼저 최고선에 접근하지 않고는 행복을 소유할 수 없다고 주장한다. 보에티우스의 행복 이론과 아리스토텔레스와 플라톤의 행복 이론의 차이점은 보에티우스는 행복을 소유하기 위한 필수 조건으로 하나님을 배치한다는 것인데, 이는 모든 사람이 행복해지기 위해서는 신의 지혜와 신의 섭리적인 지혜를 신뢰해야 한다는 것을 암시한다. IV권에서 그는 모든 것을 알고 행할 수 있는 자의 영역에서 악의 존재에 관한 문제를 다룬다(IV, 1, 12: in regno scientis omnia potentis omnia). 하느님 나라에 대한 암시(regnum dei)는 그 암시가 암묵적인 그리스도교임을 증명하는 데 매우 중요한데, 그 이유는 이 상징이 성 바오로의 편지들(디모테오 2,20; 고린도후서 4,7; 그리고 로마서)에서 발견되기 때문에, 그 집의 주인이 처분하는 금과 진흙 그릇의 은유로 이 암시를 완성하기 때문이다 9, 21), 그리고 엄청난 교부적 인용을 가지고 있었기 때문입니다. 제5권에서 보에티우스는 아리스토텔레스 이후 철학의 가장 복잡한 문제 중 하나인 인간의 자유와 신의 예지(divina praescientia)의 양립성을 검토한다. 보에티우스의 치료법은 후기 철학에 큰 이론적 가치를 지닐 것이며, 그의 논의의 잔재는 토마스 아퀴나스, 발라, 라이프니츠에서 볼 수 있다(Correia (2002a), pp. 175-186 비교).
신플라톤주의의 영향은 Consolation, 특히 Proclus (412-485 AD)와 Iamblichus의 영향에서 식별되었습니다. 그러나 이 사실이 보에티우스가 『위안』의 저자들만을 따른다고 단언하기에는 충분하지 않다. 문제는 이 작품에 암묵적인 기독교 철학이 담겨 있느냐 하는 것이다. 더욱이, 그리스도와 기독교 저자의 이름이 없기 때문에 일부 학자들은 위안이 기독교 철학의 작품이 아니라고 믿게 되었고, 보에티우스의 기독교는 이 사실 때문에 의심을 받기도 했습니다 (Courcelle, 1967, p. 7-8 비교). 여기에 덧붙여서, 만일 보에티우스가 그리스도인이었다면, 그는 이교 철학이 아니라 기독교 신앙에서 위안을 찾았을 것이다. 그러나 로고테라피의 형태로 철학적 위로라는 장르는 그리스 철학에서 전통적이었다는 점을 고려해야 한다. 솔로스의 크란토르, 에피쿠로스, 키케로, 세네카는 생명의 상실, 유배 및 인간 정신에 영향을 미치는 그 밖의 병폐에 대해 위로하는 글을 썼습니다. 키케로는 그의 저서 《투스큘라 논쟁》(3.76)에서 서로 다른 철학 학파들이 낙심한 사람들을 위로하는 임무에 전념하고 있었음을 보여주며, 서로 다른 학파들이 우주에서 인간의 위치를 생각했을 때 적용했던 다양한 전략들을 인정한다. 보에티우스는 분명 이 전통을 알고 있었고(키케로는 자신을 위해 '위로'를 썼다), 이 가정을 당연하게 받아들인다면, 보에티우스의 『철학의 위안』은 보편적인 인간의 슬픔(악, 운명, 행운, 불행)이라는 주제와 함께 보편적인 장르로서의 위안이라는 장르에 속할 것이다. 동시에 보에티우스는 이 문학 장르를 기독교 문학 장르로 개조할 것인데, 『여신철학』은 이교 철학 일반에 대한 보에티우스의 정신을 전달하는 것이 아니라 기독교적이라고 불려야 할 새로운 철학을 전달하기 때문이다. 우리는 성 바오로의 편지와 새로운 행복론을 떠올리게 할 때뿐만 아니라, 제5권에서 보에티우스가 하느님을 무에서 창조할 수 있는 효율적 원리(de operante principio)로 동일시할 때에도 이것을 볼 수 있습니다(V, 1, 24-29). 따라서 그는 아리스토텔레스의 우연에 대한 정의를 적용하여 시간과 장소에서 만물을 처분하는 신의 섭리(섭리)의 역할을 통합한다(locis temporibusque disponit: V, 1, 53-58).
b. 신학 논문
Opuscula sacra 또는 신학 논문은 기독론적 문제와 아카시아 분열 (485-519)에 흡수 된 당시의 일부 신학적 논쟁을 해결하기위한 독창적 인 노력입니다. 기본적으로, 그들은 아리스토텔레스의 개념과 추론의 세련된 집합이 하나님의 단일성에 대한 칼케도니아 공식에 찬성하고 Nestorious의 dyophysitism과 Eutyches의 monophysitism에 반대합니다. 보에티우스는 아리스토텔레스의 논리학을 사용하여 이러한 문제들에 대한 설명을 찾고 있다고 주장한다. 이것은 그를 논리학에서 신학적 사색을 신뢰하는 신학자들의 선구자로 만든다. (1) 삼위일체론(De Trinitate), (2) 성부와 성자와 성령이 실질적으로 신성(神性)에 입각한 경우, (3) 물질이 실질적으로 선하지 않으면서 어떻게 그 존재 때문에 선한가, (4) 에우티케스와 네스토리우스에 대한 논문, (5) 가톨릭 신앙론(De Fide Catholica)의 다섯 가지 논문이 원본으로 인정되고 있다. 보에티우스의 신학 논문 중 가장 독창적이고 영향력 있는 논문은 Contra Eutychen이다.
『철학의 위안』에 명백한 기독교 교리가 없기 때문에, 근대 초기의 일부 학자들은 신학 논문의 신빙성을 의심했다. 그러나 알프레드 홀더 (Alfred Holder)는 나중에 H. Usener (1877)에 의해 출판 된 Reichenau의 원고에서 카시오도루스 (Cassiodorus)의 단편을 발견했으며,이 논문의 존재와 보에티우스에 대한 귀속이보고되었습니다. 카시오도루스는 보에티우스와 함께 원로원 의원을 지냈고, 그의 뒤를 이어 테오도리쿠스 정부에서 집정관직을 맡았다. 카시오도루스는 보에티우스가 "삼위일체에 관한 책, 교의적 가르침의 몇 장, 그리고 네스토리우스에 반대하는 책"을 썼다고 언급한다(비교 Anecdoton Holderi, p. 4, 12-19. Usener ed. 1877)을 참조하십시오. 이 발견은 보에티우스의 신학 논문의 신빙성을 확인시켜주었을 뿐만 아니라 보에티우스가 기독교인인지 아닌지에 대한 의심을 해소했습니다. 에우티케스와 네스토리우스에 대한 논문은 보에티우스의 신학 논문들 중 가장 독창적인 것으로 인정되어 왔다 (Mair, 1981, p. 208). 518년까지 보에티우스는 아리스토텔레스의 『오르가논』의 상당 부분을 번역하고, 주석하고, 다루었다(De Rijk의 연대기, 1964년 비교). 따라서 보에티우스는 아리스토텔레스의 논리학을 도구로 사용한다. Contra Eutychen에서 그는 문제의 주제와 관련된 모든 자원을 사용합니다 : 분할과 정의, 가상의 삼단 논법, 용어의 모호한 의미 구별, 관련된 오류의 탐지 및 해결. 이것은 인간의 지능이 특정 논제에 반대하거나 찬성하는 논증을 저장할 수 있다는 생각과 함께 코피아 논증(논증의 사본; p. 100, 126-130)을 소유할 수 있으며, 이는 논의 중인 동일한 요점을 입증하기 위한 여러 논증이 있을 수 있음을 시사하며, 이는 아리스토텔레스의 주제를 연상시키는 문제입니다. 따라서 보에티우스는 논문의 중심 논의의 시작 부분에서 엄격하게 선언 된 완벽한 설명 순서를 제공합니다 : 1) 자연과 인격을 정의하고이 두 개념을 특정 차이로 구별하십시오. 2) 네스토리우스(Nestorius)와 유티케스(Eutyches)의 입장의 극단적인 오류를 안다. 3) 가톨릭 신앙 해결의 중도(中道)를 알아야 한다. 보에티우스의 해결책은 그리스도의 두 본성에 대한 신학적 문제에 대한 가톨릭의 해결책이다. 그의 견해에 따르면, 그리스도는 한 인격과 두 본성, 즉 신성과 인성으로 혼동되지 않고 완전하고 연합되어 있다. 따라서 인간은 인류와 동일체이며, 하나님과도 동일체이다.
c. Scientific Treatises
Within the scientific writings, we find mathematical and logical works. Boethius gives us scientific writings on arithmetic, geometry, and music; no work on astronomy has survived, but Cassiodorus (Variae I. 45, 4) attributed to him one on Ptolemy. Similarly, Cassiodorus attributes another on geometry with a translation of Euclid’s Elementa, but what we count as Boethius’ writing on geometry does not correspond to Cassiodorus’ description. His logical works are on demonstrative and inventive logic. A treatise on division (De divisione) has also credited to him (compare Magee 1998). But one on definition (De definitione) has been refuted as original and attributed to Marius Victorinus (Usener, 1877). Boethius devotes to logic three types of writings: translations, commentaries, and treatises.
Boethius uses the term quadrivium (De Institutione Arithmetica I, 1, 28) to refer to arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, which reveals that he might be engaged not only in the development of these sciences, but also in the didactic of them. However, his works on logic do not reveal that this plan might also have covered the other disciplines of the trivium, grammar and rhetoric.
The scientific writings of Boethius occupied an important place in the education of Latin Christendom. The influence that these treatises had in the medieval quadrivium and even into early modern tradition is such that only Newton’s physics, Descartes’ analytical geometry, and Newton’s and Leibniz’s infinitesimal calculus were able to prevail in the Boethian scientific tradition.
It is known that the way Boethius approaches arithmetic and music is speculative and mathematical. Arithmetic is known as the science of numbers and does not necessarily include calculation. And music is a theoretical doctrine of proportion and harmony and has nothing directly to do with making music or musical performance techniques. In De Institutione musica I, 2, 20-23, Boethius makes a distinction of three types of music: cosmic (mundana), human (humana) and instrumental. He distinguishes them according to their universality. The mundana is the most universal, since it corresponds to celestial harmony and the order of stars: some stars rotate lower, others higher, but all form a set with each other. It is followed by human music, which is what we, as humans, experience and reproduce directly within ourselves. It is the song, the melodies that are created by poetry. It is responsible for our own harmony, especially the harmonious conjunction between the sensitive part and the intellectual part of our nature, just as the bass and treble voices articulate in musical consonance. The third is instrumental music, generated by tension of a string or by the breath of air or by percussion.
At the beginning of his De Institutione Musica (I, 10, 3-6), when following Nichomachus of Gerasa, Boethius adopts without criticism not only Pythagoras’ theory of music, but also the supernatural context in which Pythagoras announces the origin of music through a divine revelation given by the symmetric and proportional sounds coming from a blacksmith. The marked tendency of the Pythagorean theory of music impedes Boethius from making a richer report of music by including the more empirical approach by Aristoxenus, who is criticized by Boethius just as the Stoics are in logic.
d. Logical Writings
Boethius has three kinds of works on logic: translations, commentaries, and treatises. Their content revolves mainly around Aristotle’s logical writings: Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistical Refutations, traditionally called the Organon. But even if Boethius wanted to devote works on each one, he did not complete the task.
i. Translations
As a translator, Boethius has a consummate artistry. His translations are literal and systematic. They do not lack the force of the Greek, and they never spoil the style of Latin. Its literal translation method has been compared to that developed later by William of Moerbeke (who translated some works of Aristotle and other Greek commentators) for their use and study of Thomas Aquinas. Boethius’ translations from Greek are so systematic that scholars often can determine what the Greek term behind the Latin word is. Boethius’ translations are edited in Aristoteles Latinus (1961-1975). Translations on every work by Aristotle’s Organon have been found. In addition to these works, Boethius translated the Isagoge of Porphyry, which is an introduction (Eisagogé is the Greek term for ‘introduction’) to Aristotle’s Categories.
In these translations, Boethius exceeded the art of Marius Victorinus, who had earlier translated into Latin Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isagoge. Boethius himself attributed certain errors and confusions in Marius Victorinus and informs us that Vetius Praetextatus’ translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, rather than being a translation of Aristotle’s text, is a paraphrase of the paraphrase made by Themistius on this Aristotelian work (compare Boethius in Int 2, p. 3; Meiser ed. 1877-1880). The translation of Greek works into Latin was common. Apuleius of Madaura, a Latin writer of 2 AD., born and settled in North Africa, had translated the arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa and wrote an abridgement of Aristotelian logic. In general, we can say that Boethius saw very clearly the importance of systematic translations into Latin of Greek philosophy and science as an educational service to the nascent European Latin Christianity.
ii. Commentaries
Even if Boethius planned to comment on the complete Organon, he finished only the following:
Though no commentary on Posterior Analytics, Topics or Sophistical Refutations exist, this does not suggest that Boethius was unaware of them. In his Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos (p. 48, 2), when Boethius deals with singular propositions, he seems to follow some explanations closely related to a commentary on Sophistical Refutations. Even if his plan of performing a double commentary on every work is not original, he explained this modus operandi. The first edition contains everything which is simple to understand, and the second edition focuses on everything which is more subtle and requires deeper, longer explanation.
The influence of these commentaries on medieval education was enormous, as they contain key concepts that became central to both the logica vetus and medieval philosophy. In fact, his comments on Porphyry’s Isagoge contain the so-called problem of universals (Brandt 1906 ed.p. 24, 159), and his comments on De Intepretatione give the linguistic and semantic basis of the long tradition of logical analysis of medieval thinkers until Peter Abelard. Additionally, his comments on Cicero’s Topics were influential in the history of logic and sciences by dividing logic into the demonstrative and the dialectic branches, underlining the distinction between Aristotle’s Analytics and Topics.
Many times, Boethius’ commentaries are given through long explanations, but they contain valuable information on the history of logic as they build upon many doctrines on earlier commentators of Aristotle. The commentary on Aristotle’s logic had a long Greek tradition, and Boethius knew to select those commentators and doctrines that improve Aristotle’s text. In that tradition, the earlier author played an important role over the latter. However, there is important evidence that Boethius is not following any continuous copy of any of the earlier Greek commentators.
iii. Treatises
Boethius not only translated and commented on the works of Aristotle and Porphyry, but he wrote some monographs or logical treatises that are different from his commentaries, for they are not intended to provide the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s text, but to improve the theory itself. If we leave aside the De definitione, five treatises are recognized:
1. On the Division
Boethius’ De divisione transmitted the Aristotelian doctrine of division, that is, the doctrine that divides a genus into subordinate species. The aim of division is to define (compare Magee 1998). For example:
In Aristotle’s works there are examples of divisions (for example, Politics 1290b21, De generatione et corruptione 330a1), which proves that Boethius accepted this definition method regardless of the fact that its origin was Platonic. The logical procedure was also appreciated by the first Peripatetics, and the proof is that, as Boethius reports at the beginning of this treatise, Andronicus of Rhodes published a book on the division, because of its considerable interest to Peripatetic philosophy (De divisione 875D; compare also Magee 1998, pp. xxxiv-xliii). Also, the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus studied Andronicus’ book and Porphyry adapted its contents for commenting on Plato’s Sophist (De divisione 876D). The species of division that were recounted by Boethius are that any division is either secundum se or secundum accidens. The first has three branches: (i) a genus into species (for example, animal is divided into rational and non-rational); (ii) the whole into its parts (for example, the parts of a house); and (iii) a term into its own meanings (for example, ‘dog’ means quadruped capable of barking, a star in Orion and an aquatic animal). The division secundum accidens is also triple: (i) a subject into its accidents (for example, a man into black, white and an intermediate color); (ii) accidents into a subject (for example, among the things that are seeking, some belong to the soul and some belong to body); finally, (iii) the accidents into accidents (for example, among white things some are liquid some are solid).
It is worth noting that not all the genus-species divisions are dichotomous, as it was with Platonists, because Peripatetic philosophers also accepted that a genus can be divided into three species or more, since the general condition of a division to be correct is that it must never have less than two species and never infinite species (De divisione 877C-D). As it seems, this is one of the differences between Aristotle and the Platonists. In fact, Aristotle criticizes the Platonists’ dependence on dichotomous divisions by arguing that if all divisions were dichotomous, then the number of animal species would be odd or a multiple of two (Aristotle, Parts of Animals I, 3, 643a16-24).
2. On the Topics
Boethius’ idea of logic is complex and in no way reduces only to formal demonstration. When he refers to logic as such (compare In Isagogen 138,4-143,7; De Top Diff 1173C.; and In Ciceronis topica I 2.6-8), he distinguishes between demonstrative and dialectical syllogism and criticizes the Stoics for leaving out the dialectical part of logic and maintaining a narrower idea of it. In fact, Boethius does not reduce logic to demonstration, but he divides logic into two parts: judgement and the discovery of arguments. Since he identifies the former to Analytics and the later to Topics, the division applies to reconcile these two main procedures of logic. Logic is both a demonstration and a justification of reasonable premises, as the syllogism can manage necessary or possible matters.
In Ciceronis Topica Boethius is commenting on Cicero’s Topics. The objective of this work is to adopt Ciceronian forensic cases and explain them within his understanding of Peripatetic tradition of Aristotle’s Topics. Boethius’ notion of topic is based on what seems to be the Theophrastean notion, which is a universal proposition, primitive and indemonstrable, and in and of itself known (Stump, 1988, pp. 210-211). A topic is true if demonstrated through human experience, and its function is to serve as a premise within the argument sought. The topic may be within or outside argumentation. One example in the treatise (1185C) appears to be autobiographic: the question of whether to be ruled by a king is better than by a consul. According to Boethius, one should argue thus: the rule of a king lasts longer than the government maintained by a consul. If we assume that both governments are good, it must be said that a good that lasts longer is better than one that takes less time. Consequently, to be ruled by a king is better than being governed by a consul. This argument clearly shows the topic or precept: goods that last longer are more valuable than those that last a shorter time. Within the argument it works as an indemonstrable proposition. Boethius often calls them a maximal proposition (propositio maxima).
Boethius called dialectic the discipline studying this type of argumentation. The syllogism can be categorical or hypothetical, but it will be dialectic if the matter in its premises is only credible and non-demonstrative. In De Top Diff 1180C, Boethius introduces a general classification of arguments in which demonstrative arguments can be non-evident to human opinion and nevertheless demonstratively true. In fact, our science has innumerable non-evident affirmations that are entirely demonstrable. On the other hand, dialectical arguments are evident to human opinion, but they could lack demonstration.
Boethius devotes the entire Book 5 of this commentary to discussing dialectical hypothetical syllogisms and here, as in his treatise on hypothetical syllogisms, the role of belief (fides) is quite important in defining dialectical arguments in general, as it will be more explained in the following section.
3. On the Hypothetical Syllogisms
The De hypothetico syllogismo (DHS), perhaps originally titled by Boethius De hypotheticis syllogismis, as Brandt (1903, p. 38) has suggested, was published in Venice in 1492 (1st ed.) and 1499 (2nd ed.). This double edition was the basis for the editions of Basel (1546 and 1570) and the subsequent publication of J.P. Migne in Patrologia Latina, vols. 63 and 64 (1st ed., 1847) and (2nd ed. 1860), which appears to be a reprint of the Basel edition. The editions of 1492 and 1499 form the editio princeps, which has been used regularly for the study of this work to the critical revision of the text by Obertello (1969). DHS is the most original and complete treatise of all those written in the antiquity on hypothetical logic that have survived. It was not systematically studied during medieval times, but it had a renaissance in the twentieth century, through the works of Dürr (1951), Maroth (1979), Obertello (1969), and others.
According to the conjecture of Brandt (1903, p. 38), it was written by Boethius between 523 and 510, but De Rijk (1964, p. 159) maintains that it was written between 516 and 522. In DHS Boethius does not follow any Aristotle’s text but rather Peripatetic doctrines. This is because Aristotle wrote nothing about hypothetical syllogisms, although he was aware of the difference between categorical and hypothetical propositions. Thus, De Interpretatione 17a15-16 defines that “A single-statement-making sentence is either one that reveals a single thing or one that is single in virtue of a connective” (Ackrill’s translation, 1963), and later (17a20-22) he adds, “Of these the one is a simple statement, affirming or denying something of something, the other is compounded of simple statements and is a kind of composite sentence” (Ackrill’s translation, 1963). Even if Aristotle promised to explain how categorical and hypothetical syllogisms are related to each other (compare Prior Analytics 45b19-20 and 50a39-b1), he never did.
Aristotle only developed a syllogistic logic with simple or categorical propositions, that is, propositions saying something of something (e.g., “Virtue is good”). The syllogism with conditional premises (for example, “The man is happy, if he is wise”) was covered by the first associates of Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus (DHS I, 1,3). Boethius’ DHS contains the most complete information about this Peripatetic development. The theory is divided into two parts: disjunctive and connective propositions. A conditional connection is like “If P, then Q”, where P and Q are simple propositions. A disjunctive proposition is instanced as “Either P or Q”. Boethius presents two indemonstrable syllogisms to each part. The first disjunctive syllogism: ‘It is P or it is Q. But, it is not P. Therefore, it is Q.’ And the second: ‘It is P or it is Q. But, it is not Q. Therefore, it is P.’ As to connectives, the first syllogism is “If it is P, then it is Q. But it is P. Then, it is Q”. And the second is “If it is P, then it is Q. But it is not Q. Then, it is not P”. Boethius accepts that ‘It is P or it is Q’ is equivalent to ‘If it is not P, then it is Q. Accordingly, Boethius leaves implicit the concordance between hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms:
First disjunctive syll. | First hypothetical syll. | Second disjunctive syll. | Second hypothetical syll. | |
It is P or it is Q It is not P Therefore, it is Q. | If it is not P, it is Q It is not P Therefore, it is Q. | It is P or it is Q It is not Q Therefore, it is P. | It is not P, it is Q It is not Q Therefore, it is P. |
The theory also develops more complex syllogisms and classifies them in modes. For example, DHS II, 11, 7, says correctly that: “The eighth mode is what forms this proposition: “If it is not a, it is not b; and if it is not b, it is not c; but it is c; therefore, it must be a”.
Boethius’ development does not use conjunctions, and this must be an important difference between the Stoic theory and the Peripatetic original development. This fact makes Boethius deny the hypothetical affirmation “If it is P, then it is Q” by attaching the negative particle to the consequent. Thus ‘If it is P, then it is not Q’ (DHS I, 9,7). This is an internal negation, instead of Stoic negation, which is external or propositional, since applies the negative particle to the entire proposition. This explains why he does not consider Stoic axioms based on conjunction in DHS, which he did in his In Ciceronis Topica, V.
The question of whether Boethius is right in believing that the theory comes from Theophrastus and other Peripatetics is still difficult to answer. Speca (2001, p. 71) raises the doubt that we cannot presently be certain of its Peripatetic provenance, because the sources cannot go further back than the end of II century AD, and by then the hypothetical theory was already terminologically conflated with Stoic terminology. He is right, if we look at Boethius’ examples like ‘It is day, then it is light’, and so forth, which are from the Stoic school. On the other hand, Bobzien (2002 and 2002a) has supported the contrary view, and she is inclined to belief in the historical view of Boethius’ account.
The scrupulous view of Speca (2001) is methodologically safe, but it is worth noticing that there are at least three important differences between Boethius’ hypothetical syllogistic logic and Stoic logic. One is negation: Peripatetic hypothetical negation follows the argumentative line of categorical negation; the negative particle must be posed before the most important part of the proposition, and that is the consequent in the case of a conditional proposition. Thus, as said, the negation of “If P, then Q” will be “If P, then not Q”. Stoic negation poses the negative particle before the entire proposition. And thus, the negation will be “It is not the case that if P, then Q”.
The second difference is that Boethius, in his DHS, distinguishes material and formal conclusions just as he does in his treatises on categorical logic (compare DHS I, iv, 1-2; 3; and I, ii, 1-7; II, ii, 7). In a hypothetical syllogism, to affirm the consequent is fallacious, but if the terms mutually exclude (as if they had an impossible matter) and the third hypothetical mood is given (“If it is not P, it is Q”), there will be a syllogism. Boethius gives the example “If it is not day, it is night. It is night. Therefore, it is not day”. But the conclusion does not obtain if ‘white’ and ‘black’ are correspondingly proposed by P and Q. Thus, a syllogism, either categorical or hypothetical, is logically valid if it does not depend on a specific matter of proposition to be conclusive. On the contrary, material syllogisms, either categorical or hypothetical, are valid under certain matters within a certain form, as they are not logical conclusions, for they are not valid universally or in every propositional matter. Accordingly, Boethius (DHS II, iv, 2) distinguishes between the nature of the relation (natura complexionis) and the nature of the terms (natura terminorum).
The third difference lies in the function Boethius puts on fides, belief (DHS I, 2,4; I, 2,5; II, 1,2). The role of fides is the crucial core of Boethius’ DHS. According to him, if someone argues through the first indemonstrable, or by any other hypothetical syllogism, he needs to confirm the minor premise, which is a belief. It is not the syllogism as such which is in doubt, but its conclusion, which is conditioned to the truth of the categorical proposition. Boethius’ reason is the originality and primitiveness of categorical syllogisms. He calls categorical syllogisms ‘simple’ and hypothetical syllogisms ‘non-simple’, because the latter resolves into the former (DHS I, 2,4. Non simplices vero dicuntur quoniam ex simplicibus constant, atque in eosdem ultimos resolvuntur). The role of belief in Boethius’ theory of hypothetical syllogisms is also emphasized in his ICT and, if Stump (1988, pp. 210-1) is right, in recognizing the activity of Theophrastus behind Boethius’ theory of Aristotle’s Topics, then Theophrastus and the activity of the first Peripatetics could be well behind DHS.
iv. Treatises on Categorical Syllogisms
The De syllogismo categorico (DSC) and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos (ISC) are two treatises on categorical syllogisms composed by the young Boethius. Their contents are similar and almost parallel, which have raised various explanations during the early twenty-first century. They have greatly influenced the teaching of logic in medieval Western thought, especially the former which is the only one that contains syllogistic logic.
1. The De Syllogismo Categorico
DSC was written by Boethius early in his life, perhaps around 505 or 506 AD (for the chronology of Boethius works in logic, compare De Rijk 1964). Despite its importance, it did not received a critical edition until the work by Thörnqvist Thomsen (2008a). In the oldest codices (for example, Orleans 267, p. 57), DSC is entitled “Introductio in syllogi cathegoricos”, but this title changed to De syllogismo categorico after the editions by Martianus Rota (Venice, 1543) and Henrichus Loritus Glareanus (Basel, 1546). The edition of Migne (1891) is based on these two editions of the sixteenth century. During the twentieth century, most scholars have corrected this title to De categoricis syllogismis, after Brandt (1903, p. 238, n. 4), argued for using the plural.
The sources of DSC seem to be a certain introduction to categorical syllogistic logic that Porphyry had written to examine and approve the syllogistic theory of Theophrastus, whose principles are inspired by Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. This seems to be suggested from what Boethius says at the end of this work (p. 101, 6-8): “When composing this on the introduction to the categorical syllogism as fully as the brevity of an introductory work would allow, I have followed Aristotle as my principal source and borrowed from Theophrastus and Porphyry occasionally” (Thomsen Thörnqvist transl.). The existence of a similar work by Theophrastus is confirmed by various ancient references; for example, Boethius attributes to him the work “On the affirmation and negation” (in Int 2, 9, 25; Meiser ed.; also Alexander of Aphrodisias in An Pr 367, 15 and so forth), and Alexander of Aphrodisias cites profusely Theophrastus’ own Prior Analytics (in An Pr 123, 19 and 388, 18; Wallies ed. On the works by Theophrastus, see Bochenski 1947 and Sharples 1992, p. 114-123). Moreover, J. Bidez, in the life and works of Porphyry (compare Bidez 1923, p. 198, and Bidez 1964, p. 66*) confirms the existence of a written work entitled “Introduction to categorical syllogisms” written by Porphyry.
DSC is divided into two books. In the first, Boethius reviews the theory of simple propositions, in a way that recalls his commentaries on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (ed. Meiser 1877-1880). However, DSC exceeds both the commentaries and what Aristotle teaches in his De Interpretatione. In fact, it includes some extra matters: (i) the law of subalternation when reviewing the logical relationships of the Square of oppositions; (ii) a broader explanation on conversion by containing conversion in contraposition (which Aristotle only developed for universal affirmative propositions); (iii) conversion by accident for universal negative propositions (which Aristotle did not include); and (iv) the division of simple propositions.
The second book is a synopsis of the central part of Aristotle’s theory of syllogism (Prior Analytics I, 2-8) plus Theophrastus’ doctrine of indirect syllogistic moods. Theophrastus added five indirect moods to Aristotle’s four moods. Medieval logicians knew these moods through the technical names: Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, and Frisesomorum. Moreover, the second book of DSC (69, 8-72, 11) contains a complete explanation of the definition of syllogism, which recalls Alexander of Aphrodisias’ teaching in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics. Again, DSC is more technical and elaborated than Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. In addition, Boethius’ explanation on reducing the imperfect moods of the second and third syllogistic figures to the first four modes of the first figure (Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio) suggests a more systematic way than Aristotle’s own explanations.
A careful reading of the logical contents of DSC also makes clear that Boethius (DSC 17, 10) is following a division of categorical propositions to define the three main logical operations of Aristotelian logic: the opposition of propositions (contradiction, contrariety, and subcontrariety); the conversion of propositions (simple, by accident, and by contraposition); and syllogisms, with its figures, syllogistic moods, and the main extensions of first figure. This division is not Boethius’. Already Alexander of Aphrodisias (In An Pr 45,9) gives a complete use of it. There are remnants in Apuleius (PeriH 7, 9-14, p. 183) and Galen (Inst Log, 6,3), and it reappears in Boethius’ time in Ammonius (In An Pr 35.26) and Philoponus (In An Pr 40.31). It is also present in later authors.
Boethius, after commenting on the definitions of the elements of simple propositions (name, verb, indefinite name and verb, and phrase) takes a pair of propositions and divides them into categorical propositions as follows: a pair of simple propositions can or cannot have terms in common. If they do not have any term in common, then they do not have any logical relation. But if they have some terms in common, there is an alternative: either both terms are in common or some term in common. If both terms are in common, they can or cannot have the same order. When they have same order, the theory of Opposition is stated. If both terms change their order, the theory of Conversion is defined. On the other hand, if the pair has only one term in common, the syllogistic theory will appear.
2. The Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos
Boethius is the author of DSC and ISC, two treatises on categorical logic. They have a notorious similarity, and they look parallel to some extent. This opens the question of why Boethius wrote two. The first modern explanation proposed a strong dependence between them. Prantl (1855, I, p. 682, n.80) believed that the first book of DSC was an excerpt of ISC. But the presence of syllogistic logic in the second book of DSC and its total absence in ISC is enough to contradict Prantl’s explanation. Brandt (1903, p. 245) was right in refuting him. However, the reason why the treatises are so alike each other had not been found at all. Murari (1905) and McKinlay (1907) have suggested that the second book of DSC (dedicated to syllogistic logic) was originally the second book of ISC, while the first book of DSC was not by Boethius, but it was attached later to the codices in the middle age. According to McKinlay’s later revision of his hypothesis (1938, p. 218), ISC must be identified to Boethius’s Institutio categorica, thought to be lost, and mentioned by Boethius in his treatise On Hypothetical Syllogism (833B).
McKinlay’s hypothesis has lost support due to later works by De Rijk (1964, p. 39) and Magee (1998, p. xvii-xix). In the early twenty-first century, in her critical edition of both treatises, Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (2008a and 2008b) has given a new explanation. She thinks (2008a, p. xxxix) that ISC is a review of the first book of DSC and that Boethius was intending to give a review of DSC’s two books, but this original plan was not completed (compare Thomsen Thörnqvist), for while Boethius was writing the first book, he realized that he had gone too far in what was supposed to be nothing more than an introduction to Aristotle’s syllogistic logic. In this conjecture she follows Marenbon (2003, p. 49).
In any case, ISC is different from DSC not only because of its absence of syllogistic logic. ISC (15.2) incorporates the notion of strict and non-strict definitions of the elements of the categorical proposition (name, verb, and so on). It incorporates with high interest proofs based on the matters of proposition (29.18). And it has a high consideration of singular propositions by including material that was not in his commentaries (48.2). Additionally, ISC contains a crucial difference: the logic of indefinite propositions. It states their opposition (51.9), their equivalence (62.9), and it develops with more detail conversion by contraposition (69.1).
The divisions of DSC and ISC
ISC cannot be the breviarium Boethius promised to write in his second commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (in Int 2, p. 251, 8-9). However, Shiel (1958, p. 238) thinks the contrary. The only reason is that ISC contains more than Boethius’ commentaries on De Interpretatione. The essence of ISC must come from its division.
After developing the linguistic section of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, both ISC and DSC present their plans through the establishment of a division of a pair of categorical propositions. These divisions contain identical branches, but they also contain important differences. On the one hand, the division of ISC is not as complete as that of DSC, because it does not incorporate the theory of syllogism, but it is more specific than that of DSC by incorporating indefinite terms, on which DSC says nothing. The following description shows how both divisions overlap one another, and what the differences between them are:
On the one hand, if ISC were the first book of DSC, then the indefinite propositions (which only ISC develops) would not take any part of the second book of DSC (which is only on syllogisms). Accordingly, their introduction would be purposeless. On the other hand, if the plan of ISC were a review of DSC’s two books, then Boethius was obliged to develop a theory of syllogisms with indefinite premises, which is unlikely since ISC’s division does not contain syllogistic logic (despite ISC’s being an introduction to syllogistic). But even if one thinks that this could have been so, there are several doubts concerning the logical capacity to do so in Boethius’ sources, even though the issue was not unknown. Boethius indeed recounts (in Int 2, 12-26, p. 316) that Plato and others made conclusive syllogisms with negative premises, which is not allowed by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics (I, 4.41b7-9). According to Boethius, it is possible because Plato in Theaetetus (186e3-4) knew that sometimes a negative categorical proposition can be replaced with the correspondent affirmation with indefinite predicate terms. Boethius (in Int 2, 9, p. 317) cites Alexander of Aphrodisias as one the ancient authors in dealing with syllogisms with indefinite premise, which is certain because Alexander, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, quotes another syllogism of this sort (in An Pr 397, 5-14). Even Aristotle’s De caelo (269b29-31) has another example. However, this does not seem sufficient to believe that Boethius in his ISC was able to introduce a theory of syllogistic logic with indefinite premises. (To this point, compare I. M. Bochenski (1948), pp. 35-37; and Thomas (1949), pp. 145-160; also, Álvarez & Correia (2012), pp. 297-306. Compare also Correia (2001), pp. 161-174.).
4. Influence of the Treatises
DSC and ISC were taken together and never considered separate. There are no signs that both treatises were studied by the medieval logicians and philosophers before the eleventh century (compare Van de Vyver, 1929, pp. 425-452).
The first text where the influence of their teaching is clear is the twelve century Anonymus Abbreviatio Montana. The other is the Dialectic by Peter Abelard. We know this not only because the name of Boethius is cited as the main source, but also because the division of propositions we have seen above is accepted and maintained by Abelard and the anonymous author of the Abbreviatio.
Later on, the authority of these treatises is more evident. In the fourteenth century, Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales adopted the indirect moods of the first figure—the doctrine of the matters of proposition (which can be traced in the history of logic as far back as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Apuleius)—and he follows Boethius in the idea that is originally found in Aristotle of reducing the imperfect moods of the second and third syllogistic figures to the first four perfect moods of the first figure.
5. His Sources
The Contra Eutychen is the most original work by Boethius. It is original in its speculative solution and its methodology of using hypothetical and categorical logic in his analysis of terms, propositions, and arguments. The Consolation of Philosophy is also original, though many authors restrict it to his methodology and the way to dispose of the elements, but not the content, which would represent the Neoplatonic school of Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus. As to his inspiring figures, Boethius gives his most respectful words to Plato and Aristotle, but the figure of Pythagoras is also venerated in De Institutione musica (DIM I, 10-20).
As to his scientific writings, his mathematical and logical works are not original, and Boethius recognizes it. When dealing with these scientific matters, Boethius relies on specific Greek sources: in mathematical disciplines, he follows the middle-Platonist Nicomachus of Gerasa (compare Bower, C., 1978, p. 5). However, not everything comes from him (Barbera, A. 1991. pp. 1-3 and 48-49). In his De Institutione musica (IV, 1-2), he follows with some changes (Barbera, ibid., pp. 38-60) to the Sectio Canonis, attributed to Euclides; and, in developing books V, and part of IV, he uses C. Ptolemy’s Harmonicas (compare DIM V, 4, 25; V, 5, 5; V, 8, 13; V, 11, 1; V, 14, 21, V, 18, 24 et al.; also, Redondo Reyes, 2002, p. cxv).
As to Aristotelian logic, he recognizes agreement with the certainty of the Peripatetic doctrines reviewed by the Neoplatonist Porphyry (compare Boethius in Int 2, 24-27, p. 17. Meiser ed., 1877-1880), but it is also true that not everything comes from him, for Boethius also names Syrianus, Proclus’s master.
As to the sources of his logical works, though far from being resolved, there is a basic agreement with refusing the hypothesis proposed by Pierre Courcelle (1969, p. 28) that they are dependent on the work of Ammonius Hermias in Alexandria. This same rebuttal attacks the widespread belief (from Courcelle too) that Boethius studied Greek in Alexandria. Indeed, Courcelle followed Bidez (1923, pp. 189-201), who some years before had shown that Boethius’ logical commentaries (not the treatises) owed almost everything to Porphyry. But Courcelle (1969) made a valuable observation about this: Boethius also refers to Syrianus, the teacher of Proclus, who taught later than Porphyry. Accordingly, Courcelle proposed that the occurrence of post-Porphyrian authors was due to Boethius’ reliance on the school of Ammonius in Alexandria, as Boethius’ logical works were written between 500 and 524, and by this time the school of Athens had fallen into decline after the death of Proclus in 485. On the other hand, Alexandria, where Ammonius taught from this date, had flourished as the center of philological, philosophical, and medical studies. Courcelle showed several parallels in the texts, but these, as he also saw, implied only a common source. However, he proposed that, in a passage of the second commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (in Int 2, 9, p. 361), the corrupt phrase sicut audivimus docet should be amended as follows: sicut Ammonius docet. Courcelle knew that the absence of the name of Ammonius in Boethius’ writings was the main objection of his hypothesis, but this emendation made it very convincing. He refused, therefore, the emendation that Meiser had done earlier in 1880, in the critical edition of Boethius’s commentaries on De Interpretatione (compare Praefatio, iv). Indeed, before Courcelle, Meiser had proposed emending Eudemus to read: sicut Eudemus docet. Subsequent studies showed that the emendation of Meiser was correct because the doctrine in question was given by Eudemus.
The focus of Courcelle, however, was to place the problem of the sources of Boethius’s logical writings into the correct focus. That is why Shiel (1958, pp. 217-244) offered a new explanation to this status quaestionis: he proposed that Boethius managed all his material, either pre- or post-Porphyrian, from a Greek codex of Aristotle’s Organon, having glosses and marginal notes from which he translated all the comments and explanations. This singular hypothesis has seduced many scholars and has even been generalized as Boethius’ general modus operandi. Shiel’s hypothesis is plausible in some respects when applied to the works on logic, but it seems to have many problems when applied to other kinds of writing. Many scholars have accepted the existence of this manuscript in Boethius’s hands by his verbatim allusions (for example, in Int 2 20-3 p. 250), although not all have accepted Shiel’s conclusions, which remove all originality to Boethius, when presenting him only as a mechanical translator of these Greek glosses. And even though Shiel always referred to Boethius’ works on logic, it is easy to generalize the servile attitude in his scientific material to his other works, but the poems or the philosophical synthesis of the Consolation or the logical analysis of Contra Eutychen have no parallel in earlier sources and are by themselves evidence of a lucid thinker.
According to Shiel (1990), Boethius’s logic comes from a copy of the commentary of Porphyry that was used in the school of Proclus in Athens. This copy was a codex containing Aristotle’s Organon with margins strongly annotated with comments and explanations. Magee has shown the difficulty to accepting the existence of this kind of codex before the ninth century AD (Magee, 1998, Introduction). On the other hand, some scholars find that Shiel’s hypothesis does not accurately apply to all the logical writings of Boethius, as Stump (1974, p. 73-93) has argued in his defense of the comments on the Topics. Moreover, the absence of Proclus’s name in Boethius’ works on logic, even when Proclus made important contribution to logic as in the case of the Canon of Proclus (compare Correia, 2002, pp. 71-84), raises new doubts about the accuracy of the formula given by Shiel.
6. References and Further Reading
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