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Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979)
RONEY, Circuit Judge:
In this truth-in-lending case, we resolve two important issues to this field of the law. First, we decide that an action on the underlying debt in default is a compulsory counterclaim that must be asserted in a suit by the debtor on a truth-in-lending cause of action.
이 truth-in-lending case 에서 중요한 결정을 했습니다.
채무 불이행 소송에서 피고의 채무에 대한 소송은 compulsory counterclaim 입니다.
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https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/compulsory_counterclaim
compulsory counterclaim
A compulsory counterclaim is a claim made by a defendant against a plaintiff that arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim, and which is forfeited if not raised in the same lawsuit. If the defendant fails to assert a counterclaim in their answer, they are thereafter precluded from asserting it against the plaintiff in the plaintiff's pending action or in an independent action. Compulsory counterclaims are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).
While failing to raise a compulsory counterclaim typically results in the loss of that claim, a few exceptions exist.
If an otherwise compulsory counterclaim requires adding a party over whom the court cannot obtain jurisdiction, that counterclaim does not need to be raised.
Additionally, if the pleader fails to make a compulsory counterclaim as the result of through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or if justice requires it - then the pleader may by leave of court set up a counterclaim by amendment.
Compulsory counterclaims are contrasted with permissive counterclaims or claims which are not forfeited if you fail to raise them in an answer.
[Last updated in July of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]
(a) [Compulsory Counterclaims.]
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
(b) [Permissive Counterclaims.]
A pleading may state as a counterclaim against an opposing party any claim that is not compulsory so long as a right of action existed thereon at the time of the filing of complaint.
MEMORANDUM
To: Subcommittee on Amendment to Civil Rules of Procedure
From: N. William Delker, Chair
Date: October 4, 2016
Re: # 2016-010. Super. Ct. R. 10. Recommendations regarding Permissive Counterclaims
compulsory counterclaim 은 한 (연방)관할 권에서 모두 해결 되어야 하는 반소를 말하고 ... 일반적으로 compulsory 가 아니면 permissive 로 보는 것 같습니다.
On July 17, 1975 plaintiff Theresa Plant executed a note in favor of defendant Blazer Financial Services, Inc. for $2,520.00 to be paid in monthly installments of $105.00. No payments were made on the note. In March 1976 plaintiff commenced a civil action under § 1640 of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 Et seq., for failure to make disclosures required by the Act and by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. (1978), promulgated thereunder.1 Defendant counterclaimed on the note for the unpaid balance. Based on defendant's failure to disclose a limitation on an after-acquired security interest, the trial court held the disclosure inadequate and awarded plaintiff the statutory penalty of $944.76 and $700.00 in attorney's fees.
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원고Plant는 피고인 Blazer Financial Services, Inc.에 $2,500.00를 대출 하고 월 $100씩 분할 지급하는 계약을 체결했습니다. 원고는 Truth-in-Lending Act, § 1640에 따라, 규정 Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 에 따라 담보권에 대한 공개를 적절히 하지 않은 것에 대해 민사 소송을 시작했습니다. 피고는 미지급 잔액에 대해 반소 했습니다. 피고가 담보권에 대한 정보를 공개하지 않은 것을 근거로 원심 법원은 원고에게 $944 의 법정 벌금과 $700.00의 변호사 수임료를 선고했습니다.
Counterclaim
Plaintiff challenges the trial court's ruling that defendant's counterclaim on the underlying debt was compulsory.2 The issue is jurisdictional. A permissive counterclaim must have an independent jurisdictional basis, Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks, 421 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1970), while it is generally accepted that a compulsory counterclaim falls within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts even if it would ordinarily be a matter for state court consideration. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n. 1, 94 S. Ct. 2504, 41 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1974); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). In the instant case there is no independent basis since neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction is available for the counterclaim. Consequently, if the counterclaim were to be treated as permissive, defendant's action on the underlying debt would have to be pursued in the state court.3
The issue of whether a state debt counterclaim in a truth-in-lending action is compulsory or permissive is one of first impression in this Circuit, has never, to our knowledge, been decided by a court of appeals, and has received diverse treatment from a great number of district courts.
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원고는 기본 채무에 대한 피고의 반소가 강제적이라는 원심 법원의 판결에 이의를 제기합니다. 이 문제는 관할권입니다. 허용 적 반소는 독립적인 관할권을 가지며, 강제 반소는 일반적으로 주 법원의 관할권 일지라도 연방 법원의 보조 관할권에 속합니다.
현 사건은 (기본 채무 문제가)연방 문제나 다이벌시티 관할권이 아니기 때문에 독립적인 근거는 없습니다. 결과적으로, 반소가 허용적인 것으로 취급된다면, 기본 부채에 대한 피고의 소송 관할권은 주 법원 되어야 할 것입니다. truth-in-lending case 에서 채무 반소가 강제적인지 허용 적인지 여부를 결정하는 경우는 이 순회 법원의 첫 번째 경우이며, 지금까지는 여러 디스트릭트 코트 에서 일관성 없이 처리되어 왔습니다.
Rule 13(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence" that is the subject matter of plaintiff's claim.5 Four tests have been suggested to further define when a claim and counterclaim arise from the same transaction:
1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1410 at 42 (1971).
An affirmative answer to any of the four questions indicates the counterclaim is compulsory.
The test which has commended itself to most courts, including our own, is the logical relation test. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d at 714; 6 Wright & Miller at 48.
The logical relation test is a loose standard which permits "a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of suits."
3 Moore's Federal Practice P 13.13 at 300. "The hallmark of this approach is its flexibility." 6 Wright & Miller at 46-47.
In Revere Copper & Brass this Court added a third tier to the counterclaim analysis by further defining "logical relationship" to exist when the counterclaim arises from the same "aggregate of operative facts" in that the same operative facts serves as the basis of both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal rights, otherwise dormant, in the defendant.
규칙 13(a)은 원고의 청구의 주제인 "arises out of the transaction or occurrence" 하는 경우 compulsory counterclaim이라고 규정합니다.
"arises out of the transaction or occurrence" 경우를 정의하기 위해 4가지 테스트가 제안되었습니다.
1) 팩트와 룰은 대체로 동일한가?
2) res judicata로후속 소송을 금지합니까? (금지 한다면 compulsory)
3) 동일한 증거가 사용 됩니까?
4)논리적 관계가 있습니까?
하나면 긍정 이어도 compulsory 입니다.
하지만 대부분의 법원서는 논리적 관계 테스트를 사용 합니다.
논리적 관계 테스트는 compulsory 에 대하여 광범위하고 현실적인 해석을 허용하는 표준입니다.
반소가 동일한 "aggregate of operative facts" 일 때 "논리적 관계" 가 존재함을 포함 함으로써 compulsory 판단을 더욱 용의 하게 하였습니다.
Applying the logical relationship test literally to the counterclaim in this case clearly suggests its compulsory character because a single aggregate of operative facts, the loan transaction, gave rise to both plaintiff's and defendant's claim. Because a tallying계산 of the results from the district courts which have decided this question, however, shows that a greater number have found such a counterclaim merely permissive, we subject the relationship between the claims to further analysis.
The split of opinion on the nature of debt counterclaims in truth-in-lending actions appears to be, in large part, the product of competing policy considerations between the objectives of Rule 13(a) and the policies of the Truth-in-Lending Act, and disagreement over the extent to which federal courts should be involved in state causes of action for debt. While Rule 13(a) is intended to avoid multiple litigation by consolidating all controversies between the parties, several courts and commentators have observed that accepting creditors' debt counterclaims may obstruct achievement of the goals of the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Various arguments are made compositely as follows: The purpose of the Act is to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
이 사건에서 반소에 논리적 관계 테스트를 적용하면 대출 거래가 compulsory 성격을 분명히 나타냅니다. 그러나 많은 경우 디스트릭트코트가 대출거래 반소가 permissive이라고 판단 했기에 추가 분석이 필요함을 느낍니다. truth-in-lending case 에서 채무 반소의 성격에 대한 의견 차이는 규칙 13(a)의 목적과 truth-in-lending act의 정책의 차이와 연방 법원이 주 채무소송에 관여해야만 하는지에 대한 의견 불일치에서 발생 합니다. 규칙 13(a)는 논쟁을 통합하여 불필요한 여러 소송을 피하기 위한 것이지만, 여러 평론가들은 채무 반소를 통합 하는 것이 truth-in-lending act본 취지에 반한다는 사실을 지적 했습니다.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1601. This purpose is effectuated by debtors' standing in the role of private attorneys general not merely to redress individual injuries but to enforce federal policy. The success of this private enforcement scheme would be undermined if debtors were faced with counterclaims on debts often exceeding the limits of their potential recovery under the Act. See Hooks v. Jefferson Chevrolet Co., CCH Consumer Credit Guide P 98,152 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1975). The purpose of the Act would suffer further frustration if federal courts were entangled in the myriad factual and legal questions essential to a decision on the debt claims but unrelated to the truth-in-lending violation. Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1974), the court also noted the incongruity불일치 of enlisting참여 the federal court's resources to assist in debt collection by the very target of the legislation which gives the plaintiff its cause of action.
Several other factors have been cited to offset the attractiveness of treating all related disputes in a single action under Rule 13. For example, courts have predicted a flood of debt counterclaims, greatly increasing the federal court workload. See, e. g., Gammons v. Domestic Loans of Winston-Salem, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 819 (M.D.N.C. 1976). Furthermore, permitting debt counterclaims might destroy truth-in-lending class actions by interjecting참견 vast numbers of individual questions.8 Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 73 F.R.D. 577 (E.D. La. 1976). The judicial economy of consolidated litigation might be countered by the delay of having to provide a jury trial for the debt claim though none is available to the truth-in-lending plaintiff. Id. at 580; Meadows v. Charlie Wood, Inc., 448 F. Supp. at 722.9 Other courts have suggested that regarding such debt counterclaims as compulsory would infringe on the power of states to adjudicate disputes grounded in state law. See, e. g., Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Daughtrey v. First Bank & Trust Co. of South Bend, 435 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
몇가지 다른 요소가 permissive counter claim 을 지지 했습니다. 예를 들어 부채 반소가 쇄도하면 연방 법원의 업무량이 지나치게 증가 할 것을 예측 했습니다.
compulsory counterclaim 은 state jurisdictional sovereignty 를 침해 할 것이라는 법원의 지적도 있었습니다.
Courts which have concluded debt counterclaims to be permissive have found the nexus between the truth-in-lending violation and debt obligation too abstract or tenuous to regard the claims as logically related. One claim, they reason, involves the violation of federal law designed to deter lender nondisclosure and facilitate credit shopping and the other concerns merely a default on a private duty. See, e. g., Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. at 4; Jones v. Sonny Gerber Auto Sales, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 695 (D. Neb. 1976).10
After careful consideration of the factors relied upon in these cases to find counterclaims permissive, we opt for the analysis applied by district courts in Louisiana, Alabama, Texas and Georgia in determining debt counterclaims to be compulsory.
어떤 법원은 truth-in-lending act 위반과 채무 의무 위반 사이의 논리적연관성이 빈약하다고 지적 했습니다.
이러한 permissive counter claim 을 지지 하는 요소를 신중하게 고려한 후, 법원은 루이지애나, 앨라배마, 텍사스 및 조지아의 디스트릭코트의 compulsory counter claim을 지지하는 분석을 선택합니다.
In Rollins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976), the court found the claim and counterclaim logically related because both concerned plaintiff's purchase of a washer and dryer from defendant. In response to the argument that federal courts should avoid state law controversies the court observed that diversity jurisdiction presumes federal courts' competence to decide state law issues and that no rule against state law counterclaims exists for other federal causes of action which may give rise to such counterclaims.12 71 F.R.D. at 543.
롤린스 법원은 원고가 피고로 부터 세탁기와 건조기를 구매 했기 때문에 소송과 반소가 논리적으로 관련이 있다고 판단 했습니다. 연방 법원이 주법 사건에 대한 간섭을 피해야 한다는 주장에 대하여 법원은 다이벌시티 관할권의 존재는 연방 법원이 주법원의 사건을 다룰 수 있음을 의미 하며 주법에는 연방법원에 반소를 금지 하는 법이 없음을 지적 했습니다.
In Carter v. Public Finance Corp., 73 F.R.D. 488 (N.D. Ala. 1977), the court concluded that both claims arose from a single loan transaction and that other than proof of default necessary to prove the counterclaim, the evidence in each would overlap. The court rejected the four suggested tests and held that the single transaction of Rule 13(a) encompassed the loan and everything necessarily done in connection with its closing.
카터에서 소송과 반소 모두 단일 대출 거래에서 발생 했으며 동일 증거가 사용 된다고 결론 지었습니다. 법원은 네가지 테스트를 무시하고 규칙 13(a)을 적용하여 단일 대출 거래가 부수적인 모든 거래를 포함 한다고 판결했습니다.
The results reached in Carter were found "inescapable" in George v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Dallas, 81 F.R.D. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Emphasizing the goal of judicial economy furthered by a single presentation of facts, the court observed that "suits on notes will inevitably deal with the circumstance of the execution of the notes and any representation made to 'induce' the borrowing." 81 F.R.D. at 6.
George 에서도 카터와 비슷한 결론이 내려 졌습니다. 단일 거래를 통해 비용을 절약하고 부수적인 모든 거래를 단일 거래로 다룰 것이라 했습니다.
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To permit the debtor to recover from the creditor without taking the original loan into account would be a serious departure from the evenhanded treatment afforded both parties under the Act. Truth-in-lending claims can be brought in either state or federal court. To the extent this dual jurisdiction was intended to permit litigation of truth-in-lending claims in actions on the debt, it reflects a purpose that the debt claim and the truth-in-lending claims be handled together. To the extent it was intended to relieve federal courts of any of this litigation, the purpose would be frustrated by providing a sanctuary from the creditor's claims in one jurisdiction but not in the other. State courts would always have jurisdiction of a creditor's counterclaim. Had Congress intended to insulate recovery in truth-in-lending actions in federal court from the counterclaims of creditors, of which it surely was aware, it could have easily done so.
We conclude that the obvious interrelationship of the claims and rights of the parties, coupled with the common factual basis of the claims, demonstrates a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim under the test of Revere Copper & Brass. We affirm the trial court's determination that the debt counterclaim is compulsory.
채무자가 원래 대출을 고려하지 않고 채권자로부터 회수할 수 있다면 공정하지 않습니다.
Truth-in-lending 위반 소송과 부채의무 위반 반소는 함께 처리되어야 합니다.
법원은 이러한 소송 과 반소 사이에 논리적 관계가 존재한다고 결론을 내렸습니다.
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