러시아가 우크라인에게 원 햇던것은...

[다른소리]

COMMUNIQUE

following consultations on March 28-30, 2022 Main Provisions ofthe Treaty on Ukraine's Security Guarantees The agreement assumes:

1. The declaration of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state under international legal guarantees in order to implement a non-aligned and nuclear-free status.

2. Possible guarantor states: Great Britain, China, Russia, the United States, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland , Israel. The free accession of other states to the treaty is proposed , in particular the Russian Federation proposes Belarus.

3. International security guarantees for Ukraine under the agreement do not apply to Crimea, Sevastopol and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. (The agreement will include an interpretation of how we understand the borders of the certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and how the Russian Federation understands them separately).

4. Ukraine does not join any military alliances, does not deploy foreign military bases and contingents, and conducts international military exercises only with the consent of the guarantor states. For their part, the guarantor states confirm‎ their intention to promote Ukraine's membership in the European Union .

5. The guarantor states and Ukraine agree that in the event of aggression, any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States, after urgent and immediate consultations between them (which shall be held within no more than three days), in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will provide (in response to and on the basis of an official request from Ukraine) assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack, by immediately taking such individual or joint action as may be necessary, including closing airspace over Ukraine, providing necessary weapons, using armed force in order to restore and subsequently maintain the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state. Any such armed attack (any military operation) and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council(un 안전보장이사회). Such measures shall cease when the Security Council takes the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The mechanism for implementing security guarantees for Ukraine, based on the results of additional consultations between Ukraine and the Guarantor States, will be regulated in the Treaty, taking into account protection from possible provocations.

6. The Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution by Ukraine and all (option: the majority of) the Guarantor States.

7. The Treaty shall enter into force after the approval of the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state in the course of an all-Ukrainian referendum and the introduction of appropriate amendmentsto the Constitution of Ukraine and ratification in the parliaments of Ukraine and the Guarantor States.

8. The agreement proposes to stipulate the desire of the parties to resolve issues related to Crimea and Sevastopol through bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation within 10 (option - 15) years.

9. It is also proposed to stipulate that Ukraine and the Russian Federation will not resolve the issues of Crimea and Sevastopol by military means, but will continue political and diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue.

10. The parties will continue consultations (with the involvement of other guarantor states) to prepare and agree on the provisions of the Treaty on Security Guarantees for Ukraine, modalitiesfor a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and other paramilitary forces, opening and ensuring the safe functioning of humanitarian corridors on an ongoing basis, as well as the exchange of bodies of the deceased and the release of prisoners of war and interned civilians.

11. The parties consider it possible to hold a meeting on ... 2022 between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia with the aim of signing an agreement and/or making political decisions regarding the remaining unresolved issues.

세칭 이스탐풀 코무니케 입니다.

러시아의 우크라인 침공 이후 터키의 중제로 양국간 평화 협상이 벌어지고 잇엇고,,막판 타결을 앞두고 ...영국의 보리스 존슨이

낑겨들어 깽판을 쳣고 ...회담은 최종 결열되엇습니다..

그리고 이금 까지 전쟁을 계속하고 잇고....이것이 어떤식으로 결말이 날지는 단지 추측일 뿐입니다..

그들이 무엇을 협상 하엿고 최종 서명을 하려 햇는지 ...그 내용입니다. 

어려운 영어 아닙니다.....

죽 한번 읽어 보시고..

그동안 서방측 언론의 일방적인 마녀 사냥과 무엇이 어떻게 다르고

러시아의 진정한 의도가 무엇이엇쓰며 영국와 미국은 왜  이런 협상에 반대하고 파괴전쟁의 계속을 체근 하엿는지

상식적으로 생각해 보시기 바랍니다..

다른소린 이런 것을 보고 나면.....항상 우리의 경우에 대입시켜 생각해 보곤 합니다..

그것이 이런 것을 읽는 가장 큰 이유입니다..

그 유명한 동아일보의 한반도 신탁통치안 오보(외곡보도)

역사에서 이런 경우는,,,너무 너무 많고, 지긋지긋하리 만큼 반복되지만...

앞으로라고 이런것이 개선되거나 수정되리라는 생각은 눈꼽 만큼도 들지 않습니다..

언론이란 본래 그런것이고 ...특히 자유 민주주의 체체의 언론의 역할이 그런 것입니다..

갈보에게서 처녀성을 기대 하는 것이니...기대 하는 년놈들의 멍청함을 탓 해야 겟지요..

언론의 역할은 진실을 보도 하는 것이 아닙니다...진실을 지들 입맛에 맞게 외곡 하는 것이지요..

다른소린 ..언론의 자유 ...따위엔 눈꼽 만큼의 관심도 없습니다..

언론의 자유가 언론으로 하여금 진실을 보도 하게 할 것이다고는  ...눈꼽 만큼도 생각하지 않습니다.

갈보가 좆 대가리를 보면 환장을 하듯이 ..언론의 사실 외곡은 본능입니다.

지금 이 순간에도 그들은 얼마나 많은 외곡을 일삼고 잇쓰며...

우리는 그들의 외곡에 얼마나 꼭두각시 처럼 휘들리고 잇는지 를 생각하면....그냥 끔찍합니다.

아래는  Aaron Maté 의 글입니다.

죽 읽어 보시기 바랍니다.

그들은(?) 항상 속입니다..

우리가 안 속을 수는 없지만, 항상 속는다면 빠가들인 것이지요.

Insider accounts and leaked documents show that Ukraine and Russia were close to a peace deal in April 2022, until “alarmed” US officials intervened.

Since the collapse of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in April-May 2022, the Biden administration and establishment US media have maintained a near-total vow of silence.(바이든 정부와 미 언론은 철쩌한 침묵으로만 일관햇다)

Even as Russian President Vladmir Putin has directly accused the US and UK of sabotaging the negotiations in Istanbul, President Biden and his top principals have never offered a rebuttal, and no major US outlet has bothered to seek one. The lone exception was an anonymous senior administration official, who told the Wall Street Journal’s Yaroslav Trofimov that Russian complaints were “Utter bulls—.” The official added: “I know for a fact the United States didn’t pull the plug on that. We were watching it carefully.”

A new article in the New York Times (이것 읽어 보시기 바랍니다.)ends the paper of record’s self-imposed quiet. The Times has published a lengthy account of the Istanbul talks based on insider sources, including three Ukrainian negotiators, as well as leaked copies of draft treaties disclosed publicly for the first time.

The Times’ reporting underscores that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators made significant progress. It also offers new evidence that the Biden administration — notwithstanding a lone anonymous denial — stood in the way. Yet rather than acknowledge the West’s role in blocking a peace deal, the Times offers up a dubious new excuse from the Ukrainian side for walking away. (타임즈의 보도는 우크라이나와 러시아 협상가들이 상당한 진전을 이루었음을 강조하엿고, 또한 바이든 행정부가- 줄기찬 익명을 통한 부정에도 불구하고-  협상을 방해 햇다는 새로운 증거를 제시햇다. 그러나 타임즈는 , 양국의 평화 협정을 방해햇던 서방의 역할을 인정하기보다는, 오히려 우크라이나 측에서 부터 평화협상에서 멀어졋다는 의심스러운 새로운 변명을 제시햇다..)

The Istanbul agreement, as summarized in a Ukrainian-authored document known as the Istanbul Communiqué, would have seen Ukraine accept permanent neutrality, rule out NATO membership, not host foreign military bases, and limit the size of its armed forces. In exchange, Russia would withdraw its military and pledge to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and security. The status of Crimea and Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region would have been left to future negotiations.

(이 협상안의 내용은..

우크라인의 영원한 중립국화, nato 가입 거부, 외국 군사기지 유치의 반대, 군사력의 제한 에 대한 댓가로 러시아군의 철수와 우크라인의 주권과 안전의 보장을 약속 받앗고 크리미아지역과 동부 돈바스 지역의 문제는 미래의 협의 사안으로 남겨 두엇다는 것을 알수 잇다)

Yet rather than acknowledge that a peace deal was within reach, the Times downplays the progress that was made in Istanbul and adopts the NATO-Ukrainian narrative that Russia sought Kyiv’s capitulation.

As has become the norm in Western media since Russia’s invasion, the Times minimizes Russian grievances about the influence of neo-Nazis and a crackdown on Russian culture inside Ukraine. According to the Times, Russia’s proposed text “targeted Ukraine’s national identity, including a ban on naming places after Ukrainian independence fighters.”

Yet turning to the actual source material, we see that Russia asked Ukraine to ban “the glorification and propaganda in any form of Nazism and neo-Nazism, the Nazi movement and organizations associated therewith,” including the naming of Ukrainian streets and memorials after Nazi collaborators. Unless the Times is now inadvertently adopting the Russian view that Ukraine is a Nazi state, Moscow’s demands can hardly be seen as an affront to “Ukraine’s national identity.” With NATO states having sided with the numerically small but politically influential ultra-nationalist movement inside Ukraine – including the Azov battalion, which the Biden administration is now arming after lifting a longstanding ban – a more accurate characterization is that Russia’s proposed curbs on Nazism were an affront to a key Western ally.

(가자 지구 학살이 계속되면서...이제는 이런식의 생각 조차도 호사스런 치장이 되어 버렷습니다...그들 서구 국가들이 유별나게 양심적인척 지저 되던 ..반 나치즘이나 홀로코스트에 대한 저항이 ....순수하지 못하고,  정치적인 지정학적인 전략을 위한 수단으로 사용되어 왓음을 백일하에 속속들이 들어낸 것이지요...

러시아가 전쟁의 명분으로 삼은  반 나찌즘이  자유 민주주의 서방국가들에게는 꼭 같은 전쟁의  명분이 될 수 없엇고...오히려 저항의 핑계가 되엇던 것이지요..

-우리 말고 ...누가 감히 반 나찌즘을 나발 거리느냐???

-그것은 우리 만이 누리는 인류의 양심이고 가치인 것이니라...

-취지지지ㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣ

=우리 말고 누구도 반 나찌즘을 나발 거리지 말그라...나발 거리는 순간 니들이 나찌주의자들이다........알간??

The Times confirm‎s that the US did not like what it was hearing from Istanbul, and made it known. According to the Times, “American officials were alarmed at the terms” of the proposed deal and relayed their concerns to the Ukrainians. A former senior US official recalled that in meetings with Ukrainian counterparts, the US characterized the deal as an act of surrender: “We quietly said, ‘You understand this is unilateral disarmament, right?’”

In fact, much like seeking the de-glorification of Nazis, Russia’s bid for permanent Ukrainian neutrality was not an outlandish demand. It was a request to revert to Ukraine’s July 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty, which affirmed Ukraine’s “intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs.” This also happened to be the position of elected Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych before he was ousted in the US-backed Maidan coup of February 2014, as well as the plurality if not majority opinion inside Ukraine over many years. As F. Stephen Larrabee, a former Soviet specialist on the U.S. National Security Council wrote in 2011, “the main obstacle” to Ukraine’s ascension to NATO “is not Russian opposition… but low public support for membership in Ukraine itself.”(우크라인이 nato의 멤버가 되는데 주요한 방해물은 러시아의 반대가 아니다...우쿠라인 내에서의  대중들의 지지가 너무 낮기 때문이엇다) 

In seeking to override both Ukraine’s founding constitution and popular opinion, the Biden administration was therefore not “alarmed” that Ukraine’s neutrality meant “unilateral disarmament.” Instead, it wanted to preserve the US-led militarization of Ukraine as a de-facto NATO proxy on Russia’s border – a project that has led to Ukraine’s unilateral decimation.(바이든 행정부는....우크라인의 헌법과 국민들의 여론을 뒤 엎기 위해서 .우크라인의 중립화가 곧 일방적인 무쟁 해제라고 경고하는 전략대신, 미국이 주도하는 우크라인의 군사화를 러시아와  국경을 맞대고 잇는 사실상의  nato 대리국으로 보존하고자 햇다..이는 우크라인의 일방적인 몰락 계획이엇다..)

The former US official also claimed that White House officials debated Putin’s “intentions”, and questioned whether he was really interested in making peace. “We didn’t know if Putin was serious. We couldn’t tell, on either side of the fence, whether these people who were talking were empowered.” Yet the same US official believed Putin was “salivating” at the prospect of peace. The Times also acknowledges that the Russian president appeared to be “micromanaging” the talks from Moscow – which would seemingly bolster the case that he was indeed serious.

Two Ukrainian negotiators also told the Times that they saw the Russians as serious, with one noting that Putin “reduced his demands” over time. For example, after initially insisting that Ukraine recognize Crimea “as an integral part of the Russian Federation,” Moscow dropped that request.

Accordingly, as Ukrainian negotiator Oleksandr Chalyi later admitted, the two sides “managed to find a very real compromise” and “were very close in the middle of April 2022… to finalize the war with some peace settlement.” Putin, he said, “tried to do everything possible to conclude [an] agreement with Ukraine.”

The two sides indeed made so much progress that the Istanbul Communiqué’s final item foresees the possibility of convening a meeting “between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia with the aim of signing an agreement and/or making political decisions regarding the remaining unresolved issues.” Two weeks later, a 16-page draft treaty (including six annexes), dated April 15th, made its way to Putin’s desk. Yet according to the Times’ newly introduced narrative, it was at this stage that a last-minute Russian maneuver sabotaged a deal.

Under the proposed agreement, Ukraine’s security would be assured by guarantor states, including the US and Russia. On this issue, outlined in Article 2, there was no dispute. But according to the Times, Moscow tried to add a clause in Article 5 concerning the guarantors’ response in the event of an armed attack on Ukraine.

Moscow proposed that if Ukraine were to be attacked, the guarantors would need to unanimously agree on any military response. In the Times’ telling, this would mean that “Moscow could invade Ukraine again and then veto any military intervention on Ukraine’s behalf — a seemingly absurd condition that Kyiv quickly identified as a dealbreaker.”

According to an unnamed Ukrainian official, Russia’s proposed clause meant that “we had no interest in continuing the talks.”

While it would indeed be unfair for Russia to insist on the right to veto a defense against any future Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no reason to assume that this “seemingly absurd condition” was indeed its demand. (my emphasis)

Article 2 of the draft treaty binds any guarantor state or party to the treaty – including Russia – “to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Accordingly, were Russia to flagrantly violate the treaty by invading Ukraine, it would have no grounds to invoke a different section of the treaty to prevent other states from responding to its attack. If one party violates a treaty — particularly its most fundamental provision — it cannot expect others to continue adhering to it. Therefore, if Russia were to attack Ukraine, it would not have right to stop someone else from responding.

The Times-Ukrainian claim that this Russian proposal was a “dealbreaker” is not only dubious on its own, but contradicted by the available record. Despite the anonymous official’s assertion that Ukraine “had no interest in continuing the talks” because of Russia’s proposed amendment, the talks in fact continued beyond April 15th into the following month.

Moreover, more than two years after the Ukrainians walked away from the Istanbul talks, they have now introduced this excuse about a Russian poison-pill for the first time.

Previously, Ukrainian officials have claimed that they abandoned the talks over concerns that Moscow could not be trusted, particularly in light of the alleged Russian atrocities that surfaced in Bucha just as the Istanbul talks progressed.

Yet in that case as well, the Russia-Ukraine talks continued even after the alleged Russian war crimes in Bucha were made public. As Zelensky argued forcefully at the time, only diplomacy could prevent the occurrence of future atrocities. Asked during an April 4th visit to Bucha if the peace talks would continue, the Ukrainian leader replied: “Yes, because Ukraine must have peace.” Zelensky reiterated that message the following day: “Every tragedy like this, every Bucha will affect negotiations. But we need to find opportunities for these steps.” Reviewing the diplomatic record from that period, Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko note that the two sides’ work on the draft treaty “continued and even intensified in the days and weeks after” the Bucha allegations surfaced, suggesting that they “were a secondary factor in Kyiv’s decision-making.”

The main factor in Ukraine’s decision-making, therefore, was almost certainty the message that Zelensky’s camp revealed in May 2022: the previous month, just as the Istanbul talks were advancing, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson paid a visit to inform Zelensky that the West did not support a peace deal with Russia, and that the Ukrainians should “keep fighting” instead.

(결론입니다.....

다른소린 우크라인 전쟁을 이야기 할 때 마다....질렌스키의 빠가성을 이야기 햇고 

왜 최고 의사 결정자가 똑똑하여야 하는가....를 이야기 햇습니다..

역사에서는  최종 의사 결정자의 멍청한 결정이 어떤 결과를 초래 햇는가를 배울 수 잇는

수 많은 경우가 넘치고 넘칩니다..

에휴...

공자는 이야기 햇지요....

권력이 인민들의 신뢰를 잃는다면 권력의 지탱 기반이 무너지는 것이라고 하엿고

이는 ...군사력, 먹걸이 보다 더 중요한 국가의 기반이라고 햇습니다.

한국의 군사력....155mm 포탄을 수출하는 지경이고

한국의 먹걸리....다이어트 시장이 얼마나 되지요??

그런데 한국 정부에 대한 신뢰성???

다른소린......이 사람에게서 그 어떤 신뢰감도 느낄 수 없습니다..

공자가 햇 쏘리를 한 것일까요??

The Times, conveniently, does not mention Johnson’s visit, nor the West’s open refusal to provide the security guarantees that Kyiv sought to underpin an agreement with Russia. Just as NATO proxy warriors have not been prepared to accept a neutral Ukraine in exchange for peace, US establishment media is not yet prepared to acknowledge their decisive role in sabotaging an early opportunity to end the war.