전장을 바꾼 FPV 드론

[위종민]

개전 초인 2022년에는 매빅 스타일의 쿼드콥터 드론이 일반적이었고 FPV 드론 공격은 소수였지만 우크라이나가 먼저 FPV 드론의 잠재력을 인식한 뒤 2023년 여름엔 러시아도 FPV 드론을 널리 사용하기 시작했다고 합니다. 

2024년 2월 8일 기준으로 비디오 증거로 채집된 3,917건의 러시아측 FPV 드론 공격 중 약 절반이 명중해 12%, 479건은 목표물을 파괴했고 15%, 594건은 피해를 입혔다고 하네요. 20% 가량은 빗나갔거나 결정적이지 않았다고 합니다. 

우크라이나의 FPV 드론은 전차나 자주포, 전자전 시스템, 방공시스템, 보급창고와 같은 고가치 표적을 공격하고 러시아는 우크라이나의 참호를 주로 노린다고 합니다. FPV 드론때문에 유개호로도 불충분하고, 최소한 참호를 L자로 파야 한다고... 

기사 말머리에 소개된 교전 사례로는 지난 1월 말 도네츠크 시 남서의 노보미하일로프카 근방에서 33 차량화소총연대 소속의 T-72 3대, BMP-1 1대, MT-LB 7대로 구성된 중대가 야지에서 공격을 위해 전개했으나, 지뢰나 장애물로 저지되지도 않고, 포격이나 로켓 공격을 받지도 않았으며, 대전차 교전도 없었고 우크라이나 측엔 전차도 없는 상황에서 FPV 드론 공격만으로 차량 한 대를 제외한 모든 차량이 손상되거나 파괴됐고 장병들은 걸어서 도주했다고 합니다. 

https://wavellroom.com/2024/03/14/fpv-drones-on-the-battlefield/

FPV drones are defining the battlefield » Wavell Room

FPV drones are defining the battlefield

by Sergio MillerMarch 14, 2024

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FPV drones are defining the battlefield

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At the end of January 2024 a Russian company from 33rd Motor Rifle Regiment 1 set off to attack in the area of Novomikhailovka, South-West of Donetsk City. The company comprised three T-72s leading one BMP-1 and seven MT-LBs (catastrophic attrition means the Russian Army now uses the MT-LB utility tracked vehicle as an APC).  After leaving a hard-topped road the sub-unit fanned out to attack from the line of march across open fields. It didn’t get too far.  The company was not stopped by mines or other engineering obstacles.  Nor was it stopped by artillery or rocket fire.  There were no anti-tank engagements and no Ukrainian tanks deployed to counter-attack.  In fact, none of the elements of a defensive battle studied by a British Army cadet at Sandhurst, or student at the Defence College at Shrivenham, were present.   The company was stopped by $500 FPV drones loaded with explosive charges.   All but one vehicle were damaged or destroyed and the survivors fled on foot.

The Russian company attack launched at Novomikhailovka on 30 January, defeated by FPV drones. Source: Censor.net

‘The price of such inability to learn is the death of people,’ lamented the prominent Russian military blogger ‘Rybar’, ‘the loss out of the blue of a heap of equipment for which industry works in three shifts, as well as landscapes of burning columns.’ This article is about the developing story of ‘the most important component of the battlefield’ – the first person view (FPV) drone.

Intensity of attacks

In 2022, only a handful of FPV-drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones (as opposed to the Mavik-style drones that were becoming ubiquitous).  By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army began to use FPV drones in greater numbers.  Since that period, attacks have grown exponentially on both sides.

Russian FPV-drone attacks June 2022 – Feb 2024 Source: LostArmour

In total, there have been 3,917 Russian attacks (with video evidence) as at 8 February.  About half hit. Roughly 12% result in destruction of the target (479 targets) and 15% in damage (594 targets).  Around 20% miss or are inconclusive. Ukrainian use is ahead but the Russian Army is catching up.

Setting aside the attrition – tactical drones of all types, with artillery, have become the biggest battlefield killers – their presence has radically altered the close battle. Both sides are now locked in a stalemate where any movement is quickly detected and threats neutralised by drones.

What is being targeted?

Analysis of what is being attacked shows clear differences in the targeting strategies of Ukrainian and Russian drone pilots.  The Ukrainians mainly attack high-value target platforms, such as tanks, SP guns, EW systems, air defence systems, and logistic stores.  The Russians overwhelmingly use FPV drones to support attacks on Ukrainian ‘positions’ – the trench lines and strong points.  Both sides have actually been attacking trenches regularly, with important implications for the design of trenches. Building overhead cover is no longer sufficient; a trench must be at least L-shaped because skilful drone pilots are flying the drones into the trenches.

The Russians are overwhelmingly attacking positions with drones; the Ukrainians target vehicles Source: Tocnhyi.info

Where are the attacks taking place?

With geo-location, open-source monitoring of drone attacks offers insights into where the fighting occurs (much as NASA FIRMS data unintentionally but usefully records heavy artillery or rocket fire as ‘heat anomalies’).  Tocnhyi.info January 2024 heat maps (shown below) reveal how the most active areas for drone attacks were the Krynky bridgehead in the west and the Avdiivka-Marinka sectors in the east.  At the former, Ukrainian defenders on the Dnipro right bank (at a higher elevation than the left bank) are using drones and artillery to keep a much larger Russian force at bay at the 36th Separate Marine Brigade bridgehead.

Open-source monitoring of drone attacks can offer useful insights into the fighting. Source: Tocnhyi.info

Innovation and democratisation

Over 200 firms are involved in drone production in Ukraine. More than 60 drone types have been developed and fielded, which is, in some respects, an unhelpful ‘menagerie of drones’. Commercial training providers have sprung up, and drone ‘shock companies’ have been raised.  Crowd-funding initiatives such as Wild Hornets have proved successful.  Ukrainian citizens are being encouraged to build ‘kitchen drones’. At the other end of the scale, drones are becoming more advanced with better anti-jamming capabilities and sensors.

The democratisation of defence procurement: Ukrainian citizens are encouraged to build ‘kitchen drones’.

It’s about drones and EW

The war has shown that tactical drones are only half the capability.  The other is Electronic Warfare (EW).  The British Army is currently standing up a Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Group.2  Three EW procurement programmes have been announced.3  The author has had industry involvement in two.  The programmes view EW through a traditional threat framework; none address the emergence of the tactical drone.  Current EW and drone training do not reflect the modern battlefield i.e. the war in Ukraine.  A future British Army EW detachment must co-locate with the future FPV drone detachments.  The two capabilities work together, assessing the electromagnetic landscape, creating corridors for deploying friendly drones, and blocking areas to deny enemy drone threats.

IT IS A SKILLED CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME.  IT SHOULD BE A SOBERING THOUGHT THAT NO EXTANT BRITISH ARMY DOCTRINE OR OTHER PAMPHLET DESCRIBES THIS REALITY. STEPS TO START TO ADDRESS THE SHORTFALLS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN.

It’s just too easy (and cheap) Source: Business InsiderThe Defence Equipment Plan 2023-2033

At the end of November 2022, the UK MOD published a 65-page glossy ‘Defence Equipment Plan 2023-2033’.  The Plan attracted commentary as well a report from the National Audit Office that concluded the Plan was ‘unaffordable, with forecast costs exceeding its current budget by £16.9 billion.’ In the ‘Army’ section, the statement was made, ‘Army Command plan to spend £40.6 billion in the Equipment Plan over the next ten years.’ General areas of spend were listed.

If the reader were to enquire of the Plan – what funding is there for what General Zaluzhny recently described 4 as ‘perhaps the number one priority…cheap, modern and highly effective unmanned vehicles? – he or she would be unable to glean an answer.  At the time of drafting, as far as can be determined, the UK MOD has no stated plans or funding to procure and field ‘the most important component on the battlefield’ – FPV drones.

Also by the author on the same subject:

https://wavellroom.com/2023/12/15/creating-a-british-army-of-drones/

https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/13/countering-tactical-kamikaze-drones-ideas-urgently-needed/

https://wavellroom.com/2023/08/02/drones-and-the-close-battle/

Recommended:

The Economist: ‘How cheap drones are transforming warfare in Ukraine: First Person View drones have achieved near mythical status on the front lines’, 6 Feb 2024

(For the Russian view) армейский стандарт (‘Army Standard’) magazine: ‘SVO and the revolution in military affairs: New weapons change the nature of combat and force tactics textbooks to be rewritten’.5

[Minowski(김유철)]

러시아는 FPV에 광섬유 달아날리면서 그냥 광역재밍 걸어버리고....전장에 드론이 큰 역할을 할거라는 예상은 있었으나 야전에서 이런 식으로 적용될 지 예상한 사람이 얼마나 될까요? 그나저나 FPV에서도 중국의 역량이 압도적인 것으로 아는데 심히 걱정되네요.......

[위종민]

전차 3대가 포함된 기계화보병이 드론만으로 격파됐다는 데에선 그저 놀랍기만 합니다.

민수용 드론은 종류 불문하고 중국이 질과 양 모두 압도적일 텐데 한국군은 요즘도 군수용 드론에 중국제가 들어가고 있는 건지 모르겠어요. 작년에 납품된 교육용 드론이 중국산 드론을 택갈이했단 의혹이 있던데 전시에 보안이나 운용에 문제가 없는건지 원..