[Torts] 1. Vosburg v. Putney--- 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891)~

[Juyoung]

[Torts. Case1- 12]

1. Vosburg v. Putney--- 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891)

1. Fact

 Vosburg and Putney, classmates in 1889, were seated across from each other when Putney lightly kicked Vosburg’s shin. Though initially unfelt, the kick led to severe pain and illness over days due to a pre-existing leg injury. Vosburg sued Putney for assault and battery, winning $2,800 in the trial court. On appeal, a new trial was granted, with the jury finding no intent to harm. Damages were reduced to $2,500, leading to another appeal by Putney.

2. issue

Whether the defendant's unintentional act of kicking the plaintiff constitutes an assault and battery, considering the circumstances of the injury occurring within a school setting.

3. rule

 * Brown v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 54 Wis. 342, to be that the wrong-doer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him.

* Ev. $ 83, the rule that "the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault.”

4. application

 The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's unintentional kick, occurring within a school setting, constituted assault and battery, resulting in significant injury, while the defendant contends that there was no intent to harm and the act occurred within the context of school activities. The court considered whether the defendant's act of kicking the plaintiff, albeit without intent to harm, constituted assault and battery. Despite the lack of malicious intent, the court determined that the act was unlawful, as it occurred in violation of school order and decorum, and resulted in significant injury to the plaintiff. The court concluded that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for assault and battery against the defendant, as the act of kicking, even without malicious intent, was deemed unlawful under the circumstances. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

5. Conclusion

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

 *Feedback

Teacher's testimony, doctor's examination, and other medical documents can be used as evidence.

In civil actions, intentional torts are at issue, and the intent to contact is important.

In criminal actions, both the intent to contact and the intent to harm are required.

Unintentional contact, such as stretching, is considered to have no intent to contact.

Evidence proving there was no intent to harm is important.

The level of legal liability is highest for intentional torts and lowest for negligence.

Negligence requires proof of a breach of duty and causation.

Criminal actions require evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil actions only require a preponderance of the evidence.

In the O.J. Simpson case, he was acquitted in the criminal trial but found liable in the civil trial.

Criminal actions aim to maintain public safety, while civil actions seek to provide compensation for damages.

2. Garratt v. Dailey---- 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955) HILL, J

1. Fact

On the 16th of July, 1951, during a visit to Ruth Garratt's residence, five-year-old Brian Dailey unintentionally caused her to fall from a lawn chair, resulting in severe injuries, including a broken hip. Garratt initiated legal proceedings against Dailey, accusing him of battery. During the trial, Garratt’s sibling testified that Dailey deliberately displaced the chair, but the court favored Dailey's account. Dailey asserted that he moved the chair to seat himself and couldn't prevent Garratt's fall despite his efforts. Consequently, the court dismissed the case, concluding Dailey lacked malicious intent. However, it estimated damages at $11,000 in anticipation of a potential appeal. Garratt appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, seeking either a judgment in her favor or a retrial.

2. issue

whether five-year-old Brian Dailey, being a minor, can be held liable for the alleged battery.

3. rule

* Bohlen, "Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 : The authorities generally, but with certain notable exceptions , state that, when a minor has committed a tort with force, he is liable to be proceeded against as any other person would be.

*1 Restatement, Torts, 29, § 13, as : "An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person makes the actor liable to the other, if "(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and "(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other's consent thereto is procured by fraud or duress, and "(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged."

* The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Mercer v. Corbin (1889)

4. application

The plaintiff's contention is that Brian Dailey committed battery and should therefore be held responsible for damages. The defendant argues that Brian did not intend to cause harm, did not engage in intentional conduct for battery, and that the elements of battery have not been sufficiently proven. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and accepted the defendant's argument. According to Restatement of Torts § 13, liability arises when an act directly or indirectly causes harmful contact with another person, provided that the act is done with the intention of causing harm or offensive contact, and without the consent of the other party. Additionally, even if there was no intent to harm or prank the plaintiff, Brian could still be held liable if he had knowledge that his actions would likely result in harmful contact. This principle was established in Mercer v. Corbin (1889). Therefore, the court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against Brian Dailey was based on the finding that the plaintiff failed to prove Brian's intent to cause harm or offensive contact, and that there was no evidence to suggest that Brian's actions were done with such intent.

5. conclusion

Remanded for clarification. (Five-year-old Brian Dailey could not be held liable for the alleged battery.)

* Feedback

Intentional torts are not dependent on age, regardless of whether mental capacity is considered. 

This issue conflicts with the idea that age doesn’t matter.

Even if a minor understands that removing a chair will cause someone to fall, they are liable for intentional torts - "age doesn’t matter."

If age is considered and it is recognized that a minor understands, they are held responsible.

Adults' mental capacity must also be assessed.

Individually, even a 5, 4, or 3-year-old can be held liable if they understand.

3.    O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co. --- 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891)

1. Fact

O’Brien, an emigrant passenger, was required to show a certificate of vaccination upon arrival in Boston. Cunard Steamship Company typically vaccinated emigrants and provided certificates. O’Brien, among around 200 female passengers, queued for vaccination. Despite informing the surgeon of a prior vaccination, she was vaccinated again without objection. O’Brien later suffered complications and sued Cunard for assault. The trial court ruled in favor of Cunard, leading O’Brien to appeal to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.

2. issue

Whether there was evidence supporting the jury's finding of assault by the defendant's representatives, and whether there was evidence of negligence by the defendant towards the plaintiff.

3. rule

*. Ford v.Ford, 143 Mass. 578, 10 N. E. Rep. 474 : In determining whether she consented, he could be guided only be her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings.

* By the fifth section of the act of congress of August 2, 1882, (22 U.S. St. at Large, 188,) is provided that "every steam-ship or other vessel carrying or bringing emigrant passengers, exceeding fifty in number, shall carry a duly competent and qualified surgeon or medical practitioner, who shall be rated as such in the ship's articles, and who shall be provided with surgical instruments, medical comforts, and medicines proper and necessary for diseases and accidents incident to sea voyages, and for the proper medical treatment of such passengers during the voyage.

4. application

The plaintiff alleged that the surgeon, employed by the defendant, committed an assault by vaccinating her without her consent. The defendant argued that the vaccination was lawful and performed with the plaintiff's implied consent, as she did not object and willingly presented her arm for vaccination. The court found that the surgeon's conduct was lawful given the circumstances, as the plaintiff's behavior indicated consent, and there was no evidence of force or objection during the vaccination process. Additionally, the court held that the defendant was not liable for any negligence on the part of the surgeon, as the shipowners' duty was to provide a competent medical practitioner for the passengers' use, and they were not responsible for the specifics of the treatment provided. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, concluding that there was no evidence of assault or negligence, and upheld the trial court's decision.

5. conclusion

The rulings at the trial were correct. The evidence excepted to was rightly admitted. Exceptions overruled. (There was no evidence of assault or negligence.)

* Feedback

Rather than the case3, discussions often revolve around whether sexual relations between minors can constitute battery. This is a more common issue. Case 3 is an exceptional case. In the United States, consensual sexual relations between minors are often considered acceptable, which differs from the legal situation in our country.

4.    Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. --- 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)

GIBSON, C.J.

1. Fact

The plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola exploded in her hand. The defendant company had bottled and delivered the alleged defective bottle to the plaintiff's employer. The bottle exploded while the plaintiff was transferring bottles from a case to a refrigerator. The explosion caused a deep cut, severing blood vessels, nerves, and muscles in the plaintiff's hand. The broken bottle was discarded shortly after the accident, but the plaintiff described the fracture. The plaintiff relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as she could not identify specific acts of negligence by the defendant.

2. Issue

whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply to hold the defendant liable for the injuries caused by the exploding bottle?

3.Rule

* Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1) defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing the injury and (2) the accident is of such a nature that it ordinarily [24 Cal.2d 458] would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant

* Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (rev. ed. 1941), page 153, it is stated that: "The doctrine ... requires evidence which shows at least the probability that a particular accident could not have occurred without legal wrong by the defendant."

4. application

The plaintiff argued that the explosion of the Coca Cola bottle implies negligence since such accidents do not typically occur without a defect or excessive pressure. The defendant contended that res ipsa loquitur does not apply because the bottle might have been damaged after they relinquished control and they exercised reasonable care in the bottling and inspection process.

There was sufficient evidence that the bottle was not damaged by any external force after delivery. The plaintiff and other witnesses testified that the bottle had not been dropped or subjected to any impact. Additionally, there was evidence that the plaintiff was handling the bottle carefully when it exploded.

The court noted that a properly prepared bottle should not explode when handled carefully. This suggested that the explosion was likely due to excessive internal pressure or a defect in the bottle itself. The court determined that the defendant had exclusive control over the bottling and delivery process. Therefore, the defendant was responsible for regulating the internal pressure and inspecting for defects. It confirmed that the defendant had exclusive control over the bottling process and inspection of the bottles.

One of the defendant’s drivers testified that he had seen Coca Cola bottles explode in the past.

The court pointed out that the defendant’s methods for pressure testing and visual inspections might not be sufficient to entirely prevent defects.

5. conclusion

The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed, as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and supported an inference of negligence by the defendant.

* Feedback

Comparing sudden acceleration incidents, train accidents, and elevator/escalator incidents, we can discuss the application of res ipsa loquitur. In the United States, courts often recognize the liability of automobile manufacturers in sudden acceleration incidents under this doctrine. Similarly, train accidents and elevator/escalator incidents typically involve complex machinery where accidents do not ordinarily occur without some form of negligence. Just as a bottle does not generally explode without a defect, these types of incidents imply negligence and warrant the application of res ipsa loquitur.

5.    Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.--- 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)

CARDOZO, Ch. J.

1. Fact

Helen Palsgraf was standing on a platform owned by the Long Island Railroad. While she was waiting for her train, another train arrived at the station. Two men ran to catch this train as it started to leave, one carrying a package containing fireworks. The man with the package struggled to board, and two railroad employees helped him. During this process, the man dropped the package, which fell onto the tracks and exploded, causing scales at the other end of the plartform to dislodge and injure Palsgraf. She sued the railroad for negligence, won in the trial court and appellate division, and the railroad appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

2. issue

whether the railroad company (defendant) can be held liable for negligence when the harm to the plaintiff (Helen Palsgraf) was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions.

3. rule

*Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right. "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do" (Pollock, Torts [11th ed.], p. 455; Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 170; cf. Salmond, Torts [6th ed.], p. 24).

*. Negligence in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all (BOWEN, L. J., in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, 694)

* "Negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances" (WILLES, J., in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co.

*"In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury" (McSHERRY, C. J., in W. Va. Central R. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652)

4. application

Helen Palsgraf was injured by a falling scale caused by an explosion from a dropped package of fireworks. The package was dislodged by railroad guards helping a man onto a moving train. The guards could not foresee the fireworks causing harm to Palsgraf, standing far away. The package, wrapped in newspaper, gave no indication of its hazardous contents. Therefore, there was no apparent risk to Palsgraf from the guards'. The railroad's duty to Palsgraf would only exist if her injury was a foreseeable result of the guards' actions. Since the risk to Palsgraf was not foreseeable, the guards did not breach a duty owed to her. The conduct of the railroad's guards, even if negligent towards the man with the package, was not negligent towards Palsgraf because her injury was not a foreseeable consequence of their actions.

5. conclusion

The trial court's judgment for Palsgraf was reversed, and the complaint was dismissed.

(The railroad company could not be held liable for negligence because the harm to Helen Palsgraf was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions.)

* Feedback

In the United States, the liability of automobile manufacturers is often recognized in sudden acceleration incidents. Generally, bottle explosions do not occur without a defect. In a case involving two passengers and a crew member, negligence requires a duty of care, breach of that duty, causation, and a resulting harm. If laws exist that govern conduct, there may be punishment, but there must be a result. Assisting someone is not inherently wrong. The passenger was not physically injured by the fireworks; they claim emotional distress. Negligence involves a duty of care, breach, causation, and result. In the Palsgraf case, if the passenger was injured, we must define the duty of care. This includes identifying whose duty it was. The employee's duty must be established.

Can a doctor be held liable for medical malpractice if a patient requests to look like Brad Pitt and experiences complications from cosmetic surgery?

A medium level of duty of care must be maintained. Natural disasters are unforeseeable, and there is no duty to prevent them. If someone is helping another while carrying fireworks, we must ask if there was a duty to prevent the foreseeable harm of the fireworks exploding.

If the police foresee an event but fail to prevent it, there is a potential breach of duty. The passenger's actions could be considered their own fault.

For instance, if someone is forced to jump from a building and dies, the cause of death may vary, such as poisoning. The final cause leading to death may not be direct.

In another case, if someone calls 911 for acute appendicitis but dies in a car accident on the way, we must determine if the death was due to the appendicitis or the trauma from the car accident.

6.  Fletcher v. Rylands --- L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1866)

1. Fact

Fletcher (plaintiff) ran multiple underground coal mines on property next to land where Rylands (defendant) had constructed a reservoir to supply water to his mill. Rylands hired engineers and contractors to build the reservoir. During construction, these workers discovered that the reservoir was being constructed over disused underground coal mines. Rylands was unaware of this fact. After the reservoir was finished, it burst and flooded Fletcher's coal mines, causing damage to Fletcher's property. Consequently, Fletcher filed a lawsuit against Rylands.

2. issue

Whether the defendant, who built and maintained a reservoir that later burst and caused damage to the plaintiff's coal mines, is liable for the resulting damage, even though the defendant employed competent contractors and was unaware of the latent defect (abandoned underground coal mines) beneath the reservoir.

3. rule

* Rylands v. Fletche : We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is primâ facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

*Tenant v. Goldwin : "It does therefore seem to us to be a very weighty authority in support of the position that he who brings and keeps anything, no matter whether beasts, or filth, or clean water, or a heap of earth or dung, on his premises, must at his peril prevent it from getting on his neighbour's, or make good all the damage which is the natural consequence of its doing so."

4. application

The plaintiff argues that the defendant should be held liable for the damage caused by the reservoir's failure, as it was built and maintained by the defendant on land with known latent defects, leading to the flooding of the plaintiff's coal mines. The defendant contends that they should not be held liable because they were unaware of the latent defects beneath the reservoir, had employed competent contractors, and had not personally neglected any duty of care. The court holds that the defendant is strictly liable for the damage caused by the escape of water from the reservoir. The court reasons that anyone who brings something potentially dangerous onto their land must ensure it does not escape and cause harm, regardless of personal knowledge of latent defects or the involvement of competent contractors. The court applies the rule from Rylands v. Fletcher, which establishes that a person who brings and keeps anything likely to cause damage if it escapes is prima facie liable for any damage that ensues from its escape. This strict liability rule applies even in the absence of negligence. The court further references cases such as Tenant v. Goldwin to support the principle that the duty to prevent escape of dangerous items is absolute. The court concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from the defendants because the defendants brought a potentially hazardous item (water in a reservoir) onto their land and failed to keep it contained, resulting in damage to the plaintiff’s property. The initial judgment for the defendants was reversed, and judgment was given for the plaintiff, with the exact amount of damages to be determined later.

5. conclusion

Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant is liable for the resulting damage, even though the defendant employed competent contractors and was unaware of the latent defect beneath the reservoir.

* Feedback

 Strict liability is a legal doctrine that holds a defendant liable for their actions regardless of fault or intent, often applied in cases involving inherently dangerous activities or defective products. In strict liability cases, the plaintiff does not need to prove negligence or intent, only that the defendant's actions caused the harm. To determine if a case involves strict liability, one must assess whether the activity or product inherently poses significant risk, such as handling hazardous materials.

The prima facie elements of strict liability include proving that the defendant engaged in a hazardous activity or produced a defective product that caused the plaintiff's injury. In negligence cases, the plaintiff must establish a duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation, and resulting damages. If there is no breach of duty, the defendant cannot be held liable for negligence. The defendant's fault in strict liability cases is irrelevant; liability is imposed based on the nature of the activity or product. Employees can be liable for breaching a duty of care if their actions directly cause harm, but this does not apply in strict liability cases.

An "Act of God" is a defense against liability claims, arguing that natural events caused the damage without human intervention. Absolute duty refers to the responsibility to ensure safety under any circumstances, without exceptions for unforeseen events, applicable in strict liability cases.

7.MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. --- 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)

CARDOZO, J.

1. Fact

The defendant, Buick Motor Company, is a manufacturer of automobiles. Buick sold a car to a retail dealer, who then resold it to the plaintiff, MacPherson. While MacPherson was in the car, it collapsed due to a defective wheel made from faulty wood. The defective wheel, manufactured by another company, had flaws that could have been discovered through reasonable inspection, but such an inspection was not performed by Buick. There was no evidence that Buick knew of the defect and intentionally concealed it.

2. issue

Whether an automobile manufacturer owes a duty of care to individuals other than the immediate purchaser, specifically to those who might foreseeably use the product, is the central issue addressed in this case.

3. rule

* Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y. 397) : If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.

* Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland, L. R. [1898] A. C. 216, 227 : one who invites another to make use of an appliance is bound to the exercise of reasonable care.

* Devlin v. Smith (89 N.Y. 470): A contractor was held liable for a defectively built scaffold used by a painter's servants.

* Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. (195 N.Y. 478): A manufacturer of a large coffee urn was held liable when the urn exploded in a restaurant.

* Heaven v. Pender (L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 503): Established the duty of care in England, stating that if a product is likely to be dangerous when negligently made, the manufacturer owes a duty of care to anyone who uses it.

4. application

Buick was negligent in failing to inspect the defective wheel, resulting in the plaintiff's injury. Buick claimed it had no duty to inspect the wheel as it was manufactured by a reputable third party and sold to a retail dealer.    The court held that the principle from Thomas v. Winchester applies beyond inherently dangerous items like poisons to products like automobiles which, if negligently made, pose a foreseeable risk of harm. The court referenced Devlin v. Smith, where a contractor was liable for a defectively built scaffold, to establish that the duty of care extends to those foreseeably using the product. In Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., a manufacturer was liable for an exploding coffee urn, demonstrating that the duty of care applies to any product inherently dangerous when negligently made. The court cited Heaven v. Pender, emphasizing a duty to use ordinary care and skill in manufacturing products likely to be used by others beyond the immediate purchaser. The court reasoned that modern transportation requires extending the principle of imminent danger to automobiles due to their widespread use and inherent risks. Buick, as a manufacturer of the finished product, had a duty to inspect all components, including those made by third parties, to ensure the car's safety. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Buick’s failure to inspect the wheel constituted negligence, as the defect was discoverable and posed a foreseeable risk to users.

5. conclusion

The judgment should be affirmed with costs. ( An automobile manufacturer owes a duty of care to individuals other than the immediate purchaser, specifically to those who might foreseeably use the product. )

* Feedback

동영상 수강

Duty of care refers to the legal obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of others. The question arises as to how a person could know if a car is well-functioning. Typically, a dealer is responsible for inspecting the car. The duty of care originates from common law principles. Even without a contract, the duty of care can be relevant. The focus should be on whether there was an inspection duty to find defects in the car. The duty of care involves identifying serious defects or foreseeable dangers. Jurors make decisions based on common sense. In this case, the primary focus is on the duty of care. If the manufacturer didn’t know about the danger, they may not be liable, and causation is tied to the duty of care and foreseeability.

8. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse --- 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979)

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

1.    Fact

Norwilton Murray, an employee of Litwin Corporation, was installing an electrical control panel built by Beloit Power Systems at a refinery in the Virgin Islands. The control panel, built to Litwin’s specifications, had iron cross-members for stabilization during shipping. While aligning the control panel's holes with those on the platform, Murray used a crowbar and put his weight on an iron cross-member, which gave way, causing him to fall and suffer serious injuries. Murray sued Beloit for products liability, alleging strict liability and common law negligence. The district court applied the Virgin Islands' comparative negligence statute, reducing Murray’s award by 5 percent due to his own negligence. The jury awarded Murray $2 million, which was reduced accordingly, and Beloit's motion for a new trial was denied. On appeal, Murray contested the reduction of his award, and the Third Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the case.

2. issue

Whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser.

3. rule

*Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y. 397, 408) :  The original vendor was liable for the injuries suffered by the patient. The principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.

* BRETT, M. R., afterwards Lord ESHER (p. 510: "Whenever one person supplies goods, or machinery, or the like, for the purpose of their being used by another person under such circumstances that every one of ordinary sense would, if he thought, recognize at once that unless he used ordinary care and skill with regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode of supplying it, there will be danger of injury to the person or property of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as to the condition or manner of supplying such thing."

4. application

The plaintiff argues that the defendant should have foreseen the risks associated with negligent manufacturing of automobiles. The plaintiff contends that the defendant should have been aware that the dealer purchasing the products would resell them to general customers. The defendant argues that it is not obligated to inspect the wheels as they were purchased from a reputable manufacturer. The defendant asserts that it is merely an automobile dealer and not a manufacturer. The court determined that the defendant has a duty to inspect the component parts before introducing the finished product into the market. The court held that the defendant, as an automobile manufacturer, bears responsibility for the finished product.

Citing the precedent of Thomas v. Winchester, the court explained that even if not inherently destructive, negligently manufactured items are considered dangerous. The court concluded that due to the defendant's failure to inspect and exercise due care, they could be held liable if a user is injured without negligence.

5. conclusion

Affirmed.

* Feedback (동영상)

Strict liability is solely related to the product. If there is a defect in the product, the manufacturer is held liable.

Contributory Negligence: This is a legal concept in tort law where a plaintiff's own negligence played a part in causing their injury. In jurisdictions that follow contributory negligence rules, if the plaintiff is found to have contributed to their own harm, they may be barred from recovering any damages from the defendant.

Proving negligence and warranty:

It is important not to be swayed by guarantees under warranty, such as five years or 100,000 miles. In strict liability, the defect must be causally linked. It doesn't make sense to argue the manufacturer's negligence.

Is it possible to sue for both negligence and strict liability? If the plaintiff proves negligence, the liability for damages increases. However, it is often difficult for the plaintiff to prove negligence.

9.Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.--62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985)

1. Fact

On January 10, 1979, Michael Troja accidentally amputated his thumb while operating a radial arm saw manufactured by Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, Inc. Troja sued Black and Decker in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, initially for both negligence and strict liability. The negligence claim was withdrawn, and the strict liability claims were based on two theories: 1) design defect due to the absence of a safeguard system, and 2) failure to warn consumers of risks. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Black and Decker on the design defect claim and the jury found no liability on the failure to warn claim.

2. issue

Whether the plaintiff's damages in a strict product liability action were correctly apportioned by comparing his contributory fault, which causally contributed to the injuries, and that of the product defect.

3. rule

Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1980 : "The rationale behind Rule 407 is that people in general would be less likely to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs or improvements would be used against them in a lawsuit arising out of a prior accident. By excluding this evidence defendants are encouraged to make such improvements.

4. application

The trial court excluded the expert testimony regarding the feasibility of a safety interlock device due to a lack of foundational support for the expert's opinions.

The court directed a verdict on the design defect issue because Troja failed to produce legally sufficient evidence, such as the feasibility, cost, and technological capability, to support the claim. The trial court correctly excluded evidence of subsequent warnings under the principle that such evidence is not admissible to prove prior culpability or defectiveness. The court did not err in limiting cross-examination of the defendant's expert, as the feasibility of remedial measures was not contested, but rather the adequacy of the warning given at the time of manufacture. The admission of testimony about compliance with federal and industry standards was proper, and any potential prejudice was mitigated by similar evidence introduced by Troja’s own experts.

5. conclusion

The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on feasibility, directing a verdict on the design defect claim, excluding evidence of subsequent warnings, limiting cross-examination on subsequent warnings, and admitting testimony on compliance with federal and industry standards.

* Feedback(동영상)

If the risks of a product cannot be eliminated, the manufacturer wins. Can the risks be avoided with careful use of the product? If the product's risks cannot be avoided even with caution, the manufacturer is responsible.

Can a user, being an average person, be aware of the inherent risks of the product? If not, it is advantageous for the consumer.

From the manufacturer's perspective, can the losses be distributed when pricing the product? Tobacco products are designated by private companies.

10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. – 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Fact

The Nelson family hired Elmer Gertz to bring a civil suit against a Chicago police officer who had been criminally prosecuted for killing their son. Gertz was featured in American Opinion magazine, which falsely accused him of orchestrating the officer's prosecution as part of a conspiracy to discredit law enforcement. Gertz sued the magazine for defamation, claiming damage to his reputation. A jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in damages, but the publisher filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court applied the New York Times v. Sullivan standard, requiring proof of actual malice, and found Gertz could not meet this standard, ruling in favor of the publisher. The appellate court affirmed this decision. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

2. issue

Whether the standard enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requiring a plaintiff to establish actual malice to successfully bring a defamation suit against a public figure extends to private individuals.

3. rule

* New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) Respondent would escape liability unless petitioner could prove publication of defamatory falsehood "with ‘actual malice' -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

4. application

The plaintiff argued that, as a private individual, the actual malice standard should not apply to his defamation suit. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's long-term professional activities made him a public figure. The court determined that the plaintiff is not a public figure, thus the New York Times standard is inapplicable. The court found that the "public or general interest" test does not adequately balance the competing values in defamation suits. Therefore, states can define their own standards of liability for defamation against private individuals without imposing liability without fault. The court ruled that punitive damages cannot be awarded unless there is a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The court concluded that the plaintiff, despite being active in his field, did not have general fame in his community, and the defendant failed to prove otherwise. Therefore, the New York Times standard does not apply, and the trial court erred by allowing liability without fault and presuming damages without proof of injury.

5. conclusion

A Reversed and remanded.

* Feedback

In insurance, people are valued differently, with compensation varying between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 won for two weeks. Annual salary is crucial in calculating injury damages. Defamation lawyers are busy due to frequent lawsuits involving public figures and the entertainment industry. Private individuals can become public figures, especially in cultural cases. Tort law balances freedom of expression‎ and the victim's right to privacy and life. Opinions are generally permissible, but hearsay statements are not admissible as evidence.

Defamation cases hinge on the distinction between opinion and fact. Insult crimes require at least three people to be considered defamation, not applicable through phone or text. Only the victim can file an insult crime, which requires damage to reputation. Logical reasoning in legal cases should be consistent, with CCTV evidence being stronger in the U.S. compared to South Korea.

11. Hamberger v. Eastman – 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964)

1. Fact

Hamberger and his wife rented a house from Eastman, whose house was adjacent to theirs. Eastman secretly placed an audio recording device in the Hambergers' bedroom. For nearly a year, Eastman recorded the Hambergers' conversations and intimate activities. Hamberger discovered the device and suffered significant mental and physical distress. Hamberger sued Eastman for invasion of privacy. The trial court deferred its decision and referred the case to the New Hampshire Supreme Court for review.

2. issue

The issue is whether New Hampshire recognizes the tort of intrusion upon one's physical and mental solitude or seclusion when a plaintiff experiences eavesdropping on private conversations through wiretapping and microphones under the law of privacy.

3. rule

* Prosser, supra, p. 833 : The principle has been carried beyond such physical intrusion "and extended to eavesdropping upon private conversations by means of wiretapping and microphones.

* Restatement, Torts, s. 867 : "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others... is liable to the other."

* Prosser, supra, 843 : The tort of intrusion on the plaintiffs' solitude or seclusion does not require publicity and communication to third persons although this would affect the amount of damages.

4. application

The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant invaded their privacy by placing an audio recording device in their bedroom, causing them significant mental distress and physical impairment. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs' claim lacked legal basis, asserting that no invasion of privacy occurred since there was no publication or communication to third parties. The court cited Prosser, p. 833, stating that the principle extends beyond physical intrusion to include eavesdropping on private conversations via wiretapping and microphones. According to Restatement, Torts, s. 867, a person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's privacy is liable for the invasion. The court referenced Prosser, p. 843, explaining that the tort of intrusion does not require publicity or communication to third parties, though it may affect damages. The court acknowledged the plaintiffs' claim of mental distress and physical impairment resulting from the invasion. It found that the defendant's eavesdropping constituted an unreasonable invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy. The court deemed the intrusion severe enough to offend a person of ordinary sensibilities. Consequently, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and upheld the plaintiffs' claim of privacy invasion. The case was remanded to determine the extent of the damages the plaintiffs could recover.

5. Conclusion.

The motion to dismiss should be denied. Remanded.

* Feedback

The cause of action in privacy cases often involves the installation of recording devices without the consent of individuals in private areas. Installing many hidden CCTV cameras in walking areas does not typically constitute a privacy problem if it’s a public space. However, unconsented recording in private areas, such as workplaces or washrooms, is considered a crime. Recording someone without consent in public areas, like subways, is generally acceptable unless it specifically targets an individual. Invasion of privacy occurs when recording targets a specific person without their consent. Photographers acting in good faith must consider constitutional rights related to privacy and public areas. The peculiarity of cases like Carts 1967 vs. 1964 involves physical invasion and the context of recording. Actual recording without consent in private areas can lead to legal damages and issues upon publication. There’s a significant difference between recording and merely installing devices, with actual recording leading to greater legal implications. The FBI can install recording devices for surveillance purposes, highlighting the distinction between private and governmental actions.

12. International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. – 244 N.Y. 331,155 N.E. 662 (1927) OPINION BY:  ANDREWS, J.

1. Fact

The plaintiff arranged with the defendants to receive and store an expected shipment of goods. The plaintiff intended to insure the goods upon arrival and asked the defendants for the storage location. The defendants informed the plaintiff that the goods would be stored in Dock F. Believing the goods had arrived, the plaintiff obtained insurance based on this information. In reality, the goods had not yet arrived and were later stored in Dock D. The goods were subsequently destroyed by fire, and the insurance company refused compensation due to the incorrect storage location. The plaintiff sued, won a directed verdict at trial, and the appellate court affirmed the decision, prompting the defendants to appeal.

2. issue

Whether the defendant is liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff due to negligent misrepresentation about the storage location of goods, leading to a failure in obtaining valid insurance coverage.

3. rule

* Bush Terminal Case (182 App. Div. 748; affd., 228 N. Y. 575): A bailee negligently misstating to the bailor the location of the goods for insurance purposes is liable for the resulting loss.

* Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N. Y. 236): A public weigher who negligently certifies the weight of goods, knowing that the buyer will rely on this certificate, is liable for erroneous statements.

* Jaillet v. Cashman (235 N. Y. 511): Liability arises when there is a duty to provide correct information and the relationship between parties suggests reliance on such information.

4. application

The plaintiff argued that they suffered a loss because the defendant provided incorrect information, which resulted in the inability to obtain proper insurance. The defendant claimed that the information provided was not intended to be a factual representation, and there was no contractual or tortious liability on their part. The court determined that the defendant had a duty to provide accurate information for insurance purposes as the bailee of the plaintiff's goods. Referring to the Bush Terminal Case, the court found that the defendant is liable for misstatements regarding the location of the goods when used for insurance purposes. The court cited Glanzer v. Shepard to emphasize that providing erroneous certificates or statements when relied upon by others incurs liability. Based on Jaillet v. Cashman, the court affirmed that a duty exists to provide correct information when there is a relationship suggesting reliance on such information. The court acknowledged that the defendant's incorrect information led to the plaintiff's inability to secure proper insurance. Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant must compensate the plaintiff for the losses incurred due to the negligent misstatement.

5. conclusion

Judgment affirmed. (The defendant is liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff due to negligent misrepresentation about the storage location of goods, leading to a failure in obtaining valid insurance coverage.)

* Feedback

The substantial fact is that there is no contractual relationship between the parties. The issue revolves around product liability resulting from an injury. Since no contract exists, the parties cannot rely on contractual remedies. If no contract is found, the injured party might consider giving up the claim. Instead of a contractual remedy, a tort remedy can be pursued. In tort law, negligence involves the existence of a duty of care. The duty of care can exist even without a contractual relationship. The injured person must prove that the duty of care was breached. The breach of duty of care must have directly caused the injury. The injured party can seek compensation for damages through a negligence claim.