일본의 연쇄사건 : 침체 -＞ 수익 창출 -＞ 평가 절하 -＞ 안정화 -＞ 보복 -＞ 하이퍼인플레이션

[giseg07]

세계의 주식 시장이 일본의 아베 신조는 곧 발표 될, 2 %의 인플레를 표적으로 순간적으로 발표하고 완전히 자신의 주머니에 중앙 은행의 책임을 떠맡아서 더많은중앙 은행 인쇄의 결과로 이동을 준비 할 때, 텔레그래프의 로즈 에반스 – Pritchard씨는 일본 총리가 수축 / 불황이 깔린 나라를 구제하려고 마지막 시간에다소 관련된 아날로그를 사용할 것을 권장합니다

골드 표준에서 일본을 제거시킨 Korekiyo 타카하시씨에 의해 1930 년대 '화려한구조'는 의도적으로 거대한 '케인즈의'예산 적자를 실행한 경제는 60% (40 %무역가중 기준)로 엔을 평가절하하여 성공을 기댈때까지 빚을 주조하도록 일본은행을강요시켰다.

처음에는 수출이 크게 증가하고 간단한 광학이 안정성을 주도하지만, 파급효과로세상은 놓치게되고 실종되고 있는 의도하지않는 결과(보복) 이다.

경제 안정화 나타나지만, 다른 주요한 수출 국가의 반응은 암시 적으로 세계 무역의 게임에 지고, 일본의 정책이 역효과를낳는 원인이 성장이 낮고 통화가 여전히낮아서 추격할 필요있는 나라를 떠나 - 결국 일본에서 하이퍼인플레이션로 이어지는 ...  다카하시의 암살.

그리고 수출할수 없는 화성인으로, 우리는 어떤 차이로 이시간을 기대해야 합니까?그리고 얼마나 쉽게 (빠르게) 현재 세계에서 변경된 무역의 흐름은?

텔레그래프을 통해

아베 신조수상은 재정 금융 및 교환 자극으로 여러 전선에서 파산으로 가는, 디플레이션에 전면적인 공격을 맹세했다.

지난번에 무슨 일이 있었는지 일본 장관은 필사적으로 성장에 나라의 가치를 평가절하 하려고할까?

이 대공황에서 자신의 국가를 "훌륭하게 구출"사람으로 벤 버냉키에 의해 설명된Korekiyo Takahasi씨 아래에서 1930 년대 초에 놀라운 실험에 가까운 복사본입니다.

Takahasi씨는 완전히 보통 개선 결과로 그의 시대의 첫 번째이었다. 그는 1931년12 월 금에서 일본을 벗겼다.

그는 프랭클린 루즈 벨트가 취임하기 전에 새로운 할인 공세를 시작하고, 의도적으로 케인즈"의예산 적자를 실행했다.

그는 경제가 성공을 기댈때까지 채무를 주조하여 일본 은행을 강요했고.채권은 나중에 유동성을 빼내기 위해 은행에 매각했다.

그는 달러에 대해 60%로 엔을 평가 절하하고, 무역 가중 기준으로 40%로  일본의 섬유, 기계, 화학 수출은 아시아를 휩쓸고 궁극적으로 제국을 설정하고 수행한대영 제국과 인도가 일으키고있는 문제가 확인 되었다고 말할수 있습니다.

그는 군사 비용을 절감하여 강화하려고 할 때 Takahasi씨는 1936 년에 군대 장교에 의해 암살되었다. 정책은 퇴화되었고. 일본은 나중에 하이퍼인플레이션에 휘청되었습니다.

하지만 초기 안정성과 성장은 의도하지 않은 결과를 가져왔습니다 :

말할 필요도없이, 인쇄하는 돈이 위험에 있습니다. 일본이 부드럽지만, 안정적인디플레이션을 그것을 알고

 일본 은행을 압도하는 채권에서 공황의비행을 보고 -악마 – 탈출할수있는 문제이다.

주지사 Masaaki 시라카와씨는 이를 악물고 다이어트를 말했듯이, "장기 수익률은상승 할 수 있으며,  공공 재정에 문제가 될것이다."

일본의 일방적 인 행동은 또한 G-20의 나머지 부분에 의해 나쁘게 인식 될수 있습니다 ...

아베씨의 불만은 이해됩니다. 일본은 적어도 원하는 문제의 시간에 채권자 상태가부담해야하는 크로스 강화하여 안전한 피난처의 통화를 저주하고 있습니다.

일본은 다른 사람들이 알지못한 '경쟁력있는 평가절하 "를 삼가 할 2009 년 3 월G20 거래를 유지 했습니다. 그러나 일본은 이제 엔을 억제하는 대량 규모 해외 채권을 구입해야 문제가있을 것입니다.

도쿄는 통화 전쟁의 발발에서 침략자로 비난 될 것입니다. 다른 나라들은 복수 할것입니다.

그리고 우리가 경고 한대로 (카일베이스가 고심하여 설명했습니다)

"은행은 기본자본의 900%가치의 JGBs(일본국채)를 개최합니다. 장기이자가2%위로 쳤으면 그들의 포트폴리오가 섬멸될 것입니다. 일본은 또한 은행 재해에직면 할 수도 있습니다. 아베씨가 만들어야 하는 어려운 선택입니다."

그리고 에반스 – Pritchard씨가 올바르게 결론내면 :

 큰 문제는 여기에 플레이에 있습니다. 세계 무역 시스템은 깨지기 쉬운 것입니다.긴침체 뒤의 낭비하는 질병은  전세계 GDP의 24%를 기록하고 높은 저축 비율, 그리고 돌아 다니기에 너무 작게 요구합니다. 누구나 약한 통화를 하려고합니다. 모두 가질 수 없습니다.

나머지는 일본의 위대한 실험적인 인하는 두 가지 : 리플레이션(통화재팽창)의 공세는 답답한 세계 경제를 올릴 수 있습니다 :하지만 엔 조작이 시장 점유율을 강탈하고, 보호주의를 선동하고, "적극적으로 관리된 환율"의 용감한 새로운 세계로 우리를 넣었고 Mervyn King경은 지난 달에 말했다.

요약하면 :

• 침체

• 수익 창출

• 평가 절하

• 안정화

• 보복

• 하이퍼인플레이션

거의 U2의 노래를 좋아합니다. 그리고 이미 일본에서 무슨 일이 있었는지 입니다. 다행히 이번에는 다를 수 있습니다.

Japan's Chain Of Events: Stagnation -> Monetization -> Deval‎‍uation -> Stabilization -> Retaliation -> Hyperinflation

As the world's equity markets prepare to rally on the back of yet more central bank printing as Japan's Shinzo Abe takes the helm with a 2% inflation target, to be announced momentarily, and a central bank entirely in his pocket, The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests a rather concerning analog for the last time a Japanese minister attempted to salvage his deflation/depression strewn nation: the 1930s 'brilliant rescue' by Korekiyo Takahashi, who removed Japan from the Gold Standard, ran huge 'Keynesian' budget deficits intentionally, and compelled the Bank of Japan to monetize his debt until the economy was back on its feet managed to deval‎‍ue the JPY by 60% (40% on a trade-weighted basis).

Initially this led to exports rising dramatically and brief optical stability, but the repercussion is the unintended consequence (retaliation) that the world missed then and is missing now. Though the economy appeared to stabilize, the responses of other major exporting nations, implicitly losing in the game of world trade, caused Japan's policies to backfire, slowed growth and left a nation needing to chase its currency still lower - eventually leading to hyperinflation in Japan... and Takahashi's assassination.

And with no Martians to export to, why should we expect any difference this time? and how much easier (and quicker) are trade flows altered in the current world?

Via The Telegraph:

Premier Shinzo Abe has vowed an all-out assault on deflation, going for broke on multiple fronts with fiscal, monetary, and exchange stimulus.

What happened last time the a Japanese minister tried to desperately deval‎‍ue his nation to growth?

This is a near copy of the remarkable experiment in the early 1930s under Korekiyo Takahasi, described by Ben Bernanke as the man who "brilliantly rescued" his country from the Great Depression. Takahasi was the first of his era to tear up rule book completely. He tookJapan off gold in December 1931. He ran "Keynesian" budget deficits deliberately, launching a New Deal blitz before Franklin Roosevelt took office. He compelled the Bank of Japan to monetize debt until the economy was back on its feet. The bonds were later sold to banks to drain liquidity. He deval‎‍ued the yen by 60pc against the dollar, and 40pc on a trade-weighted basis. Japan's textile, machinery, and chemical exports swept Asia, ultimately causing the British Empire and India to retaliate with Imperial Preference and all that was to follow -- and there lies the rub, you might say. Takahasi was assassinated by army officers in 1936 when he tried to tighten by cutting military costs. Policy degenerated. Japan later lurched into hyperinflation. 

but the initial stability and growth could have unintended consequences as:

Needless to say, printing money has its perils too. The risk is thatJapan could escape gentle but stable deflation -- the Devil it knows -- only to see a panic flight from bonds that overwhelms the Bank of Japan. As Governor Masaaki Shirakawa told the Diet through gritted teeth, "long-term yields could rise, and that would be a problem for public finances."

Japan's unilateral move may also be perceived badly by the rest of the G-20...

Mr Abe's frustration is understandable. Japan is cursed with a safen-haven currencythat strengthens in times of trouble when least wanted, the cross that  creditor states must bear. Japan did uphold the G20 deal in March 2009 to refrain from "competitive deval‎‍uations", when others did not. But should Japan now buy foreign bonds on a mass scale to suppress the yen, there will be trouble. Tokyo will be blamed as the aggressor in the outbreak of currency wars. Others will retaliate.

And just as we have warned (and Kyle Bass has painstakingly described):

"Banks hold JGBs worth 900pc of their Tier 1 capital. Their portfolios would be decimated if long rates punched above 2pc. Japan might then face a banking disaster as well. These are the hard choices that Mr Abe has to make. "

And as Evans-Pritchard concludes correctly:

Huge issues are at play here. The world's trade system is fragile. The wasting disease behind the Long Slump is a record high savings rate of 24pc of global GDP, and too little demand to go around. Everybody wants a weaker a currency. They can't all have it.

Japan's great experiment cuts both ways for the rest of us: the reflation blitz helps lift the global economy out of the doldrums: but yen manipulation snatches market share, incites protectionism, and takes us into the brave new world of "actively managed exchange rates", as Sir Mervyn King put it last month.

To summarize:

• Stagnation
• Monetization
• Deval‎‍uation
• Stabilization
• Retaliation
• Hyperinflation

Almost like a U2 song. And this is what already happened inJapan. Luckily, this time will be different.