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Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman
465 U.S. 89 (1984)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law.
I
Facts.
History.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent Terri Lee Halderman ...
Defendants were Pennhurst and various Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and several of its officials; and ...
Respondents' amended complaint charged that conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights under ...
Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision...
The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due Process Clause and the MH/MR Act; "freedom from harm" under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Furthermore, the court found that"due process demands that, if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting consistent with that individual's habilitative needs."
After concluding that the large size of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered that "immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded residents from Pennhurst."
Petitioners were ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of this and any further Orders of the Court."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's judgment.
It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 while it affirmed the District Court's holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate habilitation, the court did not decide whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be closed.
On remand, the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for each patient.
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding that 42 U.S.C. § 6010(Bill of Rights Act) did not create any substantive rights.
We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety.
It determined that, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from considering this pendent state law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F.2d at 656 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a pendent state law claim. It reasoned that, because Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be . . . an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule."
Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument that it should have abstained from deciding the state law claim under principles of comity, and refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District Court's use of a Special Master. Three judges dissented in part, arguing that, under principles of federalism and comity, the establishment of a Special Master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion.
We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and (iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two Masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues, for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
The decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 292 U. S. 325 (1934). The Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.
Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States."
In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."
Ex parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 256 U. S. 497 (1921)
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, however, that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 673 (1974).
Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 440 U. S. 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "because of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 411 U. S. 294 (1973)
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by "the principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 437 U. S. 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra. There may be a question, however, whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It is clear, of course, that, a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., ...
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial party in interest."
Thus, "the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter."
And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See ...
The Court has recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State. This was the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void," and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative character and was subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." Ibid. .
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 61 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id.
In particular, Edelman held that, when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief. Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State, since the federal law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the State, and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Respondents (Haldermam) advance two principal arguments in support of the judgment below.
First, they contend that, under the doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against the State because the courts below ordered only prospective injunctive relief.
Second, they assert that the state law claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S.
We first address the contention that respondents' state law claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that, if the judgment below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden was substantial and ongoing.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or representative character,"
This rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Eleventh Amendment.
Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, supra, BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution."
Perez v. Ledesma. Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect."
But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
Accordingly, we concluded that, although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," an award of retroactive relief necessarily "falls afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force."
In sum, Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young, while at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state law. In such a case, the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.
We conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law.
B
The contrary view of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. Under his view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to override the State's protection under that Amendment. The theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official's "instructions," and thus ultra vires his authority.
Accordingly, official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be erroneous, provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors in their official capacities. In this case, where officials clearly acting within the scope of their authority, were found not to have improved conditions in a state institution adequately under state law, the dissent's result would be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality...
To the extent there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises.
.....
Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That result gives the dissent no pause, presumably because of its view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity "undoubtedly run counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.'"
...
The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.
C
The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when -- as here -- the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction.
The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state law claim. See 673 F.2d at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that, when a federal court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise would not have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 383 U. S. 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 819-823 (1824). The Court also has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state law claim, see Siler, 213 U.S. at 213 U. S. 192-193, and that, in fact, the court usually should do so in order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id. at 213 U. S. 193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted against state officials on the basis of state law claims that were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state law claim.
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us.
"When questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 415 U. S. 533, n. 5 (1974). We therefore view the question as an open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have been that, once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. This is an erroneous view, and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions...
...The Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra at 465 U. S. 97-100, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power:
"the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given,"Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. at 256 U. S. 497.
...
D
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state law claims will have a disruptive effect on litigation against state officials. They argue that the "considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see Gibbs, supra, at 383 U. S. 726, counsel against a result that may cause litigants to split causes of action between state and federal courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based on federal or state law, must be brought in state court. Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of state law commonly are split off and referred to the state courts.
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. at 290 U. S. 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). [Footnote 33] That a litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 298 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded. Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, it is clear that, without the injunction against the state institutions and officials in this case, an order entered on state law grounds necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.1983-1984), and the costs of the Masters have been borne by the State, see 446 F. Supp. at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re Schmidt, 494 Pa., at 95-96, 429 A.2d at 635-636. In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the basis of the state law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
V
The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act. We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra at 465 U. S. 93. On remand, the Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the judgment may be sustained on these bases. [Footnote 35] The court also may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011, 6063 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. Nevertheless, I write separately to explain that, in view of my continued belief that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court suits against States only by citizens of other States," Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would hold that petitioners are not entitled to invoke the protections of that Amendment in this federal court suit by citizens of Pennsylvania.
...
To the extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that, since petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of sovereign immunity do not extend to them.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
...
In a completely unprecedented holding, today the Court concludes that Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view of the sovereign immunity of the States supports this result. To the contrary, the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the
Court repudiates at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming instead that federal courts have no power to enforce the will of the States by enjoining conduct because it violates state law. This new pronouncement will require the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability of state law grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles of judicial restraint. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment, the conception of state sovereignty it embodies, or the history of this institution requires or justifies such a perverse result.
...
I
...
II
The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous occasion to consider the Eleventh Amendment argument made by petitioners, and contends that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief on the basis of state law. That is simply not the case.
...
Until today, the rule has been simple: conduct that exceeds the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has authorized, and hence is subject to injunction. [Footnote 2/16] Whether that conduct also gives rise to damages liability is an entirely separate question.
III
...
The pivotal consideration in Young was that it was not conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. The rule that unlawful acts of an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity, and makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment, rather than merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and state interests that ignores the principles contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
...
It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all such cases, the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign, and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. In such a case, the sovereign's interest lies with those who seek to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated them.
"Public officials may become tortfeasors by exceeding the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity . . . [t]he dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the victim, who may bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld."Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 330 U. S. 738 (1947).
The majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit federal courts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign State itself seeks to prohibit thus is inconsistent with both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the underlying respect for the integrity of state policy which the Eleventh Amendment protects. The issuance of injunctive relief which enforces state laws and policies, if anything, enhances federal courts' respect for the sovereign prerogatives of the States. The majority's approach, which requires federal courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more, rather than less, friction between the States and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution.
There is general agreement that the Amendment was passed because the States were fearful that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin. Entertaining a suit for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is sought, there is no threat to the state treasury of the type that concerned the Framers, see...
IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially unwise in that it overrules a long line of cases in order to reach a result that is at odds with the usual practices of this Court. In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:"
"* * * *"
". . . The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 213 U. S. 191."
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 346-347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander, employed a remarkably similar approach to that used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission. The Federal Circuit Court found that the schedule violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights, and granted relief.
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional question because injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately supported by state law. The Court held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state law instead:
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without important reasons. In this case, we think it much better to decide it with regard to the question of a local nature, involving the construction of the state statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record."
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 213 U. S. 193 (1909).
...
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.
...
In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Siler directs the federal court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established state policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents federal courts from implementing state policies through equitable enforcement of state law. Instead, federal courts are required to resolve cases on federal grounds that no state authority can undo. Leaving violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions of federal courts may never be reexamined by the States hardly comports with the respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the Eleventh Amendment.
V
One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing petitioners' conduct, the State of Pennsylvania prohibited it. Respondents do not complain about the conduct of the State of Pennsylvania -- it is Pennsylvania's commands which they seek to enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until today, the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield the conduct of state officers which has been prohibited by their sovereign.
Throughout its history, this Court has derived strength from institutional self-discipline. Adherence to settled doctrine is presumptively the correct course. Departures are, of course, occasionally required by changes in the fabric of our society. When a court, rather than a legislature, initiates such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain and to justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however, the Court casts aside well-settled respected doctrine that plainly commands affirmance of the Court of Appeals -- the doctrine of the law of the case, the doctrine of stare decisis (the Court repudiates at least 28 cases) the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, and the doctrine of judicial restraint. No sound reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or this Court's voyage into the sea of undisciplined lawmaking.
As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.
United Mine worker v. Gibbs케이스와 차이점
같은 팬던트 관할권 문제이지만 Gibbs 에서는 Federal Issue 가 state Issue 보다 비중이 큰 지에 대해서 논하였고 연방이슈가 주이슈와 비등한 비중 이였기에 연방에서 통합하여 판결 할 수 있었던 케이스 였지만 이번Harderman 은 주 시민이 주를 상대로 한 소송 이기 때문에 수정11조로 인해 주(주 공무원)가 실질적인 피고인 경우 연방법원은 (완전한) 관할권을 가질 수 없음을 시사하는 케이스 입니다. 하지만 연방법을 적용하는 케이스에 대하여 수정11조의 예외인 Ex parte Yong 과 Future injunctive relief 만 허용 하는 Halderman 이 적용된 케이스 이며 Pendent Jurisdiction 는 Judge-made rule 이기 때문에 수정 11조 사안을 극복 할 수 없어 결국 피고에게 retroactive damage 를 청구 할 수 없게 된 케이스 입니다. Ex parte Yong 이 적용 될 때 수정 11조와 수정 14조가 충돌하는 양상을 보이나 Halderman 이 그 중재 역할을 합니다.
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