[Constitution] Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.

[강석근]

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.

450 U.S. 662 (1981)

APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

POWELL

whether an Iowa statute that prohibits the use of certain large trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.

I

Appellee (Consolidated) is one of the largest common carriers.

... Among other routes, Consolidated carries commodities through Iowa on Interstate 80, the principal east-west route linking New York, Chicago, and the west coast, and on Interstate 35, a major north-south route.

Consolidated mainly uses two kinds of trucks.

three-axle tractor pulling a 40-foot two-axle trailer

commonly called a single, or "semi," is 55 feet in length.

long been used on the Nation's highways.

two-axle tractor pulling a single-axle trailer and a second single-axle trailer

known as a double, or twin, is 65 feet long overall.

Doubles have larger capacities, and the trailers can be detached.

Consolidated would like to use 65-foot doubles on many of its trips through Iowa.

Unlike all other States in the West and Midwest, Iowa generally prohibits the use of 65-foot doubles within its borders.

Instead, most truck combinations are restricted to 55 feet in length.

Doubles, mobile homes, trucks carrying vehicles such as tractors and other farm equipment,

and

singles hauling livestock, are permitted to be as long as 60 feet.

Notwithstanding these restrictions, Iowa's statute permits cities abutting the state line by local ordinance to adopt the length limitations of the adjoining State.  

Where a city has exercised this option, otherwise oversized trucks are permitted within the city limits and in nearby commercial zones. 

 The Iowa Legislature in 1974 passed House Bill 671, which would have permitted 65-foot doubles. But Iowa Governor Ray vetoed the bill, noting that it "would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and competitors at the expense of our Iowa citizens."

The "border-cities exemption" was passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor shortly thereafter.

Iowa also provides for two other relevant exemptions.

An Iowa truck manufacturer may obtain a permit to ship trucks that are as large as 70 feet. Iowa Code § 321E.10 (1979).

Permits also are available to move oversized mobile homes, provided that the unit is to be moved from a point within Iowa or delivered for an Iowa resident. § 321E.28(5).

Because of Iowa's statutory scheme,

Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State.

Instead, the company must do one of four things:

(i) use 55-foot singles

(ii) use 60-foot doubles

(iii) detach the trailers of a 65-foot ...

(iv) divert 65-foot doubles around Iowa.

Dissatisfied with these options, Consolidated filed this suit in the District Court averring that Iowa's statutory scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.

Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure enacted pursuant to its police power.

The State asserted that 65-foot doubles are more dangerous than 55-foot singles and, in any event, that the law promotes safety and reduces road wear within the State by diverting much truck traffic to other states.

In a 14-day trial, both sides adduced evidence on safety and on the burden on interstate commerce imposed by Iowa's law. On the question of safety, the District Court found that the

"evidence clearly establishes that the twin is as safe as the semi." 

"there is no valid safety reason for barring twins from Iowa's highways because of their configuration."

"The evidence convincingly ... establishes that the 65-foot twin is as safe as the 60-foot twin and the 55-foot semi. . .."

"... Twins are more maneuverable, are less sensitive to wind, and create less splash and spray. However, they are more likely than semis to jackknife or upset. They can be backed only for a short distance.

Semis are more stable but are more likely to 'rear-end' another vehicle."

District Court applied

Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429 (1978)

and concluded that the state law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 612 F.2d 1064 (1979).

It accepted the District Court's finding that 65-foot doubles were as safe as 55-foot singles.

“Not a constitutionally permissible interest.” 

It also commented that the several statutory exemptions identified above, such as those applicable to border cities and the shipment of livestock, suggested that the law, in effect, benefited Iowa residents at the expense of interstate traffic.

“Iowa statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.”

Iowa appealed,

We now affirm.

II

The Commerce Clause does not, of course, invalidate all state restrictions on commerce.

The extent of permissible state regulation is not always easy to measure.

It may be said with confidence, however, that a state’s power to regulate commerce is never greater than in matters traditionally of local concern. 

Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333

For example, regulations that touch upon safety -- especially highway safety -- are those that "the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate." 

Raymond, supra at 434 U. S. 443

accord,

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, (1949)

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177 (1938)

Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, (1932)

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, (1915).

"if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce."

Raymond, supra at 434 U. S. 449 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).

Those who would challenge such bona fide safety regulations must overcome a "strong presumption of validity." 

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520 (1959).

In Raymond, (recent unanimous decision)

we declined to "accept the State's contention that the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce."

This "weighing" by a court requires

"a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce."

accord,

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 397 U. S. 142 (1970)

Bibb, supra, at 359 U. S.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761

III

Applying these general principles, we conclude that the Iowa truck length limitations unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.

In Raymond,

Court held that a Wisconsin statute that precluded the use of 65-foot doubles violated the Commerce Clause.

This case is Raymond revisited.

Here, as in Raymond, the State failed to present any persuasive evidence that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles.

Moreover, Iowa's law is now out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States. Iowa thus substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck.

In the absence of congressional action to set uniform standards, some burdens associated with state safety regulations must be tolerated. (Safety first, in general)

But where, as here, the State's safety interest has been found to be illusory, and its regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law cannot be harmonized with the Commerce Clause.

A

Iowa made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of its law than did Wisconsin in Raymond, but its effort was no more persuasive. 

Statistical studies supported the view that 65-foot doubles are at least as safe overall as 55-foot singles and 60-foot doubles.  

The singles were involved in 100 accidents resulting in 27 injuries and one fatality. The 65-foot doubles were involved in 106 accidents resulting in 17 injuries and one fatality. Iowa's expert statistician admitted that this study provided "moderately strong evidence" that singles have a higher injury rate than doubles.

Numerous insurance company executives, and transportation officials from the Federal Government and various States, testified that 65-foot doubles were at least as safe as 55-foot singles.

B

Consolidated demonstrated that Iowa's law substantially burdens interstate commerce.

The record shows that Iowa's law added about $12.6 million each year to the costs of trucking companies. (of which wish to continue to use 65-foot doubles)

Consolidated alone incurred about $2 million per year in increased costs.

Iowa's law may aggravate the problem.

Fifty-five-foot singles carry less freight than 65-foot doubles.

... the restriction requires more highway miles to be driven to transport the same quantity of goods.

Other things being equal, accidents are proportional to distance raveled.

Thus, if 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles, Iowa's law tends to increase the number of accidents and to shift the incidence of them from Iowa to other States.

(Moreover, trucks diverted from interstates often must travel over more dangerous roads.

The District Court, in denying a stay pending appeal, noted that Iowa's law causes "more accidents, more injuries, more fatalities and more fuel consumption.")

IV

Perhaps recognizing the weakness of the evidence ...

Iowa urges the Court simply to "defer" to the safety judgment of the State.

It argues that the length of trucks is generally related to safety.

The task of drawing a line should be left to its legislature.

The Court normally does accord "special deference" to state highway safety regulations. 

Raymond, supra.

This traditional deference "derives in part from the assumption that, where such regulations do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce, ... insuring that a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations." Ibid. 

...here. Iowa's scheme, although generally banning large doubles from the State, nevertheless has several exemptions that secure to Iowans many of the benefits ...

The "border cities exemption" also suggests that Iowa's statute may not have been designed to ban dangerous trucks, but rather to discourage interstate truck traffic.

V

In sum,

the statutory exemptions, their history, and the arguments Iowa has advanced in support of its law in this litigation

all suggest that

the deference traditionally accorded a State's safety is not warranted. 

See Raymond, supra 

The controlling factors thus are the findings of the District Court...

BRENNAN, MARSHALL concurring

For me, analysis of Commerce Cause challenges to state regulations must take into account three principles:

(1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.

(2) The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel.

(3) Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety, rather than economics.

...

REHNQUIST, THE CHIEF JUSTICE and STEWART dissenting.

I believe the analysis in both opinions oversteps our "limited authority to review state legislation under the commerce clause," and seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens.

I

...the plurality neglects to note that both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, through which Interstate 80 runs before reaching New York, also ban 65-foot doubles.

In short, the persistent (Governor Ray) effort in the plurality opinion to paint Iowa as an oddity standing alone to block commerce carried in 65-foot doubles is simply not supported by the facts.

II

A determination that a state law is a rational safety measure does not end the Commerce Clause inquiry.

A "sensitive consideration" of the safety purpose in relation to the burden on commerce is required. 

Raymond, supra, 

When engaging in such a consideration, the Court does not directly compare safety benefits to commerce costs and strike down the legislation if the latter can be said in some vague sense to "outweigh" the former. Such an approach would make an empty gesture of the strong presumption of validity accorded state safety measures, particularly those governing highways.

III

Iowa defends its statute as a highway safety regulation. There can be no doubt that the challenged statute is a valid highway safety regulation, and thus entitled to the strongest presumption of validity against Commerce Clause challenges.

50 States regulate the length of trucks which may use their highways. 

There can also be no question that the particular limit chosen by Iowa -- 60 feet -- is rationally related to Iowa's safety objective. Most truck limits are between 55 and 65 feet,...

Iowa adduced evidence supporting the relation between vehicle length and highway safe.

In sum, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the legislative determination that length is related to safety, and nothing in Consolidated's evidence undermines this conclusion.

The question is whether the Iowa Legislature has acted rationally in regulating vehicle lengths...

"Since the adoption of one weight or width regulation rather than another is a legislative, and not a judicial, choice, its constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales ..."

Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 191.

.... In Barnwell Brothers, the Court upheld a South Carolina width limit of 90 inches even though "all other states permit a width of 96 inches, which is the standard width of trucks engaged in interstate

...

Furthermore, the effort ... to portray the legislation involved here as protectionist is in error. Whenever a State enacts more stringent safety measures than its neighbors, in an area which affects commerce, the safety law will have the incidental effect of deflecting interstate commerce to the neighboring States. Indeed, the safety and protectionist motives cannot be separated: the whole purpose of safety regulation of vehicles is to protect the State from unsafe vehicles.

If a neighboring State chooses not to protect its citizens from the danger discerned by the enacting State, that is its business, but the enacting State should not be penalized when the vehicles it considers unsafe travel through the neighboring State. (Burdening road maintenance which closely related with vehicles safety)

... the jurisprudence of the "negative side" of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused.

[강석근]

Issue is whether an Iowa statute that prohibits the use of certain large trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.

Consolidated mainly uses two kinds of trucks.

Single, or "semi,"
55 feet in length.

Double, or twin,
65 feet long.

Consolidated would like to use 65-foot doubles on many of its trips through Iowa.

[강석근]

Unlike near by States, Iowa generally prohibits 65-foot doubles.
(The dissenting disagree withis fact. other states prohibits it as well )

Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State.

Consolidated filed this suit averring that Iowa's statutory scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.

Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure enacted pursuant to its police power.

In a 14-day trial, both sides adduced evidence on safety and on the burden on interstate commerce imposed by Iowa's law.

[강석근]

The District Court found that the twin is as safe as the semi.

District Court applied Raymond case.

Certiorari

This case almost same as Raymond, reacent unanimous decisen.

especially highway safety,
"if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment 

Those who would challenge such bona fide safety regulations must overcome a "strong presumption of validity." 

[강석근]

Applying these general principles, we conclude that the Iowa truck length limitations unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.

Here, as in Raymond, the State failed to present any persuasive evidence that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles.

Moreover, Iowa's law substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck.

Iowa urges the Court simply to "defer" to the safety judgment of the State.

The Court normally does accord "special deference" to state highway safety regulations. 

[강석근]

This traditional deference "derives in part from the assumption that, where such regulations do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce...

In sum, Iowa had advanced evidence in support of its law.

But all suggest that the deference traditionally accorded a State's safety is not warranted. 

Concurring.
Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety, rather than economics.

[강석근]

Dissenting.

Majority seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens.

 There can be no doubt that the challenged statute is a valid highway safety regulation, and thus entitled to the strongest presumption of validity against Commerce Clause challenges.

In sum, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the legislative determination that length is related to safety, and nothing in Consolidated's evidence undermines this conclusion.

[강석근]

Furthermore, the effort ... to portray the legislation involved here as protectionist is in error. 

Whenever a State enacts more stringent safety measures than its neighbors, the safety law will have the incidental effect of deflecting interstate commerce.

 Indeed, the safety and protectionist motives cannot be separated.