미 항모전단의 정찰 수행

[위종민]

개인 블로그의 주장입니다. 

2차대전 당시 미항모전단의 표준 작전절차는 매일 새벽(아마 BMNT?)마다 수 기의 정찰기(주로 SBD 돈틀리스)로 주변 해역을 정찰하는 것이었다고 합니다. 

그러나 돈틀리스가 일본군이 운용하는 항속거리 3천 마일의 가와니시 비행선보다 발이 짧아, 적이 뭘 하는지 알아내려면 적의 육상기반 항공기의 활동범위 안으로 접근해야 하는 핸디캡을 갖고 있었다고 하네요. 가와니시 비행선은 기지 주변 1천마일 이내의 움직임을 감시했으며, 미군은 가급적 이 비행기를 볼 때마다 격추했지만 구름 속으로 도망가는 등의 이유로 상시 격추가 가능하지는 않았다고 합니다. 일본군은 정찰로 주변 500마일 해역이 깨끗한 경우엔 휴식할 수 있었고, 미군을 발견하더라도 방공망을 가동할 시간 여유를 가질 수 있었기 때문에 미군의 공격은 밤새 금식한 뒤의 이른 아침으로 제한됐다고 하네요. 

현재는 항속거리가 길고 다양한 액티브/패시브 센서를 갖춘 전문 정찰기가 모자라며 (E-2는 전문 정찰기가 아니며 항공모함에서 멀리 벗어날 수 없음), 호넷이나 F-35C는 발이 짧고 센서가 부족합니다. 반면 중국은 일본처럼 항속거리가 긴 지상 기반 폭격기, 해상초계기, 무인기를 보유하고 있습니다. 또한 지상기반 항공기, 위성, 무인기 등의 조합으로 감시범위가 수 천 마일로 확장돼 수 백 마일로 제한되는 항모정찰능력에 비해 매우 우월하며, 순항 및 탄도미사일 등이 도입돼 요구되는 정찰 범위가 수 천마일로 늘었습니다. 또한 과거 F-14 톰캣은 소련의 Tu-95/Tu-142 베어 정찰기가 미 항모전단을 발견하기 전 먼저 제거하는 것이 임무였는데, 최근엔 이러한 대정찰(counter-scouting) 활동을 위해서 항공기뿐만 아니라 위성, 잠수함 감시, 초수평선 레이더, SOSUS 어레이 등에도 대응을 해야 하는데 이는 항모 자체 자산만으론 수행하기 불가능합니다. 

이 때문에 항모에 정찰자산을 배치해야 하며, F-35C가 효과적인 정찰기로서의 잠재력을 갖고 있고 최신 항공기의 속도를 고려해볼 때 하루에 1회가 아니라 지속적인 정찰이 시행돼야 하니 장기체공 무인기의 의존도가 높아져야 하며 상선을 개조한 전용 무인기항모에서 수 십대의 무인기를 운용하는 것이 바람직하다고 주장하네요. 

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/07/carrier-scouting.html

Monday, July 24, 2023

Carrier Scouting

ComNavOps constantly harps on targeting (see, “Weapons Don’t Matter”).  As I always say, a million mile missile is useless with ten mile targeting.  Closely related to targeting is scouting.  You want to know where the threat is and is not.  In a sense, targeting is a subset of scouting; the final ‘phase’ of scouting before the strike. 
 
Unlike targeting which is purely offensive, scouting supports both offense and defense.  If you know where the threat is, you can prepare your defenses accordingly.  Scouting provides the commander with situational awareness and, as such, it is just as important to know where the enemy isn’t as where he is.
 
Let’s look a bit closer at carrier group scouting.  As always, we begin with historical examples.
 
 
WWII
 
Many of us don’t realize that the standard operating procedure of American carrier groups in WWII was to send a dozen or so scout planes (generally SBD Dauntless aircraft) out at dawn every morning to search the surrounding seas for any sign of enemy ships or aircraft.
 

SBD Dauntless

In the book, Queen of the Flat-Tops, Lt.Cmdr. Mort Seligman, executive officer of the Lexington (CV-2) had this to say about scouting: 

“We are under a handicap out here.  The limited range of our scouts makes it necessary for us to be forever on our toes.  If we want to find out what the enemy is doing we’ve got to move up to within easy range of his land-based aircraft to find out.
 
“On the other hand, the Japanese, by using these 3000-mile Kawanishi [flying] boats, can see a lot farther than we can.  They range out over the ocean and watch every movement within some 1,000 miles of their bases.  There’s little we do in daylight that they can’t know about.  It costs them a plane every so often because we shoot them down every time we come across them.  But with these clouds out here this isn’t always possible because even though we know they are there we can’t always find them.
 
Once their day patrols have come out and they know their waters are clear for 500 miles around, they can relax.  Even if they find us they have time to bring up air defenses before we can get in our poke.  That limits our attacks almost to early morning only after an all-night fast approach.  And it makes it very difficult for us to gain the advantage of the element of surprise which is a much more important factor in war than most people realize.”[1]

Lt.Cmdr. Seligman succinctly defines both the problem and solutions for the carrier group:
 

• Problem:  Our carrier scouts were shorter range than the Japanese land based scouts.
• Solution:  Seek out and destroy the enemy’s scout planes (counter-scouting) and conduct high speed, night run-ins to the target to launch dawn strikes before the enemy can get their scouts out and alert their defenses.

 
Of course, in the open ocean, out of range of land-based scouts, the enemy naval forces had the same scout range limitations we did and the scouting contest was even;  both sides had an equal chance of finding the other first.
 
Prior (or in addition) to carriers, one of the functions of cruisers was to operate floatplanes to conduct scouting.  The Brooklyn class cruiser, for example, operated four floatplanes using a pair of stern catapults and a recovery crane.
 
That summarizes the issue for WWII surface and carrier groups but how does the issue translate to modern times?
 
 
Today
 
The same general issue and constraints apply today with the carrier at, perhaps, a somewhat worse disadvantage. Let’s consider some aspects of modern naval scouting.
 
Scout Planes – Part of the problem is that we have no carrier scout aircraft.  The E-2 Hawkeye is most emphatically not a scout aircraft and they are never deployed too far from the protection of the carrier.  We lack a dedicated scout aircraft with great range and great sensors (passive and active).  Instead, we would have to use F-18 Hornets as scouts and the Hornet simply hasn’t got the range (or sensors) to be an effective scout.  The F-35C offers a slight improvement in range and survivability but is still not an effective broad area maritime scout.
 
Conversely, China has very long range, land-based bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, and UAVs that can serve the scout function, just as Japan did in WWII.
 
Sensors – Enemy scout assets include land-based, very long range aircraft, satellites, UAVs, etc. which, in the aggregate, offer potentially multi-thousand mile scouting as compared to our few hundred mile range carrier scouting capability.  Of course, we also have the possibility of using satellites and UAVs as scouts but given that we’ll be operating far closer to China than to any US bases, we’ll be much more limited in the degree of scouting support we can expect.
 
Strike Range – WWII carriers only had to scout a couple hundred miles out to be assured of safety since that was the limit of carrier aircraft strike range.  Today, cruise and ballistic missiles have extended the potential strike range – and, hence, scouting range requirement - to thousands of miles.
 
Counter-Scouting – One of the F-14 Tomcat’s roles was counter-scouting.  Their job was to eliminate the Soviet Tu-95 Bears before they could find our carriers.  Counter-scouting, today, includes countering satellites, submarine surveillance, over-the-horizon radars, SOSUS-type listening arrays, aircraft, etc.  This can no longer be done just by the carrier’s organic assets.  For example, countering satellites is a strategic responsibility outside the carrier’s capability (barring ship launched anti-satellite missiles).  Countering sea bed listening arrays is, again, a strategic responsibility.
 
 
Conclusion
 
While we may optimistically hope that we can get land-based scouting support, the reality is that our nearest source of scout aircraft in the Pacific theater will be Guam or some such base that is thousands of miles from likely carrier operating areas and that makes any scouting support sporadic, at best, and utterly ineffective, more likely.  Our carriers need an organic scout aircraft that is available whenever and wherever needed
 
Night, and the corresponding dawn search from WWII, is no longer sufficient given that darkness is no longer the ‘shield’ it once was.  We need to be able to scout 24 hours a day and, again, land-based scouts simply cannot provide that capability on a sustained basis.
 
Interestingly, the F-35C could serve as an effective scout plane if it were given a dedicated set of effective passive and active sensors.  The F-35C has a useful degree of stealth, though not up to modern combat standards, and this would allow it to conduct scouting missions survivably and with a fair chance of not being spotted, in turn.
 
The F-35C can also effectively perform the counter-scout role against non-combat aircraft and would even have a chance against combat stealth aircraft, though not dominantly so.
 
It’s clear to see that counter-scouting must extend many hundreds of miles in all directions, on a continuous basis.  This last part is vital.  Given the speed of modern aircraft, it is no longer sufficient to scout/clear an area once a day.  We must have nearly continuous coverage.  An enemy scouting asset can appear far too quickly and cover far too much area to assume an area once cleared will stay clear of enemy scouting assets.  This suggests a heavy reliance on long endurance UAVs.  Ideally, we’d have long endurance, stealthy, UAVs operated by the dozens from a dedicated UAV carrier (a converted merchant ship).
 
The Navy has to start getting serious about combat instead of just being focused on new hulls.  We need to focus on mine warfare, mine countermeasures, logistics, large caliber naval gun support, long range fighters, small ASW ships, close in defensive AAW weapons, and scouting  …  you know, all the things that aren’t shiny and sexy but that win wars.
 

[백선호]

1944년 6월 일본 함대가 미국 함대를 먼저 발견했었던 사이판 해전 때 양쪽 함대의 정찰에 대한 글입니다.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/51Tm/48

[위종민]

"In a sense, targeting is a subset of scouting; the final ‘phase’ of scouting before the strike."

이 주장에 대입하면 미군이 정찰은 성공했지만 마지막 targeting에 실패한 경우네요. 원인 중 하나는 함재 정찰기의 발이 짧은 것 때문이고..