[constitution] Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman

[강석근]

Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman

U.S.(1984)

I

This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent Halderman (the patient) ...

Defendants (petitioners) were Pennhurst and various Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and several of its officials; ...

Respondents' amended complaint

charged that conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. § 794

the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 89 Stat. 496, 42 U. S. C. § 6001 et seq.

and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704

Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.

In 1977,

District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due Process Clause and the MH/MR Act.

"Freedom from harm" under the Eighth and Fourteenth ...

"Nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Furthermore, the court found that" due process demands that, if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting ...

Third Circuit affirmed in most part.

It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010

while it affirmed the District Court's holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate habilitation,

the court did not decide whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting (Federal Law requirement).

(Adequate habilitation and Least restrictive setting are different requirement each other)

On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety.

It determined that, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded. 

(MH/MR requires "least restrictive environment" which means state law has more strict requirement than federal law)

The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not reach the remaining issues of federal law.

We granted certiorari...

II

Petitioners (Pen officials) raise three challenges ...

(i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law...

(ii)...

We need not reach the latter two issues, for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.

A

Article III, § 2,

the federal judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State."

Relying on this language, this Court assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia. 

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).

Eleventh Amendment was proposed and adopted.

Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934).

The Amendment provides:

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890),

... despite the limited terms of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State.  (only against unconsenting States )

Ex parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921)

"... the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: 

... because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, ..."

A sovereign's immunity may be waived, however, that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).

Congress has power ... to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required an unequivocal expression‎ of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979)  

"[because] of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."

Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, (1973)

JUSTICE MARSHALL (concur)

Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." 

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978).

B

There may be a question, however, whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State.

general rule

relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter."

And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant,

... a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.

Exception: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)

a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void," and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative character and [was] subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."

Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation.

(This rationale created the "well-recognized irony" that an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Eleventh Amendment.)

Edelman, the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law.

... when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.

Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State, since the federal law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred (Edelman) by the Eleventh Amendment.

III

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question whether the claim that petitioners (Pennhurst officials) violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the State, and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Respondents (Haldermam) advance two principal arguments ...

First, under the doctrine of Edelman, the suit is not against the State because the courts below ordered only prospective injunctive relief. (Reconciled version of 11th, when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.)

Second, they assert that the state law claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S.

A (regarding the first contention, Edelman)

The Court of Appeals held that, if the judgment below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden was substantial and ongoing. (the prior circuit court held state rule must control, federal Ct. has no juristiction )

Perez v. Ledesma. 401.U.S. 82 (1971)

"Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution."

The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman. 

We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young

"has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect."

But we declined ... retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.

In sum, Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young, while at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.

... however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state law. In such a case, the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears.

... it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.

We conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law.

B

The contrary view of JUSTICE STEVENS' (ultra vires)

... it is a case of the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises.

Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity "undoubtedly run counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.

C

The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state law claim.

This Court long has held generally that, when a federal court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise would not have jurisdiction. 

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 383 U. S. 726 (1966); 

Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 819-823 (1824).

The Court also has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state law claim, see Siler, in fact, the court usually should do so in order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id. at 213 U. S. 193;

Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)

But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment. These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us.

"[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974).

We therefore view the question as an open one.

once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary. 

This is an erroneous view.

See

Ex parte State of New York

D

Respondents (the patient) urge that

application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state law claims will have a disruptive effect on litigation against state officials. They argue that the "considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see Gibbs, supra...

... alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Youngwill be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.

... bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in this area.

Under Edelman, supra, a suit against state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.

Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of state law commonly are split off and referred to the state courts.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981).

In any case, ... considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation ... 

See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. at 290 U. S. 25-26

("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction").

That a litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." 

Employees (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).

V

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.

We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this state law.

(However,) The District Court also rested its decision on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

On remand, the Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the judgment may be sustained on these bases.

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

The court also may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011, 6063. (for future monetary relief)

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. Nevertheless, I write separately to explain that, in view of my continued belief that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court suits against States only by citizens of other States," 

Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting)

...

To the extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS (ultra vires, Fed Ct. can handle state matter when the state official exceeds its duty) that, since petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of sovereign immunity do not extend to them.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

I

...

II

Until today, the rule has been simple: conduct that exceeds the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has authorized, and hence is subject to injunction. (Ultra vires) Whether that conduct also gives rise to damages liability is an entirely separate question.

III

...

The issuance of injunctive relief which enforces state laws and policies, if anything, enhances federal courts' respect for the sovereign prerogatives of the States. The majority's approach, which requires federal courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more, rather than less, friction between the States and the federal judiciary.

Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution.

There is general agreement that the Amendment was passed because the States were fearful that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin. Entertaining a suit for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is sought, there is no threat to the state treasury of the type that concerned the Framers, see...

IV

The Siler case...

A privately owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission. The Federal Circuit Court found that the schedule violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights, and granted relief.

This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional question because injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately supported by state law.

The Court held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state law instead:

"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without important reasons. In this case, we think it much better to decide it with regard to the question of a local nature, ..., rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record."

Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 213 U. S. 193 (1909).

...

Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.

...

In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. 

Siler directs the federal court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal.

By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established state policies.

In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents federal courts from implementing state policies through equitable enforcement of state law.

Instead, federal courts are required to resolve cases on federal grounds that no state authority can undo. [it] hardly comports with the respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the Eleventh Amendment.

[강석근]

the issue is whether the district court has the jurisdiction over which it has already ordered the future injuctive relief to the state institution's for the resident of that institution.

various argument was made based on different doctrin.

they were,
mainly, 11th amendment of the constitution, specifically supported by Exparte Yong and Edelman,

pendent jurisdiction,

and ultra vires doctrin.

personaly, I think the Siler case is proper to apply to this case.

even though the pendent J is judge made rule and some what diviated from the constitutional standard, giving the state ...

[강석근]

right to modify and repeal, it gives a practical way to overcome the undue judicial burden ... so, it's very persuwasive to me.