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CONNECTICUT JUNIOR REPUBLIC V. SHARON HOSPITAL Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982, 188 Conn. 1, 448 A.2d 190
Fact:
Richard Haskell Emerson left a will and two codicils, all of which were offered for probate by the named executor, the Third National Bank of Hampden County, Springfield, Massachusetts. There were three articles, and decedent designate seven charitable organization(D) as remaindermen. In the first codicil to his will, the decedent substituted the names of the eleven 1969 charities(P) for the seven 1960 charities in three separate articles of the will. In 1975, the decedent expressed his intention to make change in. is will so that the charitable remainder interest would be allowable as federal estate tax deduction. However, in drafting the second codicil, the attorney not only made the requested changes but also mistakenly reinstated the 1960 charities, which had originally been named in the will as beneficiaries under two of three articles of the will. The decedent signed the second codicil apparently without realizing the change in beneficiaries. The probate Court heard evidence on the matter and ruled that Connecticut law does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence on the issue of mistake and found that in the absence of such evidence the presumption of the validity of a testamentary instrument mandated the admission of the entire second codicil to probate. On appeal to the Superior Court, the Court granted the defendants’ motion and held that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove that the second codicil contained a mistake due to a scrivener’s error and, therefore, should not be admitted to probate. The plaintiffs have appealed.
Issue:
Whether extrinsic evidence of a mistake by a scrivener of a testamentary instrument is admissible in a proceeding to determine the validity of the testamentary instrument
Rule:
Stearns v. Stearns, 103 Conn. 213, 130 A. 112 (1925)
Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 292, 299 10*10 [1826]
Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501, 509 [1883]
It is clear that whether this is a "will construction" proceeding or a proceeding to "admit a will to probate," where the claimants seek to introduce extrinsic evidence of a scrivener's error resulting in a disposition of property allegedly contrary to the testator's intention, as expressed to the scrivener, such evidence, absent an ambiguity, is not admissible because "`if such testimony is to be admitted, we do away [with] part at least of the beneficial effect of the statute of frauds, and leave every will exposed to litigation, on a claim of a different intent.'
Morehouse v. Bridgeport City Trust, 137 Conn. 209, 217, 75 A.2d 493 (1950)
Holmes, J., in Dove v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 287, 290 [5 N.E. 520 (1866)]
Application:
P claims that the lower court erred in failing to find a distinction between a will construction proceeding and a proceeding to admit a will to probate. But the court asserts that cases of Connecticut have not distinguished between the two types of proceeding and neither the plaintiffs not the defendants have presented them with any Connecticut authority which recognizes any distinction between the rules of evidence applicable to either of these two forms of proceedings. They are not inclined to establish a rule that would effectuate such a distinction. Also, in terms of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove that material has been mistakenly inserted into a testamentary instrument, the extrinsic evidence is inadmissible in a will construction proceeding. According to Stearns v. Stearns, “Such a situation would expose many wills to litigation merely because a disappointed beneficiary did not receive exactly what he thought the testator would leave him. This would tend to produce needless litigation by transforming a simple will construction proceeding into an admission to probate problem where no problem may have actually existed.” (1925) The trial court held that parol evidence may not be admitted to show that the scrivener erred in drafting the codicil or that the testator mistakenly signed it. Whether or not the deceased is aware of the contents of the codicil, the fact that decedent has signed the codicil may be considered that decedent confirmed that codicil and agreed with it. Connecticut law does not allow extrinsic evident of a testator’s intent to be admitted in cases dealing with either will construction or cases challenging the probate of an instrument. There is an exception to this rule when there is ambiguity on the face of the will or codicil itself. However, such exception is not applicable in this case. Moreover, Greene v. Dennis(1827) present that “a settled principle, that the construction of a will must be derived from the words of it, and not from extrinsic averment.” Lastly, the plaintiff argues that it is ambiguous whether the testator intended to change the beneficiaries or whether the specific disclaimer in the last paragraph of second codicil should be govern effect. However, the claimed ambiguity did not concern the identity of any beneficiary, or the description of the property bequeathed. The second ambiguity stems from the fact that the first codicil has replaced the names charities. However, the second codicil has only revised two of the three articles and left the third unchanged. Therefore, the property is distributed according to the provisions, and the plaintiff argues that this result does not match the testator's scheme to dispose of the property. In response to this claim, the court presented that the testator's dispositive scheme is ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence should have been admitted to clarify it. The language of the will and codicils is reasonably clear and free from any claimed ambiguity. They also added that if there is no compelling reason to the contrary, effect must be given to the testator's intention as thus expressed and directed in the will.”(Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Mason ,1942).There is no error. Extrinsic evidence is not admitted.
Conclusion:
There is no error. Extrinsic evidence is not admitted. Affirmed.
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