I think it’s what’s important here is that they had this sort of back channel relationship where the Kennedy and McCarthy, the Kennedys and McCarthy privately supported each other, including having social connections. And while Kennedy didn’t overtly take a stand on McCarthy, he also overtly did not condemn him or anything along those lines. I think that’s I think that’s really important to note that the Kennedys were fine with someone who would, like, get people blacklisted and go after them.
케네디를 이야기 할때,,, 메카시와의 관계를 이야기 하는 것은 윈스턴 처칠를 이야기 할때 칼리폴리 전투를 이야기 하는 것입니다.
그 만큼 케네디 지지자들에겐 지워 버리고 싶은 것이지만...
사실은 사실입니다..기록과 증거가 지지자들의 호의와 감성으로 덮어 질 수 는 없는 것이지요..
완벽한 사람은 없습니다.....
잇는 그대로를 평가해서 보다 객관성을 확보해야 겟지만,,,,이런것도 시각에 따라 시대 환경에 따라 달라집니다..
하물며 감성에 기초한 평가라면 증말 쓰얄때기 없는 짓인 것이지요..
노무현교 사마니즘은 ..이런 감성과 호의가 어디까지 진행 될 수 잇는지를 현실감 넘치게 보여주고 잇지요.
이게요..
다른소리도 말로는 이리 하지만......잘 안되요.....그것이 잘 된다면 이미 감성보다는 이성이 지배 하는 도인일 것일땐데 ...
다른소리가 박정희나 김종필에 대해 객관적인 평가를 할 수 잇을까??
누군가의 그런 평가을 묵묵히 받아 들일 수 잇을까??
정치도 감성이라고 하지요??
그게 그래요..
좋아하는 정치인이 생겻다고 함은....이미 객관성을 잃은 노예의 길로 접어 들엇다... 고 생각하면 됩니다.
BB: [00:20:46] It also, I think, is important to understand what the nature of liberalism was after World War two(2차대전 직후의 자유주의의 성격을 이해 하는 것은 중요하다...). Cold War liberalism involved domestic reform. So Cold War liberals clearly did support things like civil rights. And they’ll be important in the civil rights movement moving forward. But liberals hated the Soviet Union and communism, so they were all in on military budgets. They were all in on interventions. They were corporate liberals.(오늘날의 리버럴과 차이도 없습니다.. 한국의 좌파 진보가 민주당, 노무현 지지자들 이란 의미와 석겨서 사용되듯이 오늘날의 미국에서의 리버럴도 그렇습니다....때때로는 수구꼴통 공화당 지지자를 의미 하기도 하고 정반대로 민주당의 진보적 지지자를 의미하기도 합니다.....문맥으로 판단해야 합니다) They thought communism was an evil, just like everybody else did. These are the people who had destroyed Henry Wallace, put pressure on FDR in 1944 to remove him from the ticket.(핸리 월리스에 대해선 그동안 많을 글을 올려드렷습니다...역사란 항상 아쉬움을 냄깁니다......e h 카는 역사란 부족한 것을 채우는 것이다고 햇지요......역사에서 가정은 무의미 하지만 가정이 사라저 버린 역사는 맛이 없습니다....우리는 뭔가 갈증이 잇고 그 갈증을 역사에서 찾으려 하지요......핸리 위리스가 투르만에 밀린 것이나...트로츠키가 스탈린에 밀린것에 ...가정이 없다면 ..역사를 무슨 맛으로 읽을 수 잇지요?) . Monkeywrenched his candidacy in 1948. Red baited them. They red baited Truman, who had instituted loyalty oaths. And the government, they red baited people like Paul Robeson and other activists. In the early days of the Civil War movement. They were calling Martin Luther King a communist. And keep in mind, the Democratic Party was really strong in the South. There were there were no Republican senators in any southern states in the 50s.
(1950년대만 해도 남부주에서 공화당 상원의원이 없엇다.. 이런것은 매우 놀랍지요..??
민주당은 남북전쟁때 남부 백인 농장주들의 편을 들어....완전히 쪼빡을 찻습니다...
70여년동안 대통령을 배출 할 수 없는 사실상의 불임정당...우리로 치면 충청도 자민련 정도로 보면 됩니다..
하지만 그 기간 동안 민주당은 변신하여고 ..농민들과 노동자들의 지지를 확보 하엿고 ...이는 우드르 윌슨을 대통령으로 만들엇습니다...... 즉 윌슨은 변화된 신 민주당의 초대 대통령으로 보면됩니다....
지금은 공화당과 민주당의 위치가 완전히 바꿧습니다..
하지만 50년대만 해도...민주당은 여전히 남부지역에서 막강한 정치세력이엇다는 것입니다..
다른소린 작금의 요동치고 잇는 한국 정치를 바로 미국의 이런 변화로 해석 해 보기도 합니다..
민주당은 도무지 고처 쓸 수 없는 수구 꼴통정당이 되엇고
오히려 국힘당에서 미국의 민주당과 같은 변화의 용트림이 잇다는 것인데..
그것이 무엇이던 변화를 하려 한다면....나쁜 것은 아닐 것이다.....는 것이 지금의 다른소리의 생각입니다.
정당이 정치집단인 것이지....처 먹은 뇌물이 뽀록단 되진 미친놈의 교단은 아니쟎어..
Kennedy came out of that. The idea to portray him, not even ten years later, as this different person who cared for civil rights and hated war and hated the military and hated intervention, is just utterly ahistorical. There’s nothing for that. He was the opposite. He came in that culture, in that system, in that structure. And so as a result of that, you get his very close connections to McCarthy, to McCarthyism, to destroying people right there, blaming the State Department and the who lost China debate in the 1960 debate against Nixon, Kennedy attacked Nixon for not overthrowing Castro in Cuba. And look at Kennedy’s address. We will pay any price, bear any burden, fight any foe. We will do this and more is what he says. We’ll do this. And why don’t you do more than that? You fight any foe, bear any burden, right? He came into office out of that culture. He was a McCarthyite. His positions on civil rights were slow and meandering yet.
SP: [00:22:48] I’ll keep going. Then I’m going to say something.
BB: [00:22:50] Oh, okay. No, it’s position on civil rights were slow and meandering. He put pressure on King and others in the civil rights movement to slow down. It’s not time yet. You need to wait. He initially tried to get them to cancel the Freedom Rides, and reluctantly agreed to put federal marshals on the buses as they were getting firebombed and people were getting beaten up and literally killed in some instances. He moved slowly.
SP: [00:23:15] The one thing that he where he gained some cred with the civil rights movement is when King was in jail and one of the southern cities, and when he was running for president, it was in Atlanta, actually. And Coretta Scott King had actually called Kennedy, basically concerned about her husband’s safety and. He was encouraged to call Mrs. King Kennedy and. Basically Robert F Kennedy the next day made a well-placed phone call to secure King’s release. The important thing to note here, though, is what the Kennedy people did is they turned this into a pamphlet about how they had been this champions of civil rights, and had actually supported King getting out of jail in October 1960, and then distributed to black churches all over the country the weekend before election, November 1960. And so it’s a really cynical act. And we’re we’re talking about he’s this liberal civil rights supporter is it’s all completely Machiavellian political moves to sow the black vote. Turns out for him in an unprecedented sort of way.
BB: [00:24:22] And it was very important in winning that election as president. He doesn’t want to piss off the southern states. He keeps . . . he appoints southern segregationist judges. He’s constantly telling King to slow down. Finally, reluctantly, was dragged into proposing the civil rights law. And. In 1963, amid the filibuster, King and others decided to put even more pressure on him with the March on Washington, and he was killed shortly after that. There’s not much of a record there, and to call him somehow a heroic champion is preposterous. And of course, the irony is that Lyndon Johnson from Texas, who had clearly didn’t have a sterling civil rights record, actually ended up doing a lot of the things that Kennedy never did. Right. You want to create this image this young man shot down? Handsome guy, handsome family and all this kind of stuff. But if you look behind it, the Kennedys, you know, Machiavellian is the perfect word. Kennedy’s. Everything they do is calculated, and it’s the same.
SP: [00:25:18] It’s the same thing with the McCarthyism. It’s liberals did not they did not want to be painted with this sort of like, communist socialist thing that was coming out of the New Deal years. And so they really doubled down on going after Truman, State Department around China or supporting loyalty oaths or everything that you had mentioned. And that was that was also so that they would not be painted as weak. It’s interesting that morally, what I was going to actually say before is morally, in one of his tweets that he put out today is about how Nixon viewed Kennedy as a weakling. But it was Kennedy who actually was Nick. I can’t say that Nixon’s not a hawk, but it seems like Kennedy seemed even more hawkish and in many ways in that debate in 1960 and undermined Nixon’s credibility, talking about Cuba and many other things. Kennedy really outfoxed Nixon in many ways, and I find it interesting that he says he refers to Nixon and Kennedy as a weakling.
BB: [00:26:15] But this is what they do. And this is what I mean. It’s ghastly. Right? It’s all based on these kind of rumors like these. These cocktail party talks, parlor talk. Right? Nixon said this, and Clare Boothe Luce said this in the military about this, and they thought this. And look at the fucking records. I can’t even be more explicit than that. Killing a president is a big deal. You don’t do it casually because someone in the so-called deep state has a snit, right? And there’s no evidence for it. And that’s the thing you got to keep coming back to. You can gaslight us. You can insult me. I don’t care about you guys insulting, especially Aaron Good. Who’s really an embarrassment. Hey, but there’s just a record out there that they won’t even engage. So if any of you have the tenacity to listen to this, engage the record. If not, frankly, you don’t want to hear it anymore because there’s a big record out there that you simply never, ever have engaged. And we’ll talk more about that. Right? The stuff of McCarthyism that’s real. That happened, his foot dragging. And that’s a really nice euphemistic word, because it was much worse than that on civil rights is documented. It’s evident it happened right now.
BB: [00:27:17] Obviously, the crux of the conspiracy argument has to do with foreign policy, especially Vietnam, but other parts of the world, too. And we’ve done a ton of stuff on this. I’ve written a ton of stuff on this, too. Once again, I would suggest that these folks have issues with it to begin by reading or listening to what we’ve done. We’ve done a ton of things. I have, I think, 2 or 3 chapters in Masters of War, specifically about the Kennedy years. We’ve written and talked about that at great length. Kennedy came to office, you know, as a cold warrior . . . pay any price, bear any burden. Vietnam was a crucial place. Vietnam and Cuba were two important places. Cuba more, actually, when Kennedy took over. Also, I think it’s important, and Noam always points this out. Kennedy took office not even a month after Dwight Eisenhower had said that the military industrial complex is threatening American democracy. Right. And Kennedy never said anything like that. Kennedy never said anything like Eisenhower’s Cross of Iron speech, that every bomb we build, every airplane we make, is, is a bed taken away from a hospital. It’s a school that’s not being built. Kennedy. Never say anything like that. Right? Eisenhower.
SP: [00:28:24] I want to note a lot of those weapons manufacturers, because I’ve been following this very closely with the both the war in Ukraine and the current debacle going on in Gaza is that a lot of those companies are based in New England and Massachusetts. It’s important to to note that there’s a deep history of weapons manufacturing companies based in Massachusetts and Kennedy from Massachusetts.
BB: [00:28:47] And the Democratic Party was closely connected, that there’s a really good book by Frank Kofsky, The War Scare of 1948, Harry Truman and the War scare of 1948, where Democratic senators, the likes of Stuart Symington and Scoop Jackson was the. These are the forerunners of Tailgunner Joe Biden, right. Were really crucial and boosting the defense budget, building new aircraft, new military. Aircraft, built naval ships. This was. The Democrats were building up the American arsenal. Eisenhower actually wanted to cut defense spending and just build a bunch of airplanes that could that could carry long range missiles. Right. So it can be in all of these ways. Clearly was part of that intellectual, liberal, intellectual and political liberal heritage in Vietnam clearly is a demonstration of that in Cuba. He came into office right, barely a couple months in, sanctioned the Bay of Pigs attack to overthrow Castro, which was an utter disaster in the aftermath of that became even more important because he had looked foolish with regard to Vietnam. There’s so much, but I just want to hit 2 or 3 main points. One Kennedy immediately ratcheted up the American role there, sent in armor, sent in, herbicides, sent in helicopters, started using napalm and Agent Orange and things like that. When Kennedy assumed office in January of 1961, there were 8000, I’m sorry, 800 American advisors in Vietnam. By the time he left, there were 16,000. So there’s a consistent escalation there.(이런것은 케네디와 드골 간의 대화가 더 이해하기 쉬워 보입니다....드골은 월남전의 성격을 알고 잇엇고..케네디에게 월남전에 뛰어 들지 말것을 충고햇습니다...케네디는 미국은 프랑스가 아니다며 일소에 붙혓습니다....초기에 케네디가 월남전의 성과에 도취된듯 하자...드골은 말 햇지요.....이제 케네디는 서서히 월남전이 무엇인지 알아가게 될 것이다..) )
BB: [00:30:25] Right, two, which I think is really important is the thrust of much of the work I’ve done, the US military, the people who allegedly had him killed because he wasn’t gung ho enough about Vietnam and Cuba and everywhere else, didn’t want to go to Vietnam. If any group in the government was opposed to Vietnam, it had a realistic view of it, it was actually the military,(미군부도 미국의 월남전 개입을 승산업고 의미없는 전쟁이라 판단 햇습니다..) and I’ve written about that in great detail. And I’m not going to go into all of it right now. But if you look at anything we’ve done, there are short articles to the military. Officers thought Vietnam wasn’t crucial to American security. They thought that the other side there had a huge advantage in terms of morale and political influence to Vietnam, the NLF(민족해방전선- VC 베트콩) and others. They didn’t believe that the ally that the US had created in the South was really worth defending or able to exist on its own. They consistently said that the war was going to escalate. They consistently said the war was getting worse, and they consistently were very candid in expressing how difficult it was. And you even had people who really were hawkish, like Westmoreland and Maxwell Taylor, who would say, we really can’t get involved there. We we should never. And especially one of the things that they’ll often put up is that Kennedy didn’t want to send troops into Vietnam. Nobody wanted to send troops into Vietnam, no one ever, in the early 60s envisioned that you would have a point at which 542,000 American troops would be in Vietnam, that that doesn’t prove anything.
BB: [00:31:53] Kennedy never thought that. No, of course not. Nobody did. Nobody. Thought you would need them. Right. So it’s just they don’t know how to use historical evidence or even do historical research. So the military, the group which allegedly, you know, hated Kennedy and wanted him dead, actually had no real interest in Vietnam. And I would say the consensus within the military was that it was a bad idea. And like I said, read two or whatever, 2 or 3 chapters, and we’ve written about it as well. The third thing, which I think is really crucial, which they dodge all the time, is the coup. And on early November 1st, 1963, the US finally authorized and approved and helped execute a coup to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem(응오 딘 지엠--우리로 치면 이승만에; 해당한 독립운동가 엿쓰며 남 배트남 반공-친미 정치인). And Nhu his brother, the Ngo family. And they were killed which wasn’t in the American that wasn’t in the American planning, but they were killed as well. If you look at the records from like mid 1963 on, Kennedy and the, the white House are very upset at GM. Why is that? Because he’s ruining the war effort. He’s not popular. He’s harassing and repressing his own people. He’s attacking the Buddhists.(응오 딘 지엠은 천주교 신자로 특히 불교에 대한 대단한 종교적 박해를 가함) There was a prison camp in 1959 where over a thousand prisoners were poisoned to death by Diem.
BB: [00:33:10] He sent troops into Buddhist temples. He sent troops to take down Buddhist flags. And of course, you had the famous immolations, right? So they knew that. I’ve had to go in addition to that, something else that these folks on the Kennedy side never even acknowledged is that at that particular moment. And George Mctc, who’s as good as anybody ever been on the first person to come up with this, and we know it now. Even better, in the early in 1963, nobody knew was having covert talks with people in the Politburo led by Le Duan(레주언--북 베트남 공산당 실질적인 지도자). In the north. They were talking about some kind of negotiated agreement, any kind of negotiated neutral settlement where essentially the north and south, northern and Southerners would say, okay, we’re going to have a provisional government. And then in the course of time, we’ll unify the government. Well, everyone knew, as they did in 1954, when Kennedy and others supported Diem to monkey Wrench the agreement to have elections at Geneva. But everyone knew again that could never be elected to run a unified Vietnam, that in fact, the only people with the credibility to do that came out of the old Viet Minh or some of the front groups, people like Ho or Truong Chinh or Pham Van Dong or Le Duan. So basically in 1963, Kennedy understands that their options are to double down, to get into Vietnam even deeper, or to see a negotiated settlement which would leave the US with egg on its face and would leave power, or somebody from the Viet Minh in charge, those are their options.
BB: [00:34:47] They don’t have anything else. They either go in deeper or they get rid, or they lose, or they get rid of Diem and getting rid of is going in deeper. What did they think they were going to overthrow? And then everything would be fine. The war would be over. How? There were 12 governments in the ensuing 18 months in Vietnam, and a lot of those governments were overthrown by the US because the new Vietnamese leaders continued to speak to the Politburo in Hanoi about a negotiated settlement. Kennedy was far more afraid of peace breaking out in Vietnam than anything else that is to me. It’s like really all the evidence you need, right? If you’re going to get out of a war, if you’re in some kind of conflict, are you going to utterly just destroy the government you’re allegedly aligned with, or are you going to just monkey wrench that? I don’t think it’s start over again. It makes no sense. It’s preposterous. And there’s nothing in the record. They keep quoting NSAM 263. Oh, and NSAM 263 was declassified in the early 80s. It’s not something they say like, oh, what is it then? Lord of the rings or something like the precious thing or that’s what they treat it like, right? Some kind of ring.
SP: [00:35:58] The ring. It’s the ring, it’s the ring.
BB: [00:36:01] NSAM 263 is a boilerplate document. It had been around in various forms for quite some time prior to that. It suggested that if things continue to go well, and in 1962, actually things had improved because the United States had sent so much firepower in there that they were using that with some success. The Vietcong and other groups rallied By early 1963, especially at Ap Bac, they had reversed that. But essentially NSAM 263 said, if the war is going well, we might be able to pull out some troops. Maybe we can withdraw some troops by the end of 1963. And then maybe if things go well, by 1965, the war will be over. That’s what policymakers do. They put together a documents. I’ve seen countless documents like that. These are the projections. That’s why you have things called the National Security Council, Policy and Planning Staff. That’s what these groups do. They study these things, and then they put out papers and they put out projections, about the military directorate’s military. And they all do that. If you go through archives, you’re going to come up with dozens of documents of this nature, and they’re going to suggest various alternatives.
BB: [00:37:08] There’s nothing wrong with saying, look, things go well, we can start pulling troops out on it. But the situation’s taken care of by 1965. We’re all fine. So what? The fact is, it wasn’t. And if it had been, if it had been that sweet and peachy keen, they wouldn’t have had a coup. They wouldn’t have been so upset that Nhu and Le Duan’s people were talking, they wouldn’t have continued to plan for a coup and overthrow them. They wouldn’t have. It’s just there’s nothing there. The evidence all points in an incontrovertible way to Kennedy ramping up the American commitment in Vietnam. That’s the only point that matters. It’s not who said what to who. Clare Boothe Luce, Richard Nixon, he’s weak. I talked to this guy. Somebody in France said this. It doesn’t freaking. matter. What matters is that every single bit of evidence in the historical record indicates Kennedy ramping up Vietnam. That’s it, that’s it. Yeah. Yeah. Like, how fucking hard is that? Excuse my language. How fucking hard is that to figure out?
SP: [00:38:07] Yeah. I just want to point out there’s this really great quote from Chomsky, which I jotted down when we did one of these episodes, which is the Kennedy assassination cult is probably the most striking case, talking about conspiracies, etcetera. “The Kennedy–assassination cult is probably the most striking case. I mean, you have all these people doing super–scholarly research, and trying to find out just who talked to whom, and what the exact contours were of this supposed high–level conspiracy — it’s all complete nonsense. As soon as you look into the various theories, they always collapse, there’s just nothing there. But in many cases, the left has just fallen apart on the basis of these sheer cults.” I think it’s really important to point out, is that they spend a lot more time talking about that one hearsay, and not documented conversations from people who are like, maybe not Nixon, but like others who are like, largely irrelevant. But then I’ve never actually seen any of the conspiracy. The assassin analogy is conspiracy. People actually dive into the November 1963 coup against Diem, right? They never talk about what.
BB: [00:39:13] Is Chomsky, Noam Chomsky? No, no, that’s my point.
SP: [00:39:16] Well, the Gaslight, by the way, they gaslight Chomsky all the time too. So yeah.
BB: [00:39:19] Yeah. Chomsky wrote a book called . . . Rethinking Camelot, which is 200 and some pages of documentary evidence, much like this stuff we’ve done. Right. We’re not sitting here talking about some tweet. We’re talking about what the record actually shows(다시한번...감성과 이성을 다릅니다...소망과 사실은 전혀 다른 것입니다.....노무현교 쥐쇗끼때들이나 박정희교 미친놈들에게 다른소리가 수 없이 반복하여 이죽거려온 말 입니다......사실을 보세요...사실이 중요합니다), which is how you do history. Right? What they were saying at the time, not what somebody said 30 years ago, how you do scholarship. Right after Kennedy took office, he was asked a question about Vietnam, and he said, “if we postpone action in Vietnam to engage in talks with the communists, we can surely count on a major crisis of nerve in Vietnam and throughout Southeast Asia. The image of US unwillingness to confront communism induced by the last performance [this is also after the Bay of Pigs] will be definitely confirmed. There will be panic and disarray.” And this is like when Biden said, is there any possibility of talks and Palestine? No. No possibility. That’s what Kennedy saying. We won’t even engage in talks, right? Because it would make us look weak. Credibility is huge. I would suggest reading the work of Gabriel Kolko on Vietnam. So what Biden is.
SP: [00:40:19] Saying about Ukraine, too? Yeah, that’s.
BB: [00:40:20] Right. And I would suggest, I think Kolko’s done the best stuff on Vietnam, and Kolko talks a lot about credibility and how important that is to be seen as strong. Right? The idea that he’s this soft, teddy bear kind of guy who wants to bring peace to the world and all these wars is preposterous. Again, no evidence for it. Right? And so you have that. There’s so much to do with Kennedy and Vietnam and like I said, but the three key points, I think, are consistent escalation, both in terms of commitment of manpower, commitment of weapons, use of dioxins and Agent Orange and things like that, two would be the military’s consistent reluctance and often opposition to fighting in Vietnam, which totally undermines any idea that there was a motive there to get rid of them. Right. And the CIA is not involved in this to any great extent either. Right. And third, of course, is the coup, which I think is really by itself takes care of the whole issue. The coup by itself, really, I think, destroys any particular argument that Kennedy was somehow going soft on Vietnam. We’re going to get out of Vietnam. That’s just it’s ridiculous. Yes. You don’t have a coup three weeks before your own death, right? Or three weeks before you’re going to start this withdrawal from Vietnam. It’s utterly insane. Right. And something just, you know, because Morley and these people keep saying, name one right wing person, that’s the people of Vietnam. If they think Kennedy was weak, ask the people of Cuba if they think Kennedy was weak, ask the people in Brazil and Guyana and Iraq if they thought Kennedy was weak.(같은 식으로 질문해 보시기 바랍니다....노무현이 진보적인 서민 정치인 이엇습니까?.......아직도 이런 질문에 답 하기를 주저 한다면....해골을 짤라 버리던지...더 도을 딱고 난 다음 나발 거리시기 바랍니다)
BB: [00:41:50] But what did he say? Ask a right wing Cuban . . . who gives a fuck about right wing Cubans, right? They were nuts. And Kennedy knew they were nuts. . . . Basically, Kennedy is trying to help them and they’re not really understanding what he’s doing. If you look at Cuba, much like Vietnam, the record is just really crystal clear. There he tries to overthrow Castro within a couple of months of becoming president, then immediately authorizes Operation Mongoose to conduct all kinds of subversion against the Cuban government of Castro. They institute all kinds of international sanctions, including the most brutal embargo the world has seen, although 17 years, I would assume people who’ve been in Gaza the last 17 years could make a case for that as well. But they institute this brutal embargo they engaged in, obviously, in covert operations. That’s why the U-2 was shot down. They were ratcheting up internal security throughout the region. And whenever they talked about Latin America. Whatever country it was in Latin America. Castro was their point man. Right. We have to do this because of Castro. We have to do that because we need the Alliance of Progress, because of Castro. We need the School of Americas, because of Castro. We need internal security programs because of Castro. Right. So the idea that somehow like that and they’ll acknowledge that this was. But then in their version of things, the Cuban Missile Crisis was his road to Damascus.
BB: [00:43:15] That was his epiphany. The world came close to getting blown up. And so he decided at that point he’d been wrong and he’d have to change course. Right. Now, you and I did a really great show on the Cuban Missile Crisis, right? And we looked at all the more recent documents. We were doing stuff the day of the show. We were still getting new documents from National Security Archive, putting them. Yeah. And I remember emailing back and forth that whole week with Chomsky. Have you seen this? Have you seen this? He’s sending me stuff and so on. So that reflected everything that was new that day. And what did we see in the Cuban Missile Crisis? He was reckless. He was provocative. Right. He never took measures to defuse the situation. That was actually Khrushchev who did that.(큐바 위기때 케네디는 무자비 햇고 도발적이엇다..케네디가 긴장완화를 위해 한 일은 없고...후르시초프가 햇다) Right. So at every point along the way, Kennedy, despite the rhetoric, wanted to take a hard line. Now, there were others who were more hawkish than him. That’s true. That’s what policymaking is. You had a bunch of people in a room, and not everybody agrees, and some people may disagree virulently. But the fact of the matter is, Kennedy didn’t take any kind of soft line, and it was really important for Kennedy to be seen as the victor in this, to the extent where he actually threw Adlai Stevenson under the bus afterward. Stevenson was the UN ambassador, and he put the story out that Stevenson is the one who wanted to negotiate, and he wouldn’t let the media report on the trade for the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
BB: [00:44:38] And I think what’s and again, this kind of seals the deal. During the missile crisis, the US continued subversive operations. And after it was over, they ramped them up again. And in fact, it wasn’t in November of I can’t remember the precise date right now. November of 1963, the US authorized these Miami terrorists to blow up a Cuban factory, and they killed 400 people right now. What’s that? You’re trying to bring freaking peace to the world, right? And they thought Castro was so upset [at JFK’s death]. Castro had a meeting and met in September of 1963. This is before Kennedy was killed. He had a meeting with a reporter from, I think, UPI. It was like an event at the Brazilian embassy in Havana or something like that. And Fidel went off on a rant about Kennedy. He’s trying to get rid of us. I can’t stand the guy. Like the Cubans didn’t see Kennedy as going soft and in fact, a very ham handed story. But also, I think, reflective of what Kennedy was really like on November 22nd, 1963, 60 years ago today, there was a Cuban operative in Paris. His codename was Am/Lash, who was being given a poison pen or something like that to use to to kill Castro. And how many? The church Committee showed that the kind of constant subversion and attempts at assassination and everything else. Yeah.
SP: [00:45:54] And I just I want to say is that in JFK revisited, which is the documentary, the faux documentary that that Oliver Stone put out last year is that there’s a segment on the where Kennedy was being progressive on foreign policy with different in different parts of the world, and one was Cuba, and it was taught and they actually talk about how Kennedy was trying to thaw the freeze with Castro. And there’s a quote that Castro says on the assassination day, this is a very bad thing. Castro probably thinks it’s a very bad thing, because it means the US is going to blame them and come after them would be my interpretation of that. Not because Kennedy was some dove that was about to open up US Cuban relations for the better. So just it’s just.
BB: [00:46:36] And Oswald was connected with reason to Cuba, right? He’s he’s the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. So yeah. Why would Castro think, oh, this is great. Of course he understands. There’s going to be a lot of attention thrown on Cuba. He’s afraid they’re going to blame him for it, which is at least the conspiracy people don’t do that. But yeah, there’s no again, nothing in the record to indicate that Kennedy was anything other than aggressive and continuing to escalate that aggression in Cuba all the way to the very end. And and was it the last speech he ever gave, I think, on the topic, was in Miami, just a less than a week, I believe, before he was in Dallas, where he talks to the Miami, the community in Miami, the terrorist community in Miami, and he’s all in with them. He gave awards to to veterans of some of these brigades and things like that. The United States continued to train them in the Everglades, violating all kinds of international laws and everything else. But again, the record shows it and engage the record! Morley, Good, DiEugenio, Oliver . . . engage the record! Go to all those documents, read what people have written. Read what Tom Patterson has written. You don’t have to listen to me. Read Tom Patterson, read Chomsky, read Steve Rabe. There’s so many people out there who’ve done good work on this. Go to the Foreign Relations series, which is all online, the National Security Archives, it’s online. This stuff is there.
BB: [00:47:57] Right. So Kennedy, as in Vietnam, is ramping up hostilities, escalating American aggression and American involvement there. There’s no reason that anyone would have within the so-called deep state, within the foreign policy making apparatus to want him dead. Killing a president is a kind of a big deal, right? You can have issues with them. They keep talking about operations. Northwood, which Kennedy killed in 1962, and Northwood was another proposal to subvert and overthrow the Castro regime there that was constant. Sometimes you agree on a particular program, right? If you agree on a program within bureaucratic politics, that means you lost that one. And maybe you find a way to try to get in through the back door. But you really you assassinate a president because he chose one particular policy proposal over another? And he didn’t say, oh, no, I’m going to reject Northwoods, and we’re going to stop all hostilities toward Cuba. We’re going to stop all suffering. That never happened. That never happened. It’s again, it’s like NSAM 263 or or Clare Boothe Luce said this or Northwood said this. He cherry picked something and you extrapolate. This is like QAnon. It really has no more intellectual validity than the pizza parlors and QAnon or some of the crazy shit RFK Jr is saying and stuff like that in Cuba and in Vietnam, which I think are. The two big issues, but it doesn’t stop there either. If you look at his issues toward Latin America, and we did talk to Noam at some length about that.
BB: [00:49:25] Kennedy initiated this era of subversion of internal security. He sent tons of money to the militaries and right wing groups in these particular countries, places like Cuba, Guiana, and outside of Latin America. If you read the Latin American policy papers there. They all say the same thing. Because of Castro, we have to stop the spread of communism throughout the region, right. And Kennedy. Kennedy is quite candid about that. He even says the famous Trujillo equation. We don’t want people like Trujillo who’ve been overthrown in Dominican. Right? But if the alternative is, what we’d like to do is have democratic governments instead of Trujillo. But the alternative may be Castro type governments, and that we can’t tolerate. Potentially the worst thing you could have would be a Castro type government, and therefore you do whatever you need to do to prevent that from happening. The idea that JFK somehow would have been comfortable with a communist government, whether it be in Hanoi or Havana or anywhere, is utterly nuts. It’s just insane. It’s preposterous. He in Latin America, he ramped up aggression there again. It’s one of the articles I’ve written in and with regard to the Cold War and military spending. He did the same thing, right? You all of these ways. In all these measures, guess is condescending and insulting to point out evidence and facts and reality to people. But if you look at all.
SP: [00:50:53] It’s trolling, it’s what it.
BB: [00:50:54] Is. It’s trolling. Yeah, we’re trolling people with facts. Next thing we’re going to blind them with science. It’s really quite remarkable that this guy would have this kind of historic reputation, and it would be like it would be praised and, and put forth by the left, by, by these people like Chris Hedges, who I admire, and Abby Martin, Majority Report, Jacobin. It’s all over the place, right. New York Times What was it a couple of months ago, when the guy who claims he found a bullet on the gurney suddenly, 60 years later, remembers it right in the New York Times, right. Every everywhere these people go, they’re able to attract media attention and get a lot of juice for it. And they’ve convinced a lot of people who really should know better, you know, about this, and they’re looking for it. And that’s the thing that’s really looking for heroes. You know.
SP: [00:51:43] Just it’s lazy reporting and looking for clickbait basically. Yeah.
BB: [00:51:47] And, and but for them to turn around and attack people who point out their flaws and there are many. It’s really funny, right? It’s very typical. Right? It’s the Trump QAnon type of argument. You don’t engage what people say, you just flip it. It’s what aboutism? It’s what about you? Or look where that showed up or what have you ever done? Or you’re insulting me, man, these guys are really freaking soft and sensitive. If they’re like, insulted and and if they feel like I’ve been condescending, I could be condescending. I’ll condescend you if you want it, but it’s just preposterous. Simply by trying to have this debate over what the record says. Right? It’s funny, when I debated DiEugenio like almost everybody who listened to it said, wow, man, you were really, like, cool and calm and all you did was talk about . . . Yeah, of course that’s what historians do, because it’s like, well, they just kept talking about anecdotes and anybody could do this. I have no special intellectual skills that enable me to think of things like, anybody could see this stuff. And there are, like I said, most people who I think have studied Kennedy have come to the same conclusions. There’s not a whole lot of people praising him and his work, and those who do think are just caught up in that myth of Camelot. They probably grew up in that era, and it was, if you look back, I mean.
SP: [00:53:01] And then and then 28 years later, after, when the myth of Camelot has started to fade, it’s still in the early 90s, it was still my grandparents generation was still here, and my parents generation who’s still here now. But but then Oliver Stone does a little bit of a reset on it, because he releases a film and makes this into a political issue. He makes a Hollywood movie about something where he inserts a lot of fiction into it, and then promotes it as fact, and then goes and goes on tour for the next couple of decades. And then he did another reset last year as well, like 30 years later after after JFK’s release. And I think Oliver Stone’s actually a talented filmmaker. I enjoy Platoon and Born on the 4th of July and films like that. But I also think that with JFK and actually the another movie he made after that, which was about Nixon, is that he’s used this to keep this alive, and it gives fuel to the fire for the DiEugenios and Aaron Goods of the world. I think Morley’s a little bit of a different animal, but definitely it just gives those people credence where it’s baffling how much cred they and how they’re building something of a career out of it.
BB: [00:54:13] Yeah, the boring part of this is it’s this is really about how people use evidence and how you do historical research. And I don’t want to turn this into a graduate student seminar. But the reality is they’re not doing that. They’re entertainers. They’re not held to the same standards. Yeah. That’s true. And and, you know, Stone was born in the 50s. So he was young, you know, when Kennedy, you know, came to political life. He’s a Vietnam vet. You know, I mean, I know a lot of people from that generation who still speak with great reverence about JFK and the Kennedy myth and look at how popular.
SP: [00:54:49] Soprano, junior soprano man.
BB: [00:54:51] Soprano. Right, Tony. He was with JFK mistress. He met JFK mistress. Look at how popular RFK junior was, at least at the outset, right. Because it evoked that. And so people of that generation, you want to believe the best about Kennedy, right? And if you look at the way the media report about him at the time, it was like the guy was like virtuous and almost messianic, right? And so they don’t want to let go of that. You know, people like Stone. But the reality is you have to do historical research, get into documents, you find all the available evidence. You figure out what people were saying at the time, what the various competing interests were, what some people said to support a particular position, what some people said to oppose a particular position, what the president decided to do. John F Kennedy decided to ramp up the American commitment in Vietnam. John F Kennedy decided to overthrow the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. John F Kennedy decided against the the advice of of most of his military, to continue to pursue a military solution in Vietnam with more American resources, John F Kennedy decided to authorize mongoose against Cuba. John F Kennedy decided to confront the Russian subs during the missile crisis. John Kennedy decided to continue subversive operations. After that, John F Kennedy decided to ramp up military spending. He decided to overthrow governments in places like Iraq and Brazil and Guyana. He decided all that, and there’s a huge documentary record of it.(이 대담의 결론입니다...)
많은 미국인들의 -심지어 일부 자칭 좌파 사회주의자들을 포함- 의 케네디에 대한 우호적인 인식과는 매우 다르게 ..
케네디 또한 냉전이후 수 없이 당을 바꿔가면서 계속되어 이어지고 잇는 미국의 패권주의, 군사주의, 예외주의에 결단코 예외일수 없는 미국의 대통령중의 한명이다는 것이고..
사람들의 막연한 인상, 근거도 빈약한 한두게의 문서나 언변, 꼼짝없이 그럴싸한 작가적인 구성 따위가 아닌 ,,
케네디의 정책과 관련 기록과 문서, fact에 근거한 추정등...광범위하고 복합적인 분석에 의한 필연적인 결론이다는 것입니다.
올리버 스턴의 영화 한편이나 ...케네지 추종자들의 아직도 버리지 못한 교주님 할렐루야 근성...답답하고 때론 참혹한 현실에 대한 비판과 냉소 따위가 ....케네디에 대한 평가가 되어 서는 않된다는 것입니다..
우리에게도 꼭 같은 케네디 현상이 잇지요.
박정희 할렐루야, 노무현 사마니즘이 그런것입니다.
감성적인 것이야.....다른소리가 알바 아닙니다....어차피 개인들의 선호 문제입니다.
하지만 객관적인 평가는 감성과는 다릅니다.
fact가 아닌 평가는 항상 기괴한 샤마니즘을 만듭니다..
이런 기괴성에서 노무현 샤마니즘은 박정희 할렐루야 증세보다 훨씬 중대하고 병리적입니다.
시간이 지난 후...
노무현교 미친개들의 십자포화를 걱정하지 않앗도 되는 시대에 누군가 ...
호기심에서던 역사적 사명에서던 ...또 무엇이던 ,,,,노무현을 정책과 기록과 증언에 바탕하여 객관적이고 복합적으로 평가해 보려 할 것인데 ,,
그들 또한 위의 대담자들의 케네디에 대한 평가와 꼭 같은 말을 하게 해서는 안 될 것 아닙니까??
그들도 위 대담자들과 꼭 같은 말을 할 것입니다...
-노무현은 진보적이지도 서민적이지도 개혁적이지도 않앗고 그 시대의 모든 대한민국 대통령들이 다 그러햇듯이
통산적인 보수를 훨씬 넘어 ....삼성과 강남과 미국에 환장한 전형적인 갱상도 수구 꼴통 대통령이엇을 뿐이다.
- 왜 노무현에 대해 이리도 엄청난 왜곡이 잇는가??....
이에 대한 답변은 한국에서 보다는 중국의 문화혁명을 참고하는 편이 더 좋을것 같다..
BB: [00:56:23] We have these things called footnotes, which would suggest they check out, rather than I interviewed the CIA guy who said that 30 years ago he found a bullet on a gurney. I know I’m conflating everything, but you get my point, right? Look at what was happening. And there’s just a ton and great. If you want to interview people, that’s fine. But that doesn’t supersede what actually happened. What I say happened 30 years ago is not a more credible version than what actually happened at the time that I recorded or reported, or that somebody viewed or that there’s a paper record for. Right, that’s more credible, that’s more credible, and they don’t do that because they know it would undermine it. Right? They want you to believe they want all of us to believe that people in the CIA and the military had issues with Kennedy over these specific policy disputes.(김진숙이 말 햇지요.....사람들은 당신이 조중동과 싸웟다고 말 하는데 우리가 보기에는 당신은 누구 보다도 조중동와 같이 하고 잇엇다.....)...And because of that, they conspired. And this has to be a pretty big conspiracy, right? They conspire to kill a US president. And then nobody spilled the beans about it. Nobody talked about it. Right. It’s it’s just if somebody handed that script to script, you could do this Hollywood. So you can do whatever you want. That’s fair. That’s cool. I don’t expect movies to be historically accurate. They’re movies. Right? But if somebody handed that story to a press to write like a nonfiction book, it would be thrown out. It’d be laughed at. Right? Since there’s no feasible evidence for any of it.
-우리에게 필요한것은 이미지 다....fact가 아니다..
나는 영화 따위에서 역사적인 정확성을 기대 하지 않는다
누군가가 논 픽션 같은 노무현에 대한 저따위 영상을 제시 한다면 난 집어 던저 버릴 것이다.
난 노무현의 5년 집권기간동안 노무현이 사람사는 세상을 만들기 위해 노력햇다는 그 어떤 증거도 보지 못 햇기 때문이다.
사람사는 세상????
노무현과 노무현교 주총자들에게서 괴벨스의 영상이 중첩되는 이유입니다.
다른소린 민주화가 전부는 아닐 것이다는 막연한 회의감은 갖고 잇엇지만
민주화가 이런 참혹한 사마니즘까지 치 달릴 수 잇을 것이다고는 ....차마 생각하지 못 햇습니다.
산적을 내 몰고 화적때를 불려들엿쓰니 .....
BB: [00:57:52] Oh, the Devil’s Chessboard and Oliver Stone and all this shit. They just throw all this at you and don’t give you a chance to respond. They. For you or shut you out, and then they accuse you of not saying anything. And all I’m simply saying is look at the evidence.(사실만은 보라-너엄 촘스키) You have to listen to anything I say. Look at all the evidence. Read what we’ve written. I say read it because I wrote. I’m saying read because there’s a bunch of footnotes in it. Okay. It’s really maddening. And this heroism, I think that’s the worst part of it really wouldn’t be that big a deal, except so many people on the left are really thumping their chest and they’re all in over this. And it’s just Joe Biden is the legitimate heir of JFK. He’s this is what Kennedy would do. So I said, if you’re looking at Scoop Jackson’s presidency(민주당 워싱턴주 상원의원), it’s Kennedy presidency. It’s no different. I think those guys probably did have better domestic programs than Biden. But this is the reality. This is what Democrats do. This is what the Democratic Party does to suggest that somehow we’re not even talking about JFK as an outlier. We are talking about him as the utter apostate of it. All right. He’s the prodigal son who just went off, totally left the reservation and did everything different. And that’s utterly ridiculous. There’s just no evidence of it. I don’t know what to say. And I don’t get why this need for heroes is.(영웅주의에 대한 근본적인 회의를 말 한 것)
SP: [00:59:09] Yeah, there’s a lot of there’s a lot of emptiness out there, I guess, that they’re trying to fill with something that they really that they’re being spoon fed this and they’re trying to fill some void they’re looking for.
BB: [00:59:21] They search for it . . . Bernie Sanders and Cornel West, and they’re looking like we need the next hero, right? Yeah. Like, dude, organize. Can you tell me who the head of Jewish Voice for Peace (이스라엘에 대한 보이콧, 투자 회수 및 제재 캠페인을 지원하는 미국의 반시온주의 좌파 유대인 활동가 조직) is? I can’t, I have no idea. I don’t know who. I don’t know who, who’s created the group, I don’t know. They’re freaking amazing. These people are amazing, right? There’s not a single person in there who’s a hero. They’re doing what they need to do. Students for Justice in Palestine. The folks you worked with last week. You don’t need some media darling. We talk so much about Martin Luther King with good reason, right by himself. King doesn’t create civil rights movement. There’s a huge number of SNCC and there’s Ella Baker, and there’s the people in North Carolina. There’s just all over. Freedom Summer. People like John Lewis and Staughton Lynd. Right? And you don’t need some Superman, some Ubermensch to come in and save the day. And Kennedy certainly was not that. It’s just nuts. Look at the people. Like after he died, the same people were there, right? The same people were there for LBJ telling them what to do in Vietnam, telling them what they’re doing back, largely.
SP: [01:00:28] Ignored by the people who claim that they know all the facts.
BB: [01:00:31] Yeah, they know the facts . . . that that you can find five facts that fit your puzzle. That’s all you need. And what we’re doing is presenting, and it’s not. What I say. We. I’m not saying like what Scott and I say that’s just we’re we’re channeling what we know and what we’ve presented. So when I say what we say, what I mean is the stuff we found is overwhelming. It doesn’t matter who says it or who writes it. Just go in and look at the documents. Look at the notes, go in and read the documents. Right. And there’s just nothing there. And if you want to get fame and fortune for it, “A Salut,” God bless you. You guys are big shots and you’re in the media and all that. That’s great. I don’t really care what bothers me. What I think is really dangerous, though, is that so many people are attaching themselves to that and it’s really skewing and murkying up the sense of politics that the left, I think, really should be engaged in. They’re looking for. They’re looking for their own version of Trump. They actually are.
SP: [01:01:26] It’s interesting how many people spend their time and resources, that the resources is what really gets me on pursuing this JFK conspiracy assassination cult in trying to get Biden to release the documents or to get themselves in the mainstream media. And they definitely are claiming to be part of some element of progressive politic right now. The Israelis, backed and funded by the US, are annihilating the people of Gaza. I looked at Aaron Good’s Twitter the other day, and he’s definitely retweeting stuff opposing the attack on Gaza. But why aren’t you spending your time and resources in undermining what liberals are doing in Israel and Palestine right now? Just like what Kennedy was doing in Vietnam and wanted to do in Cuba. That’s the thing about it is that this is all a pattern. This is . . . there’s nothing new. Nothing is happening different there than it’s happened in the last 100 years of US foreign policy. And Kennedy was a liberal. He was a Cold War liberal. He was anti-communist. He went after he was tacitly in partnership with Joe McCarthy. And they went after progressives and socialists and whoever else, communists and internationally, they waged war on the global South. And that’s exactly what Biden’s doing now.
지난 100년 동안의 미국의 대통령이 다 꼭 같은 년놈들이듯이 ...
노무현 이명박 박그뇌 문재인 윤성열......................모두 꼭 같습니다..
강도를 도적놈으로 바꾼다 하여 국민들의 위태로은 삶이 달라지지 않습니다
갈보를 화냥년으로 바꾼다 하여 죶 대가리가 더 재미를 느끼지 못 합니다.
And also the whole McCarthyism thing is they’re going after the left again right now. And the parallels are striking. Like, you’re right, Joe Biden is the sort of is the heir apparent to what also was Obama and Clinton, just to be fair. But there’s there’s nothing different going on here in 2023 than what’s going on in 1954 or whatever.
BB: [01:03:14] Or 1963 or. Yeah.
SP: [01:03:16] Yeah, yeah.
BB: [01:03:16] It’s just maddening. And it’s just obviously to see the left media’s plans. . . It. It’s frustrating when they latch on to these kinds of things and they’re participating in it. It’s unfortunate, you know? We really need to give priority to people who are out there doing stuff, who are in the streets, who are fighting against intervention and the military industrial complex.
SP: [01:03:35] And that’s my point, is that if if the conspiracists are against the attack on Gaza or they’re against the war in Ukraine or what have you, then why do they spend so much time and resources talking about something that happened 50 or 60 years ago, 60 years ago?
BB: [01:03:50] The undercurrent of all this is that there are particular people out there who are really good and want to do the right thing and make everything better. . . and that they’re being stopped. So who are these good people? It’s this. It really is. It’s a fable, right? We need a conspiracy to to explain away why these good people didn’t change everything. What good people in Vietnam? The people trying to change things tended to be in uniform. They were like generals and chiefs of staff and people like that who were saying, that’s a bad idea, right? Like, so just it confounds one because there’s just no basic evidentiary foundation to this stuff. There’s just no evidence. . . .
BB: [01:05:24] We could talk about this. We could go on and on and on because we have so much on this. I’ll leave you with this. The folks who’ve made it this far, we’ve put out all kinds of lists of the stuff we’ve done, articles, podcasts and so on. If you can’t find that, Google it. I wrote a book called Masters of War, which, like I said, has 2 or 3 chapters about Kennedy and Vietnam. I would just suggest that if you want to have an open mind about this, to go look at that stuff, look at the arguments made, look at the historical evidence presented, look at the sources, look at the notes, and you can pursue those further if you want to. Right. We’re not going to sit here and be gaslit and insulted into changing our point of view. I don’t respect what they write. I don’t think it’s based in any kind of history or historical evidence. I think they’re doing it because it certainly helps them on a personal level. But if that’s their motive or not, it clearly has. So I would just suggest, if you’re interested in this, to go out and figure it out for yourself, because the stuff is out there.(인투넷 시대의 최대의 혀택입니다...이런것을 활용할 수 없다면 빠가들이지요) If you don’t want to listen to Scott and me, that’s cool, but just go out and find the footnotes, the sources, the evidence, the historical vignettes. We don’t rely on tweets and anecdotes and year later interviews or anything like that. It’s important. We don’t need heroes. And the JFK thing is just one. You don’t go around and assassinate a president just for the hell of it. And that’s what these folks are saying. And we’ll pick this up again. We had planned on doing a lot on this, and then to some degree, I decided not to, just because we have, you know, we don’t get anywhere. The media doesn’t want to hear this side of things. And then, of course, in the last six weeks, all of us have just been obsessed with the horrors unfolding in Gaza. Thanks for this, and check it out on your own. It’s important, it’s important. So please check it out.
---)) 대담자들의 방식을 우리들에게도, 우리들의 토픽에도 꼭 같이 적용해 보시기 바랍니다.
인테넷 시대에는 관심만 갖고 잇다면 그리고 게으르지 않는다면 원하는 모든 정보를 검색할 수 잇습니다.
그런데 이런 정보의 조회와 습득에서도 또 다른 편향성이 만들어집니다.
자신들이 좋아 하는 정보와 논리만 취하고 ..그 반대편의 정보과 논리를 철처하게 배격 하는 기이한 편향성이 만들어졋습니다..
다양화는 커녕 오히려 극단화가 진행된 것이고......
이런 습성은 모든 것을 직선적이고 직렬적인 선상에 두고 구분하여 따로 따로 별게로 인식하고 접근하는 사고를 만들엇습니다..
병렬적이고 복합적인 사고를 싫어하게 합니다..
그런데 인간사는 과학이 아닙니다......
인간사의 그 무엇도 복합적이지 않고 이중적이지 않은 것은 없습니다.
확신적이고 결론적인것이라 할지라도 다르고 틀리수 잇다는 것은 항상 염두해 둔다면 더 좋을 듯 합니다.
SP: [01:07:12] Yeah, and if you like what you’re hearing, please share it on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. And if you’re watching this on YouTube, hit subscribe. If you’re listening on your audio platforms, please give us a rate and review. And then also if you like what you hear and check us out at our website, green and Red podcast.org and hit that support button or go to patreon.com/greenandredpodcast and become a patron and we will talk to you all again really soon.
Bob Buzzanco and Scott Parkin host The Green and Red Podcast.