역사에서 우리가 심각하게 공부해야 할 부분은 현대사입니다.
단군 할아비가 어짜고,웅녀가 저짜고 따위 미츤개 소리를 왜 학교에서 그 아까운 시간에 쳐 배워야 합니까?
그런것이 궁금하면 미아리 점집에나 가서 들으면 될 것입니다..
한사군이 한반도에 잇엇던 만주에 잇엇던, 중원땅에 잇엇던 그딴것이 왜 그리 중요합니까?
지금 현재의 우리와 가장 가까운 역사가 우리가 배워야 할 역사입니다.
세계사도 마찬가지입니다..
중요한 것은 프랑스 혁명이후의 현대사 입니다..
이 현대사의 이해 과정이 곧 제국주의에 대한 이해 과정입니다.
이 제국주의에 대한 이해가 없는 세계사는 쐑소리 없는 포르노와 처럼 아무런 느낌도 받을수 없습니다.
제국주의에 대한 이해만 분명하다면....지금 세계가 돌아가는 꼬라가지를 알수 잇습니다.
큰 흐름은 놓치지는 않는다는 것이지요.
수구 꼴통들의 할레루야 따위 개 지뤌질이나..
노무현교 꼴통들의 우리교주가 처 먹은 뇌물은 뇌물이 아니고 생계형범죄다 ....따위의 정신질환은 피 할수 잇다는 것이지요
한국전쟁 기간동안 미군이 주도한 세균전에 대한 글을 죽 올려왓습니다.
제국주의에 대한 이해만 제대로 되어 잇다면,
국가 민족 애국이라는 정신질환이 어느정도 까지 사람들을 파괴 할수 잇는지
사람들이 어떤짓 까지도 할수 잇는지 따위의 에 대한 의문에 쉽게 답을 찾을수 잇습니다.
한인들은 일제의 식민통치를 받앗지만, 철쩌하게 제국주의로 무장된 정신질환집단입니다.
심심하면 위안부, 독도, 토착왜구를 앞세우며 때거지 용볌질을 떨어 되지만, 이는단지
일본보다 더 먼저 깨우쳐서 발전하지 못하여, 일본 처럼 거대한 제국을 걸설해 보지 못 햇던 그 기회 상실에 대한
아쉬움일 뿐입니다.
한인들 처럼 국가 민족 애국에 쩌러 미처 날튀는 종자들은 참 드룹니다....................이스라엘정도나 잇을까??
글이 깁니다....전문 용어, 고유명사가 많이 나오고 어렵긴 합니다만....
미국이 한국전쟁 훨씬 이전 부터 세균전에 대한 연구 개발를 진행해 왓고 많은 실전적인 실험을 해 왓음을 이야기 합니다.
그들은 미국국민들을 상대하여 세균전을 실험 햇다는 글을 올려드렷습니다.
한국전쟁은 그들의 세균전을 실험해 볼수 없는 더 할나위없는 기간이엇고 그들이 어떻게 세균전을 준비하고 실행햇다는 것은 분명하게 읽어낼수 잇습니다.
한국전쟁에서의 세균전에 대한 노하우는 베트남 전쟁에서 한차원 높은 세련된 화학전으로 변이 전개 되엇습니다.
읽어 보고 싶은 분들은 읽어 보시기 바랍니다..........
국가, 민족, 애국 이라는 광기가 춤을 추면.....사람들은 항상 미칩니다.
여기에 종교까지 끼어 들면......파멸 말고는 다른 것이 없습니다..
국가 민족 종교가 가장 극성을 부리고 잇는 시기가 지금의 시기입니다.
인류 파멸의 시계가 가장 파멸과 가까와 진것은 전혀 우연이 아닙니다...
The Schnacke Affidavit: U.S. Admission of Offensive Germ Warfare Capability During the Korean War
by JEFFREY KAYE
True crime devotees are familiar with the concept of the “cold case,” which Oxford Languages defines as “an unsolved criminal investigation which remains open pending the discovery of new evidence.” Allegations from China and North Korea that the U.S. used biological weaponry (BW) during the Korean War is an example of just such a cold case.
I recently obtained from the National Archives an affidavit from assistant U.S. attorney Robert H. Schnacke. The sworn statement was filed during a controversial 1950s trial prosecuting the editorial staff of China Monthly Review for sedition for reporting on the controversy over whether the U.S. used BW against China and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK).
In the affidavit, which provides us today with two important pieces of the BW puzzle surrounding the charges of germ warfare aimed at the U.S., Schnacke stipulated the presence of an offensive capability by the U.S. to wage biological warfare dating back to the beginning of 1949, something the U.S. had long hidden or denied. The revelation briefly made headlinesin San Francisco, where the trial was being held, but more generally faded away.
Affidavit by U.S. Attorney Robert H. Schnacke in case US v John W Powell, et al.
Schnacke’s sworn statement directly contradicts the writings of Cold War scholar Milton Leitenberg, who as recently as 2016 in the pages of a monograph for the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project, assured readers, “After 1945, the United States neither produced nor procured any biological munitions until the end of 1951.” Furthermore, Leitenberg asserted — incorrectly — no BW weapon using a human pathogen was “ready until the end of 1954, about 16 months after the Korean War was over” (pg. 8) [1]
“Stop-gap measures” to implement BW “operational readiness” during the Korean War
Contrary to Leitenberg’s assertions, by October 1950, according to a previously Top Secret history of Air Force participation in the BW program, “seven BW agents had been judged feasible for use, all of which could be produced in facilities already established or proposed.” These included anthrax, brucella, tularemia, plague, botulinus toxin, cereal rust spores, and chemical growth regulators.
According to the monograph, written by Dorothy L. Miller, “The only standardized agent-fill [by October 1950] was Brucella suis. Considerable emphasis was being placed on anthrax agent, botulinus toxin, Bacterium tularense, psittacosis virus, and ‘Q’ fever Rickettsia in an attempt to bring them to the point where standardization would be feasible….
“Near the end of the period being reviewed, the development of the feather bomb… made possible an immediate capability against cereal crops. By that time the USAF had definite ideas of what it wanted to do with BW agents” (p. 65). [2]
The feather bomb was to be used to spread BW agent (e.g. wheat rust) against enemy crops. Other BW agents could be spread via feathers as well. Overall, the U.S. Air Force had purchased almost 24,000 biological cluster bomblets (M33) by October 1950.
Most of the BW agents noted above, except brucella, were singled out as used in U.S. BW operations by pathologists and virologists in China and North Korea during the Korean War. See discussion of this throughout the September 1952 report of the International Scientific Commission, headed by British scientist Joseph Needham.
Corroborating Miller’s account, a declassified secret “Summary History of Chemical Corps Activities,” prepared by the Historical Office, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, dated February 1953, revealed that between 9 September 1951 and 31 December 1952, “The field of biological warfare (BW) received more and more emphasis from every standpoint. Work on BW agents led to the standardization of an anti-personnel agent…. Work on BW munitions led to the standardization of the M114 bomb for dispersion from the M33 cluster.” [pp. 13, 16]
“Standardization” is the term used for the readiness of a weapon for operational use by way of common, interchangeable and compatible components for military purposes.
According to the same Chemical Corps historical report, the Secretary of Defense ordered a review of the military’s BW and CW readiness in early 1952. An appointed committee, headed by Dr. J.R. Killian, Jr., submitted the results of its review on 17 April 1952. It called for “greater emphasis on the development of weapons and of procedures for testing the effectiveness of BW agents for anti-personnel use” [p. 6].
Screenshot from July 1954 Memorandum for the Record, from Secretary, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, concerning “Special Aircraft Equipment for BW Munitions”, which detailed early research on the issue, including a “letter Hq USAF to Hq WADC [Wright Air Development Center], dated March 1951, Subj: ‘(Secret Title) Temperature Control for Airborne BW Munitions’. (SECRET LETTER)”. Another reference in the memo was to “WADC Memorandum Report No. WCEG-R-555–1350, dated October 1951, Subj: ‘(Secret Title) A Preliminary Study of Temperature Requirements for the Protection of BW Munitions During Airborne Delivery to Target Areas.’” (SECRET REPORT) — PDF pgs. 47–48 at Link
A reorganization was undertaken. The Chemical Corp’s Research and Development Division “in the field” was replaced by a new Research and Engineering Command “with increased responsibilities.” With the establishment of Research and Engineering Command, activities such as the Chemical Corps Chemical and Radiological Laboratories were placed under Brigadier General William M. Creasy, Commanding General, R&E Command” [pp. 11–12]
A lot of money was placed under Brig. Gen. Creasy’s control. The Military Construction Program for the Chemical Corps for FY 1952 included a total appropriation and allocation at the four principal R&E Command installations of some $34,660,000, while some $27,000,000 were earmarked for that purpose in the FY 1953 budget.”
That’s over $60 million (or over $600 million in 2021 dollars) for what turned out to be a “stop-gap” BW program to meet the military needs of the U.S. in the Korean War, given that the aerosol and other advanced BW weapons the Chemical Corps was working on were taking too long to reach operational use.
As the 1953 Chemical Corps “Summary History” retrospectively explained the situation, “During the period 9 September 1951- 31 December 1952, the Chemical Corps was principally concerned with the support of the Korean War and with the improvement of the Bacteriological Warfare (BW) and Chemical Warfare (CW) capabilities of the Armed Forces in the event of an emergency and in defense against radiological attack (RW).” [p. 1]
In a key passage, the report described the work done:
In the end, the U.S. “crash program” on BW would prove a disappointment, and the pressure for quick development of BW weapons ended in late 1953, after the end of the Korean War, as future articles will explore.
View of the main entrance to Fort Detrick in 1956, west of current main gate on West 7th Street. (Source: Ch. 3, “Cutting Edge: The History of Ft. Detrick,” Public Domain)
SOD and MKNAOMI
The “short-term developments and “stop-gap measures” appear to refer to the use of weaponry utilizing insect vectors and BW sabotage as used by Japan’s BW program against China in World War Two.(731 부대의 세균전을 말 한 것입니다...731 부대의 핵심요원들이 미국의 절대 비호 하에 화하전, 생물학전 무기 개발과 생산에 종사하엿습니다....일본 녹십자는 731 부대원들로 만들어진 제약회사 입니다) We know with near certainty that such weapons were used thanks to the release of U.S. communications intelligence reports from the Korean War that describe Chinese and North Korean military units reacting to BW attack, including by the dropping of insects and other infected materials, in an effort to contaminate the ground and spread disease. These messages were sent without any knowledge they were overheard, and can be considered powerful evidence of BW attack.
(이런식으로 북한군과 중국군의 통신 감청으로 확인된 세균전에 대한 글을 이미 부분 해석하여 올려드렷습니다)
U.S. government prosecutors were concerned about efforts in the late 1950s by journalists John W. Powell, Sylvia Powell and Julian Schuman — who all were on trial for sedition for reporting from China on the U.S. BW campaign — to subpoena documents on the U.S. germ warfare program. In a sworn filing to the court, Schnacke offered a stipulation concerning U.S. capabilities with both offensive and defensive germ warfare, while denying the Armed Forces ever dropped germ weapons over Korea.
Backing up Schnake was a supporting affidavit from John L. Schwab, the former Chief of the Special Operations Division (SOD) at Ft. Detrick during the Korean War. Schwab had been a U.S. Chemical Corps officer since 1942. By 1952, he was also “Deputy Director of the activities” at Ft. Detrick.
But Schwab had a more incredible background.
According to former staff assistant to the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, John Marks, in his famous 1979 book, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, it was Schwab who created the SOD in 1950. But according to Miller’s history, quoted above, “The Special Operations Division was activated at Camp Detrick on 17 May 1949 to perform research and development in the field of covert or sabotage operations.” Moreover, SOD was also “responsible for liaison between the Chemical Corps and various government agencies….” (p. 53)
More ominously, Schwab also was present on November 18, 1953, when his co-worker, Frank Olson, was surreptitiously dosed with LSD (and possibly other drugs) at a get-together of CIA and SOD personnel at Deep Creek Lodge in western Maryland (Marks, pg. 55).
The Olson story itself is famous and was recently the subject of an Errol Morris Netflix documentary, Wormwood. The CIA has explained that the CIA use led Olson to commit suicide. But according to the late researcher Hank Albarelli, Olson was killed by the CIA because he was a security risk. From his vantage point at Ft. Detrick’s SOD, Olson knew the details of the U.S. biowar plans and operations.
According to my research, it seems highly likely that the bioweapons constructed as part of the CIA’s Project MKNAOMI, in concert with advice and possible operational collaboration with the former bioweapons researchers from Japan’s Unit 731 and officials from the U.S. Chemical Corps, were shipped to Korea by the CIA for use in the Korean War. The Unit 731 leaders had been granted amnesty by the United States only a few years earlier for BW war crimes against China during World War II, with the prid pro quo that the Japanese scientists, who had gathered their data largely via fatal experiments on prisoners at their large secret labs in Harbin, Manchuria, would provide the data from such experiments on germ warfare directly to the Americans.
In January 1951, the Chemical Corps Technical Committee approved the M33 biological cluster bomb as a standardized BW weapon with a “fill” of the pathogen brucella suis. — Picture in the Public Domain, via Wikipedia
Moreover, important personnel from the Department of Defense’s Research and Development Board, and the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps, who were intimately involved in the assimilation of Japan’s BW program and data, and the amnesty
Schwab had close and daily contact with CIA leadership and researchers involved in MKNAOMI, the covert program the CIA operated in collaboration with the U.S. Army, where they worked in tandem, as the 1970s U.S. Senate Church Committee put it, “developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops” (pg. 6).
The Army was inhibited in conducting germ warfare due to a wobbly “retaliation only” use policy, so that any such use of BW would by necessity have to be covert. In a discussion of the “retaliation only” policy by Air Force historian Dorothy L. Miller in her formerly Top Secret History of Air Force Participation in Biological Warfare Program, 1951–54, Miller wrote:
Secret vs Covert
What appears evident is that there were two different BW programs underway by February 1952, when the North Korean and Chinese governments went public with charges of wide-spread U.S. bombing with biological weapons. One program was overt, run by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, though still subject to classification as secret or top secret. The aim of the program was to establish weapons that later would be openly used.
The other program was covert, deniable, its operational approval never written down, and run via the CIA (likely with knowledge or participation of selected U.S. Army Chemical Corps leaders and scientists). The CIA had their own aircraft, but otherwise used USAF, Army, Marine, and other military units and personnel as required, with the blessing of the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had already been pushing for a “crash” program in BW as early as 1950.[3]
With this in mind, Schwab’s affidavit reads like an exemplar of “plausible deniability.” It is worth reproducing its primary assertions.
Schwab noted in the first of two statements that from 7 July 1950 through 23 July 1953 the U.S. Army had primary responsibility “for biological warfare agents for all the Armed Forces Services of the United States.” He stated:
The second Schwab affidavit, dated like the first on 23 December 1958, states:
Nowhere in either Schwab or Schnacke’s affidavits is there any mention of the CIA, or covert use of BW, such as we know from previous investigations and document releases took place. It appears by 1959 at the time of the Powell trial, the U.S. government was willing to admit offensive BW capabilities as a “limited hangout” to better hide the covert BW program that actually took place. Powell’s case was ultimately dismissed as a mistrial in 1959, but legal prosecution hanged over those involved until the early 1960s, as the government sought to destroy the lives of those who reported truthfully on the Korean War BW scandal.
“Baptism by Fire”(이것을 이미 글로 올려드렷습니다)
In September 2020, I posted, with analysis, two dozen declassified CIA communications intelligence reports from 1952 that described Chinese and North Korean military units describing attacks with germ warfare weapons by the United States, and their reaction to such attacks. Posted as part of the CIA’s “Baptism by Fire” release of selected Korean War documents, this was the first strong documentary evidence from U.S. government sources of the validity of Communist charges of U.S. use of biological weapons during the Korean War. (The documents themselves have been posted online.)
It is well documented that by 1943 the US military and its allies had developed a robust and well-funded biological warfare program. The U.S. had helped develop with Great Britain an anthrax bomb, and had even begun pilot production of anthrax ordinance at Camp Detrick in May 1944 (Harris and Paxman, 1982/2002, p. 104).
Earlier, in July 1945, according to a “Secret” memo, written by Captain Donald B. Summers, Chemical Warfare Service Chief to the Special Assistants Division of the Research and Development Branch of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, in the final months of World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given approval for the use of “plant BW provided the theater commander wishes to use it.” Authorization was not written down but given orally.[4]
The issue of the possible contribution of Japanese BW research to alleged U.S. biological weapons attack during the Korean War was a prominent feature in propaganda from the Soviet Union, China and North Korea during the period. A good example of this can be found in the full February 22, 1952 statement from the North Korean Foreign Minister.
In September 1952, the Report of International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China, issued under the auspices of the World Peace Council, and solicited by the Chinese government and some Western scientists, specifically pointed out the similarities between the alleged germ warfare attacks and the methods of Japan’s Unit 731 (Report of the ISC, 1952, pgs. 11–12 and 58), most notably the use of insect vectors to deliver pathogens.
Stubblefield and Wetter: Links between Unit 731 and the U.S. Biowar Program
In a ground-breaking 1981 article in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientistsexposing the U.S. decision to shield Japanese officials and scientists associated with Japan’s research and operational use of BW, journalist John W. Powell, who had earlier escaped prison for reporting on U.S. BW, described how two doctors associated with U.S. biological warfare research, Edward Wetter and Henry I. Stubblefield, had strenuously argued for collaboration with the Japanese military bioscientists. (See pgs. 47 and 48.)
From a Ft. Detrick in-house history, this blurry, “rare picture,” dated 5 October 1954, shows “many of the principals of the biological laboratories from World War II to early 1960’s. They represented the Chemical Corps Advisory Council.” Dr. John L. Schwab, “technical operations,” is middle row, far left. Dr. Henry I. Stubblefield is middle row, third from the right. Dr. Edwin Hill, a Ft. Detrick scientist who co-authored a secret report on the work of Unit 731 is in the back row, fourth from the right — Public Domain (see alternate version of this picture at this link, p. 55)
According to Powell, in a July 1, 1947 memo meant “for restricted circulation to a handful of military and State Department officials,” Stubblefield and Wetter reported that Ishii (이시이 시로..731 부대 책임자) and his associates were cooperating with U.S. officials and “had agreed to supply photographs of ‘selected examples of 8,000 slides of tissues from autopsies of humans and animals subjected to BW experiments.’” (See also this Washington Postarticle.)
Moreover, Stubblefield, who was with the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, and Wetter, who was with the National Research and Development Board, argued(최종 결정은 맥아서가 함...731의 생체실험 결과가 미국의 자산이 되게 최종 결정한 사람은 더글러스 멕아더 엿다....고...고 고....그냥 외워........씨발놈들아.....인천에 맥아서 동상세워놓고, 위안부 할머니들의 상처를 어루 만지겟다고??.............쌩 지뤌들 떨어라 ...쌩 지뤌를...) that Ishii and his collaborators should not be subjected to the war crimes prosecution then being organized under the auspices of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. They wrote, “such publicity must be avoided in the interests of defense and national security of the U.S.”
These Defense Department-affiliated doctors also found that the Japanese BW data was “of great value to the U.S. BW research program,” adding, “The value to U.S. of Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes prosecution’” (Powell, ibid.). This was not the last we will hear of Drs. Stubblefield and Wetter. [5] [6]
A “Crash” Program in BW
On June 30, 1950, only a few days after the official outbreak of the Korean War, an “ad hoc” committee chaired by Earl Stevenson, President of the large consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc., submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense, General George Marshall, with observations and recommendations on the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons (CBR). Among its “major recommendations” were that CBR weapons “not be restricted by a policy of use ‘in retaliation only.’” (Report, 1950, p. 1)
법과 규정이란 어기기 위해서 만들어진 것이다..................흠!!
The Stevenson committee also recommended that “field tests of biological warfare agents and munitions be carried out as soon as possible on a scale sufficient to determine the military worth of agent-munition combinations, their offensive uses and the means of defense against them, and to secure definitive information on other problems inherent in biological warfare.” (Ibid.)
The authors of the Stevenson report stated, “Biological agents have never been used on a significant scale in warfare and have been incompletely explored as weapons” (p. 15). But this was not true, and the Stevenson reports failure to mention the U.S. protection of and collaboration with Japan’s Unit 731 is indicative of just how deeply that cooperation was buried.
Screenshot of cover page of the June 1950 Stevenson Report
So it is with some surprise that one of the four Defense Department officials assigned to the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Committee was the aforementioned Edward Wetter, who knew a great deal about Japan’s research into and use of biological weapons. Such knowledge was apparently only for those briefed on such classified information. Still, the Stevenson report went on to state, “the potential worth and the dangers of BW appear to be great…. Evidence from various sources supports such a conclusion” (Ibid.) Those sources were not enumerated, but it seems highly likely that is a reference to the Japanese studies.
---731부대의 세균전의 성과를 한껏 활용한 전쟁이 한국 전쟁이엇다.......라고 말 한다 하여 틀린말이 아니다....는 것인데
중국은 중일전쟁때...일본황군 731부대에 당햇고,,, 한국전쟁때는 미군으로 위장한 일본황군 731부대에 또 당햇다.
중국은 두번씩이나 일본인들의 세균전의 마루타가 되엇던 셈이다..
뭔.....용뵹활!!!
The Stevenson report considered the “military worth” of biological weapons, and opined, “Conclusive information” of such military worth “is not likely to be found short of their use in war.” Data on “their operational feasibility and effectiveness could be obtained if the BW agents, together with their munitions, were subjected to large-scale field tests.” But “adequate field testing facilities” were “not available.”
Even so, the “ad hoc” committee argued (with Wetter in the wings), “large-scale field tests on the BW agents and munitions should be carried out as soon as possible.” It would appear that the BW campaign in Korea and China in 1951–53 was just that large-scale use of BW to determine “military worth” of BW that the Stevenson report envisioned (Ibid, p. 17).
뭔.....지뤌을 처 맞을..
In October 1950, Secretary of Defense Marshall approved the recommendations of the Stevenson report, but held off on removing the “retaliation only” restrictions, which the Ad Hoc committee had advocated. According to a U.S. Army study of the period,[7] the Army’s Chemical Corps was given “prime responsibility for carrying out the Stevenson recommendations” (p. 3–1).
In November 1951, the Chemical Corps’ Office of the Chief Chemical Officer (OCCO) underwent a significant reorganization, and Dr. Henry I. Stubblefield — who we saw was intimately involved in the amnesty and cooperation with Unit 731 — was named Chief of the new Research Division with the Research and Development Branch of the OCCO, placing thereby another key U.S. official with knowledge of and enthusiasm for Unit 731’s activities at the heart of Chemical Corps’ BW efforts just on the eve of the alleged U.S. BW Korean War campaign, a campaign that was known to heavily rely on older Japanese techniques.
But even before Marshall had approved the recommendation, a BW production facility was already being planned at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Whether or not any BW materials from the U.S. ever made it to the Far East, expertise and covert operational capacity certainly was capable of making such a voyage. Meanwhile, according to the U.S. Army history cited above, “In September 1951, the JCS assigned priorities to the Army for the development of specific BW agents…. A directive to improve CBR readiness was issued to all elements of the Defense Department on 21 December 1951” (p. 3–3).
Less than two weeks before issuing an approval, on 15 February 1952, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, commenting on the JASC report, issued his own memo describing the JASC recommendations as “generally sound and their official recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would significantly aid the bacteriological warfare program…. A great deal of progress in the bacteriological warfare field has occurred since the inception of the JASC study… certain offensive capabilities are rapidly materializing” (Endicott and Hagerman, 1998, p. 227).
That’s a lot of “progress” in only five months, and it is tempting to wonder if it weren’t associated with the BW experimental campaign in Korea and China apparently “materializing” for use by the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps (and possibly the Navy) with the aid of former members of Japan’s Unit 731.
On 5 March 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson canceled the 21 December 1951 directive. The results of the BW “crash program” had been disappointing. According to Dorothy L. Miller’s USAF history of the period, “The new directive affirmed the necessity for a biological warfare program, but it reduced the pressure to build up an immediate capability. Instead, the emphasis was to be upon long range research and development, with an adequate field testing program. The military services realized that they had reached the point of diminishing returns on the development of existing end items (p. 79).”
Due to government secrecy, and the passage of time, we still do not know the full parameters of the U.S. biological warfare program during the Korean War period. Full transparency is something that awaits public clamor and concerted effort to finally end the Korean War, and thereby, finally end the Cold War itself.
Endnotes
1. Milton Leitenberg (2016), China’s False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States during the Korean War, CWIHP Working Paper #78, March 2016, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. [Online] Available at link. Accessed 29 October 2020. — Leitenberg turned down my request to answer a number of questions about his work, except to reiterate that Soviet archival documents, unearthed in 1998 and supposedly proving the Communists concocted BW “evidence,” were real. He would not answer questions I had about factual statements made in these documents and asked that I not write to him any further. A more intensive analysis of Leitenberg’s work on this subject is forthcoming soon, but some examples of my critique can be followed in this article. Similarly, questions sent to Kathryn Weathersby, the translator of the Soviet documents, and author of an early essay claiming their authenticity and reliability, went unanswered.
2. Dorothy L. Miller, History of the Air Force Participation in Biological Warfare Program 1944–1951, Historical Office, Office of the Executive, Air Materiel Command, Historical Study no 194, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, September 1952. Originally Top Secret, but declassified with deletions, June 1978. Available at link. The second part of her history, covering the period 1951–1954, is available at this link. Both links accessed 17 July 2021.
3. For a discussion of the CIA’s role in the Korean War, with special emphasis on the BW issue, see Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea, (1998, Indiana Univ. Press), Ch. 9, “The CIA in the Korean War,” pp. 129–142.
For an example of internal Chemical Corps references to the BW “crash” program in BW, see “Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Historical Report, 15 October 1951 to 31 December 1951,” Part V, “Operations”, pp. 8–9:
“Recommendations of the Chemical Corps Advisory Council (7–8 September 1951) were approved for implementation with the following reservations and comments:
“a. That the recommendation concerning cold weather agents correctly expressed the concern of the Chief Chemical Officer.
“b. That the proposed Crash Program in the BW field applied specifically to the development of the data necessary for design of plants and did not embrace the munition field. The recommendation was deferred pending receipt of an Advisory Council estimate as to the cost and availability of funds for the recommended Crash Program.”
The discussion about who was responsible for what in the BW program was a focus of Miller’s USAF history of participation in the BW program during the 1944–1954, referenced in this article. It was issued in two parts and is not fully declassified even now.
4. The documentation for this extraordinary claim, not documented in any current history of the subject, comes from “Final Summary Report on BW [Biological Warfare], from the Special Assistants Division, Research and Development Branch,” September 27, 1945, 7 pp., Records of the Office of Strategic Services (Record Group 226) 1940–1947, Entry 211, Box 20 of 45. Location: 250/64/32/1. CIA Accession: 85–0215R. Folder “G/6, Med Res. Lab #3”.
5. Since these two doctors will play an important role in the U.S. BW program, the relevant biographical details are provided here. In June 1947, Edward Wetter served as “Panel Director” of the Committee on Biological Warfare, part of the Defense Department’s Research and Development Board (Powell, 1980, p. 9). A June 1950 report to the U.S. Secretary of Defense from the “Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare,” aka the Stevenson Report, listed Edward Wetter as a representative of the Defense Department’s Research and Development Board on a four-person “Secretariat” to the Committee (Secretary of Defense Report, 1950, p. ix). In 1952, Wetter was introduced to a Congressional subcommittee on Appropriations, to whom he provided a classified briefing, as Deputy Executive Director of the U.S. Defense Department’s Research and Development Board’s Committee on Biological Warfare (Hearings, 1952, p. 212; Powell, 1980, p. 9) Only a few years after the end of the Korean War, Wetter worked as Executive Secretary, Committee and Panel on Special Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Development (U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1955, p. 114).
6. On November 1, 1951, Dr. Henry I. Stubblefield was appointed Chief, Research Branch, Research and Development Division of the Office of Chief Chemical Officer (OCCO, part of U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps). The same report that announced Stubblefield’s promotion directly referenced the Chemical Board’s proposed “Crash Program in the BW field” (Historical Report, 1952a, p. 9). Stubblefield apparently also served for some time during this period as Security Officer for the R&D Division of OCCO (Historical Report, 1952b, pp. 4 and 12). In February 1952, Dr. Stubblefield attended “Research and Development Board subpanel” meetings on “Agents” and “Medical Aspects,” presumably related to BW. In a 1993 history of Ft. Detrick operations, Stubblefield was listed as one of “many of the principles of the biological laboratories from World War II to early 1960s.” In a photo dated 5 October 1954, he is identified as being with the “Chemical Corps office” and, along with all the individuals in the photo, also a member of the Chemical Corps Advisory Council (Covert, 1993, p. 57).
7. U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, 1942–1977, Vol. 1, 25 February 1977, Department of the Army. [Online] Available at link. Accessed 22 May 2021.
Jeffrey Kaye is a psychologist (retired) and author of “Cover-up at Guantanamo“.