미국 형님들께서는 북괴 놈들에게 선빵을 날릴 것인가... 빅터 차 기고문

[엽군]

빅터 차 선생께서 낙마하셨다는 보도가 나오기가 무섭게... 빅터 차 본인께서 워싱턴 포스트에 기고를 하셨습니다.

제가 아는 빅터 차 선생은 미국 내 졸라 짱 쎈 매파인데... ... ... 도람푸께서는 더 쎈 분이 필요하신가 봅니다.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/victor-cha-giving-north-korea-a-bloody-nose-carries-a-huge-risk-to-americans/2018/01/30/43981c94-05f7-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html?utm_term=.cadc3c91058d

Victor Cha: Giving North Korea a ‘bloody nose’ carries a huge risk to Americans

By Victor Cha January 30 at 8:28 PM

Victor Cha is a professor at Georgetown University and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

North Korea, if not stopped, will build an arsenal with multiple nuclear missiles meant to threaten the U.S. homeland and blackmail us into abandoning our allies in Asia. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un will sell these weapons to state and nonstate actors, and he will inspire other rogue actors who want to undermine the U.S.-backed postwar order. These are real and unprecedented threats. But the answer is not, as some Trump administration officials have suggested, a preventive military strike. Instead, there is a forceful military option available that can address the threat without escalating into a war that would likely kill tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans.

When I was under consideration for a position in this administration, I shared some of these views.

Some may argue that U.S. casualties and even a wider war on the Korean Peninsula are risks worth taking, given what is at stake. But a strike (even a large one) would only delay North Korea’s missile-building and nuclear programs, which are buried in deep, unknown places impenetrable to bunker-busting bombs. A strike also would not stem the threat of proliferation but rather exacerbate it, turning what might be a North Korean moneymaking endeavor into a vengeful effort intended to equip other bad actors against us.

I empathize with the hope, espoused by some Trump officials, that a military strike would shock Pyongyang into appreciating U.S. strength, after years of inaction, and force the regime to the denuclearization negotiating table. I also hope that if North Korea did retaliate militarily, the United States could control the escalation ladder to minimize collateral damage and prevent a collapse of financial markets. In either event, the rationale is that a strike that demonstrates U.S. resolve to pursue “all options” is necessary to give the mercurial Kim a “bloody nose.” Otherwise he will remain undeterred in his nuclear ambitions.

Yet, there is a point at which hope must give in to logic. If we believe that Kim is undeterrable without such a strike, how can we also believe that a strike will deter him from responding in kind? And if Kim is unpredictable, impulsive and bordering on irrational, how can we control the escalation ladder, which is premised on an adversary’s rational understanding of signals and deterrence?

Some have argued the risks are still worth taking because it’s better that people die “over there” than “over here.” On any given day, there are 230,000 Americans in South Korea and 90,000 or so in Japan. Given that an evacuation of so many citizens would be virtually impossible under a rain of North Korean artillery and missiles (potentially laced with biochemical weapons), these Americans would most likely have to hunker down until the war was over.

While our population in Japan might be protected by U.S. missile defenses, the U.S. population in South Korea, let alone millions of South Koreans, has no similar active defenses against a barrage of North Korean artillery (aside from counterfire artillery). To be clear: The president would be putting at risk an American population the size of a medium-size U.S. city — Pittsburgh, say, or Cincinnati — on the assumption that a crazy and undeterrable dictator will be rationally cowed by a demonstration of U.S. kinetic power.

An alternative coercive strategy involves enhanced and sustained U.S., regional and global pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize. This strategy is likely to deliver the same potential benefits as a limited strike, along with other advantages, without the self-destructive costs. There are four elements to this coercive strategy.

First, the Trump administration must continue to strengthen the coalition of U.N. member states it has mustered in its thus far highly successful sanctions campaign.

Second, the United States must significantly up-gun its alliances with Japan and South Korea with integrated missile defense, intelligence-sharing and anti-submarine warfare and strike capabilities to convey to North Korea that an attack on one is an attack on all.

Third, the United States must build a maritime coalition around North Korea involving rings of South Korean, Japanese and broader U.S. assets to intercept any nuclear missiles or technologies leaving the country. China and Russia should be prepared to face the consequences if they allow North Korean proliferation across their borders.

Lastly, the United States must continue to prepare military options. Force will be necessary to deal with North Korea if it attacks first, but not through a preventive strike that could start a nuclear war.

In the land of lousy options, no strategy is perfect, but some are better than others. This strategy gets us out of crisis-management mode. It constitutes decisive action, not previously attempted, by President Trump. And it demonstrates resolve to other bad actors that threats to the United States will be countered. Such a strategy would assuredly deplete Pyongyang’s hard currency, deter it from rash action, strengthen our alliances in Asia for the next generation and increase the costs to those who continue to subsidize Pyongyang.

A sustained and long-term competitive strategy such as this plays to U.S. strengths, exploits our adversary’s weaknesses and does not risk hundreds of thousands of American lives.

[강준구]

다른 그 무엇보다 선제 타격에 대해 미국민들이 반대 혹은 회의적이라는 게 선제타격을 실행하지 못하는 이유일겁니다.
비둘기파는 물론 매파 내에서도 이런 목소리가 나오는군요.

[엽군]

... 사실 어설프게 때릴 것 같으면, 안 때리느니만 못할 것 같아서 아햏햏한 것이죠. 정말 제대로 칼 갈아서 본토에서 역량 동원하시면 사실 불가능할 것도 없기는합니다. 그래서 더 무섭... -_-;;;

[강준구]

네. 오하이오급 SSGN과 B-2, B-1만 동원해도 뭐 쥐도 새도 모르게 지워버리겠죠. 흑. 미국이 전면적인 타격을 수행한다면, 그것을 우리 정부에 언제끔 통보해주느냐도 큰 이슈가 될 것 같습니다.

[백선호]

김정은과 핵을 제거하는 "댓가"로 우리는 과연 어느 정도의 인명 손실을 각오할 수 있을까요?

포클랜드전쟁 official history를 보면 영국이 포클랜드를 되찾으러 기동부대를 보낼 때 최대 3,000명의 인명 손실을 각오했습니다.

[엽군]

감당 못할 것 아니까 다들 발빼잖아요. ㅋㅋㅋ. 목함지뢰-대북심리전 건 때 다이다이 뜨겠다고 다 같이 으름장 놓다가 김관진이랑 저 쪽 간첩 두목이랑 둘이 앉아서 내린 결론이란게 같이 꼬리내리기였잖아요. 다 이유가 있는거에요. 진짜 붙으면 둘 다 뒤지거든. ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ.