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증거법 사건인데 형소법 으로 시작해서 증거법으로 마무리 되었던 것 같습니다. 케이스에 형소법 문제가 이슈가 되지 않았지만 상식적으로 알고 있어야만 하는 부분이라 본문에서는 나와있지 않는 내용 이였습니다. 그래서 읽을 때는 미쳐 생각 하지 못했으나 수업 이후 다시 한번 생각 하게 되었고 형소법을 복습 할 수 있는 좋은 기회가 되었습니다. 확실히 반복 할 때 마다 개념이 명확해 지고 이해의 폭이 넓어짐을 느낄 수 있습니다.
이번 기회에 사전 뒤져가며 다시 리뷰하는 시간을 가져 보았습니다.
하지만 아직 무리하게 한페이지로 줄이는 작업을 할 필요가 있을지에 대해서는 확신이 서지 않습니다. 한페이지로 요약하는 작업도 일장 일단이 있다고 생각 합니다. 한 페이지로 줄이면 그만큼 리뷰가 수월해 진다는 이점이 있을 수 있으나 많은 중요한 부분을 놓칠 수 있습니다. 더욱이 처음 배우는 것을 접할 때는 무리하게 요약 하다 보면 중요한 요소를 놓치기 일수 입니다. 심지어 저는 영어와 커먼로를 배우는 입장에서 모든 문장들이 공부 해야 할 과제로 느껴 지기 때문에 요약하는 작업이 쉽지가 않습니다.
따라서 저는 한페이지 속에 중요한 내용을 모두 담기가 어렵다고 생각 하는 입장입니다. 나중에 제가 영어에 능통하고 커먼로에도 충분한 자신감이 생긴다면 비로서 아는 내용을 생략 해 가며 효율적으로 요약 할 수 있을 것 같습니다. 지금은 생략보다 반복이 더 중요한 때라고 생각 합니다. ... 그래도 말씀 하신 대로 최대한 요약해 보도록 하겠습니다.
PROBABLE CAUSE.
Reasonable cause. State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282, 284. Having more evidence for than against. Ex parte Souza, 65 Cal.App. 9, 222 P. 869, 870. A reasonable ground for belief in the existence of 'facts war- ranting the proceedings complained of. Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265, 267. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper,) which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or, in a civil case, that a cause of action existed. Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664, 13 Am. St.Rep. 362; Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal.App. 418, 32 P.2d 430, 431.
In malicious prosecution the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Lunsford v. Dietrich, 86 Ala. 250, 5 So. 461, 11 Am.St.Rep. 37. A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Sanders v. Palmer, N.Y., 55 F. 217, 5 C.C. A. 77. Such a state of facts and circumstances known to the prosecutor personally or by information from others as would, in the judgment of the court, lead a man of ordinary caution, acting conscientiously in the light of such facts and circumstances, to believe that the person charged is guilty. Keebey v. Stifft, 145 Ark. 8, 224 S. W. 396, 400. See, also, Galley v. Brennan, 216 N.Y. 118, 110 N.E. 179, 180. Where defendant in an action for malicious prosecution shows that before commencing the prosecution he, in good faith, consulted an attorney of good standing and made a full disclosure of all of the facts reasonably obtainable, and in good faith acted upon such advice, this of itself constitutes "probable cause." Gustason v. Speak, 85 Cal.App. 18, 258 P. 725, 726; Treloar v. Harris, 66 Ind. App. 159, 117 N.E. 975, 976.
As justifying arrest without a warrant by one believed guilty of felony or to be engaged in commission of a felony, is a belief fairly arising out of facts and circumstances known to officer that a party is engaged in commission of a crime. Day v . U. S., C.C.A.Neb., 37 F.2d 80, 81.
For search warrant means reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant cautious man in believing party is guilty of offense charged. Shore v. U. S., 49 F.2d 519, 521, 60 App.D. C. 137.
For arrest which must be shown as justification by defendants in action for false imprisonment is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient in themselves to warrant cautious man in believing accused to be guilty, but does not depend on actual state of case in point of fact, as it may turn out upon legal investigation, but on knowledge of facts which would be sufficient to induce reasonable belief in truth of accusation. Christ v. McDonald, 152 Or. 494, 52 P.2d 655, 658.
Class feedback.
If probable cause exists search warrant required or not?
There are two kinds of distinct warrants. A search warrant and an arrest warrant.
Under the Plain view. Search warrant not required.
To see the inside of the closed suitcase, a search warrant is required.
When the agent sees the crime scene or right after the crime scene arrest warrant is not required.
Delivering cocaine is illegal, so arresting Haven, who was implicated by the Mcleroth, does not require an arrest warrant.
Custom search is immune from the warrant requirement but only with laser search.
Even if the defendant previously cleared the custom search, because McLeroth implicated him, he could be arrested without an arrest warrant but the suitcase search without a search warrant is not permissible.
Thus, T-shirts cannot be used case in chief.
Why was the T-shirt used even though it was illegally obtained evidence?
(“There is no rule without exception.”)
Even Illegally obtained evidence could be used to attack a witness’s credibility.
But only for that limited purpose.
(One-page brief is required for simplification.)
“T-shirt” was mentioned by the prosecutor only in the cross-examination.
And the issue is whether the prosecution is allowed to be mentioned it first in the cross-examination.
(Practice makes perfect both in the field of art and the law)
Assignment:
What constitutional right from which the truth-finding derived?
2 cases or more.
2015 (September Term)
United States v. Bess, 75 M.J. 70 (it is undeniable that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense).
(whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense).
(the right to present a defense has many aspects; under the Compulsory Process Clause, a defendant has a right to call witnesses whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense; a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him is violated where it is found that a trial judge has limited cross-examination in a manner that precludes an entire line of relevant inquiry; in addition, the Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor).
This opinion is subject to revision before publication
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES _______________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Pedro M. BESS Jr., Hospitalman Second Class
United States Navy, Appellant
No. 15-0372
Crim. App. No. 201300311
Argued November 17, 2015—Decided January 6, 2016 Military Judges: Colleen Glaser-Allen, Douglas P. Barber Jr.
For Appellant: Major John J. Stephens, USMC (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Matthew M. Harris, USMC (ar- gued); Colonel Mark K. Jamison, USMC, and Major Su- zanne M. Dempsey, USMC (on brief); Lieutenant Com- mander Keith Lofland, JAGC, USN, and Brian K. Keller, Esq.
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge ERDMANN, Judges RYAN and OHLSON, and Senior Judge SENTELLE joined.
_______________
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.1
This case requires us to address the proper application of Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 921(b), which allows the military judge, “in the exercise of discretion,” to grant a re- quest from the court members that “the court-martial be reopened and ... additional evidence introduced.” Here, the military judge received a request from the members for, inter alia, certain muster reports, after their deliberations had begun. Although the muster reports were properly admissible as business records, we hold that the military judge abused his discretion by presenting them to the court members without giving Appellant an opportunity to challenge
1 Senior Judge David B. Sentelle, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sat by designation, pursuant to Article142(f), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 942(f) (2012).
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
their reliability before the factfinder. We cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus reverse.
I. Background
Before a general court-martial consisting of officer and enlisted members, Appellant, a radiological technician at a Navy clinic, was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of attempting to commit indecent acts and four specifications of committing indecent acts, in violation of Articles 80 and 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 920 (2012). In each case, the indecent act that Appellant attempted or accomplished was convincing female X-ray examinees to fully undress without justification and viewing them in the nude. Appellant was acquitted of one specification of committing indecent acts, three specifications of assault consummated by a battery, and one specification of attempted vaginal penetration.
During the panel’s deliberations, the court members submitted a question to the military judge asking whether they could view various documents that had been mentioned during cross-examination of Appellant and in closing arguments, including the “muster reports.” During a session con- ducted outside the presence of the members, the Government called a witness, Ms. Wilson, to lay a foundation for the admission of the muster reports as business records. Ms. Wilson explained the manner in which the muster reports were created and stored, and testified that on each report she had written the date to which it pertained.2 Appellant’s counsel cross-examined Ms. Wilson and also called Hospitalman First Class (HM1) Cedric Odom, who had submitted two of the five muster reports, as a witness. After this testimony and arguments from both parties, the military judge decided that the muster reports were admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for records of regularly conducted activity, better known as the “business records” exception.
2 The muster reports were electronically saved by day, month, and year, with the date being recorded as the title of the report. But when printed, the reports did not show the title, and were thus essentially meaningless as printed until the custodian wrote the corresponding date on each muster report.
2
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
See Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 803(6).
Although Appellant asked to question the witnesses be- fore the panel, the military judge denied the request and handed the reports to the panel with no explanation, stating only that they had “been admitted into evidence.” Shortly thereafter, the panel found Appellant guilty of six of the eleven charged specifications.
Appellant was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for two years. The convening authority approved the sentence and the United States Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States v. Bess, No. NMCCA 201300311, 2014 CCA LEXIS 803, at *24, 2014 WL 5449625, at *8 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2014).
II. Discussion
We granted review to consider Appellant’s contention that the military judge abused his discretion by admitting the muster reports—in a case that turned in part on the identity of the alleged perpetrator—without allowing him to attack their weight before the factfinder.
During deliberations, “[m]embers may request that the court-martial be reopened and that portions of the record be read to them or additional evidence introduced. The military judge may, in the exercise of discretion, grant such request.” R.C.M. 921(b); see also United States v. Lampani, 14 M.J. 22, 25 (C.M.A. 1982) (“our precedents make clear that, even after the court members have begun their deliberations, they may seek additional evidence”).
We review a military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter, 74 M.J. 204, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2015). This standard requires more than just our disagreement with the military judge’s decision. United States v. Stellato, 74 M.J. 473, 480 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
Instead, an abuse of discretion occurs when [the military judge’s] findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law, or the military judge’s decision on the issue at hand is outside the range of choices
3
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the law.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quota- tion marks omitted).
A. The Business Records Exception
The military judge did not err in concluding that the muster reports were admissible as business records. Ms. Wilson, who compiled and stored the muster reports by date on a daily basis, testified that she collected daily reports from supervisors, which were due at 8:00 a.m. Supervisors would submit real-time information about the physical sta- tus of those under their supervision, and Ms. Wilson would save the data as a daily muster report. Her testimony demonstrates that the muster reports qualified as business records since they were
made at or near the time ... from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge ... kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activi- ty, and ... it was the regular practice of that busi- ness activity to make the ... report ... all as shown by the testimony of the custodian.
M.R.E. 803(6).
But even if these requirements are satisfied, a document may still fail to qualify as a business record if “the source of the information or the method or circumstances of prepara- tion indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Id. The opponent of admission bears the burden of establishing sufficient indicia of untrustworthiness. Shelton v. Consumer Products Safety Comm’n, 277 F.3d 998, 1010 (8th Cir. 2002). Minor errors in a business record do not show that the business record is un- trustworthy, but significant mistakes or internal contradic- tions may indicate a lack of trustworthiness.SeeUnited States v. McGill, 953 F.2d 10, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1992). Howev- er, “courts should not focus on questions regarding the accu- racy” of a record in making the trustworthiness determina- tion because the factfinder is responsible for weighing and assessing credibility of the admitted evidence. Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1991). Appellant contends that the muster reports were so un- trustworthy that their admission as business records consti- tutes an abuse of discretion. This argument fails.
4
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
Appellant cross-examined Ms. Wilson with limited effect, pointing out that one of the reports did not list the person submitting it and that Ms. Wilson did not directly verify the reports’ veracity. When Appellant called HM1 Odom, he tes- tified that he relied upon line-level supervisors to report on who was physically present. Odom also confirmed that those listed as “present” could have left five minutes after report- ing for muster, and that people who were late to work, scheduled for a later shift, or detailed elsewhere on the base were listed as “late stay/special detail.”
Given the limited results of the cross-examination and defense witness testimony, the military judge reasonably concluded that nothing had been presented that demon- strated a “lack of trustworthiness.” M.R.E. 803(6). Service members represented as “present” had been physically veri- fied by a line-level supervisor, and the rule requires only that the records be created based upon “information trans- mitted by ... a person with knowledge.” Id. Although the meaning of “late stay/special detail” could vary depending on the context, contemporaneous documentation need not be a model of statistical clarity to qualify as a business record. See United States v. Foerster, 65 M.J. 120, 125 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (noting that, in analyzing the analogous federal rule, federal courts have held that the business records exception should be “‘construed generously in favor of admissibility’” (quoting Conoco Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). We conclude that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the muster reports as business records.
B. Appellant’s Right to Present a Defense
The question of admissibility is distinct, however, from the question of whether Appellant should have been allowed to attack the reliability of the evidence before the factfinder. See United States v. Yeauger, 27 M.J. 199, 202 (C.M.A. 1988) (“Once proffered evidence meets the foundational requirements for any of these exceptions [to the hearsay rule], it is admissible .... It is then for the factfinder to decide how much, if any, weight to accord it.”), overruled on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Moreno, 36 M.J. 107, 121 (C.M.A. 1992).
5
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
“It is undeniable that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense.” United States v. Dimberio, 56 M.J. 20, 24 (C.A.A.F. 2001). “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment ... the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).3
The right to present a defense has many aspects. Under the Compulsory Process Clause, a defendant has a “right to call witnesses whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Article 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (2012); R.C.M. 703; Unit- ed States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 225 n.6 (C.A.A.F. 2010). “A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness- es against him is violated where it is found that a trial judge has limited cross-examination in a manner that precludes an entire line of relevant inquiry.” United States v. Israel, 60 M.J. 485, 488 (C.A.A.F. 2005). In addition, “[t]he Constitu- tional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel nec- essarily includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his fa- vor.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860 (1975) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 252 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Herring, 422 U.S. at 862 (“The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in
3 Crane refers to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that applies to the military justice system. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 165 (1994); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976). We see no reason why the right to present a complete defense would be narrower under the combined protections of the Sixth and Fifth Amendments than it is under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
6
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations.”); United States v. Lampani, 14 M.J. 22, 26 (C.M.A. 1982) (a military judge has “considerable discretion” in determining whether the admission of additional evidence requires “reargument [or] reinstructions”). “This balance is bounded on the one hand by the broad discretion of trial judges and rulemakers’ broad latitude under the Constitu- tion to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal tri- als ... and on the other by the Constitution’s guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 252 (citations omitted) (internal quota- tion marks omitted).
While the military judge has broad latitude to control cross-examination, giving controverted evidence to the factfinder with no opportunity for the accused to examine or cross-examine witnesses or in any way to rebut that evi- dence in front of the members is unprecedented in our legal system, and cannot be reconciled with due process. In the full context of this trial, we conclude that Appellant’s consti- tutional rights were violated. Giving the muster reports to the panel without affording Appellant an opportunity to (a) cross-examine Ms. Wilson, (b) call HM1 Odom as a rebuttal witness, or (c) have his counsel comment on the new evi- dence in front of the members deprived Appellant of his con- stitutionally protected ability to present a complete defense, and constituted an abuse of discretion.
The relevant witnesses were available, Appellant’s evi- dence and cross-examination were relevant to the eviden- tiary weight the court members should afford the muster reports, and it would have been relatively easy to allow the parties to comment on the Government’s altered case. Fail- ure to give Appellant these opportunities violated his consti- tutional rights.
C. Prejudice
“For constitutional errors, the Government must per- suade us that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hall, 56 M.J. 432, 436 (C.A.A.F. 2002); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003) (“A constitutional error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-
7
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
tribute to the verdict obtained”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Tearman, 72 M.J. 54, 62 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
The muster reports here were properly admitted, but Appellant was precluded from challenging the evidentiary weight of those records before the factfinder. Accordingly, the question before us is whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the members would have reached the same six guilty verdicts had Appellant been allowed to ques- tion the implications of the muster reports. While the ques- tion is a close one, we cannot conclude that the error that occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This was an extensive case with eleven specifications. The Government charged Appellant with indecent conduct or attempted indecent conduct with respect to seven victims, and with assault consummated by battery (touching while nude) with respect to three of those same victims. With re- gard to one victim—J.E.—Appellant was charged with a third count of attempted vaginal penetration. The panel, af- ter receiving the muster reports, quickly returned a verdict acquitting Appellant of all assault specifications but convict- ing him of six of the seven indecent conduct specifications.4
The core of the Government’s case was the testimony of the seven alleged victims, each of whom testified about a common modus operandi by the alleged perpetrator. When no other technicians were present, the X-ray technician would request that the victims completely disrobe. He would explain that the X-rays were medically required, and in the cases of A.L., D.B. and J.E., he used a sham nudity consent form. He would then X-ray the victims in various positions while they were nude, instructing them between X-rays on different physical positions they were to take.
One of the main issues that emerged at trial was wheth- er the victims had confused Appellant, an HM2 African- American male with no discernible accent, with HM3
4 The panel acquitted Appellant of all charges with respect to only one victim: O.L.S.
8
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
Philogene, a thinner African-American male who spoke with a Haitian accent.
Appellant concedes that with respect to victims A.A. and J.E. the identity of the alleged perpetrator was not at issue. Of the remaining four victims whose allegations resulted in a conviction, three of the victims identified Appellant as their X-ray technician in court,5 two remembered his rank and his request for them to sign a nudity consent form,6 and all four had X-rays taken that bore Appellant’s identifying symbol.7 Two recalled that the perpetrator had no discerni- ble accent.8
But this evidence is not enough to demonstrate harm- lessness beyond a reasonable doubt, because challenging the evidentiary weight of the muster reports could have shaken the Government’s case.
The muster reports were not airtight evidence of Appel- lant’s identity as the perpetrator. Had he been afforded his right to put on a complete defense, as we know from the tes- timony that the military judge heard, Appellant would have at least been able to demonstrate that Ms. Wilson did not physically verify the accuracy of the reports herself and that the reports were stored in an electronic location where they could have been subsequently altered. The testimony of HM1 Odom would have demonstrated that even those who submitted the reports relied upon others to provide accurate reporting data and that each muster report was only a snap- shot of information thus submitted at 8:00 a.m., with no guarantee that an individual “present” at 8:00 a.m. might not immediately leave. Odom’s excluded testimony could have also informed the panel that “late stay/special detail” can have various meanings, including absence from the clin- ic. If allowed to make a renewed closing summation, Appel- lant’s counsel would have been able to argue to the factfinder that the muster reports should not carry much weight.
5 Victims A.L., D.B., and P.G. 6 A.L. and D.B.
7 A.L., D.B., P.G., and B.S.
8 D.B. and B.S.
9
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
Since Appellant was precluded from pursuing these in- quiries before the panel, we cannot discern with certainty how effective efforts of this sort might have been. When we add to that the timing of events at the court-martial, we are unable to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In closing argument, the defense counsel had emphasized the Government’s failure to introduce the muster reports as a significant weakness in its case. The members began de- liberations at 7:55 a.m., and requested the muster reports and a number of other documents approximately an hour later. They were told at 9:35 a.m. that the parties were “working on” the muster reports, but that the other docu- ments they requested were “not admissible under the rules.” Three hours and forty-one minutes later, at 1:16 p.m., the muster reports were handed to the panel without comment, and over objection. They announced their findings at 1:49 p.m., only a half hour after receiving them and nearly six hours after deliberations began.
Clearly, the members were affected by defense counsel’s argument, since they then requested the muster reports to see what was in them. While the Government argues that its evidence was overwhelming, this is not the case. The mem- bers asked for a substantial amount of additional evidence after an hour’s deliberation (although they only received the muster reports), and eventually acquitted Appellant of five of the eleven specifications. Given the interest which the re- ports clearly provoked among the members, and the timing of the verdict, we simply cannot say that that the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.9
D. Conclusion
Admitting evidence without allowing the parties to dispute the reliability of that evidence before the factfinder cannot be reconciled with Fifth Amendment due process, or the protections of the Sixth Amendment. On these facts, we
9 As the Supreme Court directs, we look not at some hypothet- ical reasonable panel, but at “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sul- livan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis in origi- nal); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
10
United States v. Bess, No. 15-0372 Opinion of the Court
cannot conclude that the denial of Appellant’s right to pre-sent a complete defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While R.C.M. 921(b) permits a military judge to grant the members’ request to introduce new evidence after they have begun deliberations, this case demonstrates that the military judge should review and weigh such requests with great caution. Procedures should be employed to ensure that no unfair prejudice is afforded to either party. See M.R.E. 403.
III. Judgment
The judgment of the United States Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The findings and sentence are set aside and the record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. A rehearing is authorized.
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군법 재판 입니다. 피고가 해군 내에서 원고인 한 여해군에게 엑스레이를 찍게 하는 과정에서 정당한 이유 없이 옷을 벗고 나체로 있게 하여 군법에 위배되었다는 내용 입니다. 피고는 항소 하였고 트라이얼 에서 모든 가능한 증거를 이용 하여 충분히 디펜스를 하지 못했다고 판단되어 리버스 되었습니다. Business Records Exception 도 언급 되지만 과제와 상관 없으니 생략 하겠습니다. 이슈는 피고가 사실심에서 가능한 모든 증거들을 사용하여 의미 있는 디펜스를 하지 못했기에 리버스블 에러가 되었습니다.
의미 있는 디펜스를 할 수 있는 헌법적인 권리는 수정헌법 6조와 14조가 언급 되었지만 군법에서는 5조가 추가적으로 적용 된다고 합니다.
2021 (October Term)
United States v. Beauge, 82 M.J. 157 (the right to cross-examine a witness for impeachment purposes has constitutional underpinnings because of the right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and the due process right to present a complete defense).
2018 (October Term)
United States v. Kohlbek, 78 M.J. 326 (a rule permitting a per se ban on unreliable evidence in the military justice system is neither an arbitrary nor a disproportionate restriction on an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence in his defense).
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