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Still going strong
China’s Communist Party at 100: the secret of its longevity Ruthlessness, ideological agility and economic growth have kept it in power
On july 1st China’s Communist Party will celebrate its 100th birthday. It has always called itself “great, glorious and correct”. And as it starts its second century, the party has good cause to brag. Not only has it survived far longer than its many critics predicted; it also appears to be on the up. When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, many pundits thought that the other great communist power would be next. To see how wrong they were, consider that President Joe Biden, at a summit on June 13th, felt the need to declare not only that America was at odds with China, but also that much of the world doubted “whether or not democracies can compete”.
One party has ruled China for 72 years, without a mandate from voters. That is not a world record. Lenin and his dismal heirs held power in Moscow for slightly longer, as has the Workers’ Party in North Korea. But no other dictatorship has been able to transform itself from a famine-racked disaster, as China was under Mao Zedong, into the world’s second-largest economy, whose cutting-edge technology and infrastructure put America’s creaking roads and railways to shame. China’s Communists are the world’s most successful authoritarians.
The Chinese Communist Party has been able to maintain its grip on power for three reasons. First, it is ruthless. Yes, it dithered before crushing the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But eventually it answered bullhorns with bullets, terrorising the country into submission.
China’s present leaders show no signs at all of having any misgivings about the massacre. On the contrary, President Xi Jinping laments that the Soviet Union collapsed because its leaders were not “man enough to stand up and resist” at the critical moment. For which read: unlike us, they did not have the guts to slaughter unarmed protesters with machineguns.
A second reason for the party’s longevity is its ideological agility. Within a couple of years of Mao’s death in 1976, a new leader, Deng Xiaoping, began scrapping the late chairman’s productivity-destroying “people’s communes” and setting market forces to work in the countryside. Maoists winced, but output soared. In the wake of Tiananmen and the Soviet Union’s downfall, Deng fought off Maoist diehards and embraced capitalism with even greater fervour. This led to the closure of many state-owned firms and the privatisation of housing. Millions were laid off, but China boomed.
Under Mr Xi the party has shifted again, to focus on ideological orthodoxy. His recent predecessors allowed a measure of mild dissent; he has stamped on it. Mao is lauded once more. Party cadres imbibe “Xi Jinping thought”. The bureaucracy, army and police have undergone purges of deviant and corrupt officials. Big business is being brought into line. Mr Xi has rebuilt the party at the grassroots, creating a network of neighbourhood spies and injecting cadres into private firms to watch over them. Not since Mao’s day has society been so tightly controlled.
The third cause of the party’s success is that China did not turn into a straightforward kleptocracy in which wealth is sucked up exclusively by the well-connected. Corruption did become rampant, and the most powerful families are indeed super-rich. But many people felt their lives were improving too, and the party was astute enough to acknowledge their demands. It abolished rural taxes and created a welfare system that provides everyone with pensions and subsidised health care. The benefits were not bountiful, but they were appreciated.
Over the years Western observers have found plenty of reasons to predict the collapse of Chinese communism. Surely the control required by a one-party state was incompatible with the freedom required by a modern economy? One day China’s economic growth must run out of steam, leading to disillusion and protests. And, if it did not, the vast middle class that such growth created would inevitably demand greater freedoms—especially because so many of their children had encountered democracy first-hand, when they got their education in the West.
These predictions have been confounded by the Communist Party’s continuing popularity. Many Chinese credit it for the improvement in their livelihoods. True, China’s workforce is ageing, shrinking and accustomed to ridiculously early retirement, but those are the sorts of difficulties every government faces, authoritarian or not. Vigorous economic growth looks as if it will continue for some time yet.
Many Chinese also admire the party’s strong hand. Look, they say, at how quickly China crushed covid-19 and revved up its economy, even as Western countries stumbled. They relish the idea of China’s restored pride and weight in the world. It plays to a nationalism that the party stokes. State media conflate the party with the nation and its culture, while caricaturing America as a land of race riots and gun massacres. The alternative to one-party rule, they suggest, is chaos.
When dissent emerges, Mr Xi uses technology to deal with it before it grows. Chinese streets are bristling with cameras, enhanced by facial-recognition software. Social media are snooped on and censored. Officials can solve problems early or persecute citizens who raise them. Those who share the wrong thought can lose their jobs and freedom. The price of the party’s success, in brutal repression, has been horrendous.
No party lasts for ever
The most dangerous threat to Mr Xi comes not from the masses, but from within the party itself. Despite all his efforts, it suffers from factionalism, disloyalty and ideological lassitude. Rivals accused of plotting to seize power have been jailed. Chinese politics is more opaque than it has been for decades, but Mr Xi’s endless purges suggest that he sees yet more hidden enemies.
The moment of greatest instability is likely to be the succession. No one knows who will come after Mr Xi, or even what rules will govern the transition. When he scrapped presidential term limits in 2018, he signalled that he wants to cling to power indefinitely. But that may make the eventual transfer only more unstable. Although peril for the party will not necessarily lead to the enlightened rule that freedom-lovers desire, at some point even this Chinese dynasty will end. ■
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Still going strong"
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Still going strong
China’s Communist Party at 100: the secret of its longevity
100년 중국 공산당 : 장수의 비결
Ruthlessness, ideological agility and economic growth have kept it in power
무자비 함, 이데올로기적 민첩성, 경제성장으로 인해 중국공산당 권력이 유지
On july 1st China’s Communist Party will celebrate its 100th birthday. It has always called itself “great, glorious and correct”. And as it starts its second century, the party has good cause to brag. Not only has it survived far longer than its many critics predicted; it also appears to be on the up. When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, many pundits thought that the other great communist power would be next. To see how wrong they were, consider that President Joe Biden, at a summit on June 13th, felt the need to declare not only that America was at odds with China, but also that much of the world doubted “whether or not democracies can compete”.
7.1 중국 공산당 창립 100주년이다, 중국 공산당은 항상, 스스로를 “위대하고 영광스럽고 옳다”라고 불렀다. 중국 공산당이 2세기 째를 맞게 되면서 중국 공산당은 자랑할 좋은 명분이 있다. 중국 공산당은 여러 비평가들 예언보다 훨씬 더 오래 살아남았는데, 잘 나가기까지 하는 것 같다. 1991년 소련이 내부 붕괴되었을 때 많은 전문가들은 또 다른 위대한 공산주의 강대국이 다음 차례가 될 것이라고 생각했다. 이 전문가들이 얼마나 잘못되었는지 보려면 바이든 대통령이 지난 6.13 정상회담 당시 미국이 중국과 불화를 겪고 있다는 점과 대부분의 세계 여러 나라가 민주주의들이 중국과 경쟁을 할 수 있을지 없을지에 대해 의문을 품었다는 사실을 선언할 필요성을 느꼈다는 점을 고려해보면 된다.
One party has ruled China for 72 years, without a mandate from voters. That is not a world record. Lenin and his dismal heirs held power in Moscow for slightly longer, as has the Workers’ Party in North Korea. But no other dictatorship has been able to transform itself from a famine-racked disaster, as China was under Mao Zedong, into the world’s second-largest economy, whose cutting-edge technology and infrastructure put America’s creaking roads and railways to shame. China’s Communists are the world’s most successful authoritarians.
한 정당이 유권자들로부터 권한 위임도 받지 않고 72년 동안 중국을 통치했다. 세계 신기록은 아니다. 레닌과 음울한 상속자들이 모스크바에서 좀 더 오래 권좌에 앉아 있었고 북한 노동당도 그렇다. 그러나 중국이 마오쩌뚱 치하에서 그랬던 것처럼 기아에 시달리는 재난으로부터 변신을 함으로써 세계 2번째 경제 대국으로 만든 독재 정권 사례는 없으며 이러한 중국의 첨단 기술과 인프라는 미국의 삐걱 거리는 도로와 철도를 창피하게 만들었다. 중국 공산당원들은 세계에서 가장 성공적인 권위주의자들이다.
The Chinese Communist Party has been able to maintain its grip on power for three reasons. First, it is ruthless. Yes, it dithered before crushing the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But eventually it answered bullhorns with bullets, terrorising the country into submission. China’s present leaders show no signs at all of having any misgivings about the massacre. On the contrary, President Xi Jinping laments that the Soviet Union collapsed because its leaders were not “man enough to stand up and resist” at the critical moment. For which read: unlike us, they did not have the guts to slaughter unarmed protesters with machineguns.
중국 공산당이 권력을 유지할 수 있었던 것은 3가지 이유에서 찾아 볼 수 있다. 첫 번째, 중국 공산당의 무자비함이다. 그렇다, 중국 공산당은 1989년 천안문 광장에서 시위를 진압하기 전에는 망설였다. 그러나 결국 공산당은 총탄 세례로 화답했고 테러를 가함으로써 전국민을 복종케 했다. 중국의 현존 지도자는 천안문 학살사건에 대해 어떠한 불안감을 표시했다는 사인들 보이지 않는다. 오히려 시진핑 주석은, 소련 지도자들이 중요 순간 “일어나 저항할 사나이”가 아니었기 때문에 소련이 무너졌다고 한탄한다. 그러면서 그 이유로 소련은 우리들과는 달리 비무장 시위대원들을 기관총으로 사살할 만큼 배짱을 지니지 못했다는 점을 댄다.
A second reason for the party’s longevity is its ideological agility. Within a couple of years of Mao’s death in 1976, a new leader, Deng Xiaoping, began scrapping the late chairman’s productivity-destroying “people’s communes” and setting market forces to work in the countryside. Maoists winced, but output soared. In the wake of Tiananmen and the Soviet Union’s downfall, Deng fought off Maoist diehards and embraced capitalism with even greater fervour. This led to the closure of many state-owned firms and the privatisation of housing. Millions were laid off, but China boomed.
중국 공산당 장수 이유 두 번째는 이념적 민첩성이다. 1976년 마오쩌둥 사망 2년 만에 들어선 새로운 지도자 덩샤오핑은, 죽은 주석이 만들었으나 생산성을 파괴하는 “인민공사”를 폐기 처리하고 농촌에서 시장의 힘이 발휘되게 하였다. 모택동주의자들은 움찔했으나 생산량은 치솟았다. 천안문 사태 그리고 소련 븡괴이후 덩샤오핑은 끈질기게 버티는 모택동주의자들과 싸워 물리쳤고 자본주의를 더 열정적으로 받아들였다. 이로써 많은 중국 국영기업들이 문을 닫게 되었고 주택도 사유화되었다. 수백 만 명이 실업자가 되었으나 중국에는 경제 붐이 일었다.
Under Mr Xi the party has shifted again, to focus on ideological orthodoxy. His recent predecessors allowed a measure of mild dissent; he has stamped on it. Mao is lauded once more. Party cadres imbibe “Xi Jinping thought”. The bureaucracy, army and police have undergone purges of deviant and corrupt officials. Big business is being brought into line. Mr Xi has rebuilt the party at the grassroots, creating a network of neighbourhood spies and injecting cadres into private firms to watch over them. Not since Mao’s day has society been so tightly controlled.
시진핑 치하 중국 공산당은 이념적 정통성에 초점을 맞추기 위해 다시 변화했다. 시진핑의 전임자들은 온건한 반대를 허용했으나 시진핑은 이를 탄압했다. 마오는 재차 추앙받는다. 당료들은 “시진핑 사상”을 빨아들였다. 관료사회, 군, 그리고 경찰은 일탈자와 부패한 관리들에 대한 숙청을 단행했다. 대기업도 동조하도록 만들었다. 시진핑은 당을 민초들을 기반으로 다시 세웠고 이웃을 감시하는 스파이 네트웍을 구축하는가 하면 개인 회사에 당원들을 들여보내 감시하게 했다. 마오 시절이래 이렇게 중국 사회가 타이트하게 통제된 적은 없었다.
The third cause of the party’s success is that China did not turn into a straightforward kleptocracy in which wealth is sucked up exclusively by the well-connected. Corruption did become rampant, and the most powerful families are indeed super-rich. But many people felt their lives were improving too, and the party was astute enough to acknowledge their demands. It abolished rural taxes and created a welfare system that provides everyone with pensions and subsidised health care. The benefits were not bountiful, but they were appreciated.
중국 공산당 성공의 세 번째 원인은 중국이, 힘있는 사람들의 꽌시에 의해 부가 독점적으로 빨려들어가는 도둑정치로 직행하지 않았다는 점이다. 부패가 만연했고 권문세가들이 실제 슈퍼리치이기도 하다. 그러나 많은 중국 사람들은 자신들의 삶도 나아졌다고 느꼈으며 공산당은 이들의 요구를 인정할 만큼 명민했다. 공산당은 농촌 세금을 없앴고 누구나 연금을 받고 의료비 보조를 받을 수 있는 복지제도를 만들었다. 혜택은 풍족하지는 않았어도 인민들은 감사해했다.
Over the years Western observers have found plenty of reasons to predict the collapse of Chinese communism. Surely the control required by a one-party state was incompatible with the freedom required by a modern economy? One day China’s economic growth must run out of steam, leading to disillusion and protests. And, if it did not, the vast middle class that such growth created would inevitably demand greater freedoms—especially because so many of their children had encountered democracy first-hand, when they got their education in the West
수 년간에 걸쳐 서양 관측통들은 중국 공산주의의 붕괴를 예견할 수 많은 이유를 발견했다. 확실히 일당제 국가가 필요로 하는 통제가 현대 경제가 요구하는 자유와 양립불가한가? 언젠가는 중국의 경제 성장이 활기를 잃고 환멸과 항의 시위로 이어질 것임에는 틀림없다. 그리고 그렇지 않다 하더라도 늘어난 중산층이 그러한 경제성장은 더 많은 자유에 대한 요구를 하게 되어 있는데 특히 많은 중국인들 자녀들이 서방에서 교육을 받았을 때 민주주의를 직접적으로 맞닥뜨렸기 때문이다.
These predictions have been confounded by the Communist Party’s continuing popularity. Many Chinese credit it for the improvement in their livelihoods. True, China’s workforce is ageing, shrinking and accustomed to ridiculously early retirement, but those are the sorts of difficulties every government faces, authoritarian or not. Vigorous economic growth looks as if it will continue for some time yet.
이러한 예측들은 중국 공산당이 지속적으로 인기를 누리자 혼란스러워졌다. 많은 중국인들은 자신들의 생활 개선과 관련 중국 공산당에 점수를 주었다. 사실, 중국의 노동자들은 나이를 먹고 있고 그 수가 줄어들며 말도 안 되는 조기 퇴직에 익숙해져 있으나, 이는 권위주의 정부건 아니건 세계 모든 정부가 직면하는 종류의 어려움이다. 중국의 활발한 경제 성장세는 상당 기간 지속될 것 같다.
Many Chinese also admire the party’s strong hand. Look, they say, at how quickly China crushed covid-19 and revved up its economy, even as Western countries stumbled. They relish the idea of China’s restored pride and weight in the world. It plays to a nationalism that the party stokes. State media conflate the party with the nation and its culture, while caricaturing America as a land of race riots and gun massacres. The alternative to one-party rule, they suggest, is chaos.
많은 중국인도 공산당의 철권을 칭송한다. 중국인들은, 코로나로 서방 제국이 비틀거릴 때 중국은 코로나를 신속히 제압하고 경제도 그렇게 회복시킨 것을 보라고 말이다. 이러한 사상은 중국 공산당이 늘 공산당이 추구하는 민족주의에도 작용한다. 중국인들은 복원된 중국의 자존심, 세계에서의 비중 이런 생각을 하는 음미하며 즐긴다. 중국 관영 언론은 공산당을 국가 그리고 중국 문화와 융합시키면서, 대신에 미국을 인종 폭동이 일어나고 총기 대량 학살이 일어나는 땅으로 묘사한다. 일당 통치에 대한 대안은 곧 혼란임을 점을 시사한다.
When dissent emerges, Mr Xi uses technology to deal with it before it grows. Chinese streets are bristling with cameras, enhanced by facial-recognition software. Social media are snooped on and censored. Officials can solve problems early or persecute citizens who raise them. Those who share the wrong thought can lose their jobs and freedom. The price of the party’s success, in brutal repression, has been horrendous.
반대 의견이 나오면 시 주석은 반대 의견이 나오기 전에 이 문제를 처리할 기술을 동원한다. 중국의 거리 곳곳에는 안면인식 소프트웨어로 보강된 카메라들이 빼곡하다. SNS는 누군가 지켜보고 검열을 당한다. 관리들은 조기 문제를 해결할 수 있고 문제를 야기하는 시민을 박해할 수도 있다. 잘못된 사상을 공유하는 자들은 실직하고 자유도 상실할 수 있다. 야만적 억압으로 성공을 거둔 중국 공산당의 대가는 끔찍했다.
No party lasts for ever
The most dangerous threat to Mr Xi comes not from the masses, but from within the party itself. Despite all his efforts, it suffers from factionalism, disloyalty and ideological lassitude. Rivals accused of plotting to seize power have been jailed. Chinese politics is more opaque than it has been for decades, but Mr Xi’s endless purges suggest that he sees yet more hidden enemies.
어떤 정당도 영원히 갈 수는 없다.
시진핑에 대한 가장 위험한 위협은 일반 대중이 아니라 당 자체에서 비롯된다. 시진핑의 갖은 노력에도 불구, 중국 공산당은 파벌주의, 불충 그리고 이념적 나태로 고통받고 있다. 권력을 장악하려는 음모를 꾸민 혐의로 기소된 정치적 라이벌들은 투옥되었다. 중국 정치는현재 지난 수십 년에 비해 그 어느 때보다 불투명하지만 시진핑의 끝없는 숙청은 그가 더 많은, 숨어있는 적들이 더 남았다는 사실을 시사해준다.
The moment of greatest instability is likely to be the succession. No one knows who will come after Mr Xi, or even what rules will govern the transition. When he scrapped presidential term limits in 2018, he signalled that he wants to cling to power indefinitely. But that may make the eventual transfer only more unstable. Although peril for the party will not necessarily lead to the enlightened rule that freedom-lovers desire, at some point even this Chinese dynasty will end.
가장 불안정한 순간은 권력 승계일 가능성이 높다. 누가 시진핑의 뒤를 이을 것인지, 아니면 어떤 규범이 권력전환을 적용될지 아무도 모른다. 시진핑이 2018년 주석 임기 제한을 철폐했을 당시, 시진핑 주석은 무기한 권력에 잔류하기를 원한다는 시그널을 보냈다. 그러나 결국은 할 수 밖에 없는 권력 이양을 더욱 불안하게 만들 소지가 있다. 공산당이 위험하다고 해서 반드시 자유를 사랑하는 사람들이 원하는 대로 계몽 통치로 이끌어지지는 않을 것이나, 일정 시점에 가서는 이러한 중국 공산 왕조도 결국은 종말을 맞을 것이다.
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