[Torts]_07_MacPherson v. Buick Motor C

[앨리]

7_ MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. --- 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)

Ⅰ. Fact

The defendant, Buick Motor Co. (Hereinafter, B) is a manufacturer of automobiles, sold an automobile to a retail dealer. The retail dealer resold to the plaintiff, MacPherson (Hereinafter, M). While M was in the car, it suddenly collapsed. He was thrown out and injured. One of the wheels was made of defective wood. The wheel was not made by B but bought from another manufacturer. There is evidence that inspection was omitted. There is no claim that B knew of the defect and willfully concealed it.

Ⅱ. Issue

Whether the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection rather than the immediate purchaser under English case, Winterbottom v. Wright is an issue.

Ⅲ. Rule

English case, Winterbottom v. Wright held that if the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, liability will follow.

Devlin v. Smith held that it was liable to become a source of great danger to many people if not carefully and properly constructed.

Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland, L. R. / Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. stated that one who invites another to make use of an appliance is bound to the exercise of reasonable care.

Ⅳ. Application

For product liability to arise, at some point the product must have been sold in the marketplace. In this case, B argues that things imminently dangerous to life are poisons, explosives, deadly weapons—things whose normal function it is to injure or destroy.

But whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has no longer that restricted meaning. Also, the right to enforce this liability extends to the persons or class of persons for whose use the thing is supplied. Because the goods would in all probability be used before discovering any defect which might exist and neglect of ordinary care or skill would probably cause danger to the person or property of the person for whose use it was supplied. In this case, B knew the danger and knew the car would be used by persons other than the buyer.  Also, the maker of this car supplied it for the use of purchasers from the dealer just as plainly as the contractor in Devlin v. Smith supplied the scaffold for use by the servants of the owner. Thus, if there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, then the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.

Although in case of Cadillac M. C. Co. v. Johnson held that an automobile is not within the rule of Thomas v. Winchester, the difference is rather in the application of the principle than in the principle itself. Because the principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. In addition, the trenchant criticism in Bohlen at p. 351 stated that injury to others is to be foreseen not merely as a possible, but as an almost inevitable result. Although in England, the limits of the rule are still unsettled, the English courts agree with ours in holding that one who invites another to make use of an appliance is bound to the exercise of reasonable care (Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland, L. R. , Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. ).  In addition, Devlin v. Smith held that it was liable to become a source of great danger to many people if not carefully and properly constructed. Although in case of Cadillac M. C. Co. v. Johnson held that an automobile is not within the rule of Thomas v. Winchester, the difference is rather in the application of the principle than in the principle itself. Because the principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. In addition, the trenchant criticism in Bohlen at p. 351 stated that injury to others is to be foreseen not merely as a possible, but as an almost inevitable result. Although in England, the limits of the rule are still unsettled, the English courts agree with ours in holding that one who invites another to make use of an appliance is bound to the exercise of reasonable care (Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland, L. R. , Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. ).  In addition, Devlin v. Smith held that it was liable to become a source of great danger to many people if not carefully and properly constructed.

In this case, the manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer invites the dealer's customers to use it. But, even though the invitation is addressed in the one case to determinate persons and in the other to an indeterminate class, but it is equally plain, and its consequences must be the same.

Bohlen at p. 276 stated that the lessor has the right to suppose that he will fulfill that duty, and, if he omits to do so, his guests must look to him. But in the case of Junkermann v. Tilyou R. Co. held that if A leases a building to be used by the lessee at once as a place of public entertainment, the injury to persons other than the lessee is to be foreseen, and foresight of the consequences involves the creation of a duty.

Although the court told the jury that an automobile is not an inherently dangerous vehicle, the meaning is that danger is not to be expected when the vehicle is well constructed. In addition, it was not at liberty to put the finished product on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests (Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. Elliott). Therefore, B was not absolved from a duty of inspection because it bought the wheels from a reputable manufacturer of automobiles. Thus, if danger was to be expected as reasonably certain, there was a duty of vigilance, and the danger was inherent or imminent. Because, the more probable the danger, the greater the need of caution.

Hence, both by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business, it is charged with a stricter duty.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

Ⅵ. Comment

Doctrine Res ipsa loquitur stated that the elements of duty of care, breach, and causation are inferred from an injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.

If the doctrine is successfully invoked, the plaintiff is no longer required to prove how the defendant was negligent.