네이키드 케피탈리즘의 이브스미스의 글입니다.
미국이 중간선거로 뒤 덮여잇는 동안 러시아는 카손에서 슬쩍 빠져 나왓다,,,,,고 제목을 달앗습니다.
군사 전문가라고 깝치는 찌지리 때들 보다도 이 아줌마 글 한방이 훨씬 더 정확하고 읽을 만 합니다..
m-16 잘 안다하여 군사 전략가 아니고...m-16 한번 쏴보지 못 햇다 하여 전쟁 문외한이 아닙니다.
모택통은 평생 총 한번 쏴 본적 없엇지만 붓 한자루로 거대한 중국혁명을 이루어 냇습니다.
혹자는 모택통을 제갈공명 10을 합처 놓은 것 같다고 합니다...그만큼 그의 혁명 전술 전략은 탁월햇지요.
이 사람 또한 총 한번 쏴 본적없고
ak-47구조가 어떻게 되어 잇는지도 모르는 정말 군사와는 거리가 잇는 사람이지만
지구상 최강의 군대 미국과 싸웟고...찬란한 승리를 만들어 냇습니다.
서양인들을 그들 20세기 최고의 무장이라고 추겨 세웟습니다..
-월남인들은 타이한(파월 국군)이 무슨짓을 햇는지 잘 알고 잇다.
-그들에게 사죄 하라고 하지 않겟다
-그건 그들의 양심이 알아서 할 일이다...................................무원갑
-월남에서 (사람죽이고) 돈 벌엇써도 그 돈으로 경제발전 하엿다면 애국이다.........................문재인
사람의 품질의 차이란 이런 것을 말 하는 것입니다..
천하 개 쌍놈의 경상도 쥐쇗끼.....이딴 것들이 어떻게 자칭 인권 변호라라고 취지지지 거리나..
-내가 내 돈 써서 풍산개 개 키웟다..
-더 이상 못 하겟다 니들이 키워......
-취지지지ㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣㅣ..................문재인
어쩜 하는 말이나 행동거지가 이리도 천박 할 수 잇는지....
아조 환장 하것써..
우크라인의 공격도 없고,, 궂이 철수를 해야 할 만한 긴박한 상황의 전개도 없는 상태에서의 철수가....무엇이냐??,,,를 두고
군사작전의 측면에서 다양한 분석이 내 놓고 잇습니다..
혹자는 러이사의 철수를 군사적 미끼라고 보기도 합니다.
마치 한국전쟁때 연합군을 압록강 까지 끌여 들인 공산진영의 유인작전과 같이 분석한 것이지요.
어차피 전쟁은 러시아가 이깁니다..
러시아 입장에선 궂이 희생과 파괴가 따르는 전쟁을 할 필요가 없습니다.
헤르손이 러시아의 수비가 어렵다면....우크라인이 헤르손에 진입 햇을때..그들도 수비가 어렵습니다..
더 많은 병력과 장비를 투입하려 들 것이고....다그리 때려 잡기 딱 좋다는 것이지요.
여전히 Kakhovka 댐은 러시아가 점령하고 잇습니다....수공을 펼치더라도 러시아가 선택권을 갇게 됩니다.
이것이 미끼인지 ...우크라인이 이 미끼를 물지 말지는 물론 모릅니다..
시간이 지나면 뭐가 더 확실하게 추론해 볼 수 잇는 상황전개가 잇을 것으로 보입니다.
외형적인 설명은,,,,러시아는 이미 오래전 부터 카스손이 군사적으로 방어하기기 어렵다는 판단을 하엿고
특히 우크라인이 댐을 폭팔 시켯을 때 수공을 견딜수 없다는 판단을 일찌감치 하엿고..체계적인 철수를 진행 중이엇다는 것인데.
러시아의 전쟁 수행 방식이 상당이 인간적이다는 느낌은 지울 수 없습니다.
민간인들 먼저 대피 시키고...군의 희생이 많겟다 싶으면 승퍠에 연연하지 않고 쉽게 철 수 합니다..
전쟁을 훨씬 더 크게 보고 진행중이다는 것이지요.
마치 헤비급 거인이 죽자 살자 달겨드는 플라이급 선수에게 툭툭 잽만 던지며 시합을 하는 듯 보입니다.
아.... 전쟁....자체가 파괴인데 ...인간적일 수가 잇냐고??
알고 잇다고........이 씨발놈드라.....
그런것이 곱까우면 니들이 가서 휴전을 시키던지......
겨울은 다가 오고...인프라는 깨졋습니다.
쓸수 잇는 군인들과 장비는 이미 반격작전으로 다 소모해 버린 우크라인이 다가오는 겨울을 어떻게 대응할지 궁금합니다.
지금이라도 현실을 인정하고 종전회담을 시작 하면 좋겟습니다.
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2022/11/russia-slips-out-of-kherson-under-cover-of-midterms.html
Russia Slips Out of Kherson Under Cover of Midterms
Posted on November 10, 2022 by Yves Smith
Russia-friendly commentators, apparently even more so the ones on Russian Telegram, were in an uproar after Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and theater commander Sergey Surovikin, said in a broadcast Wednesday evening that Russia would be withdrawing its forces from Kherson city and pulling its defense line back to the south side of the Dneiper, opposite the city. We and others had pointed out that such a move would be politically costly in Russia, even though Surovikin was widely believed to have been hinting at that possibility three weeks ago when he talked about the possibility of needing to make “difficult decisions” in an interview shortly after he took charge.
There are multiple layers to this news which came in a staged conversation between the two officials. The first is that the upset among Russia supporters is disproportionate and reflects what I call map thinking, which I admit I fell for here. But the second, intriguingly, is that Ukraine officials are expressing skepticism that Russia is actually pulling out, since they allege (and some Russia friendly sources also suggest) that Russia has not removed troops from Kherson city. So is this an elaborate Russian headfake?
Or is it simply that Russia is calling Ukraine’s bluff, that for whatever reason taking and holding Kherson would be problematic for Ukraine too, but given the pressure on Ukraine to show gains, it can’t not move in if Russia cedes the city (as in it’s not a trap per se but not worth the resources it would require).
Some maps to help the discussion:
In most wars, success is defined in terms of territorial gains. But when it started the Special Military Operation, Russia has only one territorial objective: to secure and clear Donetsk and Lugansk. The other, demilitarization and denazification, may result in Russia taking territory as a secondary goal. Note that Russia does not have full control of any of the “liberated” oblasts that is says are now part of Russia.
Russia has been willing to cede terrain to secure its position. This normally takes place in fits and starts on the front lines. It’s worked consistently to Russia’s advantage since that approach has enabled them to save men and materiel. By contrast, Ukraine had doggedly fought to hold positions, as did Hitler in World War II. As military historians argue and Ukraine watchers contend now, this approach has cost Ukraine dearly in manpower and equipment losses.
Despite this approach being as dull as watching paint dry from the map perspective, it has also been the least costly way for Russia to chip though the multi-layered bunkering in Donbass and grind down the Ukraine (and increasingly NATO-supplied) forces.
But differences in degree are differences in kind. When Russia pulled out of Kharkiv, Ukraine and the West spun it as a military success despite the (largely empty) territory having no strategic importance. Russians were upset by the lack of explanation, which fed suspicions that things were even worse than they looked, and the fact that some Russia-supporting citizens had not gotten out and were subjected to Ukraine reprisals.
However, after a couple of weeks of Ukraine-gasms, the military was unable to make meaningful advances, supporting the contention that Russia had chosen to fall back to lines it could defend better, and had done so taking almost no losses.
Despite that history, I discounted the idea that Russia would cede Kherson unless pressed very hard by Ukraine forces. Reports that Russia was putting more troops and equipment in Kherson city, along with constructing fortified lines and having pillboxes delivered, bolstered that view. Admittedly, Russia had more and more aggressively been pushing for civilians to evacuate and had even removed important historical monuments. The justification was that civilians were exposed to shelling and would generally be underfoot if the city was being prepared for combat, and Ukraine was trying to blow up the dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, which would cause catastrophic flooding in Kherson.
So perhaps Surovikin has always planned to fall back from Kherson city and has had to obfuscate his intent till now, given the difficulty of moving anything out of Kherson (Russia is limited to boats and pontoon bridges). Or perhaps he was hedging his bets and various factors moved the decision to more clearly favor a pullback, like Ukraine succeeding in damaging one of the locks on the Kakhovskaya dam four days ago, or possibly the status of the mud season (is it lasting longer than usual?).
One more possibility is that Russia has decided to conserve its forces and materiel while the mud season is on and let the destruction of the Ukraine grid and the economic pressures on Europe lead the charge for now. The West’s under-reporting on the continuing Russian pounding of the electrical system reflects their impotence. They’d make more noise if they thought they had an answer. And Alexander Mercouris speculated that the failure to say all that much about increasingly desperate conditions in Ukraine means Europe does not want to admit to the necessity of accepting more refugees if Russia continues to inflict more pain, which seems likely.
Nevertheless, this move is at a minimum very bad optics (unless it is a clever trap that Russia springs successfully) but the optics that matter to Russia are the optics in Russia. Larry Johnson points out that the generally uncontrollable now general and Chechen leader Razman Khadyrov had backed the withdrawal (note he recently savagely criticized a Russian general, on not well-founded grounds, so he regularly throws brickbats when he’s unhappy about military operations). Taken from Johnson’s site:
I have no idea how much this and other statements will do to calm the nerves of Russian citizens, but this is an improvement on Kharviv. The civilians are being removed to safety, the Russians are clearly signaling that they are pulling back, as opposed to allowing Ukraine to claim they were pushed out, and officials seen as being straight shooters are explaining the move.
From some of the usual suspects, first Andrei Martyanov:
And Brian Berletic:
Yes, this is the non-Russia hostile interpretation, but you’ll find plenty of the other world view elsewhere.
But here is the odd part: Ukraine is leery of the Russian present of departure. Podolyak is an advisor to Zelensky:
Consistent with Ukraine not being yet sure if Russia has a nefarious plan, the business press so far has not deigned to report on the Russian announcement, which you’d normally expect, like Kharkiv, to be a lead or at least over the fold story. Instead, for instance, nothing in the breaking news stories at Bloomberg or even in the Ukraine news updates section:(다른소린 야들이 러시의 철수를 또 어떻게 씨불 거렷을까??..........을 생각 햇는데....아예 보도를 안 햇다고 합니당ㅇㅇㅇㅇㅇㅇ....허허허...)
Moreover, Dima at Military Summary argues Russia still has so many troops in Kherson that it would be impossible for them to withdraw without Ukraine forbearance. Dima has a tendency to get out over his skis when he deviates from day-to-day reporting on the status of the front line. For instance, in the last famed Kherson offensive, he stuck with the very highest estimate of Ukraine forces, 60,000, when other reporters started with 12,000-15,000 and bumped it up to 20,000 to 30,000 (which may also have been due to the addition of reinforcements).
Nevertheless, Dima likely has some elements generally right even if the particulars might be pumped up. He again claims Ukraine has 60,000 in Kherson. For sake of argument, it is probably at least 30,000. Note that in the day to day fighting, Ukraine has been attacking in Kherson well to the east, while their assaults on Kherson seem to have been mainly in the form of shelling.
Dima claims there are 10,000 to 15,000 Russian troops in Kherson to the West of the Dneiper, which is rather a lot to remove via pontoon bridge and boats, unless Russia is counting on a protracted mud season to protect their rear. Dima also claims that Russia just blew all the bridges on the Inhulets river in Kherson oblast, which runs in a zig-zag north from the Dnieper just to the east of Kherson city. That would divide the Russian bridgehead on the west of the Dneiper….to what purpose? Dima didn’t know the disposition of Russian forces, so it is hard to speculate further.
In other words, the fog of war is pea-soupier than usual! Presumably more will be revealed in the next week or so, particularly regarding Ukraine’s response.