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Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662 (1981)
Unlike all other States in the West and Midwest, Iowa prohibits the use of 65-foot double-trailer trucks within its borders. Appellee, a trucking company filed suit alleging that Iowa's statutory scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.
Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure, asserting that 65-foot doubles are more dangerous than 60-foot trucks and that, in any event, the law promotes safety and reduces road wear.
The District Court found that the evidence established that 65-foot doubles were as safe as the shorter truck units, and held that the state law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
Since Iowa's safety interest has not been demonstrated, and since its regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the Iowa law cannot be harmonized with the Commerce Clause.
In addition to the increased costs of trucking companies in routing 65-foot doubles around Iowa or using smaller truck units through the State, Iowa's law may aggravate, rather than ameliorate, the problem of highway accidents.
While the Court normally accords "special deference" to a state legislature's judgment in enacting highway regulations, Raymond, less deference is due where, as here, the local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses. Exemptions in Iowa's statutory scheme and the history of the "border cities exemption" allowing otherwise oversized trucks within the city limits secure only Iowans many of the benefits.
When reviewing a state regulation for Commerce Clause compliance, the court must weigh the impact on commerce against the benefits sought by the state's lawmakers. The court gives special deference to the state legislature that the court does not determine whether the regulation actually achieves its intended purpose, as long as the evidence available to the lawmakers shows that the regulation is not entirely unreasonable. (according to the concurring opinion, the safety differences between various types and lengths of trucks may not need to be analyzed, however,) The Iowa regulation's legislative history shows that those regulations were insignificant to Iowa's decision to keep the state safe. Rather, with this regulation, Iowa aimed to reduce interstate truck traffic on its highways, which violates the Commerce Clause. Iowa cannot shift its fair share of the burden of maintaining interstate truck routes to other states, nor can it increase hazards on neighboring states' highways to reduce the hazards on Iowa highways.
Because of Iowa's statutory scheme, Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State. Instead, the company must do one of four things:
(i) use 55-foot singles;
(ii) use 60-foot doubles;
(iii) detach the trailers of a 65-foot double and shuttle each through the State separately; or
(iv) divert 65-foot doubles around Iowa.
Each of these options engenders inefficiency and added expense. The record shows that Iowa's law added about $12.6 million each year to the costs of trucking companies. Consolidated alone incurred about $2 million per year in increased costs.
concurring
Iowa's truck length regulation prohibiting 65-foot doubles violates the Commerce Clause, as shown in a similar case in Wisconsin, Raymond.
Analysis of Commerce Cause challenges to state regulations must take into account three principles:
(1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.
(2) The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel.
(3) Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety, rather than economics.
The safety of different truck sizes is irrelevant to the decision in this case. Iowa's reason for the truck length regulation was to discourage interstate truck traffic on their highways, not for safety purposes. Governor Ray vetoed a bill that would have increased the maximum length of twin trailer trucks from 60 to 65 feet due to concerns about increased highway maintenance costs and accidents. The legislative response was to maintain the 60-foot limit and enact a border city exemption. The size restrictions are not intended to achieve public safety.
Iowa's regulation limiting truck length to deflect through traffic is protectionist and violates the Commerce Clause. The regulation causes increased hazards on neighboring states' highways and makes the nation's highways as a whole more hazardous. The decision to promote Iowa's safety and interests at the expense of neighboring states' interests merits no deference. The Commerce Clause was framed on the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that prosperity and salvation are in union, not division.
dissenting.
I believe the analysis in both opinions oversteps our "limited authority to review state legislation under the commerce clause," Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 393 U. S. 129, 393 U. S. 136 (1968), and seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens.
Every State in the Union regulates the length of vehicles permitted to use the public roads. Nor is Iowa a renegade in having length limits which operate to exclude the 65-foot doubles favored by Consolidated.
In short, the persistent effort in the plurality opinion to paint Iowa as an oddity standing alone to block commerce carried in 65-foot doubles is simply not supported by the facts.
Iowa defends its statute as a highway safety regulation. There can be no doubt that the challenged statute is a valid highway safety regulation, and thus entitled to the strongest presumption of validity against Commerce Clause challenges. As noted, all 50 States regulate the length of trucks which may use their highways.
There can also be no question that the particular limit chosen by Iowa -- 60 feet -- is rationally related to Iowa's safety objective. Most truck limits are between 55 and 65 feet, see App. 645, and Iowa's choice is thus well within the widely accepted range.
Iowa adduced evidence supporting the relation between vehicle length and highway safety.
In sum, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the legislative determination that length is related to safety, and nothing in Consolidated's evidence undermines this conclusion.
The question, however, is whether the Iowa Legislature has acted rationally in regulating vehicle lengths, and whether the safety benefits from this regulation are more than slight or problematical.
Majority Point
The issue is whether an Iowa statute that prohibits the use of certain large trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.
I
Appellee, Consolidated, is one of the largest common carriers.
Consolidated mainly uses two kinds of trucks.
The three-axle tractor pulling a 40-foot two-axle trailer
commonly called a single, or "semi," is 55 feet in length.
two-axle tractor pulling a single-axle trailer and a second single-axle trailer
known as a double, or twin, is 65 feet long.
Doubles have larger capacities, and the trailers can be detached.
Consolidated would like to use 65-foot doubles on many of its trips through Iowa.
Unlike all other States in the West and Midwest, Iowa generally prohibits the use of 65-foot doubles within its borders.
Instead, most truck combinations are restricted to 55 feet in length.
Notwithstanding these restrictions, Iowa's statute permits cities abutting the state line by local ordinance to adopt the length limitations of the adjoining State. Iowa Code § 321.457(7) (1979).
Where a city has exercised this option, otherwise oversized trucks are permitted within the city limits and in nearby commercial zones. Ibid.
1.
The Iowa Legislature in 1974 passed House Bill 671, which would have permitted 65-foot doubles. But Iowa Governor Ray vetoed the bill, noting that it "would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and competitors at the expense of our Iowa citizens."
The "border-cities exemption" was passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor shortly thereafter.
Iowa also provides for two other relevant exemptions.
An Iowa truck manufacturer may obtain a permit to ship trucks that are as large as 70 feet. Iowa Code § 321E.10 (1979).
Permits also are available to move oversized mobile homes, provided that the unit is to be moved from a point within Iowa or delivered for an Iowa resident. § 321E.28(5).
Because of Iowa's statutory scheme, Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State.
Instead, the company must do one of four things:
(i) use 55-foot singles
(ii) use 60-foot doubles
(iii) detach the trailers of a 65-foot and shuttle each ... separately
(iv) divert 65-foot doubles around Iowa.
Dissatisfied with these options, Consolidated filed this suit in the District Court, averring that Iowa's statutory scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.
Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure enacted pursuant to its police power.
The State asserted that 65-foot doubles are more dangerous than 55-foot singles and, in any event, that the law promotes safety and reduces road wear within the State by diverting much truck traffic to other states.
In a 14-day trial, both sides adduced evidence on safety and on the burden on interstate commerce imposed by Iowa's law. On the question of safety, the District Court found that the
"evidence clearly establishes that the twin is as safe as the semi."
"... Twins are more maneuverable, are less sensitive to wind, and create less splash and spray. However, they are more likely than semis to jackknife or upset. They can be backed only for a short distance.
Semis are more stable but are more likely to 'rear-end' another vehicle."
District Court applied the standard we enunciated in
Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429 (1978)
and concluded that the state law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 612 F.2d 1064 (1979).
It accepted the District Court's finding that 65-foot doubles were as safe as 55-foot singles.
“Not a constitutionally permissible interest.”
It also commented that the several statutory exemptions identified above, such as those applicable to border cities and the shipment of livestock, suggested that the law, in effect, benefited Iowa residents at the expense of interstate traffic.
“Iowa statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.”
Not all state restrictions on commerce are invalidated by the Commerce Clause.
Determining the extent of permissible state regulation can be difficult.
Nevertheless, it is generally true that a state's authority to regulate commerce is strongest in matters that have traditionally been of local concern.
For example, regulations that touch upon safety -- especially highway safety -- are those that "the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate."
"If safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce."
In Raymond, we refused to accept the State's argument that the Commerce Clause inquiry ends without balancing the safety purpose against interstate commerce interference.
Applying these general principles, we conclude that the Iowa truck length limitations unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.
Raymond held that a Wisconsin statute that prohibited the use of 65-foot double trucks went against the Commerce Clause. The instant case is almost the same as Raymond in that the State has not provided any convincing evidence that 65-foot double trucks are less safe than 55-foot single trucks. Additionally, Iowa's law is inconsistent with the laws of other Midwestern and Western States, which creates a significant hindrance to the transportation of goods by truck across state lines.
If the state's safety interest is proven to be non-existent and its regulations significantly hinder the federal interest, then the state law cannot be in line with the Commerce Clause.
Iowa made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of its law than did Wisconsin in Raymond, but its effort was no more persuasive.
Studies show that 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles. Singles have had 100 accidents, causing 27 injuries and one fatality, while doubles had 106 accidents, resulting in 17 injuries and one fatality. Experts say that singles have a higher injury rate, but many transportation officials believe that doubles are just as safe as singles.
Consolidated demonstrated that Iowa's law substantially burdens interstate commerce.
Iowa's law led to a $12.6 million annual cost increase for trucking companies, with Consolidated facing an extra $2 million per year. 55-foot singles carry less freight than 65-foot doubles, requiring more highway miles and increasing accident risks. If 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles, Iowa's law may lead to more accidents and a shift it to other states. The law may also divert trucks to more dangerous roads and increase fuel consumption. The District Court warned of possible accidents, injuries, fatalities, and fuel consumption.
Iowa urges the Court simply to "defer" to the safety judgment of the State and that the task of determining truck length which is generally related to safety should be left to the legislature.
The Court normally does accord "special deference" to state highway safety regulations.
States can regulate commerce as long as it doesn't discriminate against interstate commerce.
Raymond, supra.
Iowa generally prohibits large double operating in the state. However, there are exemptions, including the "border cities exemption." Therefore, it may have been created to discourage interstate truck traffic rather than to eliminate dangerous trucks.
The history of statutory exemptions and the arguments Iowa presented do not justify deference to the state's safety.
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