철학 창발emergence 개념 관련 논문과 저작들 ― 마음/의식과 관련하여

[Qualia]

창발Emergence 관련 논문과 저작들 ― 마음/의식과 관련하여

(계속 수정 증보 중입니다 ― 2007. 05. 22. 화요일. 02:55 현재)

Emergence in Philosophy and Science: An Extended Bibliography

(last updated May 22, 2007)

assembled and compiled by Yoon ScinCh-nW-k (Qualia) from South Korea

마음mind과 의식consciousness 연구에서 창발/창발성emergence 개념은 앞으로 핵심적 역할을 할 것이다. 창발은 19세기 말에서 20세기 초에 철학과 과학에서 혜성처럼 나타나 초미의 관심을 끌다가 철학과 과학 양쪽에서 신비주의적 개념으로 낙인찍혀 갑작스럽게 망각의 늪으로 사라져 간 비운의 개념이다(완전한 몰락/망각은 아니었지만). 그렇게 버림받았던 창발 개념이 21세기 최첨단 과학의 시대에 화려하게 부활하고 있다. 이제 철학은 물론 과학에서도 창발은 핵심적 개념이자 이론적 도구로서 열광적으로 채택되고 있다. 창발은 경계선/가장자리에 걸쳐 있는 개념이다. 자칫하면 신비주의로 떨어지거나, 아니면 철학과 과학의 획기적 진보를 불러올 것이다. 그러나 아직 창발 (개념)이 확고한 이론으로서 자리를 잡았다고 볼 수는 없다. 창발 개념은 지금 "창발"의 초기 단계에 있는 것이다. (우선, 시간이 매우 모자라기 때문에 입수한 자료 가운데 일부만 올린다.)

(창발 개념과 직간접으로 관련이 있는 것들로 수반supervenience, 실현realization, 결정determination, 환원reduction, 부분전체론mereology, 자기조직화self-organization, 복잡성complexity, 혼돈chaos, 생기론vitalism, 기계론mechanism, 하향인과downward causation, 비선형 동역학nonlinear dynamics 따위와 같은 개념을 들 수 있다. 이들 개념에 대한 이해는 창발/창발성 연구에 필수적이다.)

Mandelbrot Set (photo from Wikipedia.org)

■ Abbott, Russ (Sep./Oct. 2006). Emergence explained: Abstractions: Getting epiphenomena to do real work. Complexity 12(1): 13-26.

Received: 28 September 2005; Accepted: 20 July 2006; Published Online: 6 Oct. 2006

This paper was submitted as an invited paper resulting from the Understanding Complex Systems conference held at the University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, May 2005.

Abstract of the Draft: Emergence—macro-level effects from micro-level causes—is at the heart of the conflict between reductionism and functionalism. How can there be autonomous higher level laws of nature (the functionalist claim) if everything can be reduced to the fundamental forces of physics (the reductionist position)? We cut through this debate by applying a computer science lens to the way we view nature. We conclude (a) that what functionalism calls the special sciences (sciences other than physics) do indeed study autonomous laws and furthermore that those laws pertain to real higher level entities but (b) that interactions among such higher-level entities is epiphenomenal in that they can always be reduced to primitive physical forces. In other words, epiphenomena, which we will identify with emergent phenomena, do real higher-level work. The proposed perspective provides a framework for understanding many thorny issues including the nature of entities, stigmergy, the evolution of complexity, phase transitions, supervenience, and downward entailment. We also discuss some practical considerations pertaining to systems of systems and the limitations of modeling.

☞ A Draft of this paper (10/12/2005):

http://cs.calstatela.edu/%7Ewiki/images/9/90/Emergence_Explained.pdf

◇ Abel, David L. and Jack T. Trevors (Dec. 2006). Self-organization vs. self-ordering events in life-origin models. Physics of Life Reviews 3(4): 211-228.

Accepted 5 July 2006.  L. Perlovsky.  Available online 12 October 2006.

Abstract: Self-ordering phenomena should not be confused with self-organization. Self-ordering events occur spontaneously according to natural “law” propensities and are purely physicodynamic. Crystallization and the spontaneously forming dissipative structures of Prigogine are examples of self-ordering. Self-ordering phenomena involve no decision nodes, no dynamically-inert configurable switches, no logic gates, no steering toward algorithmic success or “computational halting”. Hypercycles, genetic and evolutionary algorithms, neural nets, and cellular automata have not been shown to self-organize spontaneously into nontrivial functions. Laws and fractals are both compression algorithms containing minimal complexity and information. Organization typically contains large quantities of prescriptive information. Prescriptive information either instructs or directly produces nontrivial optimized algorithmic function at its destination. Prescription requires choice contingency rather than chance contingency or necessity. Organization requires prescription, and is abstract, conceptual, formal, and algorithmic. Organization utilizes a sign/symbol/token system to represent many configurable switch settings. Physical switch settings allow instantiation of nonphysical selections for function into physicality. Switch settings represent choices at successive decision nodes that integrate circuits and instantiate cooperative management into conceptual physical systems. Switch positions must be freely selectable to function as logic gates. Switches must be set according to rules, not laws. Inanimacy cannot “organize” itself. Inanimacy can only self-order. “Self-organization” is without empirical and prediction-fulfilling support. No falsifiable theory of self-organization exists. “Self-organization” provides no mechanism and offers no detailed verifiable explanatory power. Care should be taken not to use the term “self-organization” erroneously to refer to low-informational, natural-process, self-ordering events, especially when discussing genetic information.

Keywords: Chaos theory; Crystallization; Decision nodes; Dissipative structures; Dynamically-inert configurable switches; Fractals; Hypercycles; Genetic information; Programming; Origins; Molecular; Evolution; Prebiotic; Primordial soup; Codons; Proteins; Life; Nucleic acids; Cells; Genes; Computable cells; Environment

◈ Adami, Christoph (2002). What is complexity? BioEssays 24(12): 1085-1094. (DOI:10.1002/bies.10192)

Published Online: 22 Nov 2002

Abstract: Arguments for or against a trend in the evolution of complexity are weakened by the lack of an unambiguous definition of complexity. Such definitions abound for both dynamical systems and biological organisms, but have drawbacks of either a conceptual or a practical nature. Physical complexity, a measure based on automata theory and information theory, is a simple and intuitive measure of the amount of information that an organism stores, in its genome, about the environment in which it evolves. It is argued that physical complexity must increase in molecular evolution of asexual organisms in a single niche if the environment does not change, due to natural selection. It is possible that complexity decreases in co-evolving systems as well as at high mutation rates, in sexual populations, and in time-dependent landscapes. However, it is reasoned that these factors usually help, rather than hinder, the evolution of complexity, and that a theory of physical complexity for co-evolving species will reveal an overall trend towards higher complexity in biological evolution.

◈ Adami, Christoph, Charles Ofria, Travis C. Collier (Apr. 25, 2000). Evolution of biological complexity. PNAS 97(9): 4463-4468.

approved February 15, 2000 (received for review December 22, 1999)

Abstract: To make a case for or against a trend in the evolution of complexity in biological evolution, complexity needs to be both rigorously defined and measurable. A recent information-theoretic (but intuitively evident) definition identifies genomic complexity with the amount of information a sequence stores about its environment. We investigate the evolution of genomic complexity in populations of digital organisms and monitor in detail the evolutionary transitions that increase complexity. We show that, because natural selection forces genomes to behave as a natural "Maxwell Demon," within a fixed environment, genomic complexity is forced to increase.

◇ Agazzi, Evandro (ed.) (1991/2007). The Problem of Reductionism in Science: Colloquium of the Swiss Society of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Zurich, May 18-19, 1990. (Episteme Series Vol. 18). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers/Berlin: Springer.

◈ Agazzi, Evandro and Luisa Montecucco (eds.) (2002). Complexity and Emergence (Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science, Bergamo, Italy 9-13 May 2001). World Scientific Publishing Co.

Complexity has become a central topic in certain sectors of theoretical physics and chemistry (for example, in connection with nonlinearity and deterministic chaos). Also, mathematical measurements of complexity and formal characterizations of this notion have been proposed. The question of how complex systems can show properties that are different from those of their constituent parts has nurtured philosophical debates about emergence and reductionism, which are particularly important in the study of the relationship between physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. This book offers a good presentation of those topics through a truly interdisciplinary approach in which the philosophy of science and the specialized topics of certain sciences are put in a dialogue.

Contents

The Notions of Complexity and Emergence:
What is Complexity? (E Agazzi)
On Levels and Types of Complexity and Emergence (H Lenk & A Stephan)
Formal Metatheoretical Criteria of Complexity and Emergence (C U Moulines)
Beyond Reductionism and Holism. The Approach of Synergetics (B Kanitscheider)
Kolmogorov Complexity (J Mosterín)

Modèles de Structures Émergentes dans les Systèmes Complexes (J Petitot)

Complexity and Emergence in Natural Science:
Emergence in Physics: The Case of Classical Physics (R Omnés)
Classical Properties in a Quantum-Mechanical World (A Cordero)
Reduction, Integration, Emergence and Complexity in Biological Networks (J Ricard)

The Emergence of the Mind:
Complexity and the Emergence of Meaning: Toward a Semiophysics (F Tito Arecchi)
Complexity and the Emergence of Intentionality: Some Misconceptions (M Casartelli)
Can Supervenience Save the Mental? (L Montecucco)
From Complexity Levels to the Separate Soul (G Del Re)

◈ Aihara, K. (1997). Chaos in Neural Networks. Published pp. 110-126 in C. Grebogi and J.A. Yorke (eds.) The Impact of Chaos on Science and Society. New York: United Nations University Press.

◈ Albert, Réka and Albert-László Barabási (Jan. 2002). Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks. Reviews of Modern Physics 74(1): 47–97.

Abstract:  Complex networks describe a wide range of systems in nature and society. Frequently cited examples include the cell, a network of chemicals linked by chemical reactions, and the Internet, a network of routers and computers connected by physical links. While traditionally these systems have been modeled as random graphs, it is increasingly recognized that the topology and evolution of real networks are governed by robust organizing principles. This article reviews the recent advances in the field of complex networks, focusing on the statistical mechanics of network topology and dynamics. After reviewing the empirical data that motivated the recent interest in networks, the authors discuss the main models and analytical tools, covering random graphs, small-world and scale-free networks, the emerging theory of evolving networks, and the interplay between topology and the network's robustness against failures and attacks.

◈ Albert, Réka, Hawoong Jeong and Albert-László Barabási (2000). Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks. Nature 406: 378–381 (Issue of 27 July 2000).

Received 14 February 2000; Accepted 7 June 2000

Many complex systems display a surprising degree of tolerance against errors. For example, relatively simple organisms grow, persist and reproduce despite drastic pharmaceutical or environmental interventions, an error tolerance attributed to the robustness of the underlying metabolic network¹. Complex communication networks²display a surprising degree of robustness: although key components regularly malfunction, local failures rarely lead to the loss of the global information-carrying ability of the network. The stability of these and other complex systems is often attributed to the redundant wiring of the functional web defined by the systems' components. Here we demonstrate that error tolerance is not shared by all redundant systems: it is displayed only by a class of inhomogeneously wired networks, called scale-free networks, which include the World-Wide Web^{3, 4, 5}, the Internet⁶, social networks⁷ and cells⁸. We find that such networks display an unexpected degree of robustness, the ability of their nodes to communicate being unaffected even by unrealistically high failure rates. However, error tolerance comes at a high price in that these networks are extremely vulnerable to attacks (that is, to the selection and removal of a few nodes that play a vital role in maintaining the network's connectivity). Such error tolerance and attack vulnerability are generic properties of communication networks.

◈ Alexander, Samuel (1920). Space, Time, and Deity. 2 vols. London: Macmillan.

 

Table of Contents

 

Preface to New Impression

Preface to the First Edition

Introduction

 

Book I: Space-Time

 

Chapter I: Physical Space-Time

Chapter II: Perspectives and Sections of Physical Space-Time

Chapter III: Mental Space and Time

Chapter IV: Mental Space-Time

Chapter V: Mathematical Space and Time

Chapter VI: Relations in Space and Time

 

Book II: The Categories

 

Chapter I: Nature of the Categories

Chapter II: Identity, Diversity, and Existence

Chapter III: Universal, Particular, and Individual

Chapter IV: Relation

Chapter V: Order

Chapter VI: Substance, Causality, Reciprocity

Chapter VII: Quantity and Intensity

Chapter VIII: Whole and Parts; and Number

Chapter IX: Motion; and the Categories in General

Chapter X: The One and the Many

 

http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPSTAD&Volume=0&Issue=0&TOC=TRUE

◇ Ali Khalidi, Muhammad (Oct. 2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19(3): 319-333. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590500462448)

Abstract: Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience that shows that this is the case for the psychological property of fear. Though this may suggest that some psychological properties should be revised in order to conform to those of neurophysiology, the history of science demonstrates that this is not always the outcome, particularly with properties that play an important role in our folk theories and are central to human concerns.

◈ Allen, Garland E. (June 2005). Mechanism, vitalism and organicism in late nineteenth and twentieth-century biology: the importance of historical context. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36(2): 261-283.

Abstract: The term ‘mechanism’ has been used in two quite different ways in the history of biology. Operative, or explanatory mechanism refers to the step-by-step description or explanation of how components in a system interact to yield a particular outcome (as in the ‘mechanism of enzyme action’ or the ‘mechanism of synaptic transmission’). Philosophical Mechanism, on the other hand, refers to a broad view of organisms as material entities, functioning in ways similar to machines — that is, carrying out a variety of activities based on known chemical and physical processes. In the early twentieth century philosophical Mechanism became the foundation of a ‘new biology’ that sought to establish the life sciences on the same solid and rigorous foundation as the physical sciences, including a strong emphasis on experimentation. In the context of the times this campaign was particularly aimed at combating the reintroduction of more holistic, non-mechanical approaches into the life sciences (organicism, vitalism). In so doing, Mechanists failed to see some of the strong points of non-vitalistic holistic thinking. The two approaches are illustrated in the work of Jacques Loeb and Hans Spemann.

Keywords: Mechanistic materialism (Mechanism); Holistic materialism (holism); Organicism; Vitalism; Jacques Loeb; Hans Spemann; Jakob von Uexküll; Wilhelm Roux; Hans Driesch

■ Andersen, Peter Bøgh, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, bodies and matter. Århus(Aarhus): Aarhus University Press.

Downward Causation

Minds, Bodies and Matter

edited by

Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen

Århus: Aarhus University Press, 2000.
(ISBN 87 7288 814 1).

Complex global patterns of behavior can often be explained by simple interactions: for example, the complex shifting patterns of flocking birds can be generated by interactions involving only rules of movement for each bird and its immediate neighbors.
    But can the large-scale patterns re-influence the local interactions that generated them? Is there an influence downward from the whole to its parts?
    Does the cell reorganize the biochemical processes inside it in a new way? Do psychosomatic illnesses exist? Is the so-called hermeneutic circle real? Should we interpret higher-level phenomena as indicating a new ontological layer with its own units or laws? Are there special substances of life, mind and meaning? Can life change biochemical laws? Can mind change the body?
    The authors of the fourteen chapters address these intriguing questions from different viewpoints: physics, biology, psychology, systems science, linguistics, and philosophy. The contributors are from Denmark, USA, Spain and Brazil.

Contents

Preface    (p.5)

Contents    (p.9)

   Part I -- Introduction

Chapter 1:
Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation
CLAUS EMMECHE, SIMO KØPPE & FREDERIK STJERNFELT    (p. 13-34)

   Part 2 -- Physics

Chapter 2:
Wholeness and Part, Cosmos and man -- in 16th and 17th Century Natural Philosophy and in Modern Holism
TOVE KRUSE    (p. 37-50)

Chapter 3:
Macro and Micro-Levels in Physics
PEDER VOETMANN CHRISTIANSEN    (p. 51-62)

Chapter 4:
Causation, Control, and the Evolution of Complexity
H. H. PATTEE    (p. 63-77)

   Part 3 -- Biology and Psychology

Chapter 5:
Psychosomatics and the Pineal Gland
SIMO KØPPE    (p. 81-98)

Chapter 6:
Downward Causation at the Core of Living Organization
ALVARO MORENO & JON UMEREZ    (p. 99-117)

Chapter 7:
Higher-level Descriptions: Why Should we Preserve them?
CHARBEL NIÑO EL-HANI & ANTONIO MARCOS PEREIRA    (p. 118-142)

Chapter 8:
The Changes is Afoot: Emergentist Thinking in Language Acquisition
GEORGE HOLLICH, KATHY HIRSH-PASEK, MICHAEL L. TUCKER & ROBERTA M. GOLINKOFF    (p. 143-178)

   Part 4 -- Social and Communicative Systems

Chapter 9:
Material Sign Processes and Emergent Ecosocial Organization
J. L. LEMKE    (p. 181-213)

Chapter 10:
Genres as Self-Organising Systems
PETER BØGH ANDERSEN    (p. 214-260)

Chapter 11:
Anticipated Downward Causation and the Arch Structure of Texts
OLE TOGEBY    (p. 261-277)

Chapter 12:
Rule-based and Rule-generating Systems
NIELS OLE FINNEMANN    (p. 278-302)

   Part 5 -- Philosophy

Chapter 13:
Making Sense of Downward Causation
JAEGWON KIM    (p. 305-321)

Chapter 14:
Emergence
MARK H. BICKHARD with DONALD T. CAMPBELL    (p. 322-348)

Contributors    (p.349)

Author Index    (p.351)

http://www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/pr/DC.html

◈ Anderson, Philip W. (Aug. 4, 1972). More is different. Science 177(4047): 393-396.

◈ Anderson, Philip W. (1997). Is measurement itself an emergent property? Complexity 3(1): 14-16.

◈ Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences Volume 929, April 2001. A special Issue on:

Cajal and Consciousness: Scientific Approaches to Consciousness on the Centennial of Ramón y Cajál's Textura

Edited by: Pedro C. Marijuán, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain

 

This volume celebrates the centennial of the 1899 publication of "Textura del sistema nervioso del hombre y de los vertebrados" by Santiago Ramón y Cajal, long considered a masterpiece of Spanish science and perhaps the most influential work in the history of neuroscience. One hundred years ago, Cajal postulated most of the modern neuroscientific ideas of today: the "doctrine of the neuron," the evolutionary origins of nervous systems, the general architecture of central nervous systems, the structure of the cortex, interneuronal circuits, neurotropism of growing axons, plasticity of neuronal contacts, and theories on the neuronal basis of consciousness. The scientific approach to consciousness has become a focal point for interdisciplinary dialog at the turn of the new millennium. Contributors to this volume are leading figures in the field of modern neuroscience, plus an extraordinary group of polymaths, including Michael Arbib, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Gerald Edelman, Murray Gell-Mann, Stuart Hameroff, Francois Jacob, Eric Kandel, Rodolfo Llinas, Lynn Margulis, Harold Morowitz, Roger Penrose, Wolf Singer, and Lotfi Zadeh.

Introduction:

PEDRO C. MARIJUÁN

Cajal and Consciousness: Introduction

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 1-10. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]  

 

Part I. Consciousness, One Hundred Years after Textura:

 

THOMAS D. ALBRIGHT, THOMAS M. JESSELL, ERIC R. KANDEL, and MICHAEL I. POSNER

Progress in the Neural Sciences in the Century after Cajal (and the Mysteries That Remain)

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 11-40. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]  

 

Part II. Biological Complexity and the Emergence of Consciousness:

 

MURRAY GELL-MANN

Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 41-49. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

HAROLD J. MOROWITZ

The Epistemic Paradox of Mind and Matter

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 50-54. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

LYNN MARGULIS

The Conscious Cell

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 55-70. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

FRANÇOIS JACOB

Complexity and Tinkering

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 71-73. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

  

STUART HAMEROFF

Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 74-104. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

  

ROGER PENROSE

Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry: An Addendum: Some New Developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 105-110. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]  

 

Part III. From Primary to Higher-level Consciousness:

 

GERALD EDELMAN

Consciousness: The Remembered Present

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 111-122. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

WOLF SINGER

Consciousness and the Binding Problem

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 123-146. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX

Cajal on Neurons, Molecules, and Consciousness

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 147-151. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

STANISLAS DEHAENE, MICHEL KERSZBERG, and JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX

A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 152-165. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

  

RODOLFO LLINÁS and URS RIBARY

Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and Disease

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 166-175. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

PETRA STOERIG

The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 176-194. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 

 

MICHAEL A. ARBIB

Co-Evolution of Human Consciousness and Language

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 195-220. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

  

LOTFI A. ZADEH

From Computing with Numbers to Computing with Words: From Manipulation of Measurements to Manipulation of Perceptions

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 221-252. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]  

 

Part IV. Closing Remarks:

 

ALBERTO PORTERA-SÁNCHEZ

Who Was Cajal?

Ann NY Acad Sci 2001 929: 253-257. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 

http://www.annalsnyas.org/content/vol929/issue1/

■ Applied Linguistics Volume 27, Number 4, Issue of December 2006 : A Special Issue on the Topic of Language Emergence.

http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/vol27/issue4/index.dtl

◇ Arzy, Shahar,  Moshe Idel, Theodor Landis & Olaf Blanke (Nov. 2005). Speaking With One’s Self: Autoscopic Phenomena in Writings from the Ecstatic Kabbalah. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(11):

Abstract: Immediate experience localizes the self within the limits of the physical body. This spatial unity has been challenged by philosophical and mystical traditions aimed to isolate concepts of mind and body. A more direct challenge of the spatial unity comes from a well-defined group of experiences called ‘autoscopic phenomena’ (AP), in which the subject has the impression of seeing a second own body in an extrapersonal space. AP are known to occur in many human cultures and have been described in healthy, as well as neurological and psychiatric populations. In this article we investigate the phenomenology of AP as described in the writings of the ecstatic Kabbalah of the thirteenth century, and search for similarities and differences with respect to AP from these and other populations. The article discusses potential common research areas between cognitive science and the science of religious experience.
 
Key words: autoscopic phenomena, ecstatic Kabbalah, neurology, phenomenology, mystical experience, temporo-parietal junction.

◆ Arzy, Shahar, Gregor Thut, Christine Mohr, Christoph M. Michel, and Olaf Blanke (Aug. 2, 2006). Neural Basis of Embodiment: Distinct Contributions of Temporoparietal Junction and Extrastriate Body Area. The Journal of Neuroscience 26(31): 8074-8081.

Received Feb. 19, 2006; revised June 13, 2006; accepted June 25, 2006.

Embodiment, the sense of being localized within one's physical body, is a fundamental aspect of the self. Recently, researchers have started to show that self and body processing require distinct brain mechanisms, suggesting two posterior brain regions as key loci: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), which is involved in self processing and multisensory integration of body-related information; and the extrastriate body area (EBA), which responds selectively to human bodies and body parts. Here we used evoked potential mapping and a distributed linear inverse solution to show that activations in EBA and TPJ code differentially for embodiment and self location, because the location and timing of brain activation depended on whether mental imagery is performed with mentally embodied (EBA) or disembodied (TPJ) self location. In a second experiment, we showed that only EBA activation, related to embodied self location, but not TPJ activation, related to disembodied self location, was modified by the subjects' body position during task performance (supine or sitting). This suggests that embodied self location and actual body location share neural mechanisms. Collectively, these data show that distributed brain activity at the EBA and TPJ as well as their timing are crucial for the coding of the self as embodied and as spatially situated within the human body.

Key words: embodiment; self; mental imagery; body position; extrastriate body area; EBA; temporoparietal junction; TPJ

◆ Atkin, A. (Aug. 1992). On consciousness: what is the role of emergence? Medical Hypotheses 38(4): 311-314.

Can consciousness be understood as the ongoing active creation of information (of meaning)? 'Emergence', the central concept in this hypothesis, plays an essentially different role in it than in theories previously proposed.

◈ Atmanspacher, Harald (May 18, 2004). Quantum theory and consciousness: an overview with selected examples. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society Vol. 2004, No. 1: 51-73.

◈ Atmanspacher, Harald (2007). Contextual emergence from physics to cognitive neuroscience.(pdf) Journal of Consciousness Studies 14(1-2): 18-36.

◈ Atmanspacher, Harald and Peter beim Graben (2006). Contextual emergence of mental states from neurodynamics. (pdf) Chaos and Complexity Letters 2(2/3):

◈ Atmanspacher, Harald and Robert C. Bishop (2006). Stability conditions in contextual emergence. (pdf) Chaos and Complexity Letters 2(2/3):

◈ Baars, Bernard J. (Spring 1998). Are there limits to what we can know about conscious experience? Some scientific doubts about the "Hard Problem" of subjectivity: A review of The Conscious Mind by David J. Chalmers. American Journal of Psychology III(1): 119-131.

▣ Baas, Nils A. (1994). Emergence, Hierarchies, and Hyperstructures. In: Christopher G. Langton (ed.) (1994) Artificial Life III. Redwood City: Addison-Wesley.

◈ Bahn, Peter (Apr. 2007). Book Review: Conditions for the Emergence of Life on the Early Earth. Sydney Leach, Ian Smith, and Charles Cockell (editors), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 2006, vol. 361, no. 1474, pp. 1673–1894, ISSN 0962-8436. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres (Formerly Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere) 37(2): 209-211.

◈ Bailey, Andrew (1999). Supervenience and physicalism. Synthese 117: 53-73.

◈ Bak, Per, Kan Chen (Jan. 1991). Self-organized criticality. Scientific American 264(1): 26-33.

◇ Bak, Per (1994). Self-organized criticality: a holistic view of nature. In: G. Cowan, D. Pines and D. Melter (eds.) Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality, SFI Studies in the Science of Complexity, Prc. vol. XIX, Addison-Wesley, pp. 477–495.

◈ Ball, Philip (1999). The Self-Made Tapestry: Pattern Formation in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Banks, William P. and Susan Pockett (2007). Benjamin Libet's work on the neuroscience of free will. In Max Velmans and Susan Schneider eds. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

◈ Barabási, Albert-László (2002). Linked: The New Science of Networks. Perseus Books Group.

 

▣ Barendregt, Marko and J. F. Hans van Rappard (Aug. 1, 2004). Reductionism Revisited: On the Role of Reduction in Psychology. Theory and Psychology 14(4): 453 - 474.

Abstract:  Reductionism in psychology is often linked with the mind-body problem. This paper reviews the reductionism debate and concludes that many of its controversies can indeed be traced to the relation between reduction and the metaphysical mind-body problem. It is proposed that reductionism, by bridging different theories, rather should be considered as a scientific stance which favours interdisciplinary co-operation. This perspective on reductionism throws a new light on the classical model of reduction, which may capture important aspects of intertheoretic reductions if it is recognized that the bridges between theories do not need to comply completely with the classical conditions. These ideas are illustrated by analysing an example of reductionistic research concerning the psychology and neuropsychology of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

Key Words:  attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder • mind-body problem • models of reduction • reductionism • theories

◈ Barnsley, Michael Fielding (Sep. 2006). SuperFractals: Patterns of Nature. Cambridge University Press.

◈ Barrett, Jeffrey A. (Dec. 2006). A quantum-mechanical argument for mind-body dualism. Erkenntnis 65(1): 97-115.

◈ Bar-Yam, Yaneer (July/Aug. 2004). A mathematical theory of strong emergence using multiscale variety. Complexity 9(6): 15-24.

◈ Başar, Erol (1990). Chaotic Dynamics and Resonance Phenomena in Brain Function: Progress, Perspectives, and Thoughts. Published pp. 1-30 in Erol Başar (ed.) Chaos in Brain Function. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

▣ Batterman, Robert (2000). Multiple Realizability and Universality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51(1): 115–145.

This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized.

◈ Batterman, Robert (2001). The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Bechtel, William and J. Mundale (1999). Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66: 175-207.

◈ Beck, Friedrich, John C. Eccles (Dec. 1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. PNAS 89: 11357-11361.

The relationship of brain activity to conscious intentions is considered on the basis of the functional microstructure of the cerebral cortex. Each incoming nerve impulse causes the emission of transmitter molecules by the process of exocytosis. Since exocytosis is a quantal phenomenon of the presynaptic vesicular grid with a probability much less than 1, we present a quantum mechanical model for it based on a tunneling process of the trigger mechanism. Consciousness manifests itself in mental intentions. The consequent voluntary actions become effective by momentary increases of the probability of vesicular emission in the thousands of synapses on each pyramidal cell by quantal selection.

◈ Beckermann, Angar (1992). Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction. Published pp. 94-118 in: Beckermann, Ansgar, Hans Flohr, Jaegwon Kim (eds.) Emergence or Reduction? - Essays on the Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

◈ Beckermann, Ansgar, Hans Flohr, Jaegwon Kim (eds.) (1992). Emergence or Reduction? - Essays on the Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

 

contents

preface
Ansgar Beckermann: Introduction―Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism...........................1-21.

Part I
Achim Stephan: Emergence―A Systematic View on its Historical Facets..................................25-48.
Brian P. McLaughlin: The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism................................................49-93.
Ansgar Beckermann: Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction........................................94-118.
Jaegwon Kim: "Downward Causation" in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism..........119-138.
Paul Teller: A Contemporary Look at Emergence...................................................................139-153.

Part II
Robert Van Gulick: Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint...157-179.
Paul Teller: Subjectivity and Knowing What It's Like..............................................................180-200.
Clyde L. Hardin: Physiology, Phenomenology, and Spinoza's True Colors..........................201-219.
Hans Flohr: Qualia and Brain Processes.............................................................................220-238.

Part III
Bernd-Olaf Küppers: Understanding Complexity...................................................................241-256.
William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson: Emergent Phenomena and Complex Systems...257-288.
Paul Hoyningen Huene: On the Way to a Theory of Antireductionist Arguments....................289-301.

Name Index...........................................................................................................................303-306.
Subject Index........................................................................................................................307-315.

◈ Bedau, Mark A. (1997). Weak Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World: 375-399. Blackwell.

◈ Bedau, Mark A. (1998). Four puzzles about life. Artificial Life 4: 125-140.

◈ Bedau, Mark A. (2002). Downward Causation and Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia, Special Issue on Emergence and Downward Causation (El-Hani, C.N. Ed.) 6: 5-50.

◈ Bedau, Mark A., Paul Humphreys (eds.) (Jan. 2008). Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. The MIT Press.

◈ Bell, Anthony J. (1999). Levels and loops: the future of artificial intelligence and neuroscience. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. B 354: 2013-2020.

◈ Bennett, Karen (Sep. 2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, To Tract It. Noûs 37(3); 471-497.

Abstract:  A growing number of people try to solve the exclusion problem by claiming that an effect can have distinct mental and physical causes without being overdetermined. I argue that those who hold this view bear a significant burden of proof that they have not discharged. I show how they can do so, and develop a strategy for defending this sort of response to the exclusion problem.

http://www.princeton.edu/~kbennett/exclprobrev.pdf

◈ Bennett, Karen (May 2004). Global Supervenience and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  68(3): 510-529.

Abstract:  Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.

http://www.princeton.edu/~kbennett/globalsup.pdf

◈ Bennett, Karen (Apr. 2004) Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies 118(3): 339-371.

Abstract:  A lot of people believe that distinct objects can occupy precisely the same place for the entire time during which they exist. Such people have to provide an answer to the 'grounding problem'--they have to explain how such things, alike in so many ways, nonetheless manage to fall under different sortals, or have different modal properties. I argue in detail that they cannot say that there is anything in virtue of which spatio-temporally coincident things have those properties. However, I also argue that this may not be as bad as it looks, and that there is a way to make sense of the claim that such properties are primitive.

http://www.princeton.edu/~kbennett/gprev.pdf

◈ Bennett, Karen (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2(2): 316–337.

Abstract:  Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem – including some forms of physicalism – make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.

http://www.princeton.edu/~kbennett/philcompMC.pdf

◈ Bennett, Karen (forthcoming). Exclusion Again. In Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup eds. Being Reduced. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract:  Philosophers of mind use the exclusion problem in two importantly different ways. Sometimes it is used as an argument for physicalism, and sometimes it is used as an argument for a particular version of physicalism. I argue that although the former is a good argument, the latter is not. All physicalists have a well-motivated solution to the exclusion problem that no dualist has. This solution centrally involves denying what is called the 'exclusion principle'--that all effects that have more than one sufficient cause count as overdetermined. I suggest that there are two apparent ways to motivate denying this claim. One of them--the successful one--turns on endorsing the claim that the mental supervenes with metaphysical necessity upon the physical, and is consequently available to all and only physicalists. The other turns on rejecting a production view of causation in favor of a pure dependence view. But although this move is available to dualists, it provides no reason to deny the exclusion principle. Consequently, dualists really do have to either endorse epiphenomenalism or deny the completeness of physics. All physicalists, in contrast, have a well-motivated alternative available.

◈ Berenda, C. W. (Apr. 23, 1953). On emergence and prediction. The Journal of Philosophy 50(9): 269-74.

This note on emergence and prediction might be entitled somewhat facetiously, "What is wholesome in holism," since it deals, in part, with a central thesis of the holists concerning the emergence of novelty in the world of experience.

◆ Bergmann, Gustav (Oct. 1944). Holism, Historicism, and Emergence. Philosophy of Science 11(4): 209-221.

In a recent article¹, P. Henle gave an analysis of the notion of emergence. His inquiry deals with what he calls, quite appropriately, the emergence of characteristics. Such emergence, that is, the emergence of qualities and relations is undoubtedly the primary connotation of the term, and I feel that Henle has been very successful in clarifying it. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss in some detail one special aspect of Henle's analysis. This is done because the precise formulation of this particular aspect sheds light on the notion of elementarism. And the opposite of this notion, holism and organicism, belongs undoubtedly to the variety of fused and confused meanings the idea of emergence has come to cover.

¹ Henle, Paul (Aug. 27, 1942). The status of emergence. The Journal of Philosophy 39(18): 486-493.

◈ Bever, Thomas and Mario Montalbetti (Nov. 2002). Noam's Ark. Science 298(5598): 1565-1566 (Issue of Nov. 22, 2002).

We view language as a central component of being human, yet debates still rage about what language is. In their Perspective, Bever and Montalbetti dissect a review in this issue by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch that seeks to explain how we can empirically study the evolutionary basis of human language.

◈ Bich, Leonardo (2006). Autopoiesis and Emergence. Published in Gianfranco Minati, Eliano Pessa and Mario Abram eds. (2006). Systemics of Emergence: Research and Development. Springer (pp. 281-292).

Abstract:  Autopoietic theory is more than a mere characterization of the living, as it can be applied to a wider class of systems and involves both organizational and epistemological aspects. In this paper we assert the necessity of considering the relation between autopoiesis and emergence, focusing on the crucial importance of the observer’s activity and demonstrating that autopoietic systems can be considered intrinsically emergent processes. From the attempts to conceptualize emergence, especially Rosen’s, autopoiesis stands out for its attention to the unitary character of systems and to emergent levels, both inseparable from the observer’s operations. These aspects are the basis of Varela’s approach to multiple level relationships, considered as descriptive complementarities.

 

Key words:  autopoiesis - emergence - observer - descriptive complementarity - Robert Rosen - Francisco Varela

◈ Bickhard, Mark H. with Donald T. Campbell (2000). Emergence. In Peter Bøgh Anderson, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (eds.) Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. 322-348.

▣ Bickle, John (1998). Psychoneural Reduction. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Bishop, Robert C. (2005). Patching Physics and Chemistry Together. Philosophy of Science 72(5): 710-722.

The "usual story" regarding molecular chemistry is that it is roughly an application of quantum mechanics. That is to say, quantum mechanics supplies everything necessary and sufficient, both ontologically and epistemologically, to reduce molecular chemistry to quantum mechanics. This is a reductive story, to be sure, but a key explanatory element of molecular chemistry, namely molecular structure, is absent from the quantum realm. On the other hand, typical characterizations of emergence, such as the unpredictability or inexplicability of molecular structure based on quantum mechanics, do not characterize the relationship between molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics well either. A different scheme for characterizing reduction and emergence is proposed that accommodates the relationship between quantum mechanics and molecular chemistry and some initial objections to the scheme are considered.

◈ Bishop, Robert C. (2006). Downward causation in fluid convection. Forthcoming in Synthese. Published online in Friday, November 03, 2006.

Received: 14 June 2004  Accepted: 5 September 2006  Published online: 3 November 2006

 

Abstract:  Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience. Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation in classical mechanics, far more robust and less speculative than the examples typically provided in the philosophy of mind literature. Although the physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection is quite complicated, this model provides a much more realistic and concrete example for examining various assumptions and arguments found in emergence and philosophy of mind debates. After reviewing some key concepts of nonlinear dynamics, complex systems and the basic physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection, I begin that examination here by (1) assessing a recently proposed definition for emergence and downward causation, (2) discussing some typical objections to downward causation and (3) comparing this model with Sperry’s examples.

 

Keywords:  Downward causation - Complex systems - Nonlinear dynamics

 

The aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations among things; outside these relations there is no reality knowable. – Poincaré

 

◈ Bishop, Robert C. (forthcoming). Chaos. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

◈ Bishop, Robert C. and Harald Atmanspacher (2006). Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties. Foundations of Physics 36(12): 1753-1777.

Received: 28 February 2006  Revised: 2 October 2006  Published online: 17 November 2006

Abstract:  The role of contingent contexts in formulating relations between properties of systems at different descriptive levels is addressed. Based on the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions for interlevel relations, a comprehensive classification of such relations is proposed, providing a transparent conceptual framework for discussing particular versions of reduction, emergence, and supervenience. One of these versions, contextual emergence, is demonstrated using two physical examples: molecular structure and chirality, and thermal equilibrium and temperature. The concept of stability is emphasized as a basic guiding principle of contextual property emergence.

 

Keywords:  contextual emergence - contextual observables - molecular shape - temperature - topology - stability

 

 

◈ Bitbol, Michel (in press). Ontology, matter and emergence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Published online: 13 January 2007

Abstract:  “Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.

 

Key words:  emergence - causality - consciousness - neuroscience

A former version of this paper was intended as part of my contribution to the Mind & Life meeting in Dharamsala (India) in October 2002 (in fact, only a small fraction of it was presented there). I thank all the participants, especially U. Goodenough, S. Chu, and P.L. Luisi for their cogent discussion. Very special thanks are due to His Holiness the Dalai-Lama, who provided both his intellectual insight and a quality which is seldom met in other conferences: a sense of unity of purpose and “embodiment” of knowledge, beyond the differences in standpoint.

◈ Bitbol, Michel and Pier Luigi Luisi (Nov. 22, 2004). Autopoiesis with or without cognition: Defining life at its edge. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 1(1): 99-107.

www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/media/BA750MRHLP5XQCUQ9EVL/Contributions/T/J/6/2/TJ62QQKtYJ47B1T8.pdf 

◆ Blanke, Olaf (Dec. 18, 2004). Out of body experiences and their neural basis. BMJ 329: 1414-1415.

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/329/7480/1414

◆ Blanke, Olaf, Shahar Arzy (2005). The Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the Temporo-Parietal Junction. The Neuroscientist 11(1): 16-24.

Folk psychology postulates a spatial unity of self and body, a "real me" that resides in one’s body and is the subject of experience. The spatial unity of self and body has been challenged by various philosophical considerations but also by several phenomena, perhaps most notoriously the "out-of-body experience" (OBE) during which one’s visuo-spatial perspective and one’s self are experienced to have departed from their habitual position within one’s body. Here the authors marshal evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroimaging that suggests that OBEs are related to a failure to integrate multisensory information from one’s own body at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). It is argued that this multisensory disintegration at the TPJ leads to the disruption of several phenomenological and cognitive aspects of self-processing, causing illusory reduplication, illusory self-location, illusory perspective, and illusory agency that are experienced as an OBE.

Key Words: Illusion • Autoscopic phenomena • Temporo-parietal junction • Neurology • Neuroimaging

◆ Blanke, Olaf, Theodor Landis, Laurent Spinelli, Margitta Seeck (Feb. 2004). Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin. Brain 127(2): 243-258.

Received June 30, 2003. Revised August 22, 2003. Accepted September 22, 2003.

During an out-of-body experience (OBE), the experient seems to be awake and to see his body and the world from a location outside the physical body. A closely related experience is autoscopy (AS), which is characterized by the experience of seeing one’s body in extrapersonal space. Yet, despite great public interest and many case studies, systematic neurological studies of OBE and AS are extremely rare and, to date, no testable neuroscientific theory exists. The present study describes phenomenological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging correlates of OBE and AS in six neurological patients. We provide neurological evidence that both experiences share important central mechanisms. We show that OBE and AS are frequently associated with pathological sensations of position, movement and perceived completeness of one’s own body. These include vestibular sensations (such as floating, flying, elevation and rotation), visual body-part illusions (such as the illusory shortening, transformation or movement of an extremity) and the experience of seeing one’s body only partially during an OBE or AS. We also find that the patient’s body position prior to the experience influences OBE and AS. Finally, in five patients, brain damage or brain dysfunction is localized to the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). These results suggest that the complex experiences of OBE and AS represent paroxysmal disorders of body perception and cognition (or body schema). The processes of body perception and cognition, and the unconscious creation of central representation(s) of one’s own body based on proprioceptive, tactile, visual and vestibular information—as well as their integration with sensory information of extrapersonal space—is a prerequisite for rapid and effective action with our surroundings. Based on our findings, we speculate that ambiguous input from these different sensory systems is an important mechanism of OBE and AS, and thus the intriguing experience of seeing one’s body in a position that does not coincide with its felt position. We suggest that OBE and AS are related to a failure to integrate proprioceptive, tactile and visual information with respect to one’s own body (disintegration in personal space) and by a vestibular dysfunction leading to an additional disintegration between personal (vestibular) space and extrapersonal (visual) space. We argue that both disintegrations (personal; personal–extrapersonal) are necessary for the occurrence of OBE and AS, and that they are due to a paroxysmal cerebral dysfunction of the TPJ in a state of partially and briefly impaired consciousness.

Key Words: out-of-body experience; autoscopy; neurology; body schema; multisensory processing

Abbreviations: AP= autoscopic phenomenon; AS = autoscopy; FLAIR = fluid attenuated inversion recovery; OBE = out-of-body experience; SPECT = single photon emission computer tomography; TPJ = temporo-parietal junction.

◆ Blanke, Olaf, Christine Mohr, Christoph M. Michel, Alvaro Pascual-Leone, Peter Brugger, Margitta Seeck, Theodor Landis, and Gregor Thut (Jan. 19, 2005). Linking Out-of-Body Experience and Self Processing to Mental Own-Body Imagery at the Temporoparietal Junction. The Journal of Neuroscience 25(3): 550-557.

Received July 1, 2004; revised November 12, 2004; accepted November 12, 2004.

The spatial unity of self and body is challenged by various philosophical considerations and several phenomena, perhaps most notoriously the "out-of-body experience" (OBE) during which one's visual perspective and one's self are experienced to have departed from their habitual position within one's body. Although researchers started examining isolated aspects of the self, the neurocognitive processes of OBEs have not been investigated experimentally to further our understanding of the self. With the use of evoked potential mapping, we show the selective activation of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) at 330-400 ms after stimulus onset when healthy volunteers imagined themselves in the position and visual perspective that generally are reported by people experiencing spontaneous OBEs. Interference with the TPJ by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at this time impaired mental transformation of one's own body in healthy volunteers relative to TMS over a control site. No such TMS effect was observed for imagined spatial transformations of external objects, suggesting the selective implication of the TPJ in mental imagery of one's own body. Finally, in an epileptic patient with OBEs originating from the TPJ, we show partial activation of the seizure focus during mental transformations of her body and visual perspective mimicking her OBE perceptions. These results suggest that the TPJ is a crucial structure for the conscious experience of the normal self, mediating spatial unity of self and body, and also suggest that impaired processing at the TPJ may lead to pathological selves such as OBEs.

Key words: self processing; temporoparietal junction; neurology; transcranial magnetic stimulation; event-related potentials; human

◈ Blanke, Olaf, Stéphanie Ortigue, Theodor Landis, Margitta Seeck (Sep. 2002). Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions. Nature 419(6904): 269-270 (Issue of Sep. 19, 2002).

'Out-of-body' experiences (OBEs) are curious, usually brief sensations in which a person's consciousness seems to become detached from the body and take up a remote viewing position^{1, 2, 3}. Here we describe the repeated induction of this experience by focal electrical stimulation of the brain's right angular gyrus in a patient who was undergoing eval‎uation for epilepsy treatment. Stimulation at this site also elicited illusory transformations of the patient's arm and legs (complex somatosensory responses) and whole-body displacements (vestibular responses), indicating that out-of-body experiences may reflect a failure by the brain to integrate complex somatosensory and vestibular information^{1, 2, 3}.

◈ Blitz, David (1992/2004). Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Reality. (Episteme Series Vol. 19). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers/Berlin: Springer.

About this book

This volume examines the background, origin, and debate over emergent evolution, a philosophy of evolution developed by the comparative psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan. Part One studies the 19th century background in the debate over the philosophical framework for evolutionary theory in the writings of Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Wallace, and G.J. Romanes. Questions examined include the continuity of the evolutionary process, the status of qualitative as well as quantitative change, the scope of evolution, and its metaphysical implications. Part Two traces Lloyd Morgan's development of emergent evolution as a philosophy relating the various sciences, and its main thesis that qualitative novelty can occur in the course of a continuous, universal and monistic evolutionary process, proceeding from the material level to those of life and mind. The third part traces the debate over emergent evolution, and argues that, despite its temporary eclipse by reductionist and physicalist philosophies in the period from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, emergent evolution is an active trend of thought at the interface between philosophy and science.

Table of contents

Introduction

Part One: The Background to Emergent Evolution

1. Charles Darwin: The Framework for Evolutionary Theory

2. Herbert Spencer: Philosophy of Evolution

3. T.H. Huxley: Monism and Epiphenomenalism

4. Alfred Russel Wallace: Evolution and the Supernatural

5. G.J. Romanes: Evolution of Mind

Part Two: Lloyd Morgan's Formative Period

7. Influences on Lloyd Morgan

8. Lloyd Morgan's Creative Synthesis

9. Lloyd Morgan's System of Emergent Evolution

Part Three: The Debate over Emergent Evolution

10. Other Systems of Emergent Evolution

11. Systems Related to Emergent Evolution

12. Critical Reaction to Emergent Evolution

13. Further Discussion of Emergent Evolution

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

▣ Block, Ned Joel (1997). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 107–132.

▣ Block, Ned Joel (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 133–150.

◈ Block, Ned Joel (May 2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Consciousness, Function, and Representation
Collected Papers, Volume 1
Ned Block

	Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem Sample Chapter - Download PDF (67 KB)	1
I	Functionalism	13
1	Functionalism Sample Chapter - Download PDF (73 KB)	15
2	What Is Functionalism?	27
3	What Psychological States Are Not, with J. Fodor	45
4	Troubles with Functionalism	63
5	What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show	103
II	Concepts of Consciousness	109
6	Consciousness	111
7	Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained	129
8	What Is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of?	141
9	On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness	159
10	How Many Concepts of Consciousness?	215
11	Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness	249
12	Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness	269
13	Concepts of Consciousness	275
III	Empirical Approaches to Consciousness	297
14	How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness	299
15	Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness	311
16	Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation	339
17	Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness	343
18	Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception	363
IV	Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem	377
19	Are Absent Qualia Impossible?	379
20	The Harder Problem of Consciousness	397
21	Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity	435
V	Consciousness and Representation	499
22	Qualia	501
23	Inverted Earth	511
24	Mental Paint	533
25	Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness	571
26	Is Experiencing Just Representing?	603
27	Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism	611
	Name Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (33 KB)	617
	Subject Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (53 KB)

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=11055&mode=toc

◈ Block, Ned Joel (forthcoming, available online Mar. 12, 2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness?   We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious.  The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules.  But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases?  If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules.  But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’?  The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility.  The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/puzzle.pdf

◈ Block, Ned Joel (forthcoming, available online Mar. 12, 2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives edited by John Hawthorne.

In the “Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”” (published in 1968), Wittgenstein endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the “innocuous” inverted spectrum hypothesis)  is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the “dangerous” kind). I will attempt to explicate the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios, to give arguments in favor of the coherence of the dangerous scenario, and to show that the standard arguments to the effect that the dangerous scenario is impossible are flawed or ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario whose coherence I will be advocating.  I will also agree with what I think is Wittgenstein’s position that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected lets qualia in the door, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) qualities of experiential states whose phenomenal character cannot be expressed in natural language. Further, I will argue that acknowledging the coherence of the innocuous inverted spectrum commits Wittgenstein to the coherence of the dangerous inverted spectrum, thereby undermining Wittgenstein’s deepest views about the mind.  In other work, I have used the inverted spectrum hypothesis as an argument against functionalism and representationism, but here the focus is on its role in arguing for the possibility of qualia.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Wittgenstein_Qualia.pdf

▣ Bontly, Thomas D. (2002). The Supervenience Argument Generalizes. Philosopical Studies 109(1): 75–96.

Abstract:  In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.

◇ Boogerd, Fred C., Frank J. Bruggeman, Jan-Hendrik S. Hofmeyr and Hans V. Westerhoff (eds.) (Apr. 2007). Systems Biology: Philosophical Foundations. Amsterdam, The Netherlands/Oxford, Uk: Elsevier Science.

Description

Systems biology is a vigorous and expanding discipline, in many ways a successor to genomics and perhaps unprecedented in its combination of biology with a great many other sciences, from physics to ecology, from mathematics to medicine, and from philosophy to chemistry. Studying the philosophical foundations of systems biology may resolve a longer standing issue, i.e., the extent to which Biology is entitled to its own scientific foundations rather than being dominated by existing philosophies.

Table of contents

List of Contributors.....vii

Contributor Biographies.....ix

Preface.....xvii

Section I Introduction.....1

1. Towards philosophical foundations of Systems Biology: Introduction.....F.C. Boogerd, F.J. Bruggeman, J.-H.S. Hofmeyr and H.V. Westerhoff.....3

Section II Research programs of Systems Biology.....21

2. The methodologies of Systems Biology.....H.V. Westerhoff and D.B. Kell.....23

3. Methodology is Philosophy.....R.G. Shulman.....71

4. How can we understand metabolism?.....D.A. Fell......87

5. On Building Reliable Pictures with Unreliable Data: an Evolutionary and Developmental Coda for the New Systems Biology?.....W.C. Wimsatt.....103

Section III Theory / models.....121

6. Mechanism and mechanical explanation in cell biology.....R.C. Richardson and A. Stephan.....123

7. Theories, Models, and Equations in Systems Biology.....K.F. Schaffner.....145

8. All models are wrong...some more than others.....O. Wolkenhauer and M. Ullah.....163

9. Data without models merging with models without data.....U. Krohs and W. Callebaut.....181

Section IV Organization in biological systems.....215

10. The biochemical factory that autonomously fabricates itself: a systems-biological view of the living cell.....J.-H.S. Hofmeyr.....217

11. A systemic approach to the origin of biological organization.....A. Moreno.....243

12. Organization and biological mechanisms: organized to maintain autonomy.....W. Bechtel.....269

13. The disappearance of function from 'self-organizing systems'.....E.F. Keller.....303

Section V Conclusion.....319

14. Afterthoughts as foundations for Systems Biology.....F.C. Boogerd, F.J. Bruggeman, J.-H.S. Hofmeyr and H.V. Westerhoff.....321

Subject Index.....337

◈ Boogerd, Fred C., Frank J. Bruggeman, Robert C. Richardson, Achim Stephan, and Hans V. Westerhoff (2005). Emergence and its Place in Nature: a case study of biochemical networks. Synthese 145: 131–164.

http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Emergence_Place_Nature_Synthese (2005).pdf

◈ Boschetti, F., M. Prokopenko, I. Macreadie, A.M. Grisogono (2005). Defining and detecting emergence in complex networks. Knowledge-based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, PT 4, Proceedings Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 3684: 573-580.

Abstract:  Emergence is seen as the most significant feature discriminating "complex" from "non complex" systems. Nevertheless, no standard definition of emergence is currently available in the literature. This lack of a shared view affects the development of tools to detect and model emergence for both scientific and engineering applications. Here we review some definitions of emergence with the aim to describe how they can be implemented in algorithms to detect and model emergence in sensor and communication networks.

▣ Boyd, R. (1980). Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: Ned Joel Block (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 67-106.

◈ Bratcher, Daniel (Fall, 1999). David Chalmers' arguments for "property dualism". Philosophy Today: 292-301.

◇ Bregant, Janez (2004). Van Gulick’s Solution of the Exclusion Problem  Revisited. Acta Analytica 19(33):

Abstract: The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effect mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem and my objection to it.

◈ Broad, C.D. (1925). The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. first edition.

Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887―1971)

Ditext reprint available online http://www.ditext.com/broad/mpn/mpn.html

◈ Brooks, Rodney (Jan. 2001). The relationship between matter and life. Nature 409: 409-411.

◈ Brown, Richard (Dec. 2006). What Is a Brain State? Philosophical Psychology 19(6): 729-742.

Abstract:  Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain.
 
Keywords:  Brain State; Identity Conditions; Identity Theory; Mind-Body Problem; Single Cell Recording

◈ Brüntrup, Godehard (1998). Is psycho-physical emergentism committed to dualism?: the causal efficacy of emergent mental properties. Erkenntnis Vol. 48, Iss. 2/3: 133-151.

▣ Bunge, Mario Augusto (1977). Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience 2(4): 501-509.

◈ Bunge, Mario Augusto (1977). Levels and reduction. American Journal of Physiology 233(3): R75-R82.

◈ Bunge, Mario Augusto (2003). Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge. University of Toronto Press.

 
 

◆ Bünning, Silvia and Olaf Blanke (2005). The out-of body experience: precipitating factors and neural correlates. Progress in Brain Research 150: 331-350, 605-606.

Available online 25 September 2005.

Abstract:  Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are defined as experiences in which a person seems to be awake and sees his body and the world from a location outside his physical body. More precisely, they can be defined by the presence of the following three phenomenological characteristics: (i) disembodiment (location of the self outside one's body); (ii) the impression of seeing the world from an elevated and distanced visuo-spatial perspective (extracorporeal, but egocentric visuo-spatial perspective); and (iii) the impression of seeing one's own body (autoscopy) from this perspective. OBEs have fascinated mankind from time immemorial and are abundant in folklore, mythology, and spiritual experiences of most ancient and modern societies. Here, we review some of the classical precipitating factors of OBEs such as sleep, drug abuse, and general anesthesia as well as their neurobiology and compare them with recent findings on neurological and neurocognitive mechanisms of OBEs. The reviewed data suggest that OBEs are due to functional disintegration of lower-level multisensory processing and abnormal higher-level self-processing at the temporo-parietal junction. We argue that the experimental investigation of the interactions between these multisensory and cognitive mechanisms in OBEs and related illusions in combination with neuroimaging and behavioral techniques might further our understanding of the central mechanisms of corporal awareness and self-consciousness much as previous research about the neural bases of complex body part illusions such as phantom limbs has done.

◇ Burkhardt , Hans, Johanna Seibt and Guido Imaguire (eds.) (forthcoming, Oct. 2007). Handbook of Mereology. München: Philosophia Verlag.

Mereology is the investigation of part-whole relationships within all domains of reality and conceptualisation. Research in mereology has a long history and a high degree of theoretical articulation yet still lacks a synoptic presentation. The Handbook of Mereology collects international research in this fundamental philosophical discipline in a comprehensive volume, treating a wide range of issues in theoretical mereology, applied mereology and history of mereology. For the first time the Handbook presents mereology as an integrated field of research relevant to scholars working in widely different disciplines such as ontology, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind, semantics, linguistics, and knowledge representation. Addressing both specialists and interested readers it aims to serve both as a reference work as well as a systematic introduction to a field with increasing relevance in analytic philosophy.

Following the format of the Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, this volume will contain more than 250 articles on specific themes and research results in mereology, together with biographical essays summarizing historical contributions to the field. All articles have been specially commissioned for this work from leading authorities on the respective issues. The contributions are ordered alphabetically, yet survey articles with embedded subarticles and special attention to cross references highlight systematic connections. Each article is followed by a short list of recommended further readings. In addition the book includes the most comprehensive bibliography on mereology up-to-date.

◈ Buzsáki, György (Oct. 2006). Rhythms of the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Buzsáki, György (2007). The structure of consciousness. Nature 446: 267-267 (Issue of 15 Mar 2007).

Subjective awareness may depend on neural networks in the brain supporting complex wiring schemes and dynamic patterns of activity.

◈ Campbell, Donald T. (1974). Downward Causation in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems. Published pp. 179-186 in: Francisco J. Ayala & Theodosius Grigorevich Dobzhansky (eds.) Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.

◈ Carrier, Martin (2003). Emergence and the Final Theory, or: How to make Scientific Progress Sustainable. Revista de Filosofia 28(1): 7-31.

http://fs-morente.filos.ucm.es/publicaciones/revista/vol28n1/carrier.pdf

◇ Carrier, Martin and Patrick Finzer (Oct. 2006). Explanatory Loops and the Limits of Genetic Reductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20(3): 267-283. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590600960937)

Abstract: We reconstruct genetic determinism as a reductionist thesis to the effect that the molecular properties of cells can be accounted for to a great extent by their genetic outfit. The non-reductionist arguments offered at this molecular level often use the relationship between structure and function as their point of departure. By contrast, we develop a non-reductionist argument that is confined to the structural characteristics of biomolecules; no appeal to functions is made. We raise two kinds of objections against the reducibility claim underlying genetic determinism. First, some conceptual distinctions at the protein level cannot be captured on a genetic basis. A one-to-many relationship between DNA sequences and proteins emerges from them. Second, the relationship between genes and proteins is characterized by explanatory loops or reciprocal explanatory dependence. The presence of proteins is explained by the transcription from corresponding DNA sequences, and the latter is in turn accounted for by the action of proteins. By contrast, a reductive account requires a unidirectional explanatory dependence.

◈ Castellani, Elena (2002). Reductionism, emergence, and effective field theories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33: 251-267.

◈ Chakrabarti, Bikas K. and Rahul Banerjee (eds.) (in press). Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

◈ Chalmers, David John (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.

◈ Chalmers, David John (2006). Strong and Weak Emergence. Published in: Clayton, Philip, Paul Davies (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Chalmers, David John (Mar. 2008). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Chomsky, Noam (Mar. 2007). Biolinguistic Explorations: Design, Development, Evolution. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15(1): 1-21.

Abstract:  Biolinguistic inquiry investigates the human language faculty as an internal biological property. This article traces the development of biolinguistics from its early philosophical origins through its reformulation during the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and outlines my views on where the biolinguistic enterprise stands today. The growth of language in the individual, it is suggested, depends on (i) genetic factors, (ii) experience, and (iii) principles that are not specific to the faculty of language. The best current explanation of how language is recursively generated is through Merge, an operation that takes objects already constructed, and reconstructs a new object from them, generating a 'language of thought', perhaps in a manner close to optimal (relying on principles of category (iii)), with externalization (hence communication) a secondary process. The concluding section of the article offers several objectives for future research in the field.
 
Keywords:  biolinguistics; evolution of language; I-language; language of thought; semantic interface; Merge

◈ Clark, Andy (1997) Emergence and Explanation. Chapter 6 of his Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Clayton, Philip (2004). Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Clayton, Philip (2006). Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory. Published pp. 1-31 in: Clayton, Philip, Paul Davies (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Available online http://www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-928714-7.pdf

◈ Clayton, Philip and Paul Davies (eds.) (2006). The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

contents

1. Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory , Philip Clayton

 

I. The Physical Sciences

 

2. The Physics of Downward Causation , Paul Davies

 

3. The Emergence of Classicality from Quantum Theory , Erich Joos

 

4. On the Nature of Emergent Reality , George F. R. Ellis

 

II. The Biological Sciences

 

5. Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub , Terrence Deacon

 

6. The Role of Emergence in Biology , Lynn Rothschild

 

7. Emergence in Social Evolution: A Great Ape Example , Barbara Smuts

 

III. Consciousness and Emergence

 

8. Being Realistic about Emergence , Jaegwon Kim

 

9. In Defence of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation , Michael Silberstein

 

10. Emergence and Mental Causation , Nancey Murphy

 

11. Strong and Weak Emergence , David Chalmers

 

IV. Religion and Emergence

 

12. Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to the Human Mind-Brain-Body , Arthur Peacocke

 

13. Emergence: What is at Stake for Religious Reflection? , Niels Henrik Gregersen

 

14. Emergence from Quantum Physics to Religion: A Critical Appraisal , Philip Clayton

 

http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199287147

 

 

◈ Clayton, Philip and Zachary Simpson (eds.) (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Table of Contents

 

List of Contributors     xiii

Introduction   Philip Clayton     1

Part I. Religion and Science Across the World's Traditions     5

1.  Hinduism and Science   Sangeetha Menon     7
2.  Buddhism and Science   B. Alan Wallace     24
3.  Judaism and Science   Norbert M. Samuelson     41
4.  Christianity and Science   John Polkinghorne     57
5.  Islam and Science   Seyyed Hossein Nasr     71
6.  Indigenous Lifeways and Knowing the World   John Grim     87
7.  Religious Naturalism and Science   Willem B. Drees     108
8.  Atheism and Science   Peter Atkins     124

Part II. Conceiving Religion in Light of the Contemporary Sciences     137

9.  Cosmology and Religion   Bernard Carr     139
10.  Fundamental Physics and Religion   Kirk Wegter-McNelly     156
11.  Molecular Biology and Religion   Martinez Hewlett     172
12.  Evolutionary Theory and Religious Belief   Jeffrey P. Schloss     187
13.  Ecology and Religion   Susan Power Bratton     207
14.  Neurophenomenology and Contemplative Experience   Evan Thompson     226
15.  Psychology, the Human Sciences, andReligion   Raymond F. Paloutzian     236
16.  Sociology and Religion   Richard Fenn     253
17.  Anthropology and Religion   Michael Lambek     271

Part III. The Major Fields of Religion / Science     291

18.  Contributions from the History of Science and Religion   John Hedley Brooke     293
19.  Contributions from the Social Sciences   Robert A. Segal     311
20.  Contributions from the Philosophy of Science   Robin Collins     328
21.  Contributions from Philosophical Theology and Metaphysics   Joseph A. Bracken, SJ     345
22.  Contributions from Systematic Theology   Wolfhart Pannenberg     359
23.  Contributions from Practical Theology and Ethics   Ted Peters     372
24.  Contributions from Spirituality: Simplicity-Complexity-Simplicity   Pauline M. Rudd     388

 

Part IV. Methodological Approaches to the Study of Religion and Science     405

25.  The Scientific Landscape of Religion: Evolution, Culture, and Cognition   Scott Atran     407
26.  Varieties of Naturalism   Owen Flanagan     430
27.  Interpreting Science from the Standpoint of Whiteheadian Process Philosophy   David Ray Griffin     453
28.  Anglo-American Post-modernity and the End of Theology-Science Dialogue?   Nancey Murphy     472
29.  Trinitarian Faith Seeking Transformative Understanding   F. LeRon Shults     488
30.  Religious Experience, Cognitive Science, and the Future of Religion   Phillip H. Wiebe     503
31.  Toward a Comprehensive Integration of Science and Religion: A Post-metaphysical Approach   Sean Esbjorn-Hargens   Ken Wilber     523

Part V. Central Theoretical Debates in Religion and Science     547
 

      'Science and Religion' or 'Theology and Science'?     549
 

32.  Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third Millenium   Michael Welker     551
33.  Religion-and-Science   Philip Hefner     562
      

      Science, Theology, and Divine Action     577
 

34.  Quantum Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action   Robert John Russell     579
35.  Theologies of Divine Action   Thomas F. Tracy     596
36.  Ground-of-Being Theologies   Wesley J. Wildman     612
 

      Panentheism and its Critics     633
 

37.  The Potential of Panentheism for Dialogue between Science and Religion   Michael W. Brierley     635
38.  Problems in Panentheism   Owen C. Thomas     652
 

      Evolution, Creation, and Belief in God      665
 

39.  Evolution, Religion, and Science   William B. Provine     667
40.  Darwinism   Alister E. McGrath     681
41.  God and Evolution   John F. Haught     697
 

      Intelligent Design and its Critics     713
 

42.  In Defence of Intelligent Design   William A. Dembski     715
43.  The Pre-modern Sins of Intelligent Design   Robert T. Pennock     732

      Theologies of Emergent Complexity and their Critics     749
 

44.  Physics, Complexity, and the Science-Religion Debate   George F. R. Ellis     751
45.  Emergence and Complexity   Niels Henrik Gregersen     767
46.  Emergence, Theology, and the Manifest Image   Michael Silberstein     784
47.  The Hidden Battles over Emergence   Carl Gillett     801
 

      Feminist Approaches     819
 

48.  Going Public: Feminist Epistemologies, Hannah Arendt, and the Science-and-Religion Discourse   Lisa L. Stenmark     821
49.  Feminist Perspectives in Medicine and Bioethics   Ann Pederson     836
 

      Human Nature and Ethics     851
 

50.  The Sacred Emergence of Nature   Ursula Goodenough   Terrence W. Deacon     853
51.  Science, Ethics, and the Human Spirit   William B. Hurlbut      872

Part VI. Values Issues in Religion and Science     889

52.  Theology, Ecology, and Values   Celia Deane-Drummond     891
53.  Environmental Ethics and Religion/Science   Holmes Rolston III     908
54.  Biotechnology and the Religion-Science Discussion   Ronald Cole-Turner     929
55.  Relations between Homo sapiens and Other Animals: Scientific and Religious Arguments   Nancy R. Howell     945
56.  Concluding Reflections: Dover Beach Revisited   Mary Midgley     962
 

Index     979

 

◈ Collier, John D. (1988). Supervenience and Reduction in Biological Hierarchies. In Mohan Matthen and Bernard Linsky (eds.) Philosophy and Biology: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 14 (1988): 209-234.

http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/redsup.pdf

◈ Collier, John D. (2003). Fundamental Properties of Self-Organization. In Vladimir Arshinov and Christian Fuchs (eds.) Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation (Moscow, NIA-Piroda, 2003): 150-166.

◈ Collier, John D. (2003). Organisation in Biological Systems. In Vladimir Arshinov and Christian Fuchs (eds.) Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation (Moscow, NIA-Piroda, 2003): 287-302.

◈ Collier, John D. (2004). Reduction, Supervenience, and Physical Emergence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27(5): 629-630.

http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Commentary%20on%20Don%20Ross.htm

◈ Collier, John D. and Clifford A. Hooker (1999). Complexly Organised Dynamical Systems. Open Systems and Information Dynamics 6(3): 241-302.

http://www.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Cods.pdf

◈ Collier, John D. and Scott J. Muller (1998). The Dynamical Basis of Emergence in Natural Hierarchies. In George Farre and Tarko Oksala (eds.) Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy and Organization, Selected and Edited Papers from the ECHO III Conference, Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica, MA91 (Finish Academy of Technology, Espoo, 1998).

http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/echoiii.pdf

◈ Corning, Peter A. (2002). The Emergence of "Emergence": Now What? Emergence 4(3): 54-71.

◈ Corning, Peter A. (2002). The Re-emergence of "Emergence": A venerable concept in search of a theory (one solution: The "Synergism Hypothesis) Complexity 7(6): 18-30.

◆ Crane, Tim (2001). The significance of emergence. In: Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (eds.) Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ Craver, Carl F. and William Bechtel (in press). Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes. Biology and Philosophy.

Received: 22 December 2005  Accepted: 10 March 2006  Published online: 27 May 2006

Abstract:  We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect.

 

Keywords:  Levels - Mechanisms - Top-down causation - Interlevel causation - Constitution - Explanation - Emergence - Reduction

◈ Crick, Francis (Sep. 1979). Thinking about the brain. Scientific American 241(3): 219-232.

▣ Crisp, Thomas M. and Ted A. Warfield (June 2001). Kim’s Master Argument: A critical study of Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World. Nous 35(2): 304–316.

◈ Crutchfield, James P. (1994). Is anything ever new?: Considering emergence. In G. Cowan, D. Pines, D. Melzner (eds.) Integrative Themes. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity XIX. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [SFI 94-03-011]

◈ Crutchfield, James P., J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard (Dec. 1986). Chaos. Scientific American 255(6): 38-49.

◈ Cunningham, Bryon (Sep. 2001). The Reemergence of 'emergence' (the theory that a whole is greater than its parts). Philosophy of Science 68(3): S62-S75.

◈ Damasio, Antonio R. (Oct. 25, 2001). Fundamental feelings: Emotion. Nature 413: 781.

◈ Damasio, Antonio R. (May 15, 2003). Mental self: The person within. Nature 423: 227.

◇ Dardis, Anthony (2002). A "no causal rivalry" Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17(28):

Abstract: Stephen Yablo has recently argued for a novel solution to the mental causation problem: the mental is related to the physical as determinables are related to determinates; determinables are not causal rivals with their determinates; so the mental and the physical are not causal rivals. Despite its attractions the suggestion seems hard to accept. In this paper I develop the idea that mental properties and physical properties are not causal rivals. Start with property dualism, supervenience, multiple realizability, and the claim that no more than one supervenience base for a mental property can be had by a single instance of the mental property. Then a probabilistic account of causation will be unable to certify either mental properties or physical properties as causal factors for effect types. I suggest that this shows that we should not count mental properties as causal rivals with physical properties.

Keywords: Mental causation, Probabilistic causation, Supervenience, Mind/Body Problem, Non-reductive physicalism

◈ Davies, Paul C.W. (2004a). Does quantum mechanics play a non-trivial role in life? BioSystems 78: 69-79.

◈ Davies, Paul C.W. (2004b). Emergent biological principles and the computational properties of the universe: Explaining it or explaining it away. Complexity 10(2): 11-15.

◈ Davies, Paul C.W. (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

▣ Deacon, Terrence W. (July 1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain. W.W. Norton & Company.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (July 2003). Multilevel Selection in a Complex Adaptive System: The Problem of Language Origins. In Bruce H. Weber and David J. Depew eds. Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (July 2003). The Hierarchic Logic of Emergence: Untangling the Interdependence of Evolution and Self-Organization. In Bruce H. Weber and David J. Depew eds. Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (June 2006). Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub. In Philip Clayton and Paul Davies eds. The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

▣ Deacon, Terrence W. (Spring, 2006). Reciprocal linkage between self-organizing processes is sufficient for self-reproduction and evolvability. Biological Theory 1(2): 136-149.

Posted Online October 3, 2006. (doi:10.1162/biot.2006.1.2.136)

Terrence W. Deacon :  Department of Anthropology and HelenWills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

A simple molecular system ("autocell") is described consisting of the reciprocal linkage between an autocatalytic cycle and a self-assembling encapsulation process where the molecular constituents for the capsule are products of the autocatalysis. In a molecular environment sufficiently rich in the substrates, capsule growth will also occur with high predictability. Growth to closure will be most probable in the vicinity of the most prolific autocatalysis and will thus tend to spontaneously enclose supportive catalysts within the capsule interior. If subsequently disrupted in the presence of new substrates, the released components will initiate production of additional catalytic and capsule components that will spontaneously re-assemble into one or more autocell replicas, thereby reconstituting and sometimes reproducing the original. In a diverse molecular environment, cycles of disruption and enclosure will cause auto- cells to incidentally encapsulate other molecules as well as reactive substrates. To the extent that any captured molecule can be incorporated into the autocatalytic process by virtue of structural degeneracy of the catalytic binding sites, the altered autocell will incorporate the new type of component into subsequent replications. Such altered autocells will be progenitors of "lineages" with variant characteristics that will differentially propagate with respect to the availability of commonly required substrates. Autocells are susceptible to a limited form of evolution, capable of leading to more efficient, more environmentally fitted, and more complex forms. This provides a simple demonstration of the plausibility of open- ended reproduction and evolvability without self-replicating template molecules (e.g., nucleic acids) or maintenance of persistent nonequilibrium chemistry. This model identifies an intermediate domain between prebiotic and biotic systems and bridges the gap from nonequilibrium thermodynamics to life.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (forthcoming). Homunculus: Evolution, Information, and the Emergence of Consciousness. W.W. Norton.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (forthcoming). Golem: Making Things Think.

◈ Deacon, Terrence W. (forthcoming). Homo Sapiens: Evolutionary Biology and the Human Sciences. Thompson/Wadsworth.

◈ Deguet, Joris, Yves Demazeau (2005). Elements about the Emergence Issue: A survey of emergence definitions.

Abstract:  Emergence, a concept that first appeared in philosophy, has been widely explored in the domain of complex systems and is sometimes considered to be the key ingredient that makes “complex systems” “complex”. Our goal in this paper is to give a broad survey of emergence definitions, to extract a shared definition structure and to discuss some of the remaining issues. We do not know of any comparable surveys about the emergence concept. For this presentation, we start from a broadly applicable approach and finish with more specific propositions. We first present five selected works with a short analysis of each. We then propose a merged analysis in which we isolate a common structure through all definitions but also what we think needs further research. Finally, we briefly describe some perspectives about the emergence engine idea also referred to as emergent engineering.

Keywords:  survey, emergence, complexity, levels definition

https://lig.imag.fr/MAGMA/publications/papers/Deguet-Demazeau-Magnin-05.pdf

◆ Delacour, Jean (Apr. 1, 1997). Object Perception and Recognition: A Model for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Theory & Psychology 7(2): 257-262.

The main obstacles to the scientific study of consciousness are its subjectivity and its complexity. Object perception and recognition (OPR) can be a useful model in such a study because there is a remarkable agreement between the subjective and objective aspects of OPR; in addition, while OPR is somewhat simpler than other forms of cognition, it adequately represents one characteristic feature of consciousness: intentionality. It thus allows convergent studies of experimental psychology, artificial intelligence and biology, in both humans and animals. Recent advances in the neurophysiology of visual OPR in subhuman primates and its brain imaging in humans provide a vital thread to the neural basis of consciousness, especially of its integrative, unifying character.

Key Words: binding • consciousness • intentionality • object perception • world

◈ De Muijnck, Wim (2003/2006). Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations: A Theory of Mental Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers/Springer.

◈ De Sousa, Ronald (1994). Individualism and Local Control in Complex Systems. Canadian Journal of Philosophy suppl. vol. 20:165-185.

◈ De Wolf, Tom and Tom Holvoet (2005). Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined. Engineering Self Organising Systems: Methodologies and Applications (Brueckner, S. and Di Marzo Serugendo, G. and Karageorgos, A. and Nagpal, R., eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2005, Volume 3464, May 2005, pages 1-15.

Abstract: A clear terminology is essential in every research discipline. In the context of ESOA, a lot of confusion exists about the meaning of the terms emergence and self-organisation. One of the sources of the confusion comes from the fact that a combination of both phenomena often occurs in dynamical systems. In this paper a historic overview of the use of each concept as well as a working definition, that is compatible with the historic and current meaning of the concepts, is given. Each definition is explained by supporting it with import!ant characteristics found in the literature. We show that emergence and self-organisation each emphasise different properties of a system. Both phenomena can exist in isolation. The paper also outlines some examples of such systems and considers the combination of emergence and self-organisation as a promising approach in complex multi-agent systems.

http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/~tomdw/publications/pdfs/2005esoa04lncs.pdf

http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/~tomdw/

◆ Eccles, John C. (1982). How the self acts on the brain. Psychoneuroendocrinology 7(4): 271-283.

◆ Eccles, John C. (May 22, 1986). Do mental events cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 227(1249): 411-428.

If non-material mental events, such as the intention to carry out an action, are to have an effective action on neural events in the brain, it has to be at the most subtle and plastic level of these events. In the first stage of our enquiry an introduction to conventional synaptic theory leads on to an account of the manner of operation of the ultimate synaptic units. These units are the synaptic boutons that, when excited by an all-or-nothing nerve impulse, deliver the total contents of a single synaptic vesicle, not regularly, but probabilistically. This quantal emission of the synaptic transmitter molecules (about 5000-10 000) is the elementary unit of the transmission process from one neuron to another. In the second stage this refined physiological analysis leads on to an account of the ultrastructure of the synapse, which gives clues as to the manner of its unitary probabilistic operation. The essential feature is that the effective structure of each bouton is a paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grid with about 50 vesicles, which acts probabilistically in vesicular (quantal) release. In the third stage it is considered how a non-material mental event, such as an intention to move, could influence the subtle probabilistic operations of synaptic boutons. On the biological side, attention is focused on the paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grids as the targets for non-material mental events. On the physical side, attention is focused on the probabilistic fields of quantum mechanics which carry neither mass nor energy, but which nevertheless can exert effective action at microsites. The new light on the mind-brain problem came from the hypothesis that the non-material mental events, the 'World 2' of Popper, relate to the neural events of the brain (the 'World 1' of matter and energy) by actions in conformity with quantum theory. This hypothesis that mental events act on probabilistic synaptic events in a manner analogous to the probability fields of quantum mechanics seems to open up an immense field of scientific investigation both in quantum physics and in neuroscience.

◈ Eccles, John C. (Aug. 1992). Evolution of consciousness. PNAS 89: 7320-7324.

The hypothesis of the origin of consciousness is built upon the unique properties of the mammalian neocortex. The apical dendrites of the pyramidal cells bundle together as they ascend to lamina I to form neural receptor units of 100 apical dendrites plus branches receiving hundreds of thousands of excitatory synapses, the collective assemblage being called a dendron. It is proposed that the whole world of consciousness, the mental world, is microgranular, with mental units called psychons, and that in mind-brain interaction one psychon is linked to one dendron through quantum physics. The hypothesis is that in mammalian evolution dendrons evolved for more effective integration of the increased complexity of sensory inputs. These evolved dendrons had the capacity for interacting with psychons that came to exist, so forming the mental world and giving the mammal conscious experiences. In Darwinian evolution, consciousness would have occurred initially some 200 million years ago in relation to the primitive cerebral cortices of evolving mammals. It would give global experiences of a surrounding world for guiding behavior beyond what is given by the unconscious operation of sensory cortical areas per se. So conscious experiences would give mammals evolutionary advantage over the reptiles, which lack a neocortex giving consciousness. The Wulst of the avian brain needs further investigation to discover how it could give birds the consciousness that they seem to have.

◇ Ecological Modelling Volume 186, Issue 4, Pages 375-510 (10 September 2005).

Special Issue on: Emergent Properties in Individual-based Models Case Studies from the Bornhöved Project (Northern Germany)
Edited by Broder Breckling

Emergent properties in individual-based ecological models—introducing case studies in an ecosystem research context
Pages 376-388
Broder Breckling, Felix Müller, Hauke Reuter, Franz Hölker and Otto Fränzle

Dispersal of carabid beetles—emergence of distribution patterns
Pages 389-405
Fred Jopp and Hauke Reuter

A spatiotemporal individual-based fish model to investigate emergent properties at the organismal and the population level
Pages 406-426

Franz Hölker and Broder Breckling

Community processes as emergent properties: Modelling multilevel interaction in small mammals communities
Pages 427-446

Hauke Reuter

From single fine roots to a black alder forest ecosystem: How system behaviour emerges from single component activities
Pages 447-469
Ulrike Middelhoff and Broder Breckling

Emergent properties modelled with the functional structural tree growth model ALMIS: Computer experiments on resource gain and use
Pages 470-488
Christiane Eschenbach

The concepts of emergent and collective properties in individual-based models—Summary and outlook of the Bornhöved case studies
Pages 489-501
Hauke Reuter, Franz Hölker, Ulrike Middelhoff, Fred Jopp, Christiane Eschenbach and Broder Breckling

◈ Edelman, Gerald M. (Apr. 29, 2003). Naturalizing consciousness: A theoretical framework. PNAS 100(9): 5520-5524.

▣ Edelmann, J.B. and M.J. Denton (in press. Dec. 13, 2006). The uniqueness of biological self-organization: challenging the Darwinian paradigm. Biology and Philosophy.

Received: 17 November 2005  Accepted: 26 October 2006  Published online: 13 December 2006

Abstract:  Here we discuss the challenge posed by self-organization to the Darwinian conception of evolution. As we point out, natural selection can only be the major creative agency in evolution if all or most of the adaptive complexity manifest in living organisms is built up over many generations by the cumulative selection of naturally occurring small, random mutations or variants, i.e., additive, incremental steps over an extended period of time. Biological self-organization—witnessed classically in the folding of a protein, or in the formation of the cell membrane—is a fundamentally different means of generating complexity. We agree that self-organizing systems may be fine-tuned by selection and that self-organization may be therefore considered a complementary mechanism to natural selection as a causal agency in the evolution of life. But we argue that if self-organization proves to be a common mechanism for the generation of adaptive order from the molecular to the organismic level, then this will greatly undermine the Darwinian claim that natural selection is the major creative agency in evolution. We also point out that although complex self-organizing systems are easy to create in the electronic realm of cellular automata, to date translating in silico simulations into real material structures that self-organize into complex forms from local interactions between their constituents has not proved easy. This suggests that self-organizing systems analogous to those utilized by biological systems are at least rare and may indeed represent, as pre-Darwinists believed, a unique ascending hierarchy of natural forms. Such a unique adaptive hierarchy would pose another major challenge to the current Darwinian view of evolution, as it would mean the basic forms of life are necessary features of the order of nature and that the major pathways of evolution are determined by physical law, or more specifically by the self-organizing properties of biomatter, rather than natural selection.

Keywords:  Self-organization - Cumulative selection - Unique hierarchy of natural forms - Contingency - Necessity - Robustness - Pre-Darwinian

◈ Ehresmann, Andrée C., Jean-Paul Vanbremeersch, Laura McNamara and Mary Meyer (May 2007). Memory Evolutive Systems; Hierarchy, Emergence, Cognition. Elsevier.

Part A: Hierarchy. Emergence
Chapter 1: Net of Interactions and Categories
Chapter 2: The Binding Problem
Chapter 3: Hierarchy and Reductionism
Chapter 4: Complexifications and Emergence
Part B: Memory Evolutive Systems
Chapter 5: Evolutionary Systems
Chapter 6: Internal Organization and MES
Chapter 7: Robustness and Plasiticity
Chapter 8: Memory and Learning
Part C: Application to Cognition and Consciousness
Chapter 9: Cognitive Systems and MES of CAT-Neurons
Chapter10: Semantics, Archetypal Core and Consciousness 

▣ Elder, Crawford L. (Jan. 2001). Mental Causation Versus physical Causation: No Contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(1): 111–127.

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño (2002). On the Reality of Emergents. Principia, Special Issue on Emergence and Downward Causation (El-Hani, C.N. Ed.) 6: 51-87.

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño (presented Jan. 29th, 2004). Towards a coherent account of emergence and downward causation in the natural sciences.

Available online http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/tutkijaseminaari/El%20Hani.pdf

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño, Claus Emmeche (2000). On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation. Theory in Biosciences 119: 234-275.

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño, Sami Pihlström (2002a). Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism. Essays in Philosophy 3(2): 1-40.

Available online http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.html

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño, Sami Pihlström (2002b). A Pragmatic Realist View of Emergence. Manuscrito XXV (Sp. number): 105-154.

◈ El-Hani, Charbel Niño, João Queiroz (2005). Downward determination. Abstracta 1(2): 162-192.

Available online http://www.dca.fee.unicamp.br/projects/artcog/files/ElHani_Queiroz_Abstracta_paper.pdf

◇ Ellerman, David (Mar. 2007). Adjoints and emergence: applications of a new theory of adjoint functors. Axiomathes 17(1): 19-39.

Received: 16 January 2007  Accepted: 24 January 2007  Published online: 8 March 2007

Abstract:  Since its formal definition over sixty years ago, category theory has been increasingly recognized as having a foundational role in mathematics. It provides the conceptual lens to isolate and characterize the structures with importance and universality in mathematics. The notion of an adjunction (a pair of adjoint functors) has moved to center-stage as the principal lens. The central feature of an adjunction is what might be called “determination through universals” based on universal mapping properties. A recently developed “heteromorphic” theory about adjoints suggests a conceptual structure, albeit abstract and atemporal, for how new relatively autonomous behavior can emerge within a system obeying certain laws. The focus here is on applications in the life sciences (e.g., selectionist mechanisms) and human sciences (e.g., the generative grammar view of language).

Keywords:  Adjoint functors - Category theory - Universal mapping properties - Heteromorphisms - Emergence - Evolution - Selectionist mechanisms - Immune system - Neural selectionism - Generative grammar

◈ Ellis, George F.R. (Jun. 9, 2005). Physics, complexity and causality. Nature 435: 743.

◈ Ellis, George F.R. (Jun 14, 2005). Physics and the real world.

Available online http://www.metanexus.net/conference2005/pdf/ellis.pdf

◈ Ellis, George F.R. (2007). Science, complexity, and the nature of existence. Published in: Nancey Murphy, William R. Stoeger, SJ (eds.) Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Emmeche, Claus (1994). The Garden in the Machine: The Emerging Science of Artificial Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

◈ Emmeche, Claus (1997). Defining Life, Explaining Emergence. (Published in two parts as: Emmeche, Claus (1997). Autopoietic Systems, Replicators, and the Search for a Meaningful Biologic Definition of Life. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 20: 244-264; Emmeche, Claus (1998). Defining Life as a Semiotic Phenomenon. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5: 3-17.)

On-line paper http://www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/

◈ Emmeche, Claus, Simo Køppe and Frederik Stjernfelt (1997). Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28: 83-119.

◈ Emmeche, Claus, Simo Køppe and Frederik Stjernfelt (2000). Levels, emergence, and three versions of downward causation. Published pp. 13-34 in: Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, bodies and matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

▣ Engel, Gregory S., Tessa R. Calhoun, Elizabeth L. Read, Tae-Kyu Ahn, Tomá Man al, Yuan-Chung Cheng, Robert E. Blankenship & Graham R. Fleming (Apr. 12, 2007). Evidence for wavelike energy transfer through quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems. Nature 446(7137): 782-786.

Gregory S. Engel^1,2, Tessa R. Calhoun^1,2, Elizabeth L. Read^1,2, Tae-Kyu Ahn^1,2, Tomá Man al^1,2,5, Yuan-Chung Cheng^1,2, Robert E. Blankenship^3,4 & Graham R. Fleming^1,2

1. Department of Chemistry & QB3 Institute, University of California, Berkeley
2. Physical Biosciences Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, California 94720, USA
3. Department of Biology,
4. Department of Chemistry, Washington University, St Louis, Missouri 63130, USA
5. Present address: Institute of Physics of Charles University, 12116 Prague 2, Czech Republic

Received 13 October 2006; Accepted 14 February 2007

Photosynthetic complexes are exquisitely tuned to capture solar light efficiently, and then transmit the excitation energy to reaction centres, where long term energy storage is initiated. The energy transfer mechanism is often described by semiclassical models that invoke 'hopping' of excited-state populations along discrete energy levels^{1, 2}. Two-dimensional Fourier transform electronic spectroscopy^{3, 4, 5} has mapped⁶ these energy levels and their coupling in the Fenna–Matthews–Olson (FMO) bacteriochlorophyll complex, which is found in green sulphur bacteria and acts as an energy 'wire' connecting a large peripheral light-harvesting antenna, the chlorosome, to the reaction centre^{7, 8, 9}. The spectroscopic data clearly document the dependence of the dominant energy transport pathways on the spatial properties of the excited-state wavefunctions of the whole bacteriochlorophyll complex^{6, 10}. But the intricate dynamics of quantum coherence, which has no classical analogue, was largely neglected in the analyses—even though electronic energy transfer involving oscillatory populations of donors and acceptors was first discussed more than 70 years ago¹¹, and electronic quantum beats arising from quantum coherence in photosynthetic complexes have been predicted^{12, 13} and indirectly observed¹⁴. Here we extend previous two-dimensional electronic spectroscopy investigations of the FMO bacteriochlorophyll complex, and obtain direct evidence for remarkably long-lived electronic quantum coherence playing an important part in energy transfer processes within this system. The quantum coherence manifests itself in characteristic, directly observable quantum beating signals among the excitons within the Chlorobium tepidum FMO complex at 77 K. This wavelike characteristic of the energy transfer within the photosynthetic complex can explain its extreme efficiency, in that it allows the complexes to sample vast areas of phase space to find the most efficient path.

☞ see Scientific American's Science News by David Biello: When It Comes to Photosynthesis, Plants Perform Quantum Computation.

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=ED1D1446-E7F2-99DF-3CBF8B2F66C0C5D4&sc=I100322

◇ Esfeld, Michael and Christian Sachse (Mar. 2007). Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub-types. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21(1): 1-17. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590701305735)

Abstract: The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, a conservative theory reduction is in principle possible, despite multiple realization. We link this account with Nagelian reduction, as well as with Kim's functional reduction.

◈ Ezquerro, Jesús and Fernando Martínez Manrique (Apr. 2004). Intertheory Relations in Cognitive Science: Privileged Levels and Reductive Strategies. Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. 36, No. 106, April 2004, pp. 55-103.

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pdf/C106/C106_ezquerromartinez.pdf

Abstract: Research in cognitive science has often assumed the existence of a privileged level that unifies theoretical explanations arising from different disciplines. Philosophical accounts differ about the locus of those intertheory relations. In this paper, four different views are analyzed: classical, connectionist, pragmatist, and reductionist, as exemplified in the works of von Eckardt, Horgan and Tienson, Hardcastle, and Bickle, respectively. Their divergences are characterized in terms of the possibility of such a privileged level. The classical view favors a privileged computational level. The connectionist revision tries to draw biological intuitions into computational models to provide a link between neuronsand computations. The pragmatist approach rejects the idea of a privileged level and offers a more eclectic view of cognitive theory building. The reductionist account pursues theoretical unification by means of the reduction of higher level theories to basic level (biological) ones.

Keywords: cognitive science, computationalism, connectionism,reduction

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/106/sum106_esquerromartinez_in.html

■ Feltz, Bernard, Marc Crommelinck, Philippe Goujon (eds.) (2006). Self-organization and Emergence in Life Sciences. Springer.

About this book

Self-organization constitutes one of the most important theoretical debates in contemporary life sciences. The present book explores the relevance of the concept of self-organization and its impact on such scientific fields as: immunology, neurosciences, ecology and theories of evolution.

Historical aspects of the issue are also broached. Intuitions relative to self-organization can be found in the works of such key western philosophical figures as Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant. Interacting with more recent authors and cybernetics, self-organization represents a notion in keeping with the modern world's discovery of radical complexity.

The themes of teleology and emergence are analyzed by philosophers of sciences with regards to the issues of modelization and scientific explanation.

The implications of self-organization for life sciences are here approached from an interdisciplinary angle, revealing the notion as already rewarding and full of promise for the future.

Table of contents

List of Contributors. Introduction; Bernard Feltz, Marc Crommelinck and Philippe Goujon.

I. Scientific Approach.

A. Self-Organization and Biology: General Standpoints.

The Complex Adaptative Systems Approach to Biology; Gérard Weisbuch. Emergence and Reductionism: from the Game of Life to Science of Life; Vincent Bauchau. Formalizing Emergence: the Natural After-Life of Artificial Life; Hugues Bersini.

B. Self-Organization and Biology: Thematic Standpoints.

Analysis and Synthesis of Regulator Networks in Terms of Feedback Circuits; René Thomas. Properties Emerging from Sensorimotor Interfaces. Interaction Between Experimentation and Modeling in Neurosciences; Philippe Lefèvre, Cheng Tu, Marcus Missal and Marc Crommelinck. Neuronal Synchrony and Cognitive Functions; Francisco Varela. About Biology and Subjectivity in Psychiatry; Philippe Meire. Self-Organization and Meaning in Immunology; Henri Atlan and Irun Cohen.

II. Historic Approach.

A. Early Philosophical Conceptualizations.

Kant and the Intuitions of Self-Organization; Gertrudis Van de Vijver. On a "Mathematical Neo-Aristotelism" in Leibniz; Laurence Bouquiaux. "Essential Force" and "Formative Force": Models for Epigenesis in the 18th Century; François Duchesneau. From Logic to Self-Organization. Learning about Complexity; Philippe Goujon. The Concept of Emergence in the XIXth Century: from Natural Theology to Biology; Paul Mengal. 

B. Contemporary Origins.

Artificial Life and the Sciences of Complexity: History and Future; Jean-Claude Heudin. Self-Organization in Second-Order Cybernetics: Deconstruction or Reconstruction of Complexity; Pierre Livet.

III. Epistemological and Conceptual Approaches.

A. Teleology and Intentionality.

Teleology in Self-Organizing Systems; Robert Brandon. Phenomenology and Self-Organization; Marc Maesschalck and Valérie Kokoszka.

B. Explanation.

A Role for Mathematical Models in Formalizing Self-Organizing Systems; Paul Thompson. Explanation and Causality in Self-Organizing Systems; Robert C. Richardson. Self-Organization, Selection and Emergence in the Theories of Evolution; Bernard Feltz.

■ Finney, John L. (Aug. 29, 2004). Water? What's so special about it? Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B (Biological Sciences) 359(1448): 1145-1165. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1495)

Abstract: What is so special about water? Why does it have the properties it has, and how might these reasons be relevant to its apparent biological importance? By exploring the structure and dynamics of water, from the isolated molecule and its interactions, through its many crystalline phases and to its so-called anomalous liquid phase, some of its apparently unusual behaviour is rationalized. The way in which it interacts with some relatively simple interfaces is also discussed. As a result of this exploration, a checklist of possible molecular-level reasons for its biological importance is devised.

Keywords: Water Molecule, Water-Water Interactions, Ices, Liquid Water, Anomalous Properties

▣ Fodor, Jerry (1974). Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. Reprinted in Jerry Fodor (1981). Representations. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

■ Francescotti, Robert Michael (July 2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67(1): 47-63. (DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9047-0)

Robert Michael Francescotti¹ 

(1)	Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182, USA

Received: 17 January 2006  Accepted: 27 March 2007  Published online: 3 May 2007

Abstract:  Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.

 

Keywords:  Downward causation - Emergent properties - Novelty - Parts - Predictability - Relationality - Supervenience - Wholes

◈ Frecska, E. and L.E. Luna (Oct. 2006). Neuro-ontological interpretation of spiritual experiences. Neuropsychopharmacologia Hungarica (official journal of the Hungarian Association of Psychopharmacology) 8(3): 143-153.

The prevailing neuroscientific paradigm considers information processing within the central nervous system as occurring through hierarchically organized and interconnected neural networks. The hierarchy of neural networks doesn't end at the neuroaxonal level; it incorporates subcellular mechanisms as well. When the size of the hierarchical components reaches the nanometer range and the number of elements exceeds that of the neuroaxonal system, an interface emerges for a possible transition between neurochemical and quantum physical events. "Signal nonlocality", accessed by means of quantum entanglement is an essential feature of the quantum physical domain. The presented interface may imply that some manifestations of altered states of consciousness, unconscious/conscious shifts have quantum origin with significant psychosomatic implications. Healing methods based on altered states of consciousness and common in spiritual or shamanic traditions escape neuroscientific explanations based on classical cognition denoted here as "perceptual-cognitive-symbolic" (characteristic of ordinary states of consciousness). Another channel of information processing, called "direct-intuitive-nonlocal" (characteristic of non-ordinary states of consciousness) is required to be introduced for interpretation. The first one is capable of modeling via symbolism and is more culturally bound due to its psycholinguistic features. The second channel lacks the symbolic mediation, therefore it has more transcultural similarity and practically ineffable for the first one, though culture specific transliteration may occur. Different traditional healing rituals pursue the same end: to destroy "profane" sensibility. The ritual use of hallucinogens, the monotonous drumming, the repeated refrains, the fatigue, the fasting, the dancing and so forth, create a sensory condition which is wide open to the so-called "supernatural". According to contemporary anthropological views, the breakdown of ordinary sensibility/cognition is not the ultimate goal, but the way to accomplish healing, that is psychointegration in the widest sense. From the perspective of system theory, integration needs information to be brought into the system. According to the presented model, when the coping capability of the "perceptual-cognitive-symbolic" processing is exhausted in a stressful, unmanageable situation, or its influence is eliminated by the use of hallucinogens or in case of transcendental meditation, a frame shift occurs, and the "spiritual universe" opens up through the "direct-intuitive-nonlocal" channel. There is little chance either for a psychointegrative effect, or for a meaningful "opening" without ritual context, and with the recreational use of mind altering strategies. Keywords: altered states of consciousness, cognition, cytoskeleton, dimethyltryptamine, ethnopharmacology, hallucinogenic agents, ritual healing.

 

 

◈ Freeman, Anthony (ed.) (2001). The Emergence of Consciousness. A special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(9-10), Issue of September-October 2001.

 

 

Table of contents

 

Anthony Freeman

Editor's Introduction   Full Text

Robert Van Gulick   Abstract

Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind–Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview

Harry T. Hunt   Abstract

Some Perils of Quantum Consciousness: Epistemological Pan-Experientialism and the Emergence–Submergence of Consciousness

Natika Newton   Abstract

Emergence and the Uniqueness of Consciousness

Michael Silberstein   Abstract

Converging on Emergence: Consciousness, Causation and Explanation

Scott Hagan and Masayuki Hirafuji  Abstract

Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States

Todd E. Feinberg   Abstract

Why the Mind Is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain

Anthony Freeman   Abstract

God as an Emergent Property

Alwyn Scott

We Could Be Siblings Yet: Reflections on Huston Smith’s Why Religion Matters

◈ Freeman, Walter J. & Giuseppe Vitiello (2006). Nonlinear brain dynamics as macroscopic many-body field dynamics. Physics of Life Reviews 3: 93-118.

◆ French, Christopher C. (2005).  Near-death experiences in cardiac arrest survivors. Progress in Brain Research 150: 351-367.

Available online 25 September 2005.

Abstract:  Near-death experiences (NDEs) have become the focus of much interest in the last 30 years or so. Such experiences can occur both when individuals are objectively near to death and also when they simply believe themselves to be. The experience typically involves a number of different components including a feeling of peace and well-being, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), entering a region of darkness, seeing a brilliant light, and entering another realm. NDEs are known to have long-lasting transformational effects upon those who experience them. An overview is presented of the various theoretical approaches that have been adopted in attempts to account for the NDE. Spiritual theories assume that consciousness can become detached from the neural substrate of the brain and that the NDE may provide a glimpse of an afterlife. Psychological theories include the proposal that the NDE is a dissociative defense mechanism that occurs in times of extreme danger or, less plausibly, that the NDE reflects memories of being born. Finally, a wide range of organic theories of the NDE has been put forward including those based upon cerebral hypoxia, anoxia, and hypercarbia; endorphins and other neurotransmitters; and abnormal activity in the temporal lobes. Finally, the results of studies of NDEs in cardiac arrest survivors are reviewed and the implications of these results for our understanding of mind–brain relationships are discussed.

◈ Gabora, Liane (1999). Microtubules, anesthetics, and quantum consciousness: an interview with Stuart Hameroff. Foundations of Science 4: 205-223.

◈ Gärdenfors, Peter (2005). The Emergence of Thought. In David Martel Johnson and Christina E. Erneling eds. The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◆ Garnett, A. Campbell (Aug. 27, 1942). Scientific Method and the Concept of Emergence. The Journal of Philosophy 39(18): 477-486.

In their theories of the relation of the mental and the physical most thinkers today seek to avoid both the Scylla of dualism and the Charybdis of reductionism. There then remain two possibilities, (a) that mental processes have emerged from a matrix of events that once was entirely non-mental, (b) that life and mind as we know them have developed within a world matrix that has always contained mental processes in some form. Among thinkers who have insisted on scientific method in philosophy the former hypothesis is widely accepted. It is the aim of this paper to show that such a theory of emergence is not consistent with the strict demands of scientific method.

◈ Gell-Mann, Murray (Apr. 2001). Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929(1): 41-49.

▣ Georgiev, Danko Dimchev (Mar. 2007). Falsifications of Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR Model of Consciousness and Novel Avenues for Development of Quantum Mind Theory. NeuroQuantology 5(1): 145-174. www.neuroquantology.com
                                                                                                                                                                        Abstract:  In this paper we try to make a clear distinction between quantum mysticism and quantum mind theory. Quackery always accompanies science especially in controversial and still under development areas and since the quantum mind theory is a science youngster it must clearly demarcate itself from the great stuff of pseudo-science currently patronized by the term “quantum mind”. Quantum theory has attracted a big deal of attention and opened new avenues for building up a physical theory of mind because its principles and experimental foundations are as strange as the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Yet, the unwarranted recourse to paranormal phenomena as supporting the quantum mind theory plus the extremely bad biological mismodeling of brain physiology lead to great scepticism about the viability of the approach. We give as an example the Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model with a list of twenty four problems not being repaired for a whole decade after the birth of the model in 1996. In the exposition we have tried not only to pesent critique of the spotted flaws, but to provide novel possibilities towards creation of neuroscientific quantum model of mind that incorporates all the available data from the basic disciplines (biochemistry, cell physiology, etc.) up to the clinical observations (neurology, neurosurgery, molecular psychiatry, etc.). Thus in a concise fashion we outline what can be done scientifically to improve the Q-mind theory and start a research programme (in Lakatos sense) that is independent on the particular flaws in some of the existing Q-mind models.

Key Words: Hameroff and Penrose Theory, OrchOR, objective reduction, quantum mind, microtubules, neuron, consciousness

◈ Gibb, Sophie (Sep. 2006). Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14(3): 407 - 422.

Abstract:  Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a linguistic sense. Anomalous monism cannot plausibly be accused of either. The first cannot legitimately be applied to anomalous monism as it is incompatible with Davidson's ontology. And accusations of predicate epiphenomenalism, although consistent with Davidson's ontology, are ungrounded regarding Davidson's anomalous monism. Philosophers of mind have mislocated the problem with Davidson's anomalous monism, which in fact lies with the implausible theory of the causal relata upon which it rests.
 
Keywords:  Davidson; anomalous monism; epiphenomenalism; property; mental causation

▣ Gibbons, John (Jan. 2006). Mental Causation without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115(1): 79-103.

http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/1/79.pdf

■ Gibson, James Jerome (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2001). Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39: 79-98.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2002a) The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View, Analysis 62: 316-23.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2002b) The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 89-115.

Abstract:  I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about ‘emergence’ by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue ‘Strong’ emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the ‘Argument from Realization’ (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish ‘Weak’ and ‘Ontological’ emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a way one may fail to establish the possibility of Strong emergence. But I also show Weak emergence can help the full-blown reductionists and Ontological emergence helps those opposed to physicalism. Lastly, in Part 3, I argue that the Completeness of Physics (CP) is incompatible with Strong emergence and that rejecting CP provides hope for the possibility of Strong emergence in a physical world. My final conclusion is that concepts of emergence, when properly understood, have important contributions to make to philosophical debate.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2003a). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for ‘Downward’ Determination, Principia 6: 83-114.

Abstract:  Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ determination. In Part 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments. However, in Part 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in the ‘Completeness of Physics’ (CoP). I show that the truth of CoP poses a very serious obstacle to realized properties being efficacious in a physicalist universe and suggest that abandoning CoP offers hope for defending non-reductive physicalism. I then formulate a schema for a physicalist metaphysics, in Part 3, which rejects CoP. This scenario is one where microphysical properties have a few conditional powers that they contribute to individuals when they realize certain properties. In such a situation, I argue, though physicalism holds true there is still plausibly both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ determination, where the latter is crucially an under-appreciated form of determination I term ‘non-causal’. Ultimately, I conclude that this metaphysical schema offers a coherent account of Strongly emergent properties that preserves the truth of NRP, albeit in a form that is purged of any commitment to CoP. Finally, in Part 4, I carefully explore which of Kim’s assumptions and arguments this metaphysics undermines.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2003b) Non-Reductive Realization and Non-Reductive Identity: What Physicalism does not Entail. Published in: Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) Physicalism and Mental Causation. London, Mentis.

Abstract:  Reductionism has been rejuvenated by a metaphysical turn engineered by Jaegwon Kim using realization relations to effect metaphysical reductions. I outline Kim’s new ‘Functionalization’ model of reduction, in Part 1, focussing upon the key argument underlying its reductionist credentials, what I term the ‘Argument from Realization’ (AR). However, in Part 2, I illuminate a type of a realized property covered by the Functionalization model, but which I will argue is irreducible, contrary to Kim’s claims and AR.  Furthermore, in Part 3, I show that this variety of realized property also illuminates that type identity does not necessarily lead to metaphysical reductionism either. In Part 4, I will consider an important objection to my scenario for irreducible realized properties, but I will suggest that it fails because it conflates non-causal and causal determination. My conclusion, in Part 5, will be that, contra Kim, universal realization does allow for a truly non-reductive or “Patchwork” physicalism and does not entail the truth of metaphysical reductionism.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2003c). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy. 591-603.

Abstract:  The ‘received’ view of multiple realizability (henceforth ‘MR’) and the special sciences was originally laid out in the seventies in a famous paper by Jerry Fodor. Recently, a range of criticisms have been offered of this position and the most significant is provided by Lawrence A. Shapiro’s (2000) in which he defends a prima facie plausible criterion for MR which he then uses to critique the received view of both MR and special sciences themselves. However, like other critics, Shapiro does not offer a precise account of realization and it appears plausible that such an account is a necessary step in any precise understanding of multiple realization. My main goal will be to argue this oversight is indeed damaging and that work on the metaphysics of realization has an important role to play in the philosophy of psychology. For I will show that differences over the metaphysics of realization are inextricably bound-up with broader disputes over the nature, and extent, of MR. As a result, I shall argue that although we should endorse Shapiro’s important criterion for MR, his criticisms of the received view, and those of another prominent critique, beg the question against his opponents.

◈ Gillett, Carl (2006). The Hidden Battles over Emergence. Published in: Philip Clayton, Zachary Simpson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford University Press.

Available online http://titan.iwu.edu/~cgillett/paper3.pdf

This paper, written with an audience in ‘Science & Religion’ in mind, provides a survey of recent notions of property emergence and the reductionist challenge that inspires them. The paper also challenges recent assumptions that we only have two coherent forms of property emergence by showing that recent problems arise from a trio of conflicting theses, rather than the pair of theses usually assumed, thus allowing for the existence of third substantive form of ‘emergence’.

◈ Gillett, Carl (Nov. 2006). Samuel Alexander's Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists. Synthese 153(2): 261-296.

Abstract:  Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious, and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’ presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists.

Available online http://titan.iwu.edu/~cgillett/paper4.pdf

I argue that Samuel Alexander has been misinterpreted and that he actually offers us a highly original form of physicalism as a response to a pressing form of ontological reductionism. Basically, the paper provides an outline of the positive position, in an emergentist form of physicalism I label ‘Patchwork physicalism’, which I argue is one of the few viable answers to ontological reductionism and coherent forms of non-reductive physicalism.

◈ Gillett, Carl (Forthcoming). Making Sense of Levels in the Sciences.

◈ Gillett, Carl (Forthcoming). Identity does not Protect Mental Efficacy.

◈ Gillett, Carl (Forthcoming). Ridiculous or Sublime? The Varieties of Emergence in Philosophy and the Sciences. In Gillett (ed.) Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Gillett, Carl (Forthcoming). Metaphysical Seduction and the Possibility of Strong Emergence. In Gillett (ed.) Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Gillett, Carl (ed.) (Forthcoming). Emergence: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Goertzel, Ben (June 2006). The Hidden Pattern: A Patternist Philosophy of Mind. Brown Walker Press.

◈ Goldstein, Jeffrey (1999). Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues. Emergence 1(1): 49-72.

◇ Gomes, Antônio, Ricardo Gudwin, Charbel Niño El-Hani and João Queiroz (in press). Towards the emergence of meaning processes in computers from Peircean semiotics. Mind & Society.

Received: 18 January 2006  Accepted: 9 October 2006  Published online: 26 April 2007

Abstract:  In this work, we propose a computational approach to the triadic model of Peircean semiosis (meaning processes). We investigate theoretical constraints about the feasibility of simulated semiosis. These constraints, which are basic requirements for the simulation of semiosis, refer to the synthesis of irreducible triadic relations (Sign–Object–Interpretant). We examine the internal organization of the triad S–O–I, that is, the relative position of its elements and how they relate to each other. We also suggest a multi-level approach based on self-organization principles. In this context, semiosis is described as an emergent process. Nevertheless, the term ‘emergence’ is often used in a very informal way in the so called ‘emergent’ computation, without clear explanations and/or definitions. In this paper, we discuss in some detail the meaning of the theoretical terms ‘emergence’ and ‘emergent’, showing how such an analysis can lead to improvements of the algorithm proposed.

 

Keywords:  Meaning - Semiosis - Emergence - Simulation - C. S. Peirce

◈ Grazer Philosophische Studien Volume 65. 2003. Special Issue on the topic: Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence.

Guest Editors: Marc Slors and Sven Walter

Introduction
pp. 1-13(13)
Authors: Marc Slors; Sven Walter

Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction
pp. 15-36(22)
Author: Marc Slors

Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization?
pp. 37-49(13)
Author: Michael Pauen

Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist?
pp. 51-75(25)
Author: Sven Walter

Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation
pp. 77-93(17)
Author: Achim Stephan

The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance
pp. 95-121(27)
Author: Carl Gillett

Causation by Relational Properties
pp. 123-137(15)
Author: Wim De Muijnck

Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination
pp. 139-167(29)
Authors: Albert Newen; Rimas uplinskas

Warum kommen "mentale Ursachen" physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht in die Quere? Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks "A verursacht B" im Umkreis moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien
pp. 169-194(26)
Author: Bernd Ludwig

◈ Greyson, Bruce, Jeffrey P. Long, Kevin R. Nelson, Michelle Mattingly, Sherman A. Lee and Frederick A. Schmitt (Dec. 2006). Does the arousal system contribute to near death experience? Neurology 67: 2265.

▣ Grimes, Th. R. (1988). The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69: 152-160.

▣ Gröblacher, Simon, Tomasz Paterek, Rainer Kaltenbaek, aslav Brukner, Marek ukowski, Markus Aspelmeyer, & Anton Zeilinger (Apr. 19, 2007). An experimental test of non-local realism. Nature 446(): 871-875.

Simon Gröblacher^1,2, Tomasz Paterek^3,4, Rainer Kaltenbaek¹, aslav Brukner^1,2, Marek ukowski^1,3, Markus Aspelmeyer^1,2 & Anton Zeilinger^1,2

1. Faculty of Physics, University of Vienna, Boltzmanngasse 5, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
2. Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information (IQOQI), Austrian Academy of Sciences, Boltzmanngasse 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
3. Institute of Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, University of Gdansk, ul. Wita Stwosza 57, PL-08-952 Gdansk, Poland
4. The Erwin Schrödinger International Institute for Mathematical Physics (ESI), Boltzmanngasse 9, A-1090 Vienna, Austria

doi:10.1038/nature05677; Received 22 December 2006; Accepted 13 February 2007

Most working scientists hold fast to the concept of 'realism'—a viewpoint according to which an external reality exists independent of observation. But quantum physics has shattered some of our cornerstone beliefs. According to Bell's theorem, any theory that is based on the joint assumption of realism and locality (meaning that local events cannot be affected by actions in space-like separated regions) is at variance with certain quantum predictions. Experiments with entangled pairs of particles have amply confirmed these quantum predictions, thus rendering local realistic theories untenable. Maintaining realism as a fundamental concept would therefore necessitate the introduction of 'spooky' actions that defy locality. Here we show by both theory and experiment that a broad and rather reasonable class of such non-local realistic theories is incompatible with experimentally observable quantum correlations. In the experiment, we measure previously untested correlations between two entangled photons, and show that these correlations violate an inequality proposed by Leggett for non-local realistic theories. Our result suggests that giving up the concept of locality is not sufficient to be consistent with quantum experiments, unless certain intuitive features of realism are abandoned.

☞ see Philip Ball's review of this article: Physicists bid farewell to reality?

http://www.nature/com/news/2007/070416/full/070416-9.html

☞ see also Scientific American's Science News by J.R. Minkel: Quantum Theory Fails Reality Checks.

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=055C1A23-E7F2-99DF-31B2170DBBCA09A9&chanID=sa003

FOR REAL?  A new experiment on photons sharing the quantum link of entanglement finds that quantum naysayers have to give up two cherished principles of reality, not one or the other.

Image: © ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/DUNCAN WALKER

◇ Gustafson, Don (June 2007). Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories. Philosophical Psychology 20(3): 367-374.

Abstract: Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional alternative to causal analyses of intentional action is not threatened by the putative scientific findings. This, in turn, is ironic in that defenders of the noncausal accounts of action were thought to be in opposition to the natural sciences of action whereas the analyses in the causal style were "on the side of physicalism." This result is also assessed in what follows.
 
Keywords: Conscious Will; Epiphenomenalism; Intentional Action; Neuroscience; Noncausal Theories of Action

◈ Habermas, Jürgen / Translated by Joel Anderson (Mar. 2007). The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism? Philosophical Explorations 10(1): 13-50.

Abstract:  In this essay, I address the question of whether the indisputable progress being made by the neurosciences poses a genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency. I begin by situating free will as an ineliminable component of our practices of attributing responsibility and holding one another accountable, illustrating this via a discussion of legal discourse regarding the attribution of responsibility for criminal acts. I then turn to the practical limits on agents' scientific self-objectivation, limits that turn out to be mirrored philosophically in the conceptual problems that plague reductionist strategies. Having shown that free will is rooted in unavoidable performative presuppositions belonging to agents' participant perspective, I then take up the difficult issue of how to reconcile an epistemic dualism of participant and observer perspectives with the assumption of ontological monism. I critically review a range of proposed physicalist solutions, including non-reductionist and (standard) compatibilist approaches. An underlying problem with scientistic, physicalist approaches is the methodological fiction of an exclusive 'view from nowhere' which relies on the problematic move of disengaging the objectivating perspective of the scientific observer from the investigators' participant perspective of those engaged in scientific practice. Since there is no way of getting around the requisite complementarity of both the observer's encounter with the objective world and the participant's involvement in shared lifeworld practices, the remaining option is to take an epistemological turn. But even the recognition that science is ultimately constituted from within the lifeworld still leaves us with the question as to how the human mind can understand itself as the product of natural evolution. I conclude with some tentative suggestions as to how this difficult question might be addressed.
 
Keywords:  free will; compatibilism; physicalism; scientism; participant perspective; performative presuppositions

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~content=a774762029~fulltext=713240930

☞ see John Searle's reply (Mar. 2007).

◇ Häggström, Olle (Mar. 2007). Intelligent design and the NFL theorems. Biology and Philosophy 22(2): 217-230.

Received: 14 September 2005  Accepted: 15 June 2006  Published online: 13 December 2006

Abstract:  Another look is taken at the model assumptions involved in William Dembski’s (2002a, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence. Roman & Littlefield, Lanham, MA) use of the NFL theorems from optimization theory to disprove the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection, and his argument is shown to be irrelevant to evolutionary biology.

 

Key words:  Optimization - NFL theorem - Fitness landscape - Intelligent design - Local search - Uniform distribution

◈ Haken, Hermann (2004). Synergetics: Introduction and advanced topics. Berlin: Springer.

◈ Haken, Hermann (2002/2007). Brain dynamics: Synchronization and activity patterns in pulse-coupled neural nets with delays and noise. (Springer series in Synergetics). Berlin: Springer.

   

◈ Haken, Hermann (2006). Information and self-organization: A macroscopic approach to complex systems. (Springer Series in Synergetics). Berlin: Springer.

◈ Haken, Hermann (2007). Synergetics. Scholarpedia. p.7017.

◆ Haldane, John (1996). The mystery of emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 261-267.

◈ Halley, Julianne D. and David A. Winkler (undated). Classification of emergence  and its relation to self-organization.

Abstract:  Emergence is a difficult concept to describe clearly. It has been characterized in the literature in a number of ways, none of which are easy to understand or describe clearly how other concepts in complex systems science are related to emergence. We provide a simple, clear description and classification of emergence in terms of self-organization. This provides a framework for understanding how concepts such as thermodynamic equilibrium, nonlinearity, and computability are related to emergence.

Keywords:  Emergence; self-organization; predictive efficiency; observer.

◈ Halley, Julianne D. and David A. Winkler (forthcoming). Towards consistent concepts of self-organization and self-assembly, submitted to PNAS.

▣ Hameroff, Stuart R. and Roger Penrose (Apr. 1996). Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation 40(3-4): 453-480.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (Apr. 1998). 'Funda-Mentality': is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the universe? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2(4): 119-124.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (Aug. 15, 1998). Quantum computation in brain microtubules?: The Penrose-Hameroff 'Orch OR' model of consciousness. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. A 356(1743): 1869-1896.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (Apr. 2001). Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929(1): 74-104.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (June 1, 2001). Anesthesia: the "other side" of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10(2): 217-229.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (2002). Quantum computing in DNA.

http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (Aug. 2006). The Entwined Mysteries of Anesthesia and Consciousness: Is There a Common Underlying Mechanism? Anesthesiology 105(2): 400–12.

▣ Hameroff, Stuart R. (Mar. 2007). Orchestrated Reduction of Quantum Coherence in Brain Microtubules: A Model for Consciousness. NeuroQuantology 5(1): 1-8.

Abstract:  Orch OR (“Orchestrated Objective Reduction”) is a theory of consciousness put forth in the mid-1990s by British physicist Sir Roger Penrose and American anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff. Whereas most theories assume consciousness emerges from complex computation at the level of synapses among brain neurons, Orch OR involves a specific form of quantum computation which underlies these neuronal synaptic activities. The proposed quantum computations occur in structures inside the brain’s neurons called  microtubules.

Key Words: consciousness, microtubules, computation, neurons, orchestrated objective reduction

CONCLUSION:  Orch OR can account for all enigmatic features of consciousness including timing,  binding, pre-conscious to conscious transition and the hard problem of conscious experience. Orch OR is consistent with all known neurophysiology, but depends on proposed physics and biology. Orch OR has withstood numerous attempts at refutation, and is testable and falsifiable. Although controversial, it is the most complete theory of consciousness, spanning in detail physics, molecular biology, neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy.

☞ see A Severe Criticism by Georgiev, Danko Dimchev (Mar. 2007). Falsifications of Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR Model of Consciousness and Novel Avenues for Development of Quantum Mind Theory. NeuroQuantology 5(1): 145-174. www.neuroquantology.com

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R. (in press). The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer. Cognitive Science.

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/cogsci.htm

☞ see Abninder Litt and his collaborators' criticism of Stuart Hameroff's theory of quantum consciousness.

◈ Hameroff, Stuart R., Alex Nip, Mitchell Porter, Jack Tuszynski (Jan. 2002). Conduction pathways in microtubules, biological quantum computation, and consciousness. BioSystems 64(1-3): 149-168.

◆ Hasker, William (1982). Emergentism. Religious Studies 18: 473-88.

◆ Hasker, William (1999). The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press.

◈ Hattiangadi, Jagdish N. (2005). The Emergence of Minds in Space and Time. In David Martel Johnson and Christina E. Erneling eds. The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky, W. Tecumseh Fitch (Nov. 2002). The faculty of language: What is it, Who has it, and How did it evolve? Science 298(5598): 1569-1579 (Issue of Nov. 22, 2002).

We argue that an understanding of the faculty of language requires substantial interdisciplinary cooperation. We suggest how current developments in linguistics can be profitably wedded to work in evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience. We submit that a distinction should be made between the faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) and in the narrow sense (FLN). FLB includes a sensory-motor system, a conceptual-intentional system, and the computational mechanisms for recursion, providing the capacity to generate an infinite range of expressions from a finite set of elements. We hypothesize that FLN only includes recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language. We further argue that FLN may have evolved for reasons other than language, hence comparative studies might look for evidence of such computations outside of the domain of communication (for example, number, navigation, and social relations).

☞ see Thomas Bever and Mario Montalbetti's review of this paper.

◈ Hayek, Friedrich August von (1964). The theory of complex phenomena. In: The critical approach to science and technology (In honor of Karl R. Popper). (Ed. Mario Bunge). The Free Press of Glencoe. pp. 332-349.

 

Friedrich August von Hayek (May 8, 1899 - Mar. 23, 1992)

◈ Heard, Daniel (Jan. 2006). A new problem for ontological emergence. The Philosophical Quarterly 56(222): 55-62.

It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder for the ontological emergentist to avoid.

◈ Heil, John (1998). Supervenience deconstructed. European Journal of Philosophy 6: 146-155.

◈ Heil, John (2000). Multiple Realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 189-208.

◇ Hein, Hilde (Aug. 1969). Molecular biology vs. organicism: The enduring dispute between mechanism and vitalism. Synthese 20(2): 238-253.

◈ Hellman, Geoffrey, and Frank Thompson (1975). Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, Reduction. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 551 564.

◈ Hendel, Giovanna (2001). Realization. Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. 33, No. 98, August 2001, pp. 41-70.

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pdf/C98/C98_hendel.pdf

Abstract: So far no clear explication of the notion of realization has been offered, in spite of the frequent uses of the notion in the literature to discharge import!ant jobs, such as that of accounting for the causal efficacy of the mental in a physical world, and that of providing a viable characterization of physicalism, and/or psychophysical reduction. I put forward an account of realization as an identity-like relation. I argue that such account has the following advantages: (a) it provides a picture under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata, as it happened in the original uses of the term 'realization'; (b) it helps to understand how well, if at all, some appeals to realization in the literature can discharge the jobs mentioned; (c) more generally, it makes clear what realization can do.

Keywords: realization, identity-like, reduction, mental causation, physicalism

◈ Hendrey, Robin Findlay (1999). Molecular models and the question of physicalism. HYLE―International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 5(2): 117-134.

Abstract:  By their own account, physicalists are committed to the claim that physics is causally complete, or closed. The claim is presented as an empirical one. However, detailed and explicit empirical arguments for the claim are rare. I argue that molecular models are a key source of evidence but that, on closer inspection, they do not support the completeness claim.

Keywords:  chemistry, physicalism, reductionism, supervenience, disunity of science.

■ Hendry, Robin Findlay (2006). Is There Downward Causation in Chemistry? Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 242 (Philosophy Of Chemistry: Synthesis of a New Discipline, edited by Davis Baird, Eric Scerri and Lee McIntyre): 173-189. (doi:10.1007/1-4020-3261-7_9)

First paragraph:

Unless the future of chemistry holds some great ontological revision, it seems safe to assume that whenever there is chemical change there is physical change. For instance, on the assumption that an object’s membership of a natural kind is determined by its possession of certain physical properties, there cannot be change in chemical kind membership without change in these kind-constituting physical properties. There is a consensus in recent philosophy of mind that this kind of relationship—known as supervenience—is, however, compatible with a range of views on the ontological relationship between two domains.1 It is, for instance, a commitment both of physicalism—the view that physical laws and facts determine all laws and facts—and of some forms of emergentism, the view that there are autonomous facts associated with the physical systems of higher orders of complexity studied by some of the special sciences.

■ Hendry, Robin Findlay and Paul Needham (in press. published online on Apr. 30, 2007). Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

In this article we critically eval‎uate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called.

◆ Henle, Paul (Aug. 27, 1942). The Status of Emergence. The Journal of Philosophy 39(18): 486-493.

The doctrine of emergence, having passed through the stage of acute philosophic controversy, has become to a large extent a generally accepted view. Unfortunately it has not become an unambiguous view. In one sense it seems to amount to no more than the insistence that there are novelties in the world. If this is all that is intended, the doctrine is a corollary of evolutionary theory and there can be little doubt as to its truth. To take a simple case, color vision can have appeared in the world only with the development of animal life and there must have been a first animal capable of distinguishing, say, the color violet. There might be variations in the clarity with which violet is distinguished, but, allowing for such differences, the statement stands. This color of violet, in its purely qualitative aspects as it appeared to the primitive animal, must have been something new under the sun.

◈ Hensel, Michael, Achim Menges, Michael Weinstock (eds.) (2004). Emergence: Morphogenetic Design Strategies (Architectural Design). Academy Press.

◈ Himma, Kenneth Einar (2005). What is a problem for all is a problem for none: Substance
dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. American Philosophical Quarterly
42: 81-92.

◈ Hofstadter, Douglas R. (Mar. 26, 2007). I Am a Strange Loop. Basic Books.

◈ Holland, John H. (1998). Emergence: From Chaos to Order. Oxford University Press.

 

▣ Hood, Leroy and David Galas (Jan. 2003). The digital code of DNA. Nature 421(6921): 444-448 (Issue of Jan. 23, 2003).

The discovery of the structure of DNA transformed biology profoundly, catalysing the sequencing of the human genome and engendering a new view of biology as an information science. Two features of DNA structure account for much of its remarkable impact on science: its digital nature and its complementarity, whereby one strand of the helix binds perfectly with its partner. DNA has two types of digital information — the genes that encode proteins, which are the molecular machines of life, and the gene regulatory networks that specify the behaviour of the genes.

▣ Hooker, Clifford Alan (1981). Towards a general theory of reduction. Dialogue 20: 38-60, 201-236, 496-529.

◈ Hooker, Clifford Alan (2004). Asymptotics, Reduction and Emergence. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55(3):435-479.

All the major inter-theoretic relations of fundamental science are asymptotic ones, e.g. quantum theory as Planck's constant h 0, yielding (roughly) Newtonian mechanics. Thus asymptotics ultimately grounds claims about inter-theoretic explanation, reduction and emergence. This paper examines four recent, central claims by Batterman concerning asymptotics and reduction. While these claims are criticised, the discussion is used to develop an enriched, dynamically-based account of reduction and emergence, to show its capacity to illuminate the complex variety of inter-theory relationships in physics, and to provide a principled resolution to such persistent philosophical problems as multiple realisability and the nature of the special sciences.

C. A. Hooker

School of Liberal Arts, MCLG27, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia 2308,

http://www.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/index.html

◈ Horgan, Terence (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102: 555-86.

First paragraph:

The term "supervenience" derives etymologically from the Latin "super", meaning on, above, or additional; and from the Latin verb "venire", meaning to come. In non-philosophical contexts the word is used primarily in a temporal way—typically to mean "coming or occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected". In philosophical contexts it is primarily used non-temporally, to signify a metaphysical and/or conceptual determination-relation; here the etymology appears to be spatially quasi-metaphorical, the idea being that something supervenient comes above—is "grounded by"—that on which it supervenes.

◈ Horgan, Terence, Marcelo H. Sabates and David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Supervenience in Mind: A Festschrift in honor of Jaegwon Kim. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

▣ Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1994). Zu Emergenz, Mikro- und Makrodetermination. In Weyma Lübbe (ed.) (1994). Kausalität und Zurechnung. Über Verantwortung in komplexen kulturellen Prozessen. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. PDF

▣ Hoyning-Huene, Paul (1997). Comment on J. Kim's "Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the Philosophy of Mind". In: Martin Carrier and Peter Machamer (eds.) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind (Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 5), Universitätsverlag Konstanz/University of Pittsburgh Press,1997, pp. 294-302. PDF

http://www.nunics.uni-hannover.de/zeww/074_Hoyningen_Comment_Kim.pdf

◈ Hulswit, Menno (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36(2): 261-287.

Published online: 14 August 2006

 

Summary:  The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.

In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen.

Key words:  Aristotelian categories - causation - causal relata - downward causation - emergence - self-organization - formal causation

◆ Humphreys, Paul (1996). Aspects of emergence. Philosophical Topics 24:53-71.

◈ Humphreys, Paul (Mar. 1997). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of science 64(1):1-17.

A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.

◈ Humphreys, Paul (Dec. 1997). Emergence, not supervenience. Philosophy of Science 64 (Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers): S337-S345.

I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.

◆ Humphreys, Paul (to appear). Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence. Minds and Machines.

◈ Hunt, G.M.K. (June 1987). Determinism, predictability and chaos. Analysis 47(3): 129-133.

☞ see Morton (June 1988).

◈ Hut, Piet, Mark Alford and Max Tegmark (June 2006). On Math, Matter and Mind. Foundations of Physics 36(6): 765-794.

▣ Hüttemann, Andreas (Dec. 2003). What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Routledge.

Table of Contents

	Acknowledgements
	Introduction	1
1	Microphysicalism	5
2	Laws of nature	16
3	Micro-explanation	24
4	What is the issue?	58
5	Micro-determination	71
6	Micro-government and the laws of the special sciences	87
7	Micro-causation	107
8	Microphysicalism, physicalism and pluralism	120
	Notes	127
	Bibliography	134
	Index

About the Title

'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Hütemann offers a fresh challenge to this view.

Hütemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. H?temann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. H?temann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature.

What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.

▣ Hüttemann, Andreas (2004). On the prospects of confined and catholic physicalism. In: Roland Bluhm & Christian Nimtz (Hgg.) (2004). Ausgewählte Beiträge zu den Sektionen der GAP.5, Fünfter Internationaler Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, Bielefeld, 22.–26. September 2003. (CD-ROM) Paderborn: mentis. S. 396 – 405.

◈ Hüttemann, Andreas (Jan. 2005). Explanation, emergence, and quantum entanglement. Philosophy of Science 72(1): 114-127.

Received April 2003; revised February 2004.

Abstract: This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to `reductionism'. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with thoroughgoing reductionist explanations. I will distinguish two kinds of microexplanation (or micro-`reduction'). I will argue that even though quantum entanglement provides an example of the failure of one kind of microexplanation, it does not affect the other. Contrary to a recent paper by Kronz and Tiehen, I claim that the explanation of the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems is just as reductionist as it used to be in classical mechanics.

▣ Hüttemann, Andreas (2007). Causation, Laws and Dispositions In: Max Kistler and Bruno Gnassounou (eds.) (2007). Dispositions and Causal Powers. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 207 – 219.

◈ Hüttemann, Andreas and David Papineau (Jan. 2005). Physicalism decomposed. Analysis 65(1): 33-39.

http://wwwphil.uni-muenster.de/mitglieder/huettemann/texte/Physicalism_decomposed.pdf

◈ Hütteman, Andreas & Orestis Terzidis (2000). Emergence in Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14(3): 267-281.

◈ Intellectica (Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive Publiée avec le concours du CNRS) 1997/3, numéro 25.

A special issue on Emergence and Explication.

◈ Israeli, Navot, Nigel Goldenfeld (2004). Computational Irreducibility and the Predictability of Complex Physical Systems. Physical Review Letters 92(7), 074105.

(Received 16 June 2003; published 20 February 2004)

Abstract:  Using elementary cellular automata (CA) as an example, we show how to coarse grain CA in all classes of Wolfram's classification. We find that computationally irreducible physical processes can be predictable and even computationally reducible at a coarse-grained level of description. The resulting coarse-grained CA which we construct emulate the large-scale behavior of the original systems without accounting for small-scale details. At least one of the CA that can be coarse grained is irreducible and known to be a universal Turing machine.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/nlin/0309047

◈ Jacobs, Gerald H., Gary A. Williams, Hugh Cahill and Jeremy Nathans (Mar. 2007). Emergence of Novel Color Vision in Mice Engineered to Express a Human Cone Photopigment. Science 315(5819): 1723-1725 (Issue of March 23, 2007).

Changes in the genes encoding sensory receptor proteins are an essential step in the evolution of new sensory capacities. In primates, trichromatic color vision evolved after changes in X chromosome–linked photopigment genes. To model this process, we studied knock-in mice that expressed a human long-wavelength–sensitive (L) cone photopigment in the form of an X-linked polymorphism. Behavioral tests demonstrated that heterozygous females, whose retinas contained both native mouse pigments and human L pigment, showed enhanced long-wavelength sensitivity and acquired a new capacity for chromatic discrimination. An inherent plasticity in the mammalian visual system thus permits the emergence of a new dimension of sensory experience based solely on gene-driven changes in receptor organization.

《사이언티픽 아메리칸Scientific Amerian》해설 기사 ☞

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleid=7B502B4F-E7F2-99DF-3ADC02BA5D5721F0&chanId=sa017

	LET THERE BE OTHER LIGHT:  Researchers prove that the brain can handle new sensory inputs without the need for rewiring by giving mice the ability to see long-wavelength light. (Image: © IMAGES.COM/CORBIS)

◈ Jaworski, William (Sep. 2006). Mental causation from the top-down. Erkenntnis 65(2): 277-299.

Received: 4 May 2005  Accepted: 22 February 2006  Published online: 12 May 2006

 

Abstract:  Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.

 

 

▣ Jennings, H.S. (1918). Mechanism and Vitalism. Philosophical Review 27: 577-596.

 

◆ Jones, D. H. (1972). Emergent properties, persons, and the mind-body problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10: 423-433.

◈ Juarrero, Alicia (1999). Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Kallestrup, Jesper (Nov. 2006). The causal exclusion argument. Philosophical Studies 131(2): 459-485.

◈ Kauffman, Stuart A. (1993). The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University Press.

◈ Kauffman, Stuart A. (1996). At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity. Oxford University Press.

    

◈ Kauffman, Stuart A. (2000). Investigations. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

▣ Kauffman Stuart A. (2006). The third culture beyond reductionism: reinventing the sacred. Edge.org, November 20, 2006.

◈ Kauffman, Stuart A. and Philip Clayton (2006). On emergence, agency, and organization. Biology and Philosophy 21(4): 501-521.

Received: 16 July 2004  Accepted: 26 July 2005  Published online: 15 November 2006

 

Abstract:  Ultimately we will only understand biological agency when we have developed a theory of the organization of biological processes, and science is still a long way from attaining that goal. It may be possible nonetheless to develop a list of necessary conditions for the emergence of minimal biological agency. The authors offer a model of molecular autonomous agents which meets the five minimal physical conditions that are necessary (and, we believe, conjointly sufficient) for applying agential language in biology: autocatalytic reproduction; work cycles; boundaries for reproducing individuals; self-propagating work and constraint construction; and choice and action that have evolved to respond to food or poison. When combined with the arguments from preadaptation and multiple realizability, the existence of these agents is sufficient to establish ontological emergence as against what one might call Weinbergian reductionism. Minimal biological agents are emphatically not conscious agents, and accepting their existence does not commit one to any robust theory of human agency. Nor is there anything mystical, dualistic, or non-empirical about the emergence of agency in the biosphere. Hence the emergence of molecular autonomous agents, and indeed ontological emergence in general, is not a negation of or limitation on careful biological study but simply one of its implications.

 

Keywords:  Autocatalysis - Autonomous agents - Emergence - Preadaptation - Reductionism - Theory of organization - Semiotics - Teleology - Underdetermination of biology by physics - Work cycle

▣ Kauffman, Stuart A., Robert K. Logan, Robert Este, Randy Goebel, David Hobill and Ilya Shmulevich (in press. Mar. 20, 2007). Propagating organization: An enquiry. Biology and Philosophy.

Received: 2 January 2007  Accepted: 19 February 2007  Published online: 20 March 2007

Abstract:  Our aim in this article is to attempt to discuss propagating organization of process, a poorly articulated union of matter, energy, work, constraints and that vexed concept, “information”, which unite in far from equilibrium living physical systems. Our hope is to stimulate discussions by philosophers of biology and biologists to further clarify the concepts we discuss here. We place our discussion in the broad context of a “general biology”, properties that might well be found in life anywhere in the cosmos, freed from the specific examples of terrestrial life after 3.8 billion years of evolution. By placing the discussion in this wider, if still hypothetical, context, we also try to place in context some of the extant discussion of information as intimately related to DNA, RNA and protein transcription and translation processes. While characteristic of current terrestrial life, there are no compelling grounds to suppose the same mechanisms would be involved in any life form able to evolve by heritable variation and natural selection. In turn, this allows us to discuss at least briefly, the focus of much of the philosophy of biology on population genetics, which, of course, assumes DNA, RNA, proteins, and other features of terrestrial life. Presumably, evolution by natural selection—and perhaps self-organization—could occur on many worlds via different causal mechanisms. Here we seek a non-reductionist explanation for the synthesis, accumulation, and propagation of information, work, and constraint, which we hope will provide some insight into both the biotic and abiotic universe, in terms of both molecular self reproduction and the basic work energy cycle where work is the constrained release of energy into a few degrees of freedom. The typical requirement for work itself is to construct those very constraints on the release of energy that then constitute further work. Information creation, we argue, arises in two ways: first information as natural selection assembling the very constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of organization. Second, information in a more extended sense is “semiotic”, that is about the world or internal state of the organism and requires appropriate response. The idea is to combine ideas from biology, physics, and computer science, to formulate explanatory hypotheses on how information can be captured and rendered in the expected physical manifestation, which can then participate in the propagation of the organization of process in the expected biological work cycles to create the diversity in our observable biosphere. Our conclusions, to date, of this enquiry suggest a foundation which views information as the construction of constraints, which, in their physical manifestation, partially underlie the processes of evolution to dynamically determine the fitness of organisms within the context of a biotic universe.

Keywords:  Propagating organization - Constraints - Information - Shannon - Work - Semiosis - Adjacent possible

An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, but it possesses in itself formative power of a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of themselves; it organizes them, in fact, and this cannot explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion.

Immanuel Kant – Critique of Judgement.

◈ Ke, Jinyun and John H. Holland (2006). Language Origin from an Emergentist Perspective. Applied Linguistics 27(4):691-716.

Abstract:  In recent decades, there has been a surge of interest in the origin of language across a wide range of disciplines. Emergentism provides a new perspective to integrate investigations from different areas of study. This paper discusses how the study of language acquisition can contribute to the inquiry, in particular when computer modeling is adopted as the research methodology. An agent-based model is described as an illustration, which simulates how word order in a language could have emerged at the very beginning of language origin. Two important features of emergence, heterogeneity and nonlinearity, are demonstrated in the model, and their implications for applied linguistics are discussed.

☞ see Brian MacWhinney's paper that deals with the emergence of language.

◈ Keijzer, Fred, Maurice Schouten (in press). Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. Synthese.

Received: 6 October 2005  Accepted: 15 May 2006  Published online: 26 July 2006

 

Abstract:  In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.

 

Keywords:  Kim - Mental causation - Embedded cognition - Externalism

◈ Kekes, John (1966). Physicalism, the identity theory, and the concept of emergence. Philosophy of Science 33: 360-375.

◈ Kelso, J.A. Scott (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In: M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.) Action Theory (pp. 157–177). Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in Kim (1993b).

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1978). Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 149–56.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (1984a). Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:257–270. Reprinted in Kim (1993b).

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1984b). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 153-76. Reprinted pp. 53-78 in Kim 1993.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (1988). Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: 225–240.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1989). Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 77-108. Reprinted pp. 237-264. in Kim 1993.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1989). The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism. (Presidential address delivered at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, the Central Division, April, 1989). Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63: 31-47.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (1990a). Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation. In: E. Villanueva (ed.) Information, Semantics, and Epistemology (pp. 36–56). Oxford: Blackwell.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1990b). Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept. (the Metaphilosophy Address delivered at the Graduate Center, CUNY, May, 1989). Metaphilosophy 12: 1-27. Reprinted pp. 131-160 in Kim 1993.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1992a). 'Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism. Published pp. 119-138 in Beckermann, Ansgar, Hans Flohr, Jaegwon Kim (eds.) Emergence or Reduction? - Essays on the Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1992b). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1-26.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1993a). The Nonreductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation. Published in John Heil and Alfred Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1993b). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1997). Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization. Published pp. 271-293 in: Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer (eds.) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science and the Mind. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (with commentaries by Paul Hoyningen-Huene and Ansgar Beckermann).

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1997). Explanation, Prediction, and Reduction in Emergentism. Intellectica 2: 27-38.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

 

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (Aug. 1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95(1-2): 3-36.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2000). Making Sense of Downward Causation. Published pp. 305-321 in: Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, bodies and matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2001). Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-body Problems for the Physicalist. Published in: Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (eds.) Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2002). The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations. Philosophical Explorations 5: 2-20.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (ed.) (Aug. 2002). Supervenience (The International Research Library of Philosophy). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Table of Contents

	Acknowledgements
	Series Preface
	Introduction
1	Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction	1
2	Supervenience Revisited	15
3	Concepts of Supervenience	37
4	Supervenience for Multiple Domains	63
5	Postscripts on Supervenience	85
6	Supervenience and Microphysics	97
7	From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World	113
8	Varieties of Supervenience	145
9	Varieties of Supervenience	189
10	Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive	211
11	"Global" Supervenient Determination: Too Permissive?	221
12	In Defense of Global Supervenience	249
13	Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and Reducibility	271
14	Supervenience and Closure	285
15	The Myth of Supervenience	299
16	Humean Supervenience	309
17	An Argument for Strong Supervenience	317
18	Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization	325
19	Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience	343
20	Moral Supervenience	357
21	Supervenience, Essentialism and Aesthetic Properties	381
	Name Index	397

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction. Published in:  Michael J. Loux, Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook on Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.

▣ Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Blocking Causal Drainage and other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:151–176.

■ Kim, Jaegwon (2005). Physicalism, Or Somthing Near Enough. Princeton University Press.

 

Table of contents

Ch. 1	Mental causation and consciousness : our two mind-body problems	7
Ch. 2	The supervenience argument motivated, clarified, and defended	32
Ch. 3	The rejection of immaterial minds : a causal argument	70
Ch. 4	Reduction, reductive explanation, and closing the "gap"	93
Ch. 5	Explanatory arguments for type physicalism and why they don't work	121
Ch. 6	Physicalism, or something near enough	149

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2005). Philosophy of Mind. 2nd edition. Boulder: Westview Press.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2006). Being Realistic about Emergence. Published in: Clayton, Philip, Paul Davies (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Kim, Jaegwon (2006). Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues. Synthese 151(3): 547-559.

Published online: 9 August 2006

 

Abstract:  This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent explanation of how “downward” causation, a central component of emergentism, is able to avoid the problem of overdetermination.

 

Keywords:  Downward causation - Emergence - Emergentism - Reduction - Supervenience

Kim (2004). This paper is largely based on my “Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), 3–36, and “On Being Realistic about Emergence”. The latter was presented at the Emergence/Reduction Workshop at the Institut Jean Nicod in the fall of 2003; as this paper has been promised for another publication, the present paper was expressly composed in order to provide a critical target for the commentaries by Marras and Wong.

 

 

◈ Kistler, Max (2006). Reduction and emergence in the physical sciences: Reply to Rueger. Synthese 151(3): 347-354.

Published online: 8 August 2006

 

Abstract:  I analyse Rueger’s application of Kim’s model of functional reduction to the relation between the thermal conductivities of metal bars at macroscopic and atomic scales. 1) I show that it is a misunderstanding to accuse the functional reduction model of not accounting for the fact that there are causal powers at the micro-level which have no equivalent at the macro-level. The model not only allows but requires that the causal powers by virtue of which a functional predicate is defined, are only a subset of the causal powers of the properties filling the functional specification. 2) The fact that the micro-equation does not converge to the macro-equation in general but only under the constraint of a “solvability condition” does not show that reduction is impossible, as Rueger claims, but only that reduction requires inter-level constraints. 3) Rueger tries to analyse inter-level reduction with the conceptual means of intra-level reduction. This threatens the coherence of his analysis, given that it makes no sense to ascribe macroproperties such as thermal conductivity to entities at the atomic level. Ignoring the distinction between theses two senses of “reduction” is especially confusing because they have opposite directions: in intra-level reduction, the more detailed account reduces to the less detailed one, whereas in inter-level reduction, the less detailed theory is reduced to the more detailed one. 4) Finally I criticize Rueger’s way of using Wimsatt’s criteria for emergence in terms of non-aggregativity, to construct a concept of synchronic emergence. It is wrong to require, over and above non-aggregativity, irreducibility as a criterion for emergence.

Keywords:  Aggregativity - Causal power - Emergence - Functional reduction - Inter-level - Intra-level - Multirealization - Reduction - Second-order predicate

▣ Kistler, Max and Bruno Gnassounou (eds.) (Feb. 2007). Dispositions and Causal Powers. Aldershot: Ashgate.

About the Book

Dispositions are everywhere. We say that a wall is hard, that water quenches thirst and is transparent, that dogs can swim and oak trees can let their leaves fall, and that acid has the power to corrode metals. All these statements express attributions of dispositions, be they physical, physiological or psychological, yet there is much philosophical debate about how far, if at all, dispositional predicates can have complete
meaning or figure in causal explanations.

This collection of essays, by leading international researchers, examine the case for realism with respect to dispositions and causal powers in both metaphysics and science. Among the issues debated in this book is whether dispositions can be analyzed in terms of conditionals, whether all dispositions have a so-called categorical basis and, if they do, what is the relation between the disposition and its basis.

Contents

Part 1 The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causal Powers:

Dispositions and counterfactuals. From Carnap to Goodman's children and grandchildren, François Schmitz

Filled in space, Stephen Mumford

Dispositions and essences, Claudine Tiercelin

The causal efficacy of macroscopic dispositional properties, Max Kistler

Opium's virtus dormitiva, Cyrille Michon

Conditional possibility, Bruno Gnassounou

On ascribing dispositions, Ludger Jansen

Part 2 Dispositions and Causal Powers in Science:

An extended semantic field of dispositions and the grounding role of causal powers, Rom Harré

What makes a capacity a disposition?, Nancy Cartwright

Causation, laws and dispositions, Andreas Hüttemann

Can capacities rescue us from Ceteris Paribus laws?, Markus Schrenk

Dispositions, relational properties and the quantum world, Mauro Dorato

Are specific heats dispositions?, Anouk Barberousse

Bibliography

Index

◈ Klee, Robert L. (Mar. 1984). Micro-Determinism and Concepts of Emergence. Philosophy of Science 51(1): 44-63.

Contemporary scientific theories assume a primarily micro-deterministic view of nature. This paper explores the question of whether micro-determinism is incompatible with the alleged emergence of  properties and laws that some biologists and philosophers assert occurs in various biological systems. I argue that a preferable unified treatment of these emergence claims takes properties, rather than laws, to be the units of emergence. Four distinct conceptions of emergence are explored and three shown to be compatible with micro-determinism. The remaining concept of emergence, direct macro-determination, does not, I argue, meet the general requirement that an adequate scientific explanation provide a coherent mechanism or effective means of determination.

☞ see Roger Sperry (Jun. 1986). Macro- versus Micro-Determinism. Philosophy of Science 53(2): 265-270.

◈ Koch, Christof and Klaus Hepp (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature 440: 611-612. (Issue of March 30, 2006).

http://klab.caltech.edu/refweb/paper/528.pdf

◇ Korn, Robert W. (Jan. 2005). The Emergence Principle in Biological Hierarchies. Biology and Philosophy 20(1) : 137-151.

Accepted: 25 March 2004

Abstract  Emergent properties have been described by Mill, Lewes, Broad, Morgan and others, as novel, nonadditive, nonpredictable and nondeducible within a hierarchical context. I have developed a more definitive concept of a hierarchy that can be used to inspect the phenomenon of emergence in a new and detailed manner. A hierarchy is held together by descending constraints and new features can arise when an upper level entity restrains its components in new combinations that are not expected when viewing these components alone. Examples of emergent features are (i) matching anticodons and amino acids by aminoacetyl-tRNA synthetase enzymes appearing early among the first forms of life, (ii) negative feedback in end-product inhibition first occurring in microbes, (iii) memory in animals and (iv) apical cells in plants. Until recently, life was considered only in terms of physics and chemistry, but now it is known to have a third aspect of information that along with the descendant constraints in its hierarchical organization makes emergentism possible within a reductionist’s framework.

Keywords  emergence - emergentism - hierarchy - life

◈ Krapivsky, P.L., S. Redner and F. Leyvraz (Nov. 2000). Connectivity of Growing Random Networks. Physical Review Letters 85: 4629–4632.

Received 8 May 2000

A solution for the time- and age-dependent connectivity distribution of a growing random network is presented. The network is built by adding sites that link to earlier sites with a probability A_k which depends on the number of preexisting links k to that site. For homogeneous connection kernels, A_k∼k^γ, different behaviors arise for γ<1, γ>1, and γ = 1. For γ<1, the number of sites with k links, N_k, varies as a stretched exponential. For γ>1, a single site connects to nearly all other sites. In the borderline case A_k∼k, the power law N_k∼k^-ν is found, where the exponent ν can be tuned to any value in the range 2<ν<∞.

▣ Kripke, Saul (1971). Identity and necessity. In: M.K. Munitz (ed.) Identity and Individuation. New York: University Press, pp. 135-164.

◈ Kronz, Frederick M., Justin T. Tiehen (June 2002). Emergence and quantum mechanics. Philosophy of Science 69(2): 324-347.

◈ Kubík, Aleš (Winter, 2003). Toward a formalization of emergence. Artificial Life 9(1): 41-65.

Abstract:  Emergence is a concept widely used in the sciences, the arts, and engineering. Some effort has been made to formalize it, but it is used in various contexts with different meanings, and a unified theory of emergence is still distant. The ultimate goal of a theory of emergence should include using emergence to model, design, or predict the behavior of multiagent systems. The author proposes a formal definition of a basic type of emergence using a language-theoretic and grammar systems approach. It is shown which types of phenomena can be modeled in this sense and what the consequences are for other more complex phenomena.

◈ Kuczynski, John-Michael (Dec. 2006). Two Concepts of "Form" and the So-Called Computational Theory of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19(6): 795-821.

Abstract:  According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are ambiguous, as they can refer to form in either the syntactic or the morphological sense. CTM fails on each disambiguation, and the arguments for CTM immediately cease to be compelling once we register that ambiguity. The terms 'mechanical' and 'automatic' are comparably ambiguous. Once these ambiguities are exposed, it turns out that there is no possibility of mechanizing thought, even if we confine ourselves to domains (such as first-order sentential logic) where all problems can be settled through decision-procedures. The impossibility of mechanizing thought thus has nothing to do with recherché mathematical theorems, such as those proven by Gödel and Rosser. A related point is that CTM involves, and is guilty of reinforcing, a misunderstanding of the concept of an algorithm.
 
Keywords:  Computational Theory Of Mind; Formal Operation; Jerry Fodor; Syntax; Token-Semantics

◈ Lau, Hakwan C., Robert D. Rogers and Richard E. Passingham (July 5, 2006). On Measuring the Perceived Onsets of Spontaneous Actions. The Journal of Neuroscience 26(27): 7265-7271.

Received July 25, 2005; revised April 30, 2006; accepted May 23, 2006.

Abstract:  We investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the timing procedure that was devised by Libet et al. (1983) to measure the onset of conscious motor intentions in spontaneous actions. We previously showed that, when participants were required to estimate the onset of their intentions using this procedure, the activity in the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) was enhanced. Here, we show that when participants were required to estimate the onset of their motor executions (instead of their intentions), the activity in the cingulate motor area was enhanced. Across participants, the degree of this neural enhancement was correlated with the degree of perceptual bias: the higher the degree of enhancement, the earlier the perception. Analysis of data from a previous experiment suggests that the same principle holds true for the relationship between the perceived onset of intentions and the activity in the pre-SMA. We therefore argue that the timing method of Libet et al. (1983) is problematic, because the measuring process affects the neural representations of action and thus also the perceived onsets that the method is designed to measure.

Key words:  attention; motor intention; motor; movement; motion; motor activity; fMRI; motor control

◈ Lau, Hakwan C., Robert D. Rogers and Richard E. Passingham (2007). Manipulating the experienced onset of intention after action execution. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19(1): 81-90.

Abstract:  Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we have tested the time needed for the perceived onset of spontaneous motor intention to be fully determined. We found that TMS applied over the presupplementary motor area after the execution of a simple spontaneous action shifted the perceived onset of the motor intention backward in time, and shifted the perceived time of action execution forward in time. The size of the effect was similar regardless of whether TMS was applied immediately after the action or 200 msec after. The results of three control studies suggest that this effect is time-limited, specific to modality, and also specific to the anatomical site of stimulation. We conclude that the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action. A model, which is based on the mechanism of cue integration under the presence of noise, is offered to explain the results. The implications for the conscious control of spontaneous actions are discussed.

◈ Lau, Hakwan C., Robert D. Rogers, Patrick Haggard and Richard E. Passingham (Feb. 20, 2004). Attention to intention. Science 303(5661): 1208-1210.

Abstract:  Intention is central to the concept of voluntary action. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we compared conditions in which participants made self-paced actions and attended either to their intention to move or to the actual movement. When they attended to their intention rather than their movement, there was an enhancement of activity in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). We also found activations in the right dorsal prefrontal cortexand left intraparietal cortex. Prefrontal activity, but not parietal activity, was more strongly coupled with activity in the pre-SMA. We conclude that activity in the pre-SMA reflects the representation of intention.

◆ Laureys, Steven (ed.) (Aug. 2005). The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology (Progress in Brain Research, Volume 150). Elsevier Science.

 

▣ Lee, David H., Kay Severin, Yohei Yokobayashi and M. Reza Ghadiri (Dec. 1997). Emergence of symbiosis in peptide self-replication through a hypercyclic network. Nature 390(6660): 591-594 (Issue of Dec. 11, 1997).

Received 20 June 1997; Accepted 20 October 1997

Symbiosis is an association between different organisms that leads to a reciprocal enhancement of their ability to survive. Similar mutually beneficial relationships can operate at the molecular level in the form of a hypercycle, a collective of two or more self-replicating species interlinked through a cyclic catalytic network^{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The superposition of cross-catalysis onto autocatalytic replication integrates the members of the hypercycle into a single system that reproduces through a second-order (or higher) form of nonlinear autocatalysis. The hypercycle population as a whole is therefore able to compete more efficiently for existing resources than any one member on its own. In addition, the effects of beneficial mutations of any one member are spread over the entire population. The formation of hypercycles has been suggested as an important step in the transition from inanimate to living chemistry⁶ , and a large number of hypercycles are expected to be embedded within the complex networks of living systems⁷. But only one naturally occurring hypercycle has been well documented⁸, while two autocatalytic chemical systems may contain vestiges of hypercyclic organization⁹,¹⁰. Here we report a chemical system that constitutes a clear example of a minimal hypercyclic network, in which two otherwise competitive self-replicating peptides symbiotically catalyse each others' production.

■ Le Poidevin, Robin (2005). Missing Elements and Missing Premises: A Combinatorial Argument for the Ontological Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(1): 117–134. (doi:10.1093/phisci/axi106)

Abstract: Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means ‘Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?’, recent discussions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. But supposing that kind of reduction—‘epistemological reduction’—to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap.

▣ Lewes, G.H. (1875). Problems of Life and Mind. Vol. 2. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Turbner, & Co.

◈ Libet, Benjamin, Elwood W. Wright, Bertram Feinstein, Jr and Dennis K. Pearl (Mar. 1979). Subjective referral of the timing for a conscious sensory experience: A functional role for the somatosensory specific projection system in man. Brain 102: 193-224.

◈ Libet, Benjamin, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl (Sep. 1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106(3): 623-642.

Received July 20, 1982. Revised December 14, 1982.

Abstract:  The recordable cerebral activity (readiness-potential, RP) that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act was directly compared with the reportable time (W) for appearance of the subjective experience of ‘wanting’ or intending to act. The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. This relationship held even for those series (with ‘type II’ RPs) in which subjects reported that all of the 40 self-initiated movements in the series appeared ‘spontaneously’ and capriciously.

Data were obtained in at least 6 different experimental sessions with each of 5 subjects. In series with type II RPs, onset of the main negative shift in each RP preceded the corresponding mean W value by an average of about 350 ms, and by a minimum of about 150 ms. In series with type I RPs, in which an experience of preplanning occurred in some of the 40 self-initiated acts, onset of RP preceded W by an average of about 800 ms (or by 500 ms, taking onset of RP at 90 per cent of its area).

Reports of W time depended upon the subject's recall of the spatial ‘clock-position’ of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of wanting or intending to move. Two different modes of recall produced similar values. Subjects distinguished awareness of wanting to move (W) from awareness of actually moving (M). W times were consistently and substantially negative to, in advance of, mean times reported for M and also those for S, the sensation elicited by a task-related skin stimulus delivered at irregular times that were unknown to the subject.

It is concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been initiated cerebrally. This introduces certain constraints on the potentiality for conscious initiation and control of voluntary acts.

◈ Libet, Benjamin, Dennis K. Pearl, David E. Morledge, Curtis A. Gleason, Yoshio Hosobuchi and Nicholas M. Barbaro (Aug. 1991). Control of the transition from sensory detection to sensory awareness in man by the duration of a thalamic stimulus: The cerebral ‘time-on’ factor. Brain 114(4): 1731-1757.

Received June 19, 1990. Revised October 30, 1990. Accepted December 6, 1990.

Summary:  A ‘time-on’ theory to explain the cerebral distinction between conscious and unconscious mental functions proposes that a substantial minimum duration (‘time-on’) of appropriate neuronal activations up to about 0.5 s is required to elicit conscious sensory experience, but that durations distinctly below that minimum can mediate sensory detection without awareness. A direct experimental test of this proposal is reported here.

Stimuli (72 pulses/s) above and below such minimum train durations (0–750 ms) were delivered to the ventrobasal thalamus via electrodes chronically implanted for the therapeutic control of intractable pain. Detection was measured by the subject's forced choice as to stimulus delivery in one of two intervals, regardless of any presence or absence of sensory awareness. Subjects also indicated their awareness level of any stimulus-induced sensation in each and every trial. The results show (1) that detection (correct > 50%) occurred even with stimulus durations too brief to elicit awareness, and (2) that to move from mere detection to even an uncertain and often questionable sensory awareness required a significantly larger additional duration of pulses. Thus simply increasing duration (‘time-on’) of the same repetitive inputs to cerebral cortex can convert an unconscious cognitive mental function (detection without awareness) to a conscious one (detection with awareness).

◈ Linde, Andrei (Nov. 8, 2002). Inflation, quantum cosmology and the anthropic principle. Published in Johh D. Barrow, Paul C.W. Davies and Charles L. Harper, Jr. eds. (June, 2004). Science and Ultimate Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity (honoring John Wheeler's 90th birthday). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 426-458).

◈ Litt, Abninder, Chris Eliasmith, Frederick W. Kroon, Steven Weinstein and Paul Thagard (2006). Is the brain a quantum computer, Cognitive Science 30(3): 593-603.

http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/litt%20et%20al.2006.quantum%20brain.cogsci.pdf

☞ see A reply from Stuart R. Hameroff, a Pioneer and Researcher of Quantum Consciousness whom Abninder Litt et al. criticize.

◈ Lloyd, Seth (2000). Ultimate physical limits to computation. Nature 406: 1047-1054 (Issue of Aug. 31, 2000).

◈ Lloyd, Seth (June 10, 2002). Computational capacity of the universe. Physical Review Letters 88(23): 237901-4.

▣ Logan, Robert K. (2006) The extended mind model of the origin of language and culture. In: Nathalie, Gontier, Jean Paul van Bendegem and Diederik Aerts (eds.) (2006). Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach. Dordrecht: Springer.

▣ Logan, Robert K. (Sep. 2007). The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, the Human Mind, and Culture (Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

The ability to communicate through language is such a fundamental part of human existence that we often take it for granted, rarely considering how sophisticated the process is by which we understand and make ourselves understood. In The Extended Mind, acclaimed author Robert K. Logan examines the origin, emergence, and co-evolution of language, the human mind, and culture.

Building on his previous study, The Sixth Language (2000) and making use of emergence theory, Logan seeks to explain how language emerged to deal with the complexity of hominid existence brought about by tool-making, control of fire, social intelligence, coordinated hunting and gathering, and mimetic communication. The resulting emergence of language, he argues, signifies a fundamental change in the functioning of the human mind – a shift from percept-based thought to concept-based thought.

From the perspective of the Extended Mind model, Logan provides an alternative to and critique of Noam Chomsky’s approach to the origin of language. He argues that language can be treated as an organism that evolved to be easily acquired, obviating the need for the hard-wiring of Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device. In addition Logan shows how, according to this model, culture itself can be treated as an organism that has evolved to be easily attained, revealing the universality of human culture as well as providing an insight as to how altruism might have originated. Bringing timely insights to a fascinating field of inquiry, The Extended Mind will be sure to find a wide readership.

Robert K. Logan is a professor emeritus in the Department of Physics at the University of Toronto.

http://www.utppublishing.com/pubstore/merchant.ihtml?pid=8841&step=4

■ Lombardi, Olimpia and Martín Labarca (Jan. 2005). The Ontological Autonomy of The Chemical World. Foundations of Chemistry 7(2): 125-148.

Abstract:  In the problem of the relationship between chemistry and physics, many authors take for granted the ontological reduction of the chemical world to the world of physics. The autonomy of chemistry is usually defended on the basis of the failure of epistemological reduction: not all chemical concepts and laws can be derived from the theoretical framework of physics. The main aim of this paper is to argue that this line of argumentation is not strong enough for eliminate the idea of a hierarchical dependence of chemistry with respect to physics. The rejection of the secondary position of chemistry and the defense of the legitimacy of the philosophy of chemistry require a radically different philosophical perspective that denies not only epistemological reduction but also ontological reduction. Only on the basis of a philosophically grounded ontological pluralism it is possible to accept the ontological autonomy of the chemical world and, with this, to reverse the traditional idea of the ‘superiority’ of physics in the context of natural sciences.

◇ Looijen, Rick C. (Richard Christiaan) (2000/2007). Holism and Reductionism in Biology and Ecology: The Mutual Dependence of Higher and Lower Level Research Programmes. (Episteme Series Vol. 23). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers/Berlin: Springer.

About this book

Holism and reductionism are traditionally seen as incompatible views or approaches to nature. Here Looijen argues that they should rather be seen as mutually dependent and hence co-operating research programmes. He sheds some interesting new light on the emergence thesis, its relation to the reduction thesis, and on the role and status of functional explanations in biology. He discusses several examples of reduction in both biology and ecology, showing the mutual dependence of holistic and reductionist research programmes. Ecologists are offered separate chapters, clarifying some major, yet highly and controversial ecological concepts, such as `community', `habitat', and `niche'. The book is the first in-depth study of the philosophy of ecology.

Table of contents

Preface

Introduction

Part 1: Reduction and co-operation in biology

1. Holism and reductionism

2. Reduction of laws and theories

3. Reduction of concepts

4. Emergence, reduction and co-operating research programmes

5. Co-operating research programmes: reduction of the Bohr effect

6. Functional explanations in biology

Part 2: Reduction and co-operation in ecology

7. The reduction problem in ecology

8. Ecological communities: conceptual problems and definition

9. The distinction between habitat and niche

10. The reduction of the Lotka/Volterra competition model to modern niche theory

11. Co-operation in island biogeography

12. The inhibitory effect of the holism-reductionism dispute: a controversy in island biogeography and its solution

Epilogue

Notes

References

Name Index

▣ Looren de Jong, Huib (Dec. 2002). Levels of explanation in biological psychology. Philosophical Psychology. 15(4): 441-462.

Abstract:  Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent with elimination. In comparison with the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology has developed more subtle and complex ideas about functions, laws, and reductive explanation than the stark dichotomy of autonomy or elimination. It has been argued that biology is a patchwork of local laws, each with different explanatory interests and more or less limited scope. This points to a pluralistic, domain-specific and multi-level view of explanations in biology. Explanatory pluralism has been proposed as an alternative to eliminativism on the one hand and methodological dualism on the other hand. It holds that theories at different levels of description, like psychology and neuroscience, can co-evolve, and mutually influence each other, without the higher-level theory being replaced by, or reduced to, the lower-level one. Such ideas seem to tally with the pluralistic character of biological explanation. In biological psychology, explanatory pluralism would lead us to expect many local and non-reductive interactions between biological, neurophysiological, psychological and evolutionary explanations of mind and behavior. This idea is illustrated by an example from behavioral genetics, where genetics, physiology and psychology constitute distinct but interrelated levels of explanation. Accounting for such a complex patchwork of related explanations seems to require a more sophisticated and precise way of looking at levels than the existing ideas on (reductive and non-reductive) explanation in the philosophy of mind.

▣ Looren de Jong, Huib (June 1, 2003). Causal and Functional Explanations. Theory and Psychology 13(3): 291 - 317.

Abstract:  Functional explanation, for long the mainstay of psychology's autonomy, has recently come under attack. It is sometimes argued that higher-level generalizations are causally impotent, and do not really explain anything. Presumably only the reduction of higher-level patterns to underlying causal physical properties, and the specifying of lower-level, local causal mechanisms, provides genuine explanations. Two lines of argument are critically discussed: causal exclusion and multiple realization. These bear upon the credibility of functional explanation, and upon the presumed explanatory superiority of causal mechanisms over functional higher-level generalizations. It is argued that the causal exclusion argument conflates metaphysics with explanation, and that, rather than pointing towards reductionism, multiple realization indicates the indispensability of higher (functional) generalizations, alongside lower (causal) explanations; the choice for higher or lower level depends on context and explanatory interest. The notion of screening-off suggests a criterion for the legitimacy of higher-level characterizations. A brief example from the history of genetics is discussed to illustrate these ideas. This leads to a plea for pluralism in explanation.

Key Words: causal explanation • cognitive science • functional explanation • genetics • multiple realization • reduction • screening-off • supervenience

◆ Lovejoy, A.O. (1927). The meanings of "emergence" and its modes. In: E. S. Brightman (ed.) Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. Longmans, Green, and Co.

◈ Lowe, E. Jonathan (Oct. 2000). Causal closure principles and emergentism. Philosophy 75(4): 571-585.

Published online by Cambridge University Press 11 Dec. 2000

Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.

◈ Lowe, E. Jonathan (Dec. 2006). Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis 65(1): 5-23.

Published online: 17 October 2006

Abstract:  Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level.

◆ Lowry, Ann (Apr. 1974). A Note on Emergence. Mind, New Series, Vol. 83, No. 330: 276-277.

◇ Lucas, John R. (1995). The Unity of Science without Reductionism. Acta Analytica 10(15):

Abstract: The Unity of Science is often thought to be reductionist, but this is because we fail to distinguish questions from answers. The questions asked by different sciences are different - the biologist is interested in different topics from the physicist, and seeks different explanations - but the answers are not peculiar to each particular science, and can range over the whole of scientific knowledge. The biologist is interested in organisms - concept unknown to physics - but explains physiological processes in terms of chemistry, not a mysterious vital force. The replacement of Laplacian determinism by quantum mechanics further erodes the tendency towards reductionism. The answers given in different explanations are not subsumed under one complete theory; and quantum mechanics does not have a concept of haecceitas, "this-i-ness" which would make its entities the fundamental constituents of everything.

◈ Luisi, Pier Luigi (Oct. 2004). Emergence in Chemistry: Chemistry as the Embodiment of Emergence. Foundations of Chemistry 4(3): 183-200.

Abstract:  The main aim of the paper is to reinforce the notion that emergence is a basic characteristic of the molecular sciences in general and chemistry in particular. Although this point is well accepted, even in the primary reference on emergence, the keyword emergence is rarely utilized by chemists and molecular biologists and chemistry textbooks for undergraduates. The possible reasons for this situation are discussed. The paper first re-introduces the concept of emergence based on very simple geometrical forms; and considers some simple chemical examples among low and high molecular weight compounds. On the basis of these chemical examples, a few interesting philosophical issues inherent to the field of emergence are discussed – again making the point that such examples, given their clarity and simplicity, permit one to better understand the complex philosophical issues. Thus, the question of predictability is discussed, namely whether and to what extent can emergent properties be predicted on the basis of the component’s properties; or the question of the explicability (a top down process). The relation between reductionism and emergentism is also discussed as well as the notion of downward causality and double causality (macrodeterminism); namely the question whether and to what extent the emergent properties of the higher hierarchic level affect the properties of the lower level components. Finally, the question is analyzed, whether life can be considered as an emergent property. More generally, the final point is made, that the re-introduction of the notion of emergence in chemistry, and in particular in the teaching, may bring about a deeper understanding of the meaning of chemical complexity and may bring chemistry closer to the humanistic areas of philosophy and epistemology.

 

This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.

◈ Luisi, Pier Luigi (2006). The emergence of life: From chemical origins to synthetic biology. Cambridge University Press.

◇ Lyon, Caroline, Chrystopher L. Nehaniv and Angelo Cangelosi (eds.) (Feb. 2007). Emergence of Communication and Language. Springer.

Old questions on the origins of language and communication are illuminated here in new, state-of-the-art research.

This volume brings together studies from diverse disciplines, showing how they can inform and stimulate each other. It includes work in linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, anthropology and computer science. New empirical work is reported on both human and animal communication, using some novel techniques that have only recently become viable.

A principal theme is the importance of studies involving artificial agents, their contribution to the body of knowledge on the emergence of communication and language, and the role of simulations in exploring some of the most significant issues. A number of different synthetic systems are described, demonstrating how communication can emerge in natural and artificial organisms. Theories on the origins of language are supported by computational and robotic experiments.

Worldwide contributors to this volume include some of the most influential figures in the field, delivering essential reading for researchers and graduates in the area, as well as providing fascinating insights for a wider readership.

Caroline Lyon is a Senior Lecturer in Computer Science at the University of Hertfordshire. Her research and publications include work on the evolution of language, speech recognition, applications of neural networks and textual analysis. Chrystopher L. Nehaniv is Research Professor of Mathematical and Evolutionary Computer Science at the University of Hertfordshire and Director of the U.K. Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council Network on Evolvability in Biological and Software Systems. Angelo Cangelosi is Reader in Artificial Intelligence and Cognition at the University of Plymouth. He is the editor of Simulating the Evolution of Language (Springer, 2002).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Contributors ix

INTRODUCTION

1. Current Work and Open Problems: A Road-Map for Research into the Emergence of Communication and Language

Chrystopher L. Nehaniv, Caroline Lyon, and Angelo Cangelosi. . . . . 1

PART I EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS ON HUMAN LANGUAGE

2. Evolving Meaning: The Roles of Kin Selection, Allomothering and Paternal Care in Language Evolution

W. Tecumseh Fitch. . . . . 29

3. ‘Needs only’ Analysis in Linguistic Ontogeny and Phylogeny

Alison Wray. . . . . 53

4. Clues from Information Theory Indicating a Phased Emergence of Grammar

Caroline Lyon, Chrystopher L. Nehaniv, and Bob Dickerson. . . . . 71

5. Emergence of a Communication System: International Sign

Rachel Rosenstock. . . . . 87

6. Distributed Language: Biomechanics, Functions, and the Origins of Talk

Stephen J. Cowley. . . . . 105

PART II SYNTHESIS OF COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE IN ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS

7. The Recruitment Theory of Language Origins

Luc Steels. . . . . 129

8. In silico Evolutionary Developmental Neurobiology and the Origin of Natural Language

Eörs Szathmáry, Zoltán Szatmáry, Péter Ittzés, Gergö Orban, István Zachár, Ferenc Huszár, Anna Fedor, Máté Varga, Szabolcs Számadó. . . . . 151

9. Communication in Natural and Artificial Organisms: Experiments in Evolutionary Robotics

Davide Marocco and Stefano Nolfi. . . . . 189

10. From Vocal Replication to Shared Combinatorial Speech Codes: A Small Step for Evolution, A Big Step for Language

Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. . . . . 207

11. Learning and Transition of Symbols: Towards a Dynamical Model of a Symbolic Individual

Takashi Hashimoto and Akira Masumi . . . . . 223

12. Language Change among ‘Memoryless Learners’ Simulated in Language Dynamics Equations

Makoto Nakamura, Takashi Hashimoto, and Satoshi Tojo. . . . . 237

13. The Evolution of Meaning-Space Structure through Iterated Learning

Simon Kirby. . . . . 253

14. The Emergence of Language: How to Simulate It

Domenico Parisi and Marco Mirolli. . . . . 269

15. Lexical Acquisition with and without Metacommunication

Jonathan Ginzburg and Zoran Macura. . . . . 287

16. Agent Based Modelling of Communication Costs: Why Information Can Be Free

Ivana Čače and Joanna J. Bryson. . . . . 305

17. Language Change and the Inference of Meaning

Andrew D. M. Smith. . . . . 323

18. Language, Perceptual Categories and their Interaction: Insights from Computational Modelling

Tony Belpaeme and Joris Bleys. . . . . 339

PART III INSIGHTS FROM ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

19. Emergence of Linguistic Communication: Studies on Grey Parrots

Irene M. Pepperberg. . . . . 355

20. A Possible Role for Selective Masking in the Evolution of Complex, Learned Communication Systems

Graham R. S. Ritchie and Simon Kirby. . . . . 387

21. The Natural History of Human Language: Bridging the Gaps without Magic

Bjorn Merker and Kazuo Okanoya. . . . . 403

22. Neural Substrates for String-Context Mutual Segmentation: A Path to Human Language

Kazuo Okanoya and Bjorn Merker. . . . . 421

Index 435

Sample pages: download 1846284910-c2.pdf (pdf, 221 Kb)

http://www.springer.com/east/home/generic/search/results?SGWID=5-40109-22-172423533-0

◈ Lyons, Jack C. (Dec. 2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19(6): 767-794.

Abstract:  Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive physicalism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive physicalism does not imply epiphenomenalism but because the epiphenomenalist implication is actually a virtue of the theory, rather than a vice. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
 
Keywords:  Functionalism; Epiphenomenalism; Nonreductive Physicalism; Type Materialism; Mental Causation; Reduction

■ Macdonald, Cynthia (Apr. 2007). Critical notices: PHYSICALISM, OR SOMETHING NEAR ENOUGH. Philosophical Books 48 (2): 155–161. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00439.x)

◇ Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (Nov. 2007). The Metaphysics of Mental Causation. The Journal of Philosophy 103(11):

A Draft of this paper:

www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/cynthia_macdonald/publications/mmcfinal.pdf

First two paragraphs of the Draft:

◈ Macgregor, R.J. (Sep. 2006). Quantum mechanics and brain uncertainty. Journal of integrative neuroscience 5(3): 373-80.

This paper argues that molecular governing structures (such as receptors, gating molecules, or ionic channels) which operate pervasively in the brain, often with small number particle systems (as, for example, at the surfaces of membranes, synaptic clefts, or macromolecules), may plausibly be vehicles for the transmutation of quantum mechanical fluctuations to normal-level neural signaling.

◆ Mackenzie, W.L. (1926). The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6: 56-68.

◈ Maclennan, B. J. (2001). The emergence of communication through synthetic evolution. Published pp. 65-90 in: M. Patel, V. Honavar & K. Balakrishnan (eds.) Advances in the Evolutionary Synthesis of Intelligent Agents. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

◈ MacWhinney, Brian (Dec. 2006). Emergentism—Use Often and With Care. Applied Linguistics 27(4): 729-740.

☞ see also Ke Jinyun and John H. Holland's paper that deals with the language origin from an emergentist perspective.

◇ MacWhinney, Brian (ed.) (Feb. 1999). The Emergence of Language (Carnegie Mellon Symposia Cognition Series). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

About the book

For nearly four centuries, our understanding of human development has been controlled by the debate between nativism and empiricism. Nowhere has the contrast between these apparent alternatives been sharper than in the study of language acquisition. However, as more is learned about the details of language learning, it is found that neither nativism nor empiricism provides guidance about the ways in which complexity arises from the interaction of simpler developmental forces. For example, the child's first guesses about word meanings arise from the interplay between parental guidance, the child's perceptual preferences, and neuronal support for information storage and retrieval‎. As soon as the shape of the child's lexicon emerges from these more basic forces, an exploration of "emergentism" as a new alternative to nativism and empiricism is ready to begin.

This book presents a series of emergentist accounts of language acquisition. Each case shows how a few simple, basic processes give rise to new levels of language complexity. The aspects of language examined here include auditory representations, phonological and articulatory processes, lexical semantics, ambiguity processing, grammaticality judgment, and sentence comprehension. The approaches that are invoked to account formally for emergent patterns include neural network theory, dynamic systems, linguistic functionalism, construction grammar, optimality theory, and statistically-driven learning. The excitement of this work lies both in the discovery of new emergent patterns and in the integration of theoretical frameworks that can formalize the theory of emergentism.

Table of contents

Preface

J.L. Elman, The Emergence of Language: A Conspiracy Theory.

E. Bates, J.C. Goodman, On the Emergence of Grammar From the Lexicon.

T. Givón, Generativity and Variation: The Notion 'Rule of Grammar' Revisited.

J. Allen, M.S. Seidenberg, The Emergence of Grammaticality in Connectionist Networks.

R. Miikkulainen, M.R. Mayberry, III, Disambiguation and Grammar as Emergent Soft Constraints.

M.C. MacDonald, Distributional Information in Language Comprehension, Production, and Acquisition: Three Puzzles and a Moral.

A.E. Goldberg, The Emergence of the Semantics of Argument Structure Constructions.

B. MacWhinney, The Emergence of Language From Embodiment.

C.E. Snow, Social Perspectives on the Emergence of Language.

L.B. Smith, Children's Noun Learning: How General Learning Processes Make Specialized Learning Mechanisms.

R.M. Golinkoff, K. Hirsh-Pasek, G. Hollich, Emergent Cues for Early Word Learning.

W.E. Merriman, Competition, Attention, and Young Children's Lexical Processing.

R.N. Aslin, J.R. Saffran, E.L. Newport, Statistical Learning in Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Domains.

D.C. Plaut, C.T. Kello, The Emergence of Phonology From the Interplay of Speech Comprehension and Production: A Distributed Connectionist Approach.

J.P. Stemberger, B.H. Bernhardt, The Emergence of Faithfulness.

P. Gupta, G.S. Dell, The Emergence of Language From Serial Order and Procedural Memory.

◈ Mainzer, Klaus (2003). Thinking in Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind. (4th edition). Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer.

◈ Mainzer, Klaus (2005). Symmetry and Complexity: The Spirit and Beauty of Nonlinear Science. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.

 

◈ Mainzer, Klaus (in press). The Emergence of Mind and Brain. An Evolutionary, Computational, and Philosophical Approach. In Bikas K. Chakrabarti and Rahul Banerjee eds. Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Abstract:  Modern philosophy of mind cannot be understood without recent developments in computer science, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, neuroscience, biology, linguistics, and psychology. Classical philosophy of formal languages as well as symbolic AI assume that all kinds of knowledge must explicitly be represented by formal or programming languages. This assumption is limited by recent insights into the biology of evolution and developmental psychology of the human organism. Most of our knowledge is implicit and unconscious. It is not formally represented, but embodied knowledge, which is learnt by doing and understood by bodily interacting with changing environments. That is true not only of low level skills, but even for high level domains of categorization, language and abstract thinking. The embodied mind is considered an emergent capacity of the brain as a self-organizing complex system. Actually, self-organization has been a successful strategy of evolution to handle the increasing complexity of the world. Genetic programs are not sufficient and cannot prepare for all kinds of complex situations in the future. Self-organization and emergence are fundamental concepts in the theory of complex dynamical systems. They are also applied in organic computing as a recent research field of computer science. Therefore, cognitive science, AI, and robotics try to model the embodied mind in an artificial evolution. The paper analyses these approaches in the interdisciplinary framework of complex dynamical systems and discusses their philosophical impact.

◇ Malaterre, Christophe (Mar. 2007). Organicism and Reductionism in Cancer Research: Towards a Systemic Approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21(1): 57-73. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590701305792)

Abstract: In recent cancer research, strong and apparently conflicting epistemological stances have been advocated by different research teams in a mist of an ever-growing body of knowledge ignited by ever-more perplexing and non-conclusive experimental facts: in the past few years, an 'organicist' approach investigating cancer development at the tissue level has challenged the established and so-called 'reductionist' approach focusing on disentangling the genetic and molecular circuitry of carcinogenesis. This article reviews the ways in which 'organicism' and 'reductionism' are used and opposed in this context, with an aim at clarifying the debate. Methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of both approaches are discussed. We argue that the 'organicist/reductionist' opposition in the present case of carcinogenesis is more a matter of diverging heuristics than a claim about theoretical or ontological (ir)reducibility. As a matter of fact, except for the downward causation claim, which we question, we argue that the organicist arguments are compatible with the reductionist approach. Moreover, we speculate that both approaches, which currently focus on specific entities i.e., genes versus tissues, will need to shift their conceptual frameworks to studying complex arrays of relationships potentially ranging over several levels of entities, as is the case with 'systems biology'.

◇ Marcum, James A. (Mar. 2005). Metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices: Reductionism and organicism in cancer research. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19(1): 31-45. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590500051076)

Abstract: Metaphysical presuppositions are important for guiding scientific practices and research. The success of twentieth-century biology, for instance, is largely attributable to presupposing that complex biological processes are reducible to elementary components. However, some biologists have challenged the sufficiency of reductionism for investigating complex biological phenomena and have proposed alternative presuppositions like organicism. In this article, contemporary cancer research is used as a case study to explore the importance of metaphysical presuppositions for guiding research. The predominant paradigm directing cancer research is the somatic mutation theory, in which mutated genes are presumed to be ultimately responsible for explaining carcinogenesis. This reductionistic approach to cancer has been criticised recently, and an organistic approach has been proposed. The article concludes with a discussion of the reciprocal interaction of metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices for investigating cancer's complex nature.

◈ Marcus, Eric (2005). Mental causation in a physical world. Synthese 122(1): 27-50.

Abstract:  It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but hold that Completeness, together with certain plausible assumptions, entails Closure. I refute the most fully worked-out version of such an argument. Finally, some find Completeness all by itself threatening to mental causation. I argue that one will only find Completeness threatening if one operates with a philosophically distorted conception of mental causation. I thereby defend what I call naïve realism about mental causation.

http://www.auburn.edu/~marcuea/MCPWsamp.pdf

◆ Margolis, J. (1986). Emergence. Philosophical Forum 17: 271-295.

◈ Margulis, Lynn (Apr. 2001). The conscious cell. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929(1): 55-70.

◇ Markič, Olga (2004). Causal Emergentism. Acta Analytica 19(33):

Abstract: In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper's emergentist theory of consciousness and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper's theory belong to strong causal emergentism and yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science. Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces genuine new mental causal powers and genuine downward causation, while weak emergentism provides new insights in understanding the mechanisms and explanation that is compatible with physicalism.

▣ Marras, Ausonio (Apr. 1993). Supervenience and Reducibility: An Odd Couple. Philosophical Quarterly 43(171):215–222.

▣ Marras, Ausonio (Sep. 1998). Kim’s Principle of Explanatory Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(3):439–451.

▣ Marras, Ausonio (2000). Critical Notice of Mind in a Physical World. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30: 137–160.

◈ Marras, Ausonio (2002). Kim on reduction. Erkenntnis 57(2): 231-257.

Abstract:  In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.

▣ Marras, Ausonio (2005). Consciousness and Reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(2): 335–361.

A number of philosophers—among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kim—have claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction (regarded by Kim as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian model) which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show that this is an unreasonable requirement—a requirement that no reductive explanation in science should be expected to satisfy. I argue that the functional model is not substantively different from the Nagelian model properly understood, and that the question whether consciousness is reductively explainable—in a sense involving property identifications or in some weaker sense compatible with Nagelian reduction—is a fundamentally empirical question, not one that can be settled on conceptual grounds alone.

◈ Marras, Ausonio (2006). Emergence and reduction: Reply to Kim. Synthese 151(3): 561-569.

Published online: 15 August 2006

 

Abstract:  In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists.

Keywords:  Emergence - Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductive physicalism - Reduction - Reductive explanation - Supervenience

▣ Marras, Ausonio (May 2007). Kim’s Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 66(3): 305-327.

Received: 19 January 2006  Accepted: 8 December 2006  Published online: 2 February 2007

Abstract:  The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs. nonreductive physicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated.

 

Keywords:  Kim - nonreductive physicalism - supervenience - mental causation

◈ Maturana, Humberto R. and Franciso J. Varela (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston: Reidel. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume 42. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

◆ Maturana, Humberto R. and Franciso J. Varela (1993). The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Shambhala Publications, Inc.

 

☞ 한국어판『앎의 나무』는 중요한 철학적/인지과학적 개념 중 몇 가지를 부적절하게 번역했음.

차후에 이 한국어판의 번역을 비판할 것임.

▣ Maynard Smith, John (2000). The concept of information in biology. Philosophy of Science 67:177–194.

◈ McClamrock, Ron (1993). Emergence unscathed: Kim on non-reducible types. The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.

http://www.albany.edu/~ron/papers/Kim-ejap.html

◈ McDonough, Richard (2002). Emergence and Creativity: Five Degrees of Freedom. In Terry Dartnell (ed.) Creativity, Cognition and Knowledge: An Interaction. Westport CT: Praeger, 283-320.

◈ McFadden, Johnjoe (2002). Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain's electromagnetic field: Evidence for an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(4): 23-50.

Abstract:  The human brain consists of approximately 100 billion electrically active neurones that generate an endogenous electromagnetic (em) field, whose role in neuronal computing has not been fully examined. The source, magnitude and likely influence of the brain’s endogenous em field are here considered. An estimate of the strength and magnitude of the brain’s em field is gained from theoretical considerations, brain scanning and microelectrode data. An estimate of the likely influence of the brain’s em field is gained from theoretical principles and considerations of the experimental effects of external em fields on neurone firing both in vitro and in vivo. Synchronous firing of distributed neurones phase-locks induced em field fluctuations to increase their magnitude and influence. Synchronous firing has previously been demonstrated to correlate with awareness and perception, indicating that perturbations to the brain’s em field also correlate with awareness. The brain’s em field represents an integrated electromagnetic field representation of distributed neuronal information and has dynamics that closely map to those expected for a correlate of consciousness. I propose that the brain’s em information field is the physical substrate of conscious awareness — the cemi field — and make a number of predictions that follow from this proposal. Experimental evidence pertinent to these predictions is examined and shown to be entirely consistent with the cemi field theory. This theory provides solutions to many of the intractable problems of consciousness — such as the binding problem — and provides new insights into the role of consciousness, the meaning of free will and the nature of qualia. It thus places consciousness within a secure physical framework and provides a route towards constructing an artificial consciousness.

◈ McFadden, Johnjoe (2002). The conscious electromagnetic information (Cemi) field theory: The Hard Problem made easy? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(8): 45-60.

Abstract:  In the April 2002 edition of JCS I outlined the conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory, claiming that consciousness is that component of the brain’s electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neurons and is thereby capable of communicating its informational content to the outside world. In this paper I demonstrate that the theory is robust to criticisms. I further explore implications of the theory particularly as regards the relationship between electromagnetic fields, information, the phenomenology of consciousness and the meaning of free will. Using cemi field theory I propose a working hypothesis that shows, among other things, that awareness and information represent the same phenomenon viewed from different reference frames.

◈ McIntyre, Lee (1999). The emergence of the philosophy of chemistry. Foundations of Chemistry 1(1): 57-63.

◈ McIntyre, Lee (Apr. 2002). Supervenience and explanatory exclusion. Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Vol. 34, No. 100: 87–101.

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pdf/C100/C100lee.pdf

Abstract: This paper argues that there is an inconsistency between Jaegwon Kim's earlier work on supervenience and his more recent work on explanatory exclusion. In his work on supervenience Kim advocates an explanatory agnosticism that, by the time of his later work, is replaced by an endorsement of reductive explanation. My argument is that this tension between Kim's early and later work is unfortunate since explanatory exclusion is highly questionable in its own right and is not reconcilable with his earlier work on supervenience anyway.

Keywords: supervenience, explanatory exclusion, reductionism, Jaegwon Kim

◈ McIntyre, Lee (Apr, 2007). Emergence and reduction in chemistry: ontological or epistemological concepts? Synthese 155(3): 337-343.

Received: 8 May 2006  Accepted: 30 August 2006  Published online: 21 November 2006

Abstract:  In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts.

 

Keywords:  Philosophy of Chemistry - Emergence - Reduction - Ontology - Epistemology

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. Published pp. 49-93 in: Beckermann, Ansgar, Hans Flohr, Jaegwon Kim (eds.) Emergence or Reduction? - Essays on the Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyte.

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (1995). Varieties of Supervenience. Published pp. 16-59 in: E. Savellos, and U. Yalcin (eds.) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (1997). Emergence and Supervenience. Intellectica 25: 25-43.

http://www.utc.fr/arco/publications/intellectica

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (1999). Emergence. Published pp. 267-269 in: Robert. A. Wilson, and Frank C. Keil (eds.) The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (2003). Vitalism and Emergence. Published pp. 631-39 in: T. Baldwin (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ McLaughlin, Brian P. (Forthcoming). A Primer on Supervenience.

◆ Meehl, Paul E. and Wilfrid Sellars (1956). The Concept of Emergence.  In: Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. University of Minnesota Press, pp. 239-252.

First Paragraph:  Somewhat over a quarter of a century ago, Professor Stephen Pepper published a paper on "Emergence"{1} which was (and still is) symptomatic of a certain way of thinking on this topic. The paper had the virtues of brevity and clarity, and, which is more important, it went to the heart of the matter. The fact that the crucial step in its argument is a simple non sequitur by no means detracts from its diagnostic value as a document in the controversy over emergence.

http://www.ditext.com/sellars/ce.html

◈ Meijers, Anthonie W.M. (2000). Mental causation and Searle's impossible conception of unconscious intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8(2): 155-170.

◇ Mellor, Hugh, and Tim Crane (1990). There Is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99: 185 206.

◇ Merker, Bjorn (Feb. 2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 63-81. (doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07000891)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 01 May 2007

Abstract: A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain – spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data – is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain – culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals – came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone.

Key Words: action selection; anencephaly; central decision making; consciousness; control architectures; hydranencephaly; macrosystems; motivation; target selection; zona incerta.

☞ see Open Peer Commentaries from many specialists in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 81-110.

◇ Merker, Bjorn (Feb. 2007). Author's Response - Grounding consciousness: The mesodiencephalon as thalamocortical base. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 110-120. (doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07001173)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 01 May 2007

Abstract: My response addresses general commentary themes such as my neglect of the forebrain contribution to human consciousness, the bearing of blindsight on consciousness theory, the definition of wakefulness, the significance of emotion and pain perception for consciousness theory, and concerns regarding remnant cortex in children with hydranencephaly. Further specific topics, such as phenomenal and phylogenetic aspects of mesodiencephalic-thalamocortical relations, are also discussed.

◈ Merricks, Trenton (Jan. 1998). Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Mind 107(425): 59-71.

◈ Metzinger, Thomas (ed.) (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Empirical and Conceptual Questions
Edited by Thomas Metzinger

	Preface Sample Chapter - Download PDF (24 KB)
1	Introduction: Consciousness Research at the End of the Twentieth Century Sample Chapter - Download PDF (129 KB)
I	FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
2	What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?
3	The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness: C. D. Broad on the Explanatory Gap
4	Prospects for a Scientific Research Program on Consciousness
5	The Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness
II	CANDIDATES FOR THE NCC I: REPRESENTATIONAL DYNAMICS
6	The Unconscious Homunculus
7	A Neurobiology for Consciousness
8	Phenomenal Awareness and Consciousness from a Neurobiological Perspective
9	Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience
III	CANDIDATES FOR THE NCC II: VISION
10	Visual Perception Without Awareness: Priming Responses by Color
11	Face Representation Without Conscious Processing
12	Space in the Brain: Different Neural Substrates for Allocentric and Egocentric Frames of Reference
13	Conscious Registration of Continuous and Discrete Visual Events
14	Imaging Conscious Vision
15	Binocular Rivalry and Human Visual Awareness
IV	CANDIDATES FOR THE NCC III: CONSCIOUSNESS, ANESTHESIA, AND THE NMDA RECEPTOR COMPLEX
16	NMDA Receptor--Mediated Computational Processes and Phenomenal Consciousness
17	How to Understand the N in NCC
18	The Role of NMDA Receptors in Consciousness: What We Learn from Anesthetic Mechanisms?
19	NMDA Receptor--Mediated Consciousness: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Effects of Anesthesia on Cognition?
V	TOWARD THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF SELFHOOD, AGENCY, AND SOCIAL COGNITION
20	The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective
21	Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis
22	The Acting Subject: Toward the Neural Basis of Social Cognition
	Contributors
	Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (56 KB)

◆ Metzinger, Thomas (Feb. 2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Being No One:
The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Thomas Metzinger

	Acknowedgments	xi
1.	Questions Sample Chapter - Download PDF (83 KB)	1
2.	Tools I	13
3.	The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience	107
4.	Neurophenomenological Case Studies I	213
5.	Tools II	265
6.	The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective	299
7.	Neurophenomenological Case Studies II	429
8.	Preliminary Answers	547
	References	635
	Name Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (50 KB)	663
	Subject Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (129 KB)

◈ Metzinger, Thomas (2003). The pre-scientific concept of a "soul": A neurophenomenological hypothesis about its origin. In M. Peschl (Hrsg.), Auf der Suche nach dem Konzept/Substrat der Seele. Ein Versuch aus der Perspektive der Cognitive (Neuro-) Science. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

A much better and revised version: Metzinger, Thomas (2005). Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of a "Soul". Mind and Matter, 3(1): 57-84. Here is a version including color figures: [ PDF; 1,57 MB ].

◈ Meyering, Theo C. (2000). Physicalism and downward causation in psychology and the special sciences. Inquiry 43: 181-202.

■ Minati, Gianfranco, Eliano Pessa (eds.) (2002). Emergence in Complex Cognitive, Social and Biological Systems. Springer.

About this book

The systems movement is made up of many systems societies as well as of disciplinary researchers and researches, explicitly or implicitly focusing on the subject of systemics, officially introduced in the scientific community fifty years ago. Many researches in different fields have been and continue to be sources of new ideas and challenges for the systems community. To this regard, a very important topic is the one of EMERGENCE. Between the goals for the actual and future systems scientists there is certainly the definition of a general theory of emergence and the building of a general model of it.

The goal of this book, is to recall to the systems community an important challenge to be dealt with in the immediate future: the study and characterization of general features of what is commonly qualified as `emergence', chiefly in complex systems such as biological and cognitive ones. Such a topic was a fundamental one at the very beginning of the systemic movement, and to it the founding fathers, such as Von Bertalanffy, Ashby and Von Foerster, devoted most efforts. In more recent times, however, the interests shifted towards an empirical study of systemic properties characterizing human organizations, and the subject of emergence was partly abandoned. Notwithstanding, the understanding of what is emergence, and of the circumstances which allow for its occurrence within a complex system, is of crucial importance for systemics. Namely all systemic properties - the ones which allow a system to behave as a whole and not as an aggregate of constituents - are just emergent properties.

Table of contents

Opening Lecture.....1

Synergetics - An Overview..... H. Haken.....3

 

Modelling.....15

First Cellular Automata Model of Red Mullet Behaviour..... F. Badalamenti, G. D'Anna, S. Di Gregorio, C. Pipitone, and G.A. Trunfio.....17

Simulations of Forest Fires by Cellular Automata Modelling.....E. Bendicenti, S. Di Gregorio, F.M. Falbo, and A. Iezzi.....31

The Dynamic Usage of Models (DYSAM).....G. Minati and S. Brahms.....41

 

Cognitive Science.....53

The Emergence of Strategies in Cognitive Development.....M.P. Penna.....55

Emergence of the Symbolic Function.....G. Terenzi.....63

Synaptic Development as a Variational Problem.....P. Camiz.....75

 

Theoretical Issues in Systemics.....83

Emergence and Ergodicity: A Line of Research....G. Minati.....85

Decomposition of Systems.....M.R. Abram.....103

Generic Properties of Complex Networks.....R. Serra.....117

The Role of Stability Theory in the Great Theories of the XX Century.....U. Di Caprio.....127

A Generalization of Compensation Mechanism in Variable-Structure Systems.....E. Pessa and G. Resconi.....141

 

Education.....151

A Systemic Proposal on the Use of a New Technology as a Learning Tool in School Context.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara, and N. Bonfiglio.....153

A System Approach to the Educational Research: Reflection on an Experience.....A. Codetta Raiteri, and R. Cambini.....159

Eval‎uating an Educational Course. A Constructivist Approach.....R. Cambini, and A. Codetta Raiteri.....177

 

Systemic Approach and Information Technology.....191

Reactive Navigation Based on Self-Organised Visual Information.....G. Tascini, A. Montesanto, P. Puliti, and N. Rabascini.....193

Web Usability: Meaning and Context. Over Data Structures.....M.C. Tofoni, A. Montesanto.....205

Membrane Systems for Computing.....G. Mauri and C. Zandron.....213

 

General Systems.....233

Transforming Leadership through Coalitions: Building the Ethics of Sustainable Development in Globalization.....L.A. Magliocca and G. Minati.....235

Meaning Extraction from the Analysis of Video-Registrations of Human Movements.....M.P. Penna, D. Zandona, A. Montesanto, and N.S. Bonfiglio....251

Multidisciplinary Techniques for Classifying Styles in Narrative Texts: a Preliminary Study.....M. Nardon, E. Not, F. Pianesi, and M. Zancanaro.....269

The Religious Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the West Bank: Systemic Implications....S. Brahms.....277

Disciplinarity in the Pursuit of Knowledge.....A. Collen.....285

 

Management.....297

Distributed Knowledge Management. A Systemic Approach.....M. Bonifacio and P. Bouquet.....299

The Role of Knowledge Management as a Key Tool for Companies to deal with the Turbulent Environment: A Survey.....P. Penna, E. Celani, and N.S. Bonfiglio.....313

 

Systemic Approaches to Human Care.....321

Balancing and Compensating Equilibrium Deficits in Beings Provided with Cognitive Processing Capabilities.....G. Minati and A. Ricciuti.....323

Emergence, Individuality, Therapy.A Systemic Vision of Homeopathy.....M. Trionfi.....335

Systemic Support Therapy for Cancer Patients During and After Chemotherapy.....A. Ricciuti.....347

A Systemic Approach to the Modelling of Epileptic Phenomena.....P.L. Bandinelli, C. Palma, M.P. Penna, E. Pessa, and R. Petroni.....359

 

Synergetics and Systemics.....375

Some Comments about Determinism and Classical Physics.....L. Galgani.....377

What is Emergence?.....E. Pessa.....379

Quantum Field Theory and System Theory.....G. Vitello.....383

Index.....391

■ Minati, Gianfranco, Eliano Pessa, Mario Abram (eds.) (2006). Systemics of Emergence: Research and Development. Springer.

 

About this book

Within the General Systems Theory (GST) approach, it is possible to focus on "emergent" systemic properties (typically occurring in open, adaptive, anticipatory and chaotic systems), by stressing their specificity and their lack of reducibility into further components. In other words, emergence underlies the processes allowing the establishing of systemic properties. Research on emergence deals with experimental detection, modeling and simulation of processes giving rise to the occurrence of macroscopic (often complex and unexpected) behaviors in complex systems consisting of a large number of components. Actually such a theoretical and experimental effort relies on analytical methods, such as the ones used in modern theories of self-organization, collective-behaviors, phase transitions and artificial life. In sum, the research on emergence analyzes the engine of GST, while GST itself focuses on the general outcomes of this research, thus conceptually inducing an inter- and trans-disciplinary context.

SYSTEMICS OF EMERGENCE: Research and Development is a volume devoted to exploring the core theoretical and disciplinary research problems of emergence processes from which systems are established. It focuses on emergence as the key point of any systemic process. This topic is dealt with within different disciplinary approaches, indicated by the organization in sections: 1) Applications; 2) Biology and human care; 3) Cognitive Science; 4) Emergence; 5) General Systems; 6) Learning; 7) Management; 8) Social Systems; 9) Systemic Approach and Information Science; 10) Theoretical issues in Systemics.

The Editors and contributing authors have produced this volume to help, encourage and widen the work in this area of General Systems Research.

Table of contents

Program Committee.....xi

Contributing Authors.....xiii

Preface.....xv

Acknowledgments.....xix

OPENING LECTURE.....1

Uncertainty and Information: Emergence of Vast New Territories.....G.J. Klir.....3

APPLICATIONS.....29

Complexity in Universe Dynamic Evolution. Part 1 - Present state and future evolution.....U. Di Caprio.....31

Complexity in Universe Dynamic Evolution. Part 2 - Preceeding history.....U. Di Caprio.....51

Mistake Making Machines.....G. Minati and G. Vitiello.....67

Explicit Velocity for Modelling Surface Complex Flows with Cellular Automata and Applications.....M.V. Avolio, G.M. Crisci, D. D'Ambrosio, S. Di Gregorio, G. Iovine, V. Lupiano, R. Rongo, W. Spataro and G.A. Trunfio.....79

Analysis of Fingerprints through a Reactive Agent.....A. Montesanto, G. Tascini, P. Baldassarri and L. Santinelli.....93

User Centered Portal Design: A case study in web usability.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara and D. Costenaro.....105

BIOLOGY AND HUMAN CARE.....115

Logic and Context in Schizophrenia.....P.L. Bandinelli, C. Palma, M.P. Penna and E. Pessa.....117

The "Hope Capacity" in the Care Process and the Patient-Physician Relationship.....A. Ricciuti.....133

Puntonet 2003. A multidisciplinary and systemic approach in training disabled people within the experience of Villa S. Ignazio.....D. Fortin, V. Durini and M. Nardon.....147

Intelligence and Complexity Management: From physiology to pathology. Experimental Evidences and Theoretical Models.....P.L. Marconi.....155

Disablement, Assistive Technologies and Computer Accessibility: Hints of Analysis through a clinical approach based on the ICF model.....C. Masala and D.R. Petretto.....169

Chaos and Cultural Fashions.....S. Benvenuto.....179

COGNITIVE SCIENCE.....191

Personality and Complex Systems: An expanded view.....M. Meleddu and L.F. Scalas.....193

Complexity and Paternalism.....P. Ramazzotti.....207

A Computational Model of Face Perception.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara, M. Boi and P. Puliti.....223

The Neon Color Spreading and the Watercolor Illusion: Penomenal Links and Neural Mechanisms.....B. Pinna.....235

Usability and Man-Machine Interaction.....M.P. Penna and R. Rani.....255

Old Maps and the Watercolor Illusion: Cartography, Vision Science and Figure-Ground Segregation Principles.....B. Pinna and G. Mariotti.....261

EMERGENCE.....279

Autopoiesis and the Emergence.....L. Bich.....281

Typical Emergencies in Electric Power Systems.....U. Di Caprio.....293

Strategies of Adaptation of Man to His Environment: Projection Outside the Human Body of Social Institutions.....E.A. Nunez.....311

Emergence of the Cooperation-Competition Between Two Robots.....G. Tascini and A. Montesanto.....317

Overcoming Computationalism in Cognitive Science.....M.P. Penna....341

Physical and Biological Emergence: Are they different?.....E. Pessa.....355

GENERAL SYSTEMS.....375

Interactions Between Systems.....M.R. Abram.....377

Towards a Systemic Approach to Architecture.....V. Di Battista.....391

Music, Emergence and Pedagogical Process.....E. Pietrocini.....399

Intrinsic Uncertainty in the Study of Complex Systems: The Case of Choice of Academic Career.....M.S. Ferretti and E. Pessa.....417

A Model of Hypertextual Structure and Organization.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara, D. Costenaro and P. Puliti.....427

LEARNING.....435

Teachers in the Technological Age: A Comparison between Traditional and Hypertextual Instructional Strategies.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara and D. Costenaro.....437

The Emergence of E.Learning.....M.P. Penna, V. Stara and P. Puliti.....447

Spatial Learning in Children.....B. Lai, M.P. Penna and V. Stara....453

MANAGEMENT.....461

Dynamics of Strategy: A feedback approach to corporate strategy-making.....V. Coda and E. Mollona.....463

A Cognitive Approach to Organizational Complexity.....G. Fioretti and B. Visser.....495

Normative Commitment to the Organization, Support and Self Competence.....A. Battistelli, M. Mariani and B. Bello.....515

A Multivariate Contribution to the Study of Mobbing, Using the QAM 1.5 Questionnaire.....P. Argentero and N.S. Bonfiglio.....527

Representation in Psychometrics: Confirm‎atory Factor Models of Job Satisfaction in a Group of Professional Staff.....M.S. Ferretti and P. Argentero.....535

SOCIAL SYSTEMS.....549

The Impact of Email on System Identify and Autonomy: A Case Study in Self-Observation.....L. Biggiero.....551

Some Comments on Democracy and Manipulating Consent in Western Post-Democratic Societies.....G. Minati.....569

Metasystem Transitions and Sustainability in Human Organizations, Part 1 - Towards Organizational Synergetics.....G. Terenzi.....585

Metasystem Transitions and Sustainability in Human Organizations, Part 2 - A Heuristics for Global Sustainability.....G. Terenzi.....601

SYSTEMIC APPROACH AND INFORMATION SCIENCE.....613

Scale Free Graphs in Dynamic Knowledge Acquisition.....I. Licata, G. Tascini, L. Lella, A. Montesanto and W. Giordano.....615

Recent Results on Random Boolean Networks.....R. Serra and M. Villani.....625

Color-Oriented Content Based Image Retrieval‎.....G. Tascini, A. Montesanto and P. Pulini.....635

THEORETICAL ISSUES IN SYSTEMICS.....651

Uncertainty and the Role of the Observer.....G. Bruno, G. Minai and A. Trotta.....653

Towards a Second Systemics.....G. Minati.....667

Is Being Computational an Intrinsic Property of a Dynamical System?.....M. Giunti.....683

The Origin of Analogies in Physics.....E. Tonti.....695

Prisoner Dilemma: A model taking into account expectancies.....N.S. Bonfiglio and E. Pessa.....707

The Theory of Levels of Reality and the Difference between Simple and Tangled Hierarchies.....R. Poli.....715

General System Theory, Like-Quantum Semantics and Fuzzy Sets.....I. Licata.....723

About the Possibility of a Cartesian Theory Upon Systems, Information and Control.....P. Rocchi.....735

◇ Misteli, Tom (Oct. 15, 2001). The concept of self-organization in cellular architecture. The Journal of Cell Biology 155(2): 181-186. (doi:10.1083/jcb.200108110)

Published 15 October 2001.

Abstract: In vivo microscopy has recently revealed the dynamic nature of many cellular organelles. The dynamic properties of several cellular structures are consistent with a role for self-organization in their formation, maintenance, and function; therefore, self-organization might be a general principle in cellular organization.

Key Words: self-organization; cytoskeleton; nucleus; Golgi complex; dynamics

http://www.jcb.org/cgi/content/full/155/2/181

◈ Molenaar, Peter C.M. (Dec. 2006). Psychophysical dualism from the point of view of a working psychologist. Erkenntnis 65(1): 47-69.

▣ Montecucco, Nitamo Federico (Jan. 2006). Coherence, Brain Evolution, and the Unity of Consciousness: The evolution of Planetary Consciousness in the Light of Brain Coherence Research. World Futures 62(1 & 2): 127-133.

Abstract:  The law of coherence helps us understand the physical force behind the increasing complexity of the evolutionary process, from quanta, to cells, to self-awareness and collective consciousness. The coherent electromagnetic field is the inner glue of every system, the "intelligent" energy-information communication that assures a cooperative and synergic behavior to all the components of the system, as a whole, allowing harmonious evolution and unity of consciousness. Neuropsychological experiments show that the different brain areas communicate with more or less coherence according to different states of consciousness: high values are correlated with states of psychophysical integrity and well-being, whereas low values with states of conflict and depression. If we expand isomorphically these brain discoveries, we will have four main general states of coherence: from disgregation to unity, which represents an important element, in the General System Theory, to differentiate between inanimate and animate system, and to understand how billions cells become a single living organism, and then how billions of human beings could eventually generate planetary consciousness. In this light the resolution of the global ecosystem crisis implicates human transformation from a low to a highly coherent state of consciousness. The key to the entire process seems to be the coherent nature of consciousness.

Keywords:  Brain synchronization; coherence; evolution of consciousness; self-awareness; unity of consciousness

■ Moreno, Alvaro and Jon Umerez (2000). Downward Causation at the Core of Living Organization. In Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, bodies and matter. Århus(Aarhus): Aarhus University Press, pp. 99-117.

◈ Morgan, C. Lloyd (1923). Emergent Evolution. London: Williams & Norgate.

Available online http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/morgan/Morgan_1923

◈ Morowitz, Harold J. (Apr. 2001). The epistemic paradox of mind and matter. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929(1): 50-54.

◈ Morowitz, Harold J. (2003). The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex. Oxford University Press.

◆ Morris, C.R. (1926). The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6: 49-55.

■ Müller-Herold, U. (Dec. 1984). A simple model for the evolutionary emergence of novel properties. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres (Formerly Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere) 14(1-4): 523-529.

◈ Murphy, Nancey and Warren S. Brown (May 2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

contents

Introduction: New Approaches to Knotty Old Problems
1. Avoiding Cartesian Materialism
2. From Causal Reductionism to Self-Directed Systems
3. From Mindless to Intelligent Action
4. How Can Neural Nets Mean?
5. How Does Reason Get Its Grip on the Brain?
6. Who's Responsible?
7. Neurobiological Reductionism and Free Will
Postscript

◈ Murphy, Nancey, William R. Stoeger, SJ (eds.) (2007). Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

contents

Introduction , Nancey Murphy

 

I. Philosophy

 

1. Reduction - how did we fall into it and can we emerge from it? , Nancey Murphy

 

2. Reduction, emergence, and the mind/body problem , Robert Van Gulick

 

3. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? , Robert Van Gulick

 

4. Three levels of emergent phenomena , Terrence Deacon

 

II. Science

 

5. Science, complexity, and the nature of existence , George F. R. Ellis

 

6. Emergence in the physical sciences: lessons from the particle physics and condensed matter debate , Don Howard

 

7. True to life? Biological models of origin and evolution , Martinez Hewlett

 

8. Nonlinear science and the cognitive hierarchy , Alwyn Scott

 

9. The emergence of causally efficacious mental function , Warren S. Brown

 

III. Theology

 

10. Reductionism and emergence: implications for the theology and science dialogue , William R. Stoeger, SJ

 

11. Emergence, scientific naturalism, and theology , John Haught

 

12. Emergent realities with causal efficacy - philosophical and theological applications , Arthur Peacocke

 

13. Reduction and emergence in artificial life: a theological appropriation , Niels Henrik Gregersen

 

14. Toward a constructive Christian theology of emergence , Philip Clayton

 

Postscript , William R. Stoeger, SJ

 

http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199204717

 

 

◆ Nagel, Ernest (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt.

 

   

 

 

■ Needham, Paul (Jan. 2000). What is Water? Analysis 60(265): 13–21.

 

 

■ Needham, Paul (Oct. 2002). The Discovery that Water is H₂O. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16(3): 205–226.

 

Abstract: What are the criteria determining the individuation of chemical kinds? Recent philosophical discussion, which puts too much emphasis on microstructure, seems to presuppose a reductionist conception not motivated by the scientific facts. The present article traces the development of the traditional notion of a substance with the rise of modern chemistry from the end of the 18th century with a view to correcting this speculative distortion.

 

 

◈ Nelson, Kevin R., Michelle Mattingly, Sherman A. Lee and Frederick A. Schmitt (Apr. 2006). Does the arousal system contribute to near death experience? Neurology 66:1003-1009.

 

Received August 22, 2005. Accepted in final form December 20, 2005.

The neurophysiologic basis of near death experience (NDE) is unknown. Clinical observations suggest that REM state intrusion contributes to NDE. Support for the hypothesis follows five lines of evidence: REM intrusion during wakefulness is a frequent normal occurrence, REM intrusion underlies other clinical conditions, NDE elements can be explained by REM intrusion, cardiorespiratory afferents evoke REM intrusion, and persons with an NDE may have an arousal system predisposing to REM intrusion. To investigate a predisposition to REM intrusion, the life-time preval‎ence of REM intrusion was studied in 55 NDE subjects and compared with that in age/gender-matched control subjects. Sleep paralysis as well as sleep-related visual and auditory hallucinations were substantially more common in subjects with an NDE. These findings anticipate that under circumstances of peril, an NDE is more likely in those with previous REM intrusion. REM intrusion could promote subjective aspects of NDE and often associated syncope. Suppression of an activated locus ceruleus could be central to an arousal system predisposed to REM intrusion and NDE.

 

 

◈ Nelson, Kevin R., Michelle Mattingly, and Frederick A. Schmitt (Mar. 2007). Out-of-body experience and arousal. Neurology 68(10): 794-795.

 

 

◈ Newman, David V. (June 1996). Emergence and Strange Attractors. Philosophy of Science 63(2): 244-260.

 

Recent work in the Philosophy of Mind has suggested that alternatives to reduction are required in order to explain the relationship between psychology and biology or physics. Emergence has been proposed as one such alternative. In this paper, I propose a precise definition of emergence, and I argue that chaotic systems provide concrete examples of properties that meet this definition. In particular, I suggest that being in the basin of attraction of a strange attractor is an emergent property of any chaotic nonlinear dynamical system. This shows that non-reductive accounts of inter-theoretic relations are necessary, and that non-reductive accounts of the mental are possible. Moreover, this work provides a foundation for future work investigating the nature of explanation, prediction, and scientific understanding of non-reductive phenomena.

 

 

◈ Newman, David V. (2001). Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 79, No. 2: 180-196.

 

 

◈ Newman, David V. (2004). Chaos and Qualia. Essays in Philosophy (A Biannual Journal) 5(1).

 

First Paragraph:  When I look at a ripe tomato, in good lighting conditions and otherwise normal circumstances, I have a visual experience of redness. When I look at an unripe tomato under similar conditions, I have a visual experience of greenness. If conditions are the same in the two cases except for the ripeness of the fruit, the difference between the two experiences allows me to isolate two qualia, one of redness and another of greenness. Many opine that qualia are troublesome for any physicalist theory of mind because they are difficult (or impossible) to explain in physicalist terms. Daniel Dennett and Leopold Stubenberg are among those who suggest that qualia are impossible to explain in physicalist terms, though they characterize qualia in different ways (Dennett 1988; Stubenberg 1996). I will argue below that if qualia are emergent properties of chaotic brains, it is possible to explain them in physicalist terms. While I don’t provide logically sufficient conditions for the existence of qualia in physicalist terms, I believe the argument provided here gives good reason to think that it is possible to do so.

 

 

◈ Newman, Micah (in press). Chemical supervenience. Foundations of Chemistry.

 

Received: 1 November 2006  Accepted: 8 November 2006  Published online: 13 February 2007

 

Abstract:  This paper surveys some ways in which the chemical realm can be described and outlined in terms of the concept of supervenience. The particular contours of general chemical theory provide a ready basis for interpretation of determination, covariance, and nonreduction—the characteristic metaphysical facets of the supervenience relation—in mutual terms. Building on this, the extent to which chemically characterized properties and entities can be described in terms of a supervenience-scaffolded structure represents a particularly vivid application that philosophers in general interested in supervenience would do well to attend to. In addition, the model of chemical supervenience given here can be used as a rubric on which to decide on issues already raised by philosophers of chemistry.

 

Keywords:  Supervenience - Chemistry - Properties - Emergence - Reduction - Explanation - Closure - Intensive - Aristotle

 

 

◆ Newton, Natika (2001). Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8(9-10): 47-59.

 

Abstract:  This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point is to show that the uniqueness of consciousness is comprehensible in terms of a more general kind of emergence. I then argue that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves synchronous activations of representations of ‘identical’ intentional objects with distinct temporal tags, and is thus a case of the emergence of novelty from forced blending of incompatible components. It follows from the general nature of such emergence that consciousness would be indefinable and hence seem mysterious. This analysis will show why phenomenal consciousness would be impossible to resolve into its constituents by the conscious subject. The result is, I hope, a happy blend of physicalist explanation with respectful acknowledgement of the robustness of subjective experience.

 

 

▣ Nickles, T. (1973). Two concepts of intertheoretic reduction. Journal of Philosophy 70: 181-201.

 

 

◈ Nicolis, Grégoire and Ilya Prigogine (Apr. 1977). Self-Organization in Nonequilibrium Systems: From Dissipative Structures to Order through Fluctuations. New York: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated.

 

 

 

◈ Nielsen, Keld Stehr (2006). Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37(1): 139-163.

Published online: 13 October 2006

Summary: Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence.

Keywords: explanation - self-organization - emergence - cognition

 

■ Noë, Alva (Jan. 2005). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

 

 

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noë. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noë argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought -- that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience.

To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In Action in Perception, Noë investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. Noë then argues that perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of color. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.

Alva Noë is Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of California, Berkeley. He is the editor of Vision and Mind (MIT Press, 2002).

 

Action in Perception
Alva Noë

	Preface Sample Chapter - Download PDF (27 KB)	vii
	Acknowledgments	ix
1	The Enactive Approach to Perception: An Introduction Sample Chapter - Download PDF (191 KB)	1
2	Pictures in Mind	35
3	Enacting Content	75
4	Colors Enacted	123
5	Perspective in Content	163
6	Thought in Experience	181
7	Brain in Mind: A Conclusion	209
	Notes	233
	Works Cited	251
	Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (39 KB)

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10257&mode=toc

 

 

◈ Noonan, Harold W. (Oct. 1999). Microphysical supervenience and consciousness. Mind 108(432): 755-759.

 

 

▣ Noordhof, Paul (1999). Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99(1): 109–114.

 

 

▣ Noordhof, Paul (2006). Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation. Synthese 149(3): 551-575.

 

 

◈ Northoff, Georg and Kristina Musholt (Oct. 2006). How Can Searle Avoid Property Dualism? Epistemic-Ontological Inference and Autoepistemic Limitation. Philosophical Psychology 19(5): 589-605.

 

Abstract:  Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features - we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism.
 
Keywords:  Autoepistemic Limitation; Epistemic-Ontological Inferences; Property Dualism; John Searle

 

 

◇ Novotny, Daniel D. (Mar. 2007). Searle on the unity of the world. Axiomathes 17(1): 41-51.

 

Received: 6 April 2005  Accepted: 24 August 2006  Published online: 14 February 2007

 

Abstract:  According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s objections to it.
 
Keywords:  Physicalism/Naturalism - Reduction - Mind–Body problem - Searle’s ontology

 

 

◈ O'Connor, Timothy (1994). Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 31: 91-104.

 

 

◈ O'connor, Timothy, Hong Yu Wong (Dec. 2005). The metaphysics of emergence. Noûs 39(4): 658-678.

 

http://mypage.iu.edu/%7Etoconnor/MetaphEm.pdf

 

 

◈ O'connor, Timothy, Jonathan D. Jacobs (Oct. 2003). Emergent individuals. The Philosophical Quarterly 53(213): 540-555.

 

 

◈ Palmquist, Stephen (2007). Emergence, Evolution, and the Geometry of Logic: Causal Leaps and the Myth of Historical Development. Foundations of Science 12(1): 9-37.

Published online: 24 October 2006

 

Abstract:  After sketching the historical development of “emergence” and noting several recent problems relating to “emergent properties”, this essay proposes that properties may be either “emergent” or “mergent” and either “intrinsic” or “extrinsic”. These two distinctions define four basic types of change: stagnation, permanence, flux, and evolution. To illustrate how emergence can operate in a purely logical system, the Geometry of Logic is introduced. This new method of analyzing conceptual systems involves the mapping of logical relations onto geometrical figures, following either an analytic or a synthetic pattern (or both together). Evolution is portrayed as a form of discontinuous change characterized by emergent properties that take on an intrinsic quality with respect to the object(s) or proposition(s) involved. Causal leaps, not continuous development, characterize the evolution of human life in a developing foetus, of a thought out of certain brain states, of a new idea (or insight) out of ordinary thoughts, and of a great person out of a set of historical experiences. The tendency to assume that understanding evolutionary change requires a step-by-step explanation of the historical development that led to the appearance of a certain emergent property is thereby discredited.

Keywords:  analysis and synthesis - causality - emergence - evolution - geometry and logic - insight - intrinsic properties - Kant

◇ Panksepp, Jaak (Feb. 2007). Emotional feelings originate below the neocortex: Toward a neurobiology of the soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 101-103. (doi:10.1017/S0140525X07001094)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 01May2007

Abstract: Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates.

☞ 이 논문은 뵈요론 머커Bjorn Merker의 논문「대뇌 피질이 없어도 의식은 있다―신경과학과 의학에 대한 하나의 도전Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine」을 논평한 논문임.

☞ see Merker, Bjorn (Feb. 2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(1): 63-81.

▶ Pap, Arthur (Feb. 1952). The Concept of Absolute Emergence. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2(8): 302-311.

Received 30 April 1951.

First Paragraph: I understand the business of the philosophy of science to be painstakingly careful analysis of concepts, principles and methods used in science. This broad statement fails, of couse, to differentiate such analysis of concepts as inevitably occurs in a developed science itself (e.g. analysis of the concepts 'simultaneity,' 'absolute motion,' 'energy,' etc. in physics) from such analysis as is more likely to be the professional concerno of the philosopher of science as philosopher. The most natural object of distinctively philosophical analysis concerned with science would seem to be the very activity, or class of activities, defining science in general, rather than some one specific science. As it goes without saying that one such activity characteristic of science is prediction, the analysis of the concept of predictability is the vital task of the philosophy of science. Ability to predict is a virtue marking a good scientist ; ability to analyse clearly the concept of predictability is a virtue marking a good philosopher of science.

 

 

◆ Parnia, Sam (2006). What Happens When We Die?: A Groundbreaking Study into the Nature of Life and Death. Hay House.

 

 

◆ Parnia, Sam (in press). Do reports of consciousness during cardiac arrest hold the key to discovering the nature of consciousness? Medical Hypotheses.

 

Sam Parnia

Consciousness Research Group, School of Medicine, University of Southampton, UK

Department of Critical Care Medicine, Weill Cornell Medical Center, 5th Floor, Starr Building, 525 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, USA

 

Received 21 January 2007;  accepted 31 January 2007.  Available online 24 April 2007.

 

Summary:  Perhaps the biggest challenge facing neuroscience at the dawn of the 21st century is understanding the relationship between mind, consciousness and the brain. Editorials in recent years have highlighted the difficulties faced by cognitive neuroscience in attempting to answer questions regarding the nature, as well as the mechanism by which subjective experiences and our sense of consciousness may arise through neuronal processes. Current scientific views regarding the origin of consciousness vary widely and range from an ‘epiphenomenon’ arising from neuronal networks, to neuronal quantum processes, to a separate undiscovered scientific entity. Although there has been a lack of experimental studies to test these theories, recent studies have indicated that the study of the human mind during cardiac arrest may hold the key to solving the mystery of consciousness. Four published prospective studies of cardiac arrest survivors have demonstrated that paradoxically human mind and consciousness may continue to function during cardiac arrest. This is despite the well demonstrated finding that cerebral functioning as measured by electrical activity of the brain ceases during cardiac arrest, thus raising the possibility that human mind and consciousness may continue to function in the absence of brain function. In this article the broad theories for the causation of consciousness are reviewed as well as a novel method to study consciousness during cardiac arrest. This may provide a unique experimental method to determine the nature of human mind and consciousness as well as its relationship with the brain.

 

 

◈ Parnia, Sam, Peter Fenwick (Jan. 2002). Near death experiences in cardiac arrest: visions of a dying brain or visions of a new science of consciousness. Resuscitation 52(1): 5-11.

 

Received 1 July 2001;  accepted 14 September 2001.  Available online 13 January 2002.

 

Abstract:  Very little is known about the dying process and in particular the state of the human mind at the end of life. Cardiac arrest is the final step in the dying process irrespective of cause, and is also the closest physiological model of the dying process. Recent studies in cardiac arrest survivors have indicated that although the majority of cardiac arrest survivors have no memory recall from the event, nevertheless approximately 10% develop memories that are consistent with typical near death experiences. These include an ability to ‘see’ and recall specific detailed descriptions of the resuscitation, as verified by resuscitation staff. Many studies in humans and animals have indicated that brain function ceases during cardiac arrest, thus raising the question of how such lucid, well-structured thought processes with reasoning and memory formation can occur at such a time. This has led to much interest as regards the potential implications for the study of consciousness and its relationship with the brain, which still remains an enigma. In this article, we will review published research examining brain physiology and function during cardiac arrest as well as its potential relationship with near death experiences during this time. Finally, we will explore the contribution that near death experiences during cardiac arrest may make to the wider understanding of human consciousness.

Author Keywords: Cardiac arrest; Near death experiences; Dying brain; Visions of a new science

 

 

◈ Parnia, Sam, D.G. Waller, R. Yeates, Peter Fenwick (Feb. 2001). A qualitative and quantitative study of the incidence, features and aetiology of near death experiences in cardiac arrest survivors. Resuscitation 48(2): 149-156.

 

Received 12 July 2000; revised 21 August 2000; accepted 29 August 2000. Available online 26 January 2001.

 

Abstract

Aim: To carry out a prospective study of cardiac arrest survivors to understand the qualitative features as well as incidence, and possible aetiology of near death experiences (NDEs) in this group of patients. Method: All survivors of cardiac arrests during a 1 year period were interviewed within a week of their arrest, regarding memories of their unconscious period. Reported memories were assessed by the Greyson NDE Scale. The postulated role of physiological, psychological and transcendental factors were studied. Physiological parameters such as oxygen status were extracted from the medical notes. Patients’ religious convictions were documented in the interviews and hidden targets were used to test the transcendental theories on potential out of body claims. Those with memories were compared to those without memories. Results: 11.1% of 63 survivors reported memories. The majority had NDE features. There appeared to be no differences on all physiological measured parameters apart from partial pressure of oxygen during the arrest which was higher in the NDE group. Conclusions: Memories are rare after resuscitation from cardiac arrest. The majority of those that are reported have features of NDE and are pleasant. The occurrence of NDE during cardiac arrest raises questions about the possible relationship between the mind and the brain. Further large-scale studies are needed to understand the aetiology and true significance of NDE.

Author Keywords: Cardiac arrest; Death; Near death experiences

 

 

◈ Patel, Apoorva (June 11, 2001). Why genetic information processing could have a quantum basis. (arXiv : quant-ph/0105001 v2 11 Jun 2001)

 

 

◈ Paul, R. Cranston and Theodore Sider (1992). In Defense of Global Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 833-854.

 

 

◈ Penrose, Roger (1989).The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

   

 

 

◈ Penrose, Roger (1994). Shadows of the mind: a search for the missing science of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

 

 

◈ Penrose, Roger (1996). On gravity's role in quantum state reduction. General Relativity and Gravitation 28(5): 581-600.

 

 

◈ Penrose, Roger (Aug. 15, 1998). Quantum computation, entanglement and state reduction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London A 356(1743): 1927-1939.

 

 

◈ Penrose, Roger (Apr. 2001). Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry: An addendum: Some new developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929(1): 105-110.

 

 

◆ Pepper, Stephen C. (Apr. 29, 1926). Emergence. The Journal of Philosophy 23(9): 241-245.

 

First paragraph: Emergence signifies a kind of change. There seem to be three important kinds of change considered possible in modern metaphysical discussion. First, there is chance occurrence, the assertion of a cosmic irregularity, an occurrence about which no law could be stated. Second, there is what we may call a "shift," a change in which one characteristic replaces another, the sort of change traditionally described as invariable succession and when more refined described as a functional relation. Thirdly, there is emergence, which is a cumulative change, a change in which certain characteristics supervene upon other characteristics, these characteristics being adequate to explain the occurrence in their levels. The important points here are first, that in discussing emergence we are not discussing the possibility of cosmic chance. The emergent evolutionists admit a thorough-going regularity in nature. And secondly, we are not discussing the legitimacy of shifts. These also are admitted. The issue is whether in addition to shifts there are emergent changes.

 

 

◈ Pérez Otero, Manuel (Dec. 1998). On the Utility of Global Supervenience. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Volumen XXX, no. 90: 3-21.

 

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pdf/C90/C90_otero.pdf

 

 

▶ Peters, S.L. (1995). Emergent Materialism: A Proposed Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. University Press of America.

 

 

▶ Peterson, Gregory R. (Sep. 2006). Species of Emergence. Zygon ― Journal of Religion & Science 41(3): 689–712.

 

Abstract:  The category of emergence has come to be of considerable importance to the science-and-religion dialogue. It has become clear that the term is used in different ways by different authors, with important implications. In this article I examine the criteria used to state that something is emergent and the different interpretations of those criteria. In particular, I argue similarly to Philip Clayton that there are three broad ranges of interpretation of emergence: reductive, nonreductive, and radical. Although all three criteria have their place, I suggest that the category of radical emergence is important both for science and theology.

 

 

◈ Piccinini, Gualtiero (Mar. 2007). Computational modelling vs. Computational explanation: Is everything a Turing Machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1): 93-115.

 

Abstract:  According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified distinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.
 
1 This paper was prompted by a remark by Diego Marconi, which convinced me that the issue of whether everything is a Turing Machine needed to be sorted out. A version was presented at the 2002 APA Eastern Division in Philadelphia. I am grateful to the audience and commentator Julie Yoo for their feedback. Thanks to John Norton, Sam Scott, Oron Shagrir, Brandon Towl, the referees, and especially Peter Machamer for comments on previous versions of this paper.

 

 

◈ Pihlström, Sami (May 1999). What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental
issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 18(2): 192-211.

◈ Pihlström, Sami (2002). The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate. Principia, Special
Issue on Emergence and Downward Causation (El-Hani, C.N. Ed.) 6: 133-181.

◈ Pikovsky, Arkady, Michael Rosenblum, Jürgen Kurths (2002). Synchronization: A Universal Concept in Nonlinear Sciences. Cambridge University Press.

▣ Pineda, David (Oct. 2006). A Mereological Characterization of Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20(3): 243-266. (DOI: 10.1080/02698590600960929)

Abstract:  Physicalism is usually understood as the claim that every empirical entity is or is determined by physical entities. The claim is however imprecise until it is clarified what are the physical entities in question. A sceptical argument in the form of a dilemma tries to show that this problem of formulation of physicalism cannot be adequately met. If we understand physical entities as the entities introduced by current physics, the resulting claim becomes most probably false. If we instead understand physical entities as those entities introduced by some future ideal physics, the claim then becomes indeterminate in content. Both horns seem equally bad. In the first part of the paper, I survey the strengths and weaknesses of different proposed solutions to this problem of formulation. In the second part, I lay out a new formulation of physicalism, partly based on a mereological principle, which overcomes the dilemma, and argue that it is a correct formulation of physicalism to the extent that it rules out clear antiphysicalist scenarios and is compatible with clear physicalist scenarios.

◆ Pinker, Steven (1997). How the Mind Works. W.W. Norton & Company.

 

◆ Pinker, Steven (Jan. 19, 2007). The mystery of consciousness. Time.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394,00.html

▶ Pluhar, E. (1978). Emergence and reduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 9: 279-289.

◈ Pockett, Susan (2002). Difficulties with the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(4): 51-56.(pdf)

Abstract: The author’s version of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness is stated briefly and then three difficulties with the theory are discussed. The first is a purely technical problem: how to measure accurately enough the spatial properties of the fields which are proposed to be conscious and then how to generate these artificially, so that the theory can be tested. The second difficulty might also be merely technical, or it might be substantive and fatal to the theory. This is that present measurements seem to show a non-constant relationship between brain-generated electromagnetic fields and sensation. The third difficulty involves the basic question of whether consciousness per se has any direct effect on the brain. As an afterword, the disproportionate contribution of synchronously firing neurons to conscious percepts is simply explained in terms of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness.

◈ Pockett, Susan (in press). The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law. Behavioral sciences & the law.

Available online 2007 Feb 23.

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.

 

 

◈ Pockett, Susan, William P. Banks and Shaun Gallagher (eds.) (Mar. 2006). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

 

 

 

Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
Edited by Susan Pockett, William P. Banks and Shaun Gallagher

	Introduction Susan Pockett, William P. Banks and Shaun Gallagher Sample Chapter - Download PDF (66 KB)	1
I	Neuroscience	9
1	The Neuroscience of Movement Susan Pockett Sample Chapter - Download PDF (129 KB)	9
2	Consciousness of Action as an Embodied Consciousness Marc Jeannerod	25
3	Intentions, Actions, and the Self Suparna Choudhury and Sarah-J. Blakemore	39
4	Free Choice and the Human Brain Richard E. Passingham and Hakwan C. Lau	53
5	Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality Walter J. Freeman	73
II	Philosophy
6	Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will Shaun Gallagher	109
7	Empirical Constraints on the Problem of Free Will Peter W. Ross	125
8	Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions Elisabeth Pacherie	145
9	Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will Timothy Bayne	169
10	Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data Alfred R. Mele	187
11	Of Windmills and Straw Men: Folk Assumptions of Mind and Action Bertram F. Malle	207
III	Law and Public Policy
12	Does Consciousness Cause Misbehavior? William P. Banks	235
13	Free Will as a Social Institution Wolfgang Prinz	257
14	Truth and/or Consequences: Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility Leonard V. Kaplan	277
15	Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech Susan Hurley	301
16	Neurosociety Ahead? Debating Free Will in the Media Sabine Maasen	339
	List of Contributors Sample Chapter - Download PDF (22 KB)	361
	Index Sample Chapter - Download PDF (33 KB)

 

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10887&mode=toc

 

 

◇ Poli, Roberto (Mar. 2007). Three obstructions: forms of causation, chronotopoids, and levels of reality. Axiomathes 17(1): 1-18.

 

Received: 13 January 2007  Accepted: 19 January 2007  Published online: 9 March 2007

 

Abstract:  The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better, and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.

 

Keywords:  Ontology - Causation - Interaction - Levels of Reality - Space - Time - Spacetime - Chronotopoids - Hartmann - Dynamics

 

 

◈ Polyani, Michael (1968). Life's Irreducible Structure. Science 160: 1308-1312.

 

 

▣ Popper, Karl Raimund (1979). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32: 339-355.

▣ Popper, Karl Raimund and John Carew Eccles (1977). The Self and Its Brain. Berlin, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer.

■ Pribram, Karl H. (1991). Brain and perception: Holonomy and structure in figural processing. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

■ Pribram, Karl H. (Apr. 22, 2007). Holonomic Brain Theory. Scholarpedia.

http://scholarpedia.org/article/Holonomic_Brain_Theory

Karl H. Pribram

◈ Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers (1984). Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam Books.

Ilya Prigogine (Jan. 17, 1917 - May 28, 2003)

■ Primas, Hans (1998). Emergence in Exact Natural Sciences. In G. Farre and T. Oksala (Eds.) Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica 91: 83–98.

Abstract: The context of an operational description is given by the distinction between what we consider as relevant and what as irrelevant for a particular experiment or observation. A rigorous description of a context in terms of a mathematically formulated context-independent fundamental theory is possible by the restriction of the domain of the basic theory and the introduction of a new coarser topology. Such a new topology is never given by first principles, but depends in a crucial way on the abstractions made by the cognitive apparatus or the pattern recognition devices used by the experimentalist. A consistent mathematical formulation of a higher-level theory requires the closure of the restriction of the basic theory in the new contextual topology. The validity domain of the so constructed higher-level theory intersects nontrivially with the validity domain of the basic theory: neither domain is contained in the other. Therefore, higher-level theories cannot be totally ordered and theory reduction is not transitive. The emergence of qualitatively new properties is a necessary consequence of such a formulation of theory reduction (which does not correspond to the traditional one). Emergent properties are not manifest on the level of the basic theory, but they can be derived rigorously by imposing new, contextually selected topologies upon context-independent first principles. Most intertheoretical relations are mathematically describable as singular asymptotic expansions which do not converge in the topology of the primary theory, or by choosing one of the infinitely many possible, physically inequivalent representations of the primary theory (Gelfand–Naimark–Segal-construction of algebraic quantum mechanics). As examples we discuss the emergence of shadows, inductors, capacitors and resistors from Maxwell’s electrodynamics, the emergence of order parameters in statistical mechanics, the emergence of mass as a classical observable in Galilei-relativistic theories, the emergence of the shape of molecules in quantum mechanics, the emergence of temperature and other classical observables in algebraic quantum mechanics.

Keywords: Intertheoretical relations. Higher-level theories. Singular asymptotic expansions. Gelfand–Naimark–Segal-construction. Emergence of novelty.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000953/00/EmergenceInExactSciences.pdf

◈ Principia (an International Journal of Epistemology) Vol. 6, no. 1, June 2002.

Special Issue on: Emergence and Downward Causation

• An Introcution to a Special Number of Principia (Charbel Niño El-Hani, organizer)
• Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence (Mark Bedau)
• On the Reality of Emergents (Charbel Niño El-Hani)
• Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism (Carl Gillett)
• Mental Causation and the Causal Completeness of Physics (Wilson Mendonça)
• The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate (Sami Pihlström)
• Emergence and Reflexive Downward (John Symons)

http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/~pricipia/

◈ Queiroz, João, Charbel Niño El-Hani (Sep. 2006). Towards a multi-level approach to the emergence of meaning processes in living systems. Acta Biotheoretica 54(3): 179-206.

Received: 5 January 2006  Accepted: 11 April 2006  

 

Abstract:  Any description of the emergence and evolution of different types of meaning processes (semiosis, sensu C.S.Peirce) in living systems must be supported by a theoretical framework which makes it possible to understand the nature and dynamics of such processes. Here we propose that the emergence of semiosis of different kinds can be understood as resulting from fundamental interactions in a triadically-organized hierarchical process. To grasp these interactions, we develop a model grounded on Stanley Salthe's hierarchical structuralism. This model can be applied to establish, in a general sense, a set of theoretical constraints for explaining the instantiation of different kinds of meaning processes (iconic, indexical, symbolic) in semiotic systems. We use it to model a semiotic process in the immune system, namely, B-cell activation, in order to offer insights into the heuristic role it can play in the development of explanations for specific semiotic processes.

 

Key Words:  meaning processes - semiosis - emergence - types of signs - levels

◈ Rantala, Veikko (2001). Knowledge representation: two kinds of emergence. Synthese 129: 195-209.

◈ Reid, Robert G.B. (Mar. 2007). Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Biological Emergences
Evolution by Natural Experiment
Robert G. B. Reid

	Series Foreword	xi
	Preface	xiii
	Introduction: The Re-invention of Natural Selection	1
1	Paradigm Drift	27
2	Prologue to Emergence	67
3	Evolution by Association	95
4	The Physiological Arena	137
5	Development and Evolution	179
6	Epigenetic Mechanisms	223
7	Orthogenesis	267
8	The Re-invention of Emergence	289
9	From the Particular to the General	329
10	An Emergence Theory	363
11	A Biological Synthesis	401
	Notes	437
	Bibliography	465
	Index	505

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=11165&mode=toc

▶ Ripley, Charles (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness. Inquiry 27: 399-423.

◈ Robb, David and John Heil (Dec. 18, 2003). Mental causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/

◈ Rohrlich, Fritz (1997). Cognitive emergence. Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings): S346-358.

◈ Rosenblum, Bruce, Fred Kuttner (2006). Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

 

contents

1. Presenting the Enigma

2. Einstein Called it "Spooky"--and I Wish I Had Known

3. The Visit to Neg Ahne Poc: A Quantum Parable

4. Our Newtonian Worldview: A Universal Law of Motion

5. All the Rest of Classical Physics

Hello Quantum Mechanics

6. How the Quantum Was Forced on Physics

7. Schrödinger's Equation: The New Universal Law of Motion

8. One-Third of Our Economy

9. Our Skeleton in the Closet

10. Wonderful, Wonderful Copenhagen

11. Schrödinger's Controversial Cat

12. Seeking a Real World: EPR

13. Spooky Interactions: Bell's Theorem

14. What's Going On?: Interpreting the Quantum Enigma

15. The Mystery of Consciousness

16. The Mystery Meets the Enigma

17. Consciousness and the Quantum Cosmos

Suggested Readings

Index

http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780195175592

◈ Rosenberg, Alex (July 2001). On multiple realization and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy 98(7): 365-373.

◈ Ross, Peter W. (Mar. 2001). The location problem for color subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10(1): 42-58.

◈ Ross, Peter W. (Oct. 2001). Qualia and the senses. The Philosophical Quarterly 51(205): 495-511.

◈ Rudrauf, David, Antoine Lutz, Diego Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Lachaux and Michel Le Van Quyen (2003). From Autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s exploration of the biophysics of being. Biological Research 36(1): 27-65.

◈ Rueger, Alexander (Sep. 2000). Robust supervenience and emergence. Philosophy of Science 67(3): 466-489.

◈ Rueger, Alexander (2000). Physical emergence, Diachronic and Synchronic. Synthese 124(3): 297-322.

Abstract:  This paper explicates two notions of emergencewhich are based on two ways of distinguishinglevels of properties for dynamical systems.Once the levels are defined, the strategies ofcharacterizing the relation of higher level to lower levelproperties as diachronic and synchronic emergence are the same. In each case, the higher level properties aresaid to be emergent if they are novel or irreducible with respect to the lower level properties. Novelty andirreducibility are given precise meanings in terms of the effectsthat the change of a bifurcation or perturbation parameterin the system has. (The same strategy can be applied to otherways of separating levels of properties, like themicro/macro distinction.)

The notions of emergence developed here are notions of emergencein a weak sense: the higher level emergent properties wecapture are always structural properties (or are realized insuch properties), that is, they are defined in terms of the lowerlevel properties and their relations. Diachronic and synchronicemergent properties are distinctions within thecategory of structural properties.

◈ Rueger, Alexander (2006). Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences. Synthese 151(3): 335-346.

Published online: 28 July 2006

 

Abstract:  Kim’s model of ‘functional reduction’ of properties is shown to fail in a class of cases from physics involving properties at different spatial levels. The diagnosis of this failure leads to a non-reductive account of the relation of micro and macro properties.

Keywords:  Emergence - Functional properties - Kim’s view of reduction - Micro/macro levels - Reduction - Singular Perturbations

■ Russell, E. S. (1926). The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6: 39-48.

◈ Ryan, Alex J. (Sep. 6, 2006). Emergence is Coupled to Scope, not Level. abbreviated version to be submitted to Complexity.

Since its application to systems, emergence has been explained in terms of levels of observation. This approach has led to confusion, contradiction, incoherence and at times mysticism. When the idea of level is replaced by a framework of scope, resolution and state, this confusion is dissolved. We find that emergent properties are determined by the relationship between the scope of macrostate and microstate descriptions. This establishes a normative definition of emergent properties and emergence that makes sense of previous descriptive definitions of emergence. In particular, this framework sheds light on which classes of emergent properties are epistemic and which are ontological, and identifies fundamental limits to our ability to capture emergence in formal systems.

◈ Sarkar, Sahotra (1998). Genetics and Reductionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ Savellos, Elias E. and Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.) (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

◈ Sawyer, R. Keith (Dec. 1999). The emergence of creativity. Philosophical Psychology 12(4): 447-469.

◈ Sawyer, R. Keith (Nov. 2001). Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Some Implications for Sociological Theory. American Journal of Sociology 107(3): 551-585.

Abstract: Many accounts of the micro-macro link use the philosophical notion of emergence to argue that collective phenomena are collaboratively created by individuals yet are not reducible to explanation in terms of individuals. However, emergence has also been invoked by methodological individualists; they accept the existence of emergent social properties yet claim that such properties can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals and their relationships. Thus, contemporary sociological uses of emergence are contradictory and unstable. This article clarifies this situation by developing an account of emergence based in contemporary philosophy of mind. The philosophical account is used to eval‎uate contradictory sociological theories. Several unresolved issues facing theories of emergence in sociology are identified.

■ Sawyer, R. Keith (2002). Emergence in Psychology: Lessons from the History of Non-Reductionist Science. Human Development 45(1): 2-28 (DOI: 10.1159/000048148).

Abstract:  Theories of emergence have had a longstanding influence on psychological thought. Emergentism rejects both reductionism and holism; emergentists are scientific materialists, and yet argue that reductionist explanation may not always be scientifically feasible. I begin by summarizing the history of emergence in psychology and sociology, from the mid-19th century through the mid-20th century. I then demonstrate several parallels between this history and contemporary psychology, focusing on two recent psychological movements: socioculturalism and connectionist cognitive science. Placed in historical context, both socioculturalism and connectionism are seen to be revivals of 19th and early 20th century emergentism. I then draw on this history to identify several unresolved issues facing socioculturalists and connectionists, and to suggest several promising paths for future theory.

Keywords: Cognitive science, Emergence, History, Reductionism, Socioculturalism

■ Sawyer, R. Keith (2002). Nonreductive Individualism Part I—Supervenience and Wild Disjunction.  Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32(4): 537-559.

The author draws on arguments from contemporary philosophy of mind to provide an argument for sociological collectivism. This argument for nonreductive individualism accepts that only individuals exist but rejects methodological individualism. In Part I, the author presents the argument for nonreductive individualism by working through the implications of supervenience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in some detail. In Part II, he extends the argument to provide a defense for social causal laws, and this account of social causation does not require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of individuals.

■ Sawyer, R. Keith (2003). Nonreductive Individualism Part II—Social Causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33(2): 203-224.

In Part I, the author argued for nonreductive individualism (NRI), an account of the individual-collective relation that is ontologically individualist yet rejects methodological individualism. However, because NRI is ontologically individualist, social entities and properties would seem to be only analytic constructs, and if so, they would seem to be epiphenomenal, since only real things can have causal power. In general, a nonreductionist account is a relatively weak defense of sociological explanation if it cannot provide an account of how social properties can participate in causal relations. In this article, the author extends NRI to address this weakness and provides an account of social causation that he refers to as supervenient causation.

Key Words: individualism • collectivism • social realism • social causation

■ Sawyer, R. Keith (2004). The Mechanisms of Emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34(2): 260-282.

This article focuses on emergence in social systems. The author begins by proposing a new tool to explore the mechanisms of social emergence: multi agent–based computer simulation. He then draws on philosophy of mind to develop an account of social emergence that raises potential problems for the methodological individualism of both social mechanism and of multi agent simulation. He then draws on various complexity concepts to propose a set of criteria whereby one can determine whether a given social mechanism generates emergent properties, in the sense that their explanation cannot be reduced to a mechanistic account of individuals and their interactions. This combined account helps to resolve the competing claims of methodological individualists and social realists. The author’s conclusion is that the scope of mechanistic explanation may be limited due to the extreme complexity of many social systems.

Key Words: emergence • mechanism • computer simulation • methodological individualism • social realism

◈ Sawyer, R. Keith (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   

▣ Schaffner, K.F. (1967). Approaches to reduction. Philosophy of Science 34: 137-147.

◈ Schouten, Maurice K.D. and Huib Looren de Jong (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.

Table of contents

Contributors
Preface and Acknowledgments
1. Mind Matters: The Roots of Reductionism: Maurice Schouten and Huib Looren de Jong (Tilburg University and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam)

Part I: Metaphysics of Science:
2. Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes: Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri-Columbia)
3. Some Metaphysical Anxieties of Reductionism: Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)
4. The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism: Carl Gillett (Illinois Wesleyan University)
5. Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology: Lawrence A. Shapiro (University of Wisconsin)

Part II: Philosophical Accounts of Reduction, Mechanism, Co-evolution:
6. Reduction without the Structures: Robert C. Richardson (University of Cincinnati)
7. Reinforcing the Three "R"s: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement: Ronald Endicott (North Carolina State University)
8. Reducing Psychology while Maintaining its Autonomy via Mechanistic Explanations: William Bechtel (University of California, San Diego)
9. Enriching Philosophical Models of Cross-Scientific Relations: Incorporating Diachronic Theories: Robert N. McCauley (Emory University)

Part III: Mechanisms of Mind:
10. Coupling, Emergence, and Explanation: Andy Clark (University of Edinburgh)
11. Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct?: Cory D. Wright (University of California, San Diego)
12. Who Says You Can't Do a Molecular Biology of Consciousness?: John Bickle (University of Cincinnati)
13. Mind Reading and Mirror Neurons: Exploring Reduction: Huib Looren de Jong and Maurice Schouten (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam and Tilburg University)
Name Index
Subject Index

◈ Schröder, Jürgen (1998). Emergence: Non-deducibility or Downwards Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48(193): 433-452.

◈ Schröder, Jürgen (2002). The supervenience argument and the generalization problem. Erkenntnis 56(3): 319-328.

▣ Schrödinger, Erwin (1944/1992). What is Life?: The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

 

  Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961)

 

◇ Schurz, Josef (in press). Probability and Evolution. Why the Probability Argument of Creationists is Wrong. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. (doi:10.1007/s10838-006-9020-7)

Published online: 20 April 2007

Summary:  Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule, which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event.

 

Keywords:  probability - evolution - creation - complexity - self-organization - selection rule

Josef Schurz: Institut fur Chemie Physikalische Chemie, Universität Graz, Heinrichstr. 28, A-8010 Graz, Austria

◆ Schwartz, Jeffrey M., Henry P. Stapp and Mario Beauregard (Jun. 29, 2005). Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 360(1458): 1309-27.

Received 2 June 2004, Accepted 19 October 2004

Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

Keywords: mind; consciousness; brain; neuroscience; neuropsychology; quantum mechanics

The only acceptable point of view appears to be the one that recognizes both sides of reality—the quantitative and the qualitative, the physical and the psychical—as compatible with each other, and can embrace them simultaneously.
(Pauli 1955, p. 208)

http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/PTRS.pdf

◈ Scott, Alwyn C. (1995). Stairway to the Mind: The Controversial New Science of Consciousness. Springer.

 

▣ Scott, Alwyn C. (Apr. 1996). The hierarchical emergence of consciousness. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation 40(3-4): 481-489.

◈ Scott, Alwyn C. (1996). On quantum theories of the mind (pdf 150 KB), Journal of Consciousness Sudies 3(5-6): 484-491. For other points of view see a rebuttal by Henry Stapp (pdf 140 KB) and support from a paper by Max Tegmark (pdf 456 KB).

◈ Scott, Alwyn C. (2001). We could be siblings yet (pdf 51 KB). A review of Why Religion Matters by Houston Smith. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(9-10): 161-166.

◈ Scott, Alwyn C. (2004). Reductionism revisited (pdf 121 KB). Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(2): 51-68.

◈ Scott. Alwyn C. (2007). The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life . Springer.

◈ Seager, William (2005). Emergence and efficacy. In David Martel Johnson and Christina E. Erneling eds. The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Searle, John (Mar. 2007). Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations 10(1): 69-76.

Abstract:  I agree with much of Habermas's article 'The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will,' but concentrate on disagreements. (i) He is wrong to think the language game of neuroscience is somehow at odds with the language game of rational intentionality. I argue that they give different levels of description of the same system. He also has too narrow a conception of contemporary neurobiological research. (ii) He is mistaken in thinking there is a 'performative contradiction' in engaging in research that presupposes free will in order to disprove free will. (iii) His 'epistemic dualism' is irrelevant to the issue. (iv) He has some misconceptions about the world in general, especially about 'downward causation.' He seems to think that the physical world is deterministic. It is not. Quantum indeterminacy pervades the entire universe. We have the illusion of determinism because in some systems the quantum indeterminacies cancel out at the macro level. Is the brain a deterministic system? Right now we do not know.

Keywords:  determinism; epistemic dualism; levels of description; neurobiology

◇ Seibt, Johanna (1995). The Myth of Substance and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. Acta Analytica 11(15):

Abstract: Substance ontologists claim that substances are ontologically primary because the category of substance enjoys unique explanatory potential. Unless it can be shown that *only* substances fulfill the central explanatory tasks in ontology, this inference from explanatory success to ontological primacy amounts to a fallacy akin to the error Whitehead called 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' I investigate recent prototypical arguments for substance metaphysics and try to show that some explanatory functions of substance can also be fullfilled by other ontological categories. In particular, I argue against M. Ayers that there is no reason to think that all and only substances are discrete individuals, natural wholes and logical units. I conclude that the category of substance does not provide us with a uniquely powerful explanans for the notion of logical and physical unity.

◈ Seife, Charles (2000). Cold numbers unmake the quantum mind. Science 287: 791 (Issue of Feb. 4, 2000).

◈ Shagrir, Oron (2002). Global supervenience, coincident entities and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies 109: 171-196.

◈ Shagrir, Oron (forthcoming). Concepts of Supervenience Revisited.

▣ Shannon, Claude Elwood (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27: 379–423, 623–656.

▣ Shannon, Claude Elwood and Warren Weaver (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press.

▣ Shapiro, Lawrence A. (Dec. 2000). Multiple Realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97(12): 635–654.

◈ Shields, George W. (May 2001). Physicalist panexperientialism and the mind-body problem. American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 22(2): 133-154.

◈ Shoemaker, Sidney (Mar. 2002). Kim on emergence. Philosophical Studies 108(1/2): 53-63.

◈ Shrader, Warren E. (Oct. 2005). The Metaphysics of Ontological Emergence. PhD Dissertation. University of Notre Dame.

http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-10242005-100620/unrestricted/ShraderW1005.pdf

◈ Sider, Theodore (1999). Global Supervenience and Identity across Times and Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 913-937.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (1998). Emergence and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5(4): 464-482.

Abstract: In the first part of the paper I argue that neither physicalism (whether its reductive or non-reductive form) nor standard forms of dualism (as well as Chalmers' fundamentalism) can provide an explanatory framework for consciousness or cognition - neither account can existence of conscious experience nor its relationship to cognition and the brain. Physicalism and fundamentalism fail to provide an explanatory framework for consciousness because they both share, at least with respect to the physical universe, the same misguided commitment to part/whole reductionism and microreductive accounts of explanation. In addition to their lack of explanatory power, both physicalism and fundamentalism have well known absurd and troubling metaphysical consequences such as eliminativism and epiphenomenalism. In the second section of the paper I advocate a position I call radical emergence, arguing that microphysics (especially quantum mechanics) provides strong empirical evidence for emergence. I show that emergence provides a viable alternative for explaining consciousness and cognition - an alternative that has none of the awkward metaphysical consequences of either physicalism or fundamentalism.

◈ Silberstein, Michael and John McGeever (Apr. 1999). The search for ontological emergence. The Philosophical Quarterly 49: 182-200. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00136)

Abstract: We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term 'emergence'. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of 'emergence' in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems to offer one, in the Bell properties of entangled particles, but other apparently promising candidates, such as non-linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, seem on careful analysis to display only epistemological emergence. We examine the consequences for physicalism of admitting ontological emergence in the micro-physical.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (Sep./Oct. 2001). Converging on Emergence: consciousness, causation and explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(9-10): 61-98.

Abstract: I will argue that emergence is an empirically plausible and unique philosophical/ scientific framework for bridging the ontological gap and the explanatory gap with respect to phenomenal consciousness. On my view the ontological gap is the gap between fundamental ingredients/parts of reality that are not conscious (such as particles and fields) and beings/wholes (such as ourselves) that are conscious. The explanatory gap is the current lack of a philosophical/scientific theory that explains how non-conscious parts can become conscious wholes. Both gaps are of course conceptual as well as empirical in nature. Section I will be devoted to these issues as well as providing other general criteria for an account of consciousness. In section II, different types of emergence will be defined in the context of a more general taxonomy of reduction and emergence. Emergentism about consciousness becomes much more plausible when we see that the ancient ‘atomism’ (i.e., mereological and nomological supervenience) that drives physicalism on one end, and fundamental property dualism on the other, is probably false. Backing up this claim will be the primary burden of section III. In section IV I will conjecture that phenomenal consciousness is mereologically and perhaps nomologically emergent from neurochemical/ quantum processes, just as many other properties are so emergent. In section V I defend my view of emergence against the objections that: (1) it cannot bridge the explanatory/ontological gap between matter and consciousness and (2) it cannot account for the causal efficacy of consciousness in itself. Finally, in section VI, there is speculation about where all of this might take us in the future.

◈ Silberstein, Michael (2002). Reduction, Emergence and Explanation. In Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein (eds.) Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (2006). Emergence, Theology and the Manifest Image. In Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (2006). In Defence of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation. In Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (eds.) The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (forthcoming). Consciousness, Emergence and Mereology. In Hans Burkhardt , Johanna Seibt and Guido Imaguire (eds.) Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag.

◇ Silberstein, Michael (forthcoming). Emergence and Consciousness. In Oxford Companion to Consciousness.

◈ Silberstein, Michael (forthcoming). Contextual Emergence: On the Relational Nature of Reality.

◈ Skarda, C.A. and Walter J. Freeman (1987). How Brains Make Chaos in Order to Make Sense of the World. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (June): 161-173.

◈ Skarda, C.A. and Walter J. Freeman (1990). Chaos and the New Science of the Brain. Concepts in Neuroscience 1(2): 275-285. 

◈ Slors, Marc (1997). Why functional properties can be emergent: An argument against Kim. Intellectica 25(2): 59-65.

▣ Smart, J.J.C. (1981). Physicalism and emergence. Neuroscience 6: 109-113.

◈ Smedes, Taede A. (2004―2005). Emergence, Materialism, and Worldviews: A Review Article. Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical 31(1): 36-41.

www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/TAD%20WEB%20ARCHIVE/TAD31-1/TAD31-1-oct16fnl-pg36-41-pdf.pdf

Abstract:  This review article deals with four recent books exploring issues of emergence and self-organization. Three of these also deal with issues of materialism and religious worldviews, while one charts the history and philosophical unerpinnings of emergentist thought.

Key Words:  chaos theory; complexity; emergence; Intelligent Design; materialism; Polanyi, Michael; reductionism; self-organization

◈ Smith, Kerri (2007). Looking for hidden signs of consciousness. Nature 446(7134): 355 (Issue of 22 March 2007).

A 'brain-activity' test for patients in a vegetative state has divided neurologists.

◈ Smythies, John (Mar. 2003). Space, time and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(3): 47-56.

This paper describes a new theory of consciousness based on previous work by C.D. Broad, H.H. Price, Andrei Linde and others. This hypothesis states that the Universe consists of three fundamental entities  —  space-time, matter and consciousness, each with their own degrees of freedom. The paper pays particular attention to three areas that impact on this theory: (1) the demonstration by neuroscience and psychophysics that we do not perceive the world as it actually is but as the brain computes it most probably to be; (2) the need to delineate between phenomenal space-time and physical space-time. Recent theories in physics that suggest that the Universe has more than three spatial dimensions are relevant here; (3) the role of consciousness in the block Universe described by Special Relativity. The integration of these topics suggests a new physical theory of the nature of consciousness.

■ Spencer-Smith, Richard (1995). Reductionism and emergent properties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 113-29.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (1969). A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review 76: 532-536. Reprinted In: M. H. Marx and F. E. Gradson (eds.) (1976). Theories in Contemporary Psychology, pp. 451-457. New  York: MacMillan Publ.Co., Inc.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (1970). An objective approach to subjective experience: Further explanation of a hypothesis. Psychological Review 77: 585-590.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (1976). Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function. In: Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell and Irwin Savodnik (eds.) Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (1980). Mind-brain interaction: mentalism, yes; dualism, no. Neuroscience 5: 195-206. Reprinted in A.D. Smith, R. Llanas and P.G. Kostyuk (eds.) Commentaries in the Neurosciences. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 651-662 (1980).

◆ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (Jun. 1986). Macro- versus Micro-Determinism. Philosophy of Science 53(2): 265-270.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (1987). Consciousness and causality. In: Richard L. Gregory (ed.) The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 164-166.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (Spring 1991). In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction. The Journal of Mind and Behavior 12(2): 221-245.

The mentalist mind-brain model is defended against alleged weaknesses. I argue that the perceived failings are based mostly on misinterpretation of mentalism and emergent interaction. Considering the paradigmatic concepts at issue and broad implications, I try to better clarify the misread mentalist view, adding more inclusive detail, relevant background, further analysis, and comparing its foundational concepts with those of the new cognitive paradigm in psychology. A changed "emergent interactionist" form of causation is posited that combines traditional microdeterminism with emergent "top-down" control. This emergent form of causation has wide application to causal explanation in general and is hypothesized to be the key common precursor for the consciousness (cognitive) revolution and subsequent boom in new worldviews, "systems thinking," emerging new paradigms, and other transformative developments of the 1970s and 1980s.

☞ see Larry R. Vandervert's argument (1991) against Roger Sperry's mentalism and emergent interactionism.

▣ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (Summer 1992). Turnabout on consciousness: a mentalist view. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13(3): 259-280.

Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic dichotomies. Formerly opposed features from previous polar alternatives become merged into a novel unifying synthesis, an unambiguous description of which demands redefinition of old terms or/and the invention of new terminology. The present analysis and interpretation are backed by statements from the early papers.

◆ Sperry, Roger Wolcott (Apr. 1, 1995). The Riddle of Consciousness and the Changing Scientific WorldView. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 35(2): 7-33.

Centuries-old determinist traditions of scientific materialism are currently challenged in an unprecedented outburst during the past two decades of emerging new paradigms, new worldview "visions," new approaches to consciousness and to reality, and other transformative trends including an all-time high in favor of holism over reductionism. These revisionary developments are traced to sources in the preceding cognitive revolution and its changed concepts of consciousness and causation. Anew reciprocal "two-way" mode of causal determinism, required to shift mental states into an ineliminable causal role, is a common underlying factor. This bidirectional model is upheld to be a more complete and adequate paradigm for all casual explanation and understanding, giving science a new approach to the ultimate nature and meaning of existence with a new set of answers to some of today's thorniest issues.

◈ Spurrett, David, David Papineau (Jan, 1999). A note on the completeness of 'physics'. Analysis 59(1): 25-29.

■ Stace, W.T. (May 1939). Novelty, Indeterminism, and Emergence. The Philosophical Review 48(3): 296-310.

First three paragraphs:

The purpose of this paper is entirely analytical. It is not my aim to put forward any positive or constructive thesis. My object is, if possible, to introduce some measure of clarity into what seems to me to be a fog of vague ideas connected with the concept of novelty as that concept is found in the writings of such authors as Bergson, William James, Samuel Alexander, and other contemporary philosophers. I simply want to try to help in clearing up what seems to me to be a sphere of very confused thinking.

Before entering on the detail of this I want to make three introductory remarks. First, the concept of novelty in contemporary philosophy (except perhaps in Alexander) is part and parcel of a philosophical revolt against the overweening pretensions of science. Science finds, or used to find, the world completely governed by law. All events are reduced to cases of causal or functional determination. This means, it is alleged, that there can be no genuine novelty in the world. We shall have a mechanical universe, an eternal repetition of unalterable sequences, the everlasting turning of wheels upon wheels. All change is mere rearrangement of old elements in new patterns. The end is foreseeable in the beginning, is contained in the beginning. The universe cannot produce anything which was not implicitly present from the very beginning, that is, it cannot produce any novelty. The concept of novelty in philosophy is a revolt against this mechanical view of the world which is the product of science.

Secondly, it is a revolt based upon an emotional revulsion. The philosophers of novelty dislike the scientific picture. They desire a world in which what they call genuine novelty shall be possible. And because they wish for such a world they attempt to prove that the world really is of this sort. I do not want to be considered here as making a cheap accusation of wishful thinking. Their objections may, for all I know, be philosophically justifiable. I merely wish that this background of emotional revulsion be noted.

◈ Stalnaker, Robert (1996). Varieties of Supervenience. In James Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 221-241.

◇ Stapp, Henry P. (Nov. 2005). Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(11): 43-58.  (Reprinted in Zygon 41(2) September 2006. 599-615)

Abstract: René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind–brain connection allows many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and practically useful way. The intent of this paper is to give an updated account of the author’s developing theory that is clearer than before, focused on the positive, and suitable for non-specialist readers.

◈ Stapp, Henry P. (Dec. 2006). Quantum interactive dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen causal anomalies. Erkenntnis 65(1): 117-142.

Published online: 17 October 2006

Abstract:  Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance-free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky types. This article is a sequel to Stapp [2005, Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(11), 43–58] but strives to be largely self-contained.

◈ Stephan, Achim (1992). Emergence – A Systematic View on its Historical Facets. Published pp. 25-48 in: Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, Jaegwon Kim (eds.) Emergence or Reduction? ― Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.

◈ Stephan, Achim (1997). Armchair Arguments against Emergentism. Erkenntnis 46(3): 305-314.

http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Amchair_Arguments_Erkenntnis_46_(1997).pdf

◈ Stephan, Achim (1998). Varieties of Emergence in Artificial and Natural Systems. Zeitschrift für Naturforschung 53c: 639-656.

◈ Stephan, Achim (1999). Varieties of Emergentism. Evolution and Cognition 5: 49-59.

http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Varieties_of_Emergentism_(1999).pdf

◈ Stephan, Achim (1999). Emergenz: Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden and München: Dresden University Press.

◈ Stephan, Achim (2002a). Emergence, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (Special Topic: Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence): 77-93.

http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Grazer_Philosophische_Studien_65_(2002).pdf

◈ Stephan, Achim, Hans Lenk (2002b). On Levels and Types of Complexity and Emergence. Published pp. 13-28 in: Evandro Agazzi and Luisa Montecucco (eds.) Complexity and Emergence. (Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science. Bergamo, Italy 9 - 13 May 2001). New Jersey, London: World Scientific.

◈ Stephan, Achim (2002c). Emergence. Published pp. 1108-1115 in: L. Nadel (ed.) Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan.

◈ Stephan, Achim (2004). Phenomenal Emergence. Networks. Rivista di filosofia dell'intelligenza artificiale e scienze cognitive – A journal of the philosophy of artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences 3-4: 91-102.

http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Phenomenal_Emergence_Networks_3-4_(2004).pdf

http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/ai/networks

◈ Stephan, Achim (2006). The dual role of ‘emergence’ in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. Synthese 151(3): 485-498.

Published online: 8 August 2006

Abstract:  The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.

 

Keywords:  Artifical life - Connectionism - Emergence - Qualia - Reductive explanation - Robotics

▣ Stöckler, Manfred (1990). Emergenz. Bausteine für eine Begriffsexplikation. Conceptus 24(63): 7-24.

▣ Stöckler, Manfred (1991). A Short History of Emergence and Reductionism. In Evandro Agazzi (ed.) The Problem of Reductionism in Science. (71-90). Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

▣ Stöckler, Manfred (1991). Reductionism and the New Theories of Self-Organization. In Gerhard Schurz, Georg J.W. Dorn (eds.) Advances in Scientific Philosophy, Poznan Studies 24: 233-254.

◈ Stoljar, Daniel (Mar. 2001). Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXII, No. 2: 253-281.

◇ Storch, Maja, Benita Cantieni, Gerald Hüther and Wolfgang Tschacher (2006). Embodiment: Die Wechselwirkung von Körper und Psyche verstehen und nutzen. [Embodiment: Understanding and Using the Mutual Relationship. between Body and Mind]. Bern, Switzerland: Huber.

Warum fällt es vielen Menschen so schwer, achtsam mit dem eigenen Körper umzugehen? Warum ist das Befassen mit dem eigenen Körper oft mit Peinlichkeit besetzt? Warum gilt nur als intelligent, wer Würfel im Raum drehen kann und lange Wörterlisten auswendig lernen? Warum geben Menschen die Autorität für ihren physischen Körper so bereitwillig ab an eine Wissenschaft, die ihn aufteilt in scheinbar unzusammenhängende Einzelteile?
Maja Storch, Benita Cantieni, Gerald Hüther und Wolfgang Tschacher gehen in «Embodiment» diesen Fragen nach und kommen einmütig zum Schluss: Es ist höchste Zeit, das wichtigste Erfahrungsinstrument des Menschen zurückzuerobern: den Körper. Sie fordern, das Prinzip Embodiment zu berücksichtigen. Wer Menschen berät, therapiert, erforscht, muss immer auch den Körper einbeziehen.
Maja Storch beleuchtet, warum und wie die Psyche im Körper wohnt.
Wolfgang Tschacher zeigt auf, weshalb die Abspaltung des Geistes vom Körper nicht funktionieren kann.
Gerald Hüther schildert, wie sich das gut funktionierende Gehirn und der gut funktionierende Körper gegenseitig bedingen.
Benita Cantieni liefert schliesslich das anatomische Angebot: Richten Sie sich auf, richten Sie sich in Ihrem Körper ein.
Mehr auch unter www.ismz.ch

http://www.hogrefe.de/?mod=detail_bern&ISBN=978-3-456-84323-0&PHPSESSID=6qr6aob4q89ghne61n8nqo1092

◈ Strogatz, Steven (2003). Sync: How Order Emerges From Chaos in the Universe, Nature, and Everyday Life. New York: Hyperion.

 

◇Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesVolume 36, Issue 2, Pages 233-464 (June 2005).

Mechanisms in biology
Edited by Carl F. Craver, Lindley Darden

Introduction
Pages 233-244
Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden

Mechanisms of life in the seventeenth century: Borelli, Perrault, Régis
Pages 245-260
Dennis Des Chene

Mechanism, vitalism and organicism in late nineteenth and twentieth-century biology: the importance of historical context
Pages 261-283
Garland E. Allen

Darwinism and mechanism: metaphor in science
Pages 285-302
Michael Ruse

Adaptive speciation: the role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation
Pages 303-326
Jason M. Baker

Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection
Pages 327-347
Jr., Robert A. Skipper and Roberta L. Millstein

Relations among fields: Mendelian, cytological and molecular mechanisms
Pages 349-371
Lindley Darden

Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience
Pages 373-395
Carl F. Craver

Regularities and causality; generalizations and causal explanations
Pages 397-420
Jim Bogen

Explanation: a mechanist alternative
Pages 421-441
William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen

Modeling mechanisms
Pages 443-464
Stuart Glennan

◈ Sudakov, K.V. (2001). "Imprints of Reality" in the systems mechanisms of brain activity. Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology 31(6): 561-571.

◇ Suster, Danilo (1995). Modality and Supervenience. Acta Analytica 10(15):

Abstract: According to the thesis of modal supervenience it is impossible that two objects be alike in their actual properties but differ in their modal properties. Some have argued that the concept of supervenience is inapplicable to the modal-actual case. Some have argued that the thesis of modal supervenience is trivially true. These arguments are refuted; a thesis of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is meaningful and nontrivial. The significance of the thesis is nevertheless limited by the problem of finding a nonmodal specification for the purported subvenient properties.

▣ Symons, John and Francisco Calvo Garzón (eds.) (forthcoming in Mar. 31, 2008). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.

Table of Contents

Introduction Paco Calvo and John Symons

Part 1: Historical Background

1. Rationalist Roots of Modern Psyhology Gary Hatfield

2. Empirist Roots of Modern Psychology Raymond Martin

3. Origins of Experimental Psychology

Part 2: The Status of Psychological Theories

4. Is Folk Psychology a Theory? Ian Ravenscroft

5. What is a Psyhological Explanation William Betchel & Cory Wright

6. The Interface Bewteen Neuroscience and Psychology Valerie Hardcastle

Part 3: Modeling the Mind : The Battle of the ‘isms’

7. Behavourism David Braddon-Mitchell

8. Cognitivism Alan Garnham

9. Computational Functionalism Tom Polger

10. Connectionism Noel Sharkey

11. Dynamicism Gregor Schöner

12. Interactivism Mark Bickhard

Part 4: Behavior, Development and the Brain

13. Conceptual Problems in Statistics, Testing and Experimentation David Danks

14. Imaging Technologies Geraint Rees

15. Neural Mehanisms Carl Craver

16. Cellular and Sub-Cellular Neuroscience John Bickle

17. Evolutionary Models in Psychology Michael Wheeler

18. Development and Learning Aarre Laakso

19. Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Ken Aizawa

20. Actiona and Mind Alfred Mele

Part 5: Thought and Language

21. The Many Problems of Representation Zoltan Dienes

22. Naturalising Content Dan Ryder

23. Language and Thought Susan Schneider

24. Modularity Verena Gottschling

25. Nativism Richard Samuels

26. Non-Human Minds and Languages Colin Allen

27. Mind Reading Joseph Cruz

28. Representation and the Brain Art Markman

Part 6: Perception and Consciousness

29. Consciousness Timothy Bayne

30. Individuating the Senses Brian Keeley

31. Vision Patricia Churchland & John Jacobson

32. Color Jonathan Cohen

33. Audition Casey O'Callaghan

34. Attention Christopher Mole

Part 7: The Inner World

35. Introspection Jordi Fernández

36. Memory Mark Rowlands

37. Dreams John Sutton

38. Emotion Anthony Atkinson

39. The Unconscious/Freud Edward Erwin

40. Temporality Rick Grush

Part 8: Psychology and the Self

41. Personal Identity Marya Schechtman

42. Emodiment in Schizophrenia Giovanni Stanghellini

43. Confabulation William Hirstein

44. Aphasis Daniel Kolak

45. (Propositional) Imagination Shaun Nichols

46. Moral Judgements Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly and Stephen Stich

47. Buddhist Perspectives Owen Flanagan

A Glossary for Philosophy of Psychology Paco Calvo and John Symons

◈ Synthese Volume 151, Number 3, 2006년 8월.

Guest Editor: Max Kistler

Specaial Issue on: 

New Perspectives on Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Biology and Psychology

 

◈ Tegmark, Max (Apr. 2000). Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. Physical Review E 61(4): 4194-4206.

Received 6 July 1999

Based on a calculation of neural decoherence rates, we argue that the degrees of freedom of the human brain that relate to cognitive processes should be thought of as a classical rather than quantum system, i.e., that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the current classical approach to neural network simulations. We find that the decoherence time scales (∼10^-13–10^-20 s) are typically much shorter than the relevant dynamical time scales (∼10^-3–10^-1 s), both for regular neuron firing and for kinklike polarization excitations in microtubules. This conclusion disagrees with suggestions by Penrose and others that the brain acts as a quantum computer, and that quantum coherence is related to consciousness in a fundamental way.

◈ Tegmark, Max (Oct. 1, 2000). Why the brain is probably not a quantum computer. Information Sciences 128(3-4): 155-179.

◈ Thompson, Evan T. and Francisco J. Varela (2001). Radical Embodiment: Neuronal Dynamics and Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science 5: 418-425.

◈ Thompson, Evan T. (2004). Life and Mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3(4): 381-398.

◈ Thompson, Evan T. (Mar. 26, 2007). Mind In Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind. Harvard University Press.

 

http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/THOMIN.html

 Evan Thompson

◈ Thompson, Evan T. (forthcoming). Buddha and the Brain: Contemplative Insight and the Neuroscienece of Consciousness.

◇ Tschacher, Wolfgang and Hermann Haken (Apr. 2007). Intentionality in non-equilibrium systems? The functional aspects of self-organized pattern formation. New Ideas in Psychology Volume 25, Issue 1: 1-15. (doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.09.002)

Available online 7 November 2006.

Abstract: Psychology is frequently confronted with mind–body issues—is there a way by which mentalist and physical approaches to cognition can be integrated? Can the intentional attributes of mind be understood in scientific terms? The authors propose that synergetics, the theory of non-linear complex systems, offers steps towards a possible solution to this conundrum. In particular, we maintain that an essential property of self-organized pattern formation lies within its functionality, this being the ability to optimize, respond and adapt ‘meaningfully’ to environmental constraints. Patterns become functional because they consume in a most efficient manner the gradients which cause their evolution, thereby making synergetic pattern formation appear ‘intentional’. We therefore posit that self-organization phenomena may afford basic explanations for the adaptive, intentional and purposive behavior of many complex systems, in particular of cognitive systems. This present approach elaborates on the second law of thermodynamics.

Keywords: Cognition; Gradients; Intentionality; Mind–body problem; Self-organization; Synergetics

◈ Tuszynski, Jack A. (ed.) (2006). The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer.

About this book

Consciousness is one of the major unsolved problems in science. How do the feelings and sensations making up conscious experience arise from the concerted actions of nerve cells and their associated synaptic and molecular processes? Can such feelings be explained by modern science, or is there an entirely different kind of explanation needed? And how can this seemingly intractable problem be approached experimentally? How do the operations of the conscious mind emerge out of the specific interactions involving billions of neurons? This multi-authored book seeks answers to these questions within a range of physically based frameworks, i.e, the underlying assumption is that consciousness can be understood using the intellectual potential of modern physics and other sciences. There are a number of theories of consciousness in existence, some of which are based on classical physics while some others require the use of quantum concepts. The latter ones have drawn a lot of criticism from the present-day scientific establishment while simultaneously claiming that classical approaches are doomed to failure. This book presents the reader with a spectrum of opinions from both sides of this on-going scientific debate, letting him/her decide which of these approaches are most likely to succeed.

http://www.springer.com/east/home/generic/search/results?SGWID=5-40109-22-52096966-0

contents

1 The Path Ahead --- Jack A. Tuszynski, Nancy Woolf

2 Consciousness and Quantum Physics: Empirical Research on the Subjective Reduction of the Statevector --- Dick J. Bierman, Stephen Whitmarsh

3 Microtubules in the Cerebral Cortex: Role in Memory and Consciousness --- Nancy J. Woolf

4 Towards Experimental Tests of Quantum Effects in Cytoskeletal Proteins --- Andreas Mershin, Hugo Sanabria, John H. Miller, Dharmakeerthna Nawarathna, Efthimios M.C. Skoulakis, Nikolaos E. Mavromatos, Alexadre A. Kolomenskii, Hans A. Schuessler, Richard F. Luduena, Dimitri V. Nanopoulos

5 Physicalism, Chaos and Reductionism --- Alwyn Scott

6 Consciousness, Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics: The Case for a Connection --- Stuart Hameroff

7 Life, Catalysis and Excitable Media: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Metabolism and Cognition --- Christopher James Davia

8 The Dendritic Cytoskeleton as a Computational Device: An Hypothesis --- Avner Priel, Jack A. Tuszynski, Horacion F. Cantiello

9 Recurrent Quantum Neural Network and its Applications --- Laxmidhar Behera, Indrani Kar, Avshalom C. Elitzur

10 Microtubules as a Quantum Hopfield Network --- Elizabeth C. Behrman, K. Gaddam, J.E. Steck, S.R. Skinner

11 Consciousness and Quantum Brain Dynamics --- Gordon Globus

12 The CEMI Field Theory: Seven Clues to the Nature of Consciousness --- Johnjoe McFadden

13 Quantum Cosmology and the Hard Problem of the Conscious Brain --- Chris King

14 Consciousness and Logic in a Quantum Computing Universe --- Paola Zizzi

Index

http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783540238904-t1.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-282394-p52096966

■ Van Bouwel, Jeroen (Dec. 2004). Individualism and Holism, Reduction and Pluralism: A Comment on Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34(4): 527-535.

Received 13 November 2003

Commenting on recent articles by Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle, the author questions the way in which the debate between methodological individualists and holists has been presented and contends that too much weight has been given to metaphysical and ontological debates at the expense of giving attention to methodological debates and analysis of good explanatory practice. Giving more attention to successful explanatory practice in the social sciences and the different underlying epistemic interests and motivations for providing explanations or reducing theories (which ask for different kinds of explanatory information to be found on the social or on the individual level) might lead to real progress in the debate on methodological individualism, and away from the unending battles of (metaphysical) intuitions.

Keywords: methodological individualism; nonreductive materialism; pluralism; pragmatics of explanation

■ Van Bouwel, Jeroen (2006). De idee van emergentie in de sociologie: perspectieven en problemen(The idea of emergence in sociology: perspectives and problems). Tijdschrift voor Sociologie (Themanummer over causaliteit) 27(4): 337-350.

Recently the philosophical concept of emergence has been used in sociology to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (e.g., Sawyer, 2001, 2003 and forthcoming). In this paper, I want to analyse how the concept of emergence helps us illuminating the individual-collective relation in sociology, paying attention to the analogies with philosophy of mind. Subsequently, some questions will be raised about Keith Sawyer's use of emergence in his defence of sociological explanation. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that sociological explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation (c.f., Van Bouwel, 2004; Van Bouwel and Weber, 2002) and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

■ Van Bouwel, Jeroen (200+). Why social emergence? Discussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory. In: R. Vanderbeeken and B. D’Hooghe (eds.) (200+). Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company (forthcoming).

■ Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Erik Weber (Dec. 2002). Remote Causes, Bad Explanations? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32(4): 437-449 (doi:10.1111/1468-5914.00197).

◈ Van Cleve, James 1990. Mind-Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 215-226.

First three paragraphs:

If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin of things. Accordingly, we find that the more clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are beginning to posit it there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it.

So wrote William James in the section of The Principle of Psychology entitled "Evolutionary Psychology Demands a Mind-Dust." The mind-dust argument, or something like it, has recently been revived by Thomas Nagel. In Nagel's version, the argument runs as follows:

1. Human beings are complex systems composed entirely of matter. (Material Composition, or Anti-Dualism)

2. Mental properties are not logically implied by any physical properties. (Anti-Reductivism)

3. Human beings do have mental properties. (Anti-Eliminativism)

4. There are no emergent properties. That is to say, all properties of a complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituents and their mode of combination. (Anti-Emergence)

◈ Van De Laar, Tjeerd (Oct. 2006). Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37(2): 307-332.

 

Published online: 11 January 2007

 

Summary:  Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors (e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I eval‎uate the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency.

 

Keywords:  dimensioned realization - downward causation - downward determination - dynamical systems theory - mental causation

■ Vandervert, Larry R. (Spring 1991). A Measurable and Testable Brain-Based Emergent Interactionism: An Alternative to Sperry's Mentalist Emergent Interactionism. The Journal of Mind and Behavior  12(2): 210-220.

Possible measurement and testability weaknesses in Sperry's mind-supervenient emergent interactionism "argument by analogy" model are described. An alternative brain-supervenient interactionism that addresses the weaknesses of Sperry's mind-brain model is presented. The alternative model, Neurological Positivism (NP) - a systems-theoretical evolutionary epistemology - proposes that the measurable energy quality of the algorithmic organization of the Darwinian brain supervenes that of cultural mental models (collectively, mind) and thus downwardly influences the brain circuitry patterns that underlie them. Brain and mind are defined in interrelated energy terms within the context of the self-referential maximum-power principle. The equivalence of maximum-power principle energy hierarchies to chaotic/fractal dynamical designs is described. The production of mental models through reflective thinking is defined as an emergent dimension of energetic self-referencing by the brain operating in accordance with the maximum-power principle. It is concluded that within the context of NP the brain-mind relationship constitutes an "uneven" central state energy identity, with brain supervenient, when brain-mind relative energy qualities are taken into account.

■ Vandervert, Larry R. (Autumn 1991). On the Modeling of Emergent Interaction: Which Will it Be, The Laws of Thermodynamics, or Sperry's "Wheel" in the Subcircuitry? The Journal of Mind and Behavior  12(4): 535-540, ISSN 0271-0137.

Weaknesses in Roger Sperry's "Defense of Mentalism" that appeared in the Spring issue of JMB are described. Sperry's clarification of his mentalist position still appears to lack a plausible mechanism of interaction. The wheel rolling down hill analogy is described as "a ghost in the subcircuitry." Neurological Positivism's (NP) energetic mechanism of brain-mind interaction is summarized. The relatioship of systems theory to reductionism is described briefly in terms of NP.

◈ Vandervert, Larry R. (1995). Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: a thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem. New Ideas in Psychology 13(2): 107-127.

▣ Van Eck, Dingmar, Huib Looren de Jong and Maurice M.K.D. Schouten (2006). Eval‎uating New Wave Reductionism: the case of vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(1): 167-196.

This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience than a complete take-over of the former by the latter. In the case of vision, cross-theory influences between psychology and neuroscience go back and forth, resulting in refinement in both disciplines.

We interpret this case study as showing that:

(1) Mutual co-evolution of psychological and neurobiological theories, exemplifying persisting top-down influences from psychology, is a more empirically adequate way to describe psychoneural theory relations than a view on co-evolution, favoured by reductionists, which regards the cross-theory contributions from psychology as merely heuristically useful with no enduring influence on neurobiological theorizing;

(2) In research on vision, discovering (or hypothesizing) the neural basis of functions vindicates psychological approaches, it does not eliminate them;

(3) Current work on vision shows that many perceptual phenomena must be understood in terms of dynamical interactions between an observer and his/her environment. Therefore, we argue that internalist characterizations of the visual system must be supplemented with externalist accounts that address these reciprocal observer-environment interactions involved in vision. Such processes seem quite different from (internal) cellular and molecular ones, and as such seem to lie outside the scope of neuroscientific inquiry. We conclude that psychoneural reduction or elimination is implausible as a meta-theoretical prediction of theory choice in empirical work. Instead, this case study of vision shows that both psychology and neuroscience contribute to, and complement one another in the study of visual perception.

◈ Vaneechoutte, Mario (2000). Experience, awareness and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach. Foundations of Science 5: 429-456.

◈ Van Gulick, Robert (Sep/Oct. 2001). Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(9-10): 1-34.

My aim here is to give an overview of the recent philosophic discussion to serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will not offer a comprehensive survey of the debate or mark every important variant to be found in the recent literature. I will mark the principal features of the philosophic landscape that one might use as general orientation points in navigating the terrain.

I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of mind, combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the ultimate basis of all that is real. The view has been challenged from both left and right, on one side from dualists (Chalmers, 1996) and on the other from hard core reductive materialists (Kim, 1989). Despite their differences, those critics agree in finding nonreductive physicalism an unacceptable and perhaps even incoherent position. They agree as well in treating reducibility as the essential criterion for physicality; they differ only about whether the criterion can be met. Reductive physicalists argue that it can, and dualists deny it.

The terms ‘reduction’, ‘nonreductive’ and ‘emergence’ get used in a bewildering variety of ways in the mind–body literature, none of which is uniquely privileged or standard. Thus clarity about one’s intended meaning is crucial to avoid confusion and merely verbal disagreements. Thus, much of my mapping will be devoted to sorting out the main versions of reduction and emergence before turning to assess their interrelations and plausibility. My intent is to act largely as a guide and not an advocate. Though I am sure my biases will sometimes affect how I describe the issues, my goal is to lay out the logical geography in a more-or-less neutral way.

◈ Varela, Francisco J. (1991). Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves. In Alfred I. Tauber (ed.) Organism and the Origins of Self. The Hague: Kluwer, pp. 79-107.

◇ Varela, Francisco J. (1995). Resonant cell assemblies: A new approach to cognitive function and neuronal synchrony, Biological Research 28(1): 81–95.

Abstract: This paper presents a novel reading of ideas on temporal binding as a key for cognitive operations by means of fast (gamma band) phase synchrony. We advocate a view of binding of widely distributed cell assemblies transiently locked in a neural hypergraph which serves as a reference point to incorporate or interpret other less coherent concurrent neural events. The paper traces in some detail the empirical evidence concerning the gamma binding process and presents some implications for the constitution of a unified cognitive-mental space.

Author Keywords: Cell assemblies; Cognitive operations; Gamma binding; Neural hypergraph; Phase synchrony

◈ Varela, Francisco J. (1997). Patterns of life: Intertwining identity and cognition. Brain and Cognition 34: 72-87.

◈ Varela, Francisco J., Jean-Philippe Lachaux, Eugenio Rodrigues and Jacques Martinerie (Apr. 2001). The brain web: Phase synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2(4): 229-239.

Abstract:  The emergence of a unified cognitive moment relies on the coordination of scattered mosaics of functionally specialized brain regions. Here we review the mechanisms of large-scale integration that counterbalance the distributed anatomical and functional organization of brain activity to enable the emergence of coherent behaviour and cognition. Although the mechanisms involved in large-scale integration are still largely unknown, we argue that the most plausible candidate is the formation of dynamic links mediated by synchrony over multiple frequency bands.

◈ Varela, Francisco J., Evan T. Thompson (2003). Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In Axel Cleeremans ed. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

◈ Varela, Francisco J. and Evan T. Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.

 

◈ Velmans, Max and Susan Schneider (eds.) (2007). The Blackwell Companion to Conscoiusness. Blackwell Publishing.

◈ Vicente, Agustín (Agostos 2002). The dual Explanandum strategy. CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Vol. 34, No. 101: 73–96.

http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pdf/C101/C101_vicente.pdf

Abstract: In this paper I try to fix the price that a non-epiphenomenal dualism demands. To begin with, the defender of non-epiphenomenal dualism cannot hold that mental events cause physical events, since the physical world is causally closed. Hence, she must say that mental events cause events that are not physical, or at least, events that are not affected by the principle of the causal closure of the physical world (this is the "dual explanandum strategy"). However, this is not all: the events mental causes bring about must fulfill certain further conditions, which I spell out. When properly analyzed, it will be seen that these conditions make the dual explanandum strategy highly demanding.

Keywords: mental causation, dual explanandum strategy, conceptual divides, dualism

◈ Vicente, Agustín (Aug. 2004). The overdetermination argument revisited. Minds and Machines 14(3): 331-347.

Abstract:  In this paper I discuss a famous argument for physicalism – which some authors indeed regard as the only argument for it – the overdetermination argument . In fact it is an argument that does not establish that all the entities in the world are physical, but that all those events that enter into causal transactions with the physical world are physical. As mental events seem to cause changes in the physical world, the mind is one of those things that fall within the scope of the argument. Here I analyze one response to the overdetermination argument that has acquired some popularity lately, and which consists in saying that what mental events cause are not physical effects. I try to show that recent attempts to develop this response are not successful, but that there may be a coherent way of doing so. I also try to show that there seems to be a philosophical niche in which this way might fit.

Keywords:  dual explanandum strategy - mental causation - overdetermination argument - physicalism

◈ Vicente, Agustín (July 2006). On the causal completeness of physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20(2): 149-171.

Abstract: According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called ‘overdetermination argument’. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics.

◈ Voneida, Theodore J. (1998). Sperry's concept of mind as an emergent property of brain function and its implications for the future of humankind. Neuropsychologia 36(10): 1077-1082.

◇ Walter, Sven and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Thoverton: Imprint Academic.

Table of Contents

Preface

Part I: Conceptual Foundations: Realization, Supervenience, and the Characterization of Physicalism

Introduction

John Heil

Multiply Realized Properties

Carl Gillett

Non-Reductive Realization and Non-Reductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail

Gene Witmer

Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Eval‎uating Kim’s Challenge

Paul Noordhof

Not Old . . . But Not That New Either: Explicability, Emergence, and the Characterisation of Materialism

John Bolender

A Farewell to Isms

Part II: Overdetermination and the Causal Closure of the Physical

Introduction

E.J. Lowe

Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation

Andrew Melnyk

Some Evidence for Physicalism

Barbara Montero

Varieties of Causal Closure

Part III: Mental Causation and the Problem of Causal/Explanatory Exclusion

Introduction

Peter Menzies

The Causal Efficacy of Mental States

Paul Raymont

Kim on Closure, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism

Ausonio Marras

Methodological and Ontological Aspects of the Mental Causation Problem

Part IV: Causality and Human Agency

Introduction

Noa Latham

Are There Any Non-Motivating Reasons for Action?

Ralf Stoecker

Climbers, Pigs and Wiggled Ears: The Problem of Waywardness in Action Theory

Terence Horgan, John Tienson, George Graham

The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency

Bibliography

Notes on Contributors

Name Index

Subject Index

Sample Chapter

http://www.imprint.co.uk/books/walter.html

◈ Wautischer, Helmut (ed.) (Nov. 2007). Ontology of Consciousness: Percipient Action. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

◈ Weber, Andreas, Francisco J. Varela (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97-125.

◈ Weber, Bruce H. (July 2003). Emergence of Mind and the Baldwin Effect. In Bruce H. Weber and David J. Depew eds. Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

◈ Weinberg, Steven (Feb. 11, 1988). Reply to "The limits of reductionism" by Ernst Mayr. Nature 331: 475-476.

◈ Welshon, Rex (Mar. 2002). Emergence, supervenience, and Realization. Philosophical Studies 108(1-2): 39-51.

Abstract:  In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent down ward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relationsbetween emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false.

◈ Whittle, Ann (Mar. 2007). The co-instantiation thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1): 61-79.

Abstract:  The co-instantiation thesis is pivotal to a significant solution to the problem of causal exclusion. But this thesis has been subject to some powerful objections. In this paper, I argue that these difficulties arise because the thesis lacks the necessary metaphysical framework in which its claims should be interpreted and understood. Once this framework is in place, we see that the co-instantiation thesis can answer its critics. The result is a rehabilitated co-instantiation solution to the troubling problem of causal exclusion. But questions remain concerning the viability of certain of its applications.

◈ Wilken, Patrick, Timothy Bayne and Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

◈ Wilson, Robert A. (2001). Two views of realization. Philosophical Studies 104: 1-31.

▣ Wimsatt, William C. (1976). Reductionism, levels of organization and the mind-body problem. In: Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell and Irwin Savodnik (eds.) Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 199-267.

▣ Wimsatt, William C. (1979). Reduction and reductionism. In: P.D. Asquith and H.E. Kyburg Jr. (eds.) (1979). Current Research in the Philosophy of Science. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 352-377.

▣ Wimsatt, William C. (1994). The ontology of complex systems: Levels, perspectives, and causal thickets. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. 20. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

◈ Wimsatt, William C. (Dec. 1997). Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence. Philosophy of Science 64 (Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers): S372-S384.

Abstract: Most philosophical accounts of emergence are incompatible with reduction. Most scientists regard a system property as emergent relative to properties of the system's parts if it depends upon their mode of organization―a view consistent with reduction. Emergence can be analyzed as a failure of aggregativity―a state in which "the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts." Aggregativity requires four conditions, giving tools for analyzing modes of organization. Differently met for different decompositions of the system, and in different degrees, these conditions provide powerful eval‎uation criteria for choosing decompositions, and heuristics for detecting biases of vulgar reductionisms. This analysis of emergence is compatible with reduction.

◈ Wimsatt, William C. (Sep. 2000). Emergence as non-aggregativity and the biases of reductionisms. Foundations of Science 5(3): 269-297.

Abstract:  Most philosophical accounts of emergence are incompatible with reduction. Most scientists regard a system property as emergent relative to properties of its parts if it depends upon their mode of organization-a view consistent with reduction. Emergence is a failure of aggregativity, in which ``the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts''. Aggregativity requires four conditions, giving powerful tools for analyzing modes of organization. Differently met for different decompositions of the system, and in different degrees, the structural conditions can provide eval‎uation criteria for choosing decompositions, ``natural kinds'', and detecting functional localization fallacies, approximations, and various biases of vulgar reductionisms. This analysis of emergence and use of these conditions as heuristics is consistent with a broader reductionistic methodology.

Keywords:  additivity - aggregativity - emergence - functional localization fallacies - heuristics - near-decomposeability - reduction - whole-parts relations

◈ Witmer, Gene (1999). Supervenience Physicalism and the Problem of Extras. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37: 315-331.

◇ Wong, Hong Yu (July 2006). Emergents from Fusion. Philosophy of Science 73(3): 345-367.

Received January 2004; revised November 2006. (online date May 17, 2007).

Abstract: This is a critical discussion of Paul Humphreys's fusion view of emergence, focusing on the basal loss feature of his ontology. The discussion yields some general morals for special science ontology.

■ Woolley, R.G. (Apr. 1998). Is there a quantum definition of a molecule? Journal of Mathematical Chemistry 23(1-2): 3–12. (doi:10.1023/A:1019144518901)

Abstract:  The paper surveys how chemistry has developed over the past two centuries starting from Lavoisier’s classification of the chemical elements at the end of the eighteenth century; the subsequent development of the atomic–molecular model of matter preoccupied chemists throughout the nineteenth century, while the results of the application of quantum theory to the molecular model has been the story of this century. Whereas physical chemistry originated in the nineteenth century with the measurement of the physical properties of groups of chemical compounds that chemists identified as families, the goal of chemical physics is the explanation of the facts of chemistry in terms of the principles and theories of physics. Chemical physics as such was only possible after the discovery of the quantum theory in the 1920’s. By then the first of the sub‐atomic particles had been discovered and seemingly it is no longer possible to discuss chemical facts purely in terms of atoms and molecules – one has to recognize the electron and the nucleus, the parts of atoms. The combination of classical molecular structure with the quantum properties of the electron has given us a tremendously successful account of chemistry called ‘quantum chemistry’. Yet from the perspective of the quantum theory the deepest part of chemistry, the existence of chemical isomers and the very idea of molecular structure that rationalizes it, remains a central problem for chemical physics.

 

This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.

◈ Worley, Sara (1997). Determination and Mental causation. Erkenntnis 46: 281-304.

■ Wynn, M. (1999). Emergent phenomena and theistic explanation. International Philosophical Quarterly 39: 141-55.

▣ Yablo, Stephen (Apr. 1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101(2): 245–280.

◈ Yoo, Julie (Mar. 2007). Mental causation. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mental-c.htm

◈ Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Supervenience, determination, and dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88(1): 114–133. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00283.x

Issue online: 20 Feb 2007

Abstract:  I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras.

◈ Zelazo, Philip David, Morris Moscovitch and Evan T. Thompson (eds.) (2007). The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

◈ Zohar, Danah (Nov. 1995). A quantum mechanical model of consciousness and the emergence of ‘I’. Minds and Machines 5(4): 597-607.

Abstract:  There have been suggestions that the unity of consciousness may be related to the kind of holism depicted only in quantum physics. This argument will be clarified and strengthened. It requires the brain to contain a quantum system with the right properties — a Bose-Einstein condensate . It probably does contain one such system, as both theory and experiment have indicated. In fact, we cannot pay full attention to a quantum whole and its parts simultaneously, though we may oscillate between the two. In a quantum theory of consciousness, emergent meanings arise as an inevitable consequence of Heisenberg''s Uncertainty Principle.

 

Key words:  Quantum - consciousness - emergence - Bose-Einstein condensates - Fröhlich

===========================================================

①지금 2007. 03. 25. 일요일. 흐린 듯. 새벽 03시 16분. 여기는 스타워즈 피시방...

②지금 2007. 03. 26. 월요일. 흐린 듯. 낮 11시 16분. 스타워즈 피시방... 자료 보태다.

③지금 2007. 03. 27. 화요일. 흐림. 낮 1시 01분. 스타워즈 피시방에서 자료 더 보태다.

④지금 2007. 04. 01. 일요일. 조금 흐린 듯. 새벽 06시 10분. 스타워즈 피시방에서... 몇 개의 오타 수정하고 자료를 더 보태다.

⑤지금 2007. 04. 10. 화요일. 10:17. 스타워즈 피시방에서...

⑥지금 2007. 04. 13. 금요일. 새벽부터 가랑비 조금씩 오락가락. 바람 조금. 대부분 흐림. 여기는 ㅊㅈ대 도서관 2층 인터넷 검색대... 논문 입수하러 오다.

⑦지금 2007. 04. 16. 월요일. 06:30. 어제 밤 늦게부터 비. 인력시장에 나가기 직전에 스타워즈 피시방에서 자료 약간 덧붙임.

⑧지금 2007. 04. 17. 화요일. 01:59. 구름이 걷히고 있다. 스타워즈 피시방에서 자료 덧붙임.

⑨지금 2007. 04. 18. 수요일. 22:35. 맑고 따스한 날. 오늘 오창과학산업단지로 땅파기 일 나갔다가(8백원 벌었다), 돌아오는 길에 ㅊㅈ대 도서관에 들러, 오타 수정하고 자료 더 보태다.

⑩지금 2007. 04. 22. 일요일. 22:39. 구름 조금. 오늘 일 나가지 못해, ㅊㅈ대 도서관으로 와서 논문 서지 사항 덧붙이다.

⑪지금 2007. 04. 24. 화요일. 00:40. 맑음. 어제 낮 1시30분~5시 57분까지 시민 컴퓨터 교실에서, 밤 7시 25분~8시 27분까지 ㅊㅂ대 도서관에서, 어제 밤 9시 35분~ 오늘 00시 44분까지 스타워즈 피시방에서 서지 사항을 더 보태다.

⑫지금 2007. 04. 26. 목요일. 06:23. 맑음. 인력시장으로 가기 전에 스타워즈 피시방에서 서지 사항 더 보태다.

(13) 지금 2007. 04. 30. 월요일. 01:12. 맑음. 요즘 산남동 아파트 단지(대우 푸르지오, 대원 칸타빌)에서 베란다 철거 일 하다. 일하고 와서 서지 사항 더 보태고, 몇 가지 표기 잘못을 고치다.

(14) 지금 2007. 05. 05. 토요일. 21:36. 맑음. 오늘 낮 12시쯤에 ㅊㅈ대 도서관으로 와서 서지 사항을 보태다.

(15) 지금 2007. 05. 06. 일요일. 21:33. 흐림. 일 나가지 못해 낮 12시쯤 ㅊㅈ대 도서관으로 와서 서지 사항을 보태다.

(16) 지금 2007. 05. 08. 화요일. 18:05. 맑음. 시민 컴퓨터 교실→ㅊㅂ대 전자정보실→신학생회관→스타워즈 피시방으로 옮겨가며 서지 사항을 보태다. 오늘 수동에서 장롱, 서랍장, 쌀통, 책장을 옮겨주는 일을 하고 3백원 벌다. 일거리는 엄청 많이 들어왔지만, 어쩌다가 나는 마지막으로 가까스로 일을 나갈 수 있었다. 품값이 하루치 기본 벌이의 절반도 안 되는 일거리였다. 하지만, 아주 짧은 시간 동안 일하고 끝냈기 때문에 돈대신 "시간을 많이 벌어" 그런 대로 기분은 좋았다.

(17) 지금 2007. 05. 09. 수요일. 02:42. 조금 흐린 듯. 스타워즈 피시방에서...

(18) 지금 2007. 05. 11. 금요일. 01:58. 맑음. 어제 서울 영풍문고, 반디앤루니스, 교보문고에 다녀오다(낮 1시~밤11시 50분). 서울 공화국 사람들... 풍족하니 잘들 사는 것 같다. 스타워즈 피시방에서...

(19) 지금 2007. 05. 12. 토요일. 03:00. 흐림. 어제(15:40~18:00) 시민 컴퓨터 교실에서, 그리고 스타워즈 피시방에서(22:57~) 서지 목록을 보태다.

(20) 지금 2007. 05. 13. 일요일. 06:21. 맑은 듯. 스타워즈 피시방에서 서지 목록을 보태다.

(21) 지금 2007. 05. 15. 화요일. 16:32. 맑은 듯. 스타워즈 피시방에서 서지 사항을 보태다.

(22) 지금 2007. 05. 18. 금요일. 22:21. 맑음→늦은 낮 5시쯤 넘어서 빗방울 조금 뿌림. 동생네 집에서 자료 조금 보탬. 오늘 봉명동 상가 건물 1층에서 폐업한 가게의 내부 장식(목조)을 철거하는 일을 하다.

(23) 지금 2007. 05. 19. 토요일. 아침에 흐림. 구름이 많은 날. 지금 20:20. 여기는 ㅊㅂ대 신학생회관 1층 검색대. 오늘은 공치다. 이곳으로 와서 서지 사항을 늘리다.

(24) 지금 2007. 05. 20. 일요일. 23:01.

(25) 지금 2007. 05. 22. 화요일. 02:56. 맑음. 신학생회관, 스타워즈 피시방에서...

콸리아/콸리어/퀄리아qualia

[빠삐용]

와 대단합니다. 이 저작들을 모두 소장하고 계신건가요? 개인적으로 이 의견이 마음에 드네요. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder

[빠삐용]

for the ontological emergentist to avoid.

[Qualia]

아래 자료를 다 소장하려면, 돈으로만 따져도 한 1천 만원 정도는 최소한 들지 않겠어요? ^^ 그리고 이 논문들과 책들을 입수하는 데는 시간도 엄청나게 많이 들겠죠. 발품도 엄청 팔아야 되겠죠. (한국스런 상황에서는) 도서관 직원들과 싸움도(!) 많이 해야 할 겁니다^^ 그러나 돈보다 머리/뇌가 더 문제겠죠^^ 저뿐만 아니라 이 자료를 보시는 분들 중 어떤 분이라도, 창발/마음/의식 논문 한 편이라도 써 낸다면, 그보다 더 보람찬 일이 없을 겁니다.

[Qualia]

빠삐용 님, 위 인용문이 마음에 든다고 하셨는데, 그럼 창발(적 존재자)에 대해서 회의하신다는 건가요?

[빠삐용]

Heard, Daniel (2006). A new problem for ontological emergence <--요거이 함 구해서 읽어보고 말씀드릴게요. 저도 아직 생각이 정리된 건 아니라서요. 혹시 가지고 계시면 부탁드립니다.

[Qualia]

대니얼 허드의「존재론적 창발의 새로운 문제」Heard, Daniel (Jan. 2006). A new problem for ontological emergence. The Philosophical Quarterly 56(222): 55-62는 이곳 자료실에 저장해 놨습니다. 그리고 이 논문은 블랙웰 출판사에서 무료로 제공하고 있더군요. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/phiq/56/222 여기로찾아가시면 문서를 공짜로 구할 수 있습니다. 고맙습니다~

[구름위햇살^^]

와~ 대단해요~많은 분들에게 도움이 될 듯~~^^

[Qualia]

저도 부탁 하나 할게요. Buzsaki, Gyorgy (2007). The structure of consciousness. Nature 446: 267-267 (Issue of 15 Mar 2007). Smith, Kerri (2007). Looking for hidden signs of consciousness. Nature 446(7134): 355 (Issue of 22 March 2007).《네이처Nature》지에 실린 위의 두 편의 글을 입수할 수 없을까요? 《네이처Nature》지에 접근 가능하신 분 도와 주세요~~~^^

[빠삐용]

감사합니다. 저도 학교에 있는 칭구 통해 구했어요. ^^

[Qualia]

몇 개의 오타를 수정하고, 자료를 더 보탰습니다. 시간이 모자라 안타깝네요. 다음에 또 추가 자료를 보태고, 앞으로 서지 사항을 더 정확하고 더 완벽하게 작성하겠습니다. 고맙습니다.

[빠삐용]

Alwyn Scott의 책이 하나 국내에 번역되어 나와있습니다. <마음에 이르는 계단-새로운 의식의 과학에 대한 논쟁> 안창림 백은경 역, 이화여자대학교출판부, 2001. 원제: Stairway to the Mind: The Controversial New Science of Consciousness. 참고가 되었으면 좋겠습니다.

[Qualia]

빠삐용 님, 책 소개 고맙습니다. 사실은 저도 얼윈 스캇(스콧)Alwyn Scott의 <마음에 이르는 계단>을 오래 전에 읽어더랬습니다. 제9장 "의식의 창발적 이론을 향하여"라는 흥미로운 부분이 있어서 더욱 관심이 갔었죠. 그런데요 제 생각에, 번역 상태는 그다지 좋지 않다고 봅니다. 언젠가 간단히 분석하고 비판할 생각입니다. 아무튼 서지 목록에 넣어야 할 좋은 책임에는 틀림없습니다. 도움 말씀 정말 고맙습니다.

[Qualia]

빠삐용 님, 대니엘 허드의 논문 내용을 요약 정리해서 아래에 올려 놓았습니다. 위에서 빠삐용 님한테 드렸던 간단한 질문에 대한 답을 듣고 싶은데, 가능한 것인지요?