(Hot News Today • Saturday 9 July 2016)
Choppy waters ahead for Asean as all sides brace for Hague ruling
People’s Liberation Army Navy soldiers in the Spratly Islands, known in China as the Nansha Islands, in February this year.
The sign reads ‘Nansha is our national land, sacred and inviolable’. South China Sea is an existential issue for China,
said veteran Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan. PHOTO: Reuters
Writer: Albert Wai / albertwai@mediacorp.com.sg
SINGAPORE — The Special Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean)China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was supposed to be a step in the right direction, with the grouping speaking in one voice against Beijing’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. But things backfired spectacularly last month when Asean issued a hard-hitting media statement expressing “serious concerns” over developments that had “increased tensions” in the South China Sea, only to retract it three hours later as several member states caved in to pressure from Beijing. The result was an Asean in disarray, unable to articulate its own diplomatic narrative on a critical issue at a critical juncture. The timing could not have been worse, coming less than a month before a landmark ruling by an international tribunal. It will decide whether China’s territorial claims, which encompass most of the South China Sea, are invalid because they infringe upon the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Asean-China relations now look to be headed for a rough patch. Beijing is expected to lean on its regional allies for support as it comes under pressure from the international community for rejecting the ruling by the arbitration panel next week. The case will also put Asean’s traditional working method — of seeking consensus among all member states rather than voting on divisive issues — under greater scrutiny.
The signs are ominous, with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen already dismissing the case as nothing but a political conspiracy against China.
Still, observers say that there are no other viable working methods in sight, for now at least, especially given the political diversity in the region. Singapore, the current coordinator for Asean-China dialogue relations, will have to navigate a treacherous diplomatic terrain, as last December’s proclamation of Asean as an integrated community starts ringing hollow.
At the foreign ministers’ meeting in Yunnan, there were clear signs of unhappiness among some Asean countries over China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned Asean member states against citing an Asean position on the South China Sea, saying the grouping is not a party to the dispute, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi was said to have jumped in to advocate the need for Asean consensus and centrality in the regional architecture.
A senior Asean diplomat noted that China was very surprised that the grouping came to a joint statement in Yunnan with strongly worded concerns on the South China Sea issue.
“This (joint statement) is a signal of a pushback from Asean, and China went into damage control to recover lost ground,” said the diplomat, who asked not to be named due to political sensitivities.
China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, through which around US$5 trillion (S$6.8 trillion) of seaborne trade passes through annually. There are overlapping claims by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, and Beijing maintains that the claims should be resolved bilaterally.
For the past two years, Beijing has carried out massive land reclamation and built military facilities on some of the disputed islands and reefs, sparking fears of militarisation in the area.
For China, the South China Sea is of paramount importance. The ruling Chinese Communist Party uses the issue to justify its legitimacy based on history. “It is an existential issue for China,” noted veteran Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan, who was speaking at a recent lecture as the Institute of Policy Studies’ second S R Nathan fellow.
Yet Beijing’s assertiveness in staking its claim to the disputed waters and its divide-and-rule tactics in Asean have clearly upset some member states and undercut China’s charm offensive in the region over the years.
“It is a big mistake for the Chinese to believe that it can switch off Asean unity anytime,” said Dr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, a lead researcher at the Asean Studies Centre in IseasYusof Ishak Institute.
There are suggestions that Malaysia had leaked the strongly worded Asean statement in Yunnan as a diplomatic signal of how it objects to Beijing’s interference in the grouping.
In the statement issued by Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry on June 14 to the regional media, the Asean ministers expressed “serious concerns over recent and ongoing developments, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and which may have the potential to undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea”.
The ministry retracted the statement about three hours later for “urgent amendments”.
As serious doubts on Asean unity began to emerge in the days following the kerfuffle, several Asean member states, including the Philippines and Indonesia, stated there had indeed been unanimous support within Asean for the statement. In a subsequent press release, the Malaysian Foreign Ministry made the same point, adding that “subsequent developments” leading to the withdrawal of the statement “took place after the departure of the Asean Foreign Ministers”.
These statements underscore the unhappiness among some Asean members over how others in the grouping had buckled after pressure by withdrawing consensus for the statement.
Beijing has denied exerting pressure on Cambodia and Laos to backtrack from the agreed statement. Both countries have strong political and economic ties with China. In 2012, Asean foreign ministers failed to release a joint statement for the first time at the end of their annual gathering, with then Asean Chairman Cambodia being fingered for blocking criticism of China.
Analysts have also described the fallout resulting from the Yunnan meeting as one of the lowest points in Asean-China relations. The episode also showed that in pushing back against China on a core issue, it can expect a forceful response from Beijing.
This raises serious questions on how Asean should respond in the wake of the tribunal ruling next week.
Hours after The Hague announced last week that the ruling will be announced on July 12, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a stern rebuke. It reiterated that Beijing will not recognise the ruling as it believes that the arbitration tribunal has no jurisdiction over the case.
Beijing also claims that around 60 countries in the international community support its position that the issue should instead be resolved by direct negotiations between the two countries.
Last weekend, China announced that it will hold military drills in the Paracel Islands between July 5 and 11, another calculated show of strength in the run-up to the ruling.
“It might also signal internal concerns that China is losing the legal fight by default, by not participating in it (the arbitration),” said Dr Termsak of the Asean Studies Centre.
Already, Hanoi has protested against the exercises, saying they violate Vietnam’s sovereignty and raise tensions in the region.
Partly in response to Beijing’s position, American navy destroyers have been sailing close to Chinese-held reefs and islands in the South China Sea in recent weeks.
Analysts say that with the big power tussle playing out in the South China Sea, Asean members are likely to continue to hedge between China and the US. “The US continues to be seen as a reliable long-time post-war partner whose benign naval strength has kept peace and stability in the maritime region for trade and economic development,” said Dr Lim Tai Wei, a senior lecturer at SIM University and adjunct research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute.
“China is perceived as a new rising power with strong potential for partnerships in infrastructure development and connectivity.”
The tribunal is widely expected to hand down an unfavourable verdict for China, which will then put pressure on its regional allies to support the Chinese rejection of the decision.
Assistant Professor Richard Heydarian, who teaches political science at De La Salle University in Manila, said that, after the announcement, it was important for Asean to release a statement that calls for compliance by the disputing parties. “But given the body’s consensus-based decision-making structure and open opposition of some members to the arbitration case, I doubt this will happen,” he said, adding that it will then fall on individual member states to state their positions.
Professor Robert Beckman, head of the Ocean Law and Policy Programme at the Centre for International Law in Singapore, added: “Asean claimant states and others with an interest in the South China Sea and a rules-based order for the oceans are likely to issue statements requesting China to comply with the award.” He said Manila has a good legal case that is likely to clarify several aspects in international law regarding maritime claims in the disputed waters.
But Prof Beckman pointed out that the case “will not address the territorial sovereignty disputes or delimit any maritime boundaries”. In other words, it is unlikely that the Hague ruling will prove decisive in resolving the longstanding South China Sea dispute.
WHITHER CONSENSUS?
Regardless of the ruling handed out by The Hague, the focus will be on Asean to come up with a credible response. Particular attention will be paid to how quickly the grouping can come to a consensus and whether some member states will again buckle under Chinese pressure.
Decision-making within Asean is traditionally carried out by consultation and consensus, rather than argument and voting. There is also the possibility of member states agreeing on an “Asean-X” working method for difficult issues — an arrangement where some members can go ahead to implement decisions, while those that need more time are given a more flexible timeline.
For instance, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have been given flexibility to abolish all tariffs by 2018 under the Asean Economic Community, while the other member states had already done so by last year.
In the rare instance when consensus cannot be reached among the Asean member states, the Asean Charter mandates that the dispute be referred to the Asean Summit attended by the leaders for decision.
Critics of Asean, many of them from outside the region, say the consensus method is outdated, sometimes resulting in decisions made in the “lowest common denominator” fashion.
The “Asean Way” has been accused of hampering the grouping’s effectiveness in dealing with regional issues, such as environmental pollution, and slowed the pace of regional integration.
Despite putting in place a comprehensive network of dialogue partners, Asean has at times struggled to impose its centrality in the regional architecture. With Timor Leste’s application to join Asean up for consideration, there are fears that Asean unity may be further undermined as the country has close ties with China.
Others point out that the consensus working method is the most viable way given the myriad political systems, level of development and foreign policy orientation of Asean member states. In fact, it has played an indispensable role in fostering regional cohesiveness and understanding.
Associate Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University, told TODAY that while the Asean way of seeking consensus has been outdated for some time, it remains the bedrock of Asean cohesion especially after the expansion of the grouping to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in the late 1990s.
Asean consensus may not be perfect, but “anything short of it, such as the Asean-X formula, risks tearing Asean apart on the South China Sea issue,” he noted. He added that while the Asean-X method may work on lower-level functional issues, the South China Sea issue is an existential issue for some countries.
Others, such as Ms Moe Thuzar, another lead researcher at the Asean Studies Centre, note that the consensus statement can sometimes underplay the fact that vigorous discussions do take place at Asean meetings, with each member country stating its views.
“Of course, consensus and sticking to it are important for Asean’s unity of purpose, where collective positions or decisions taken for the benefit of the regional whole need to take precedence over national preferences,” she said.
The senior Asean diplomat added: “For Asean to function effectively as a regional leveller of blunt power being exerted by any big country, every member state must feel it is having a say on the relevant issue.
“The trick is to exercise this role cleverly and to stress to the big guys that Asean will be useful to them only if Asean is not divided and can play a positive role in reconciliation.”
The diplomat said that other major powers, including the United States and Russia, had in the past made the mistake of forcing their positions on Asean, only for the grouping to rally together.
For instance, both Washington and Moscow had lobbied strongly to join the Asean-led East Asia Summit despite an initial freeze on membership. But Asean stood firm on the issue before formally inviting both in 2011.
“It appears that point is nearing and Beijing should not pressure indiscriminately going forward. Unfortunately, China does not appreciate how small states operate in such an adverse situation,” said the diplomat.
Singapore Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan (3rd from left),
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other foreign ministers from Asean in Yuxi last month.
Singapore is one of the few Asean members that can take the lead in managing China’s muscle flexing,
said a lead researcher at the Asean Studies Centre. PHOTO: AFP
Singapore, as the coordinator for Asean-China dialogue relations, meanwhile has its work cut out.
On the one hand, it must be mindful of its bilateral ties with China. Like other Asean member states, Singapore has substantial bilateral interests in China. China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, and the Republic has been China’s top foreign investor since 2013.
Already, some political commentators in Beijing have opined that Singapore, despite its cultural linkages with China, has chosen to side with the US on the South China Sea even though the Republic has taken a clear and consistent position on the issue.
Singapore’s leaders have stressed that while the Republic is not a claimant country and takes no sides in any of the territorial disputes, it has fundamental interest in the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with international law and the upholding of freedom of navigation.
If there is any bilateral fallout, Singaporean business interests in China could be affected.
On the other hand, Singapore will also need to show that it is a responsible member of Asean and look for compromise positions with other members.
Ms. Thuzar believes that Singapore is one of the few Asean members that can take the lead in managing China’s muscle-flexing. She said that the Republic recognises and highlights the reality that Asean is probably the only forum for constructive dialogue among parties concerned.
“Singapore’s strength in restoring Asean credibility may probably lie in its power to persuade other Asean member states of the benefits of boosting their own credibility through collective efforts to strengthen and maintain regional institutions,” she said.
Asean can ill afford another fracas after the Hague ruling, or there will be more serious questions raised about its relevance before the next Asean Summit to be held in Vientiane in September.