유도탄 호주 해군의 VLS 셀 수 변화

[위종민]

1995년에는 VLS 셀 수가 368개였는데 2020년에는 208셀이네요. (안작급 8척 * 8셀, 호바트급 3척 * 48셀) 1995년 수준까지 회복되려면 2045년까지 기다려야 하고 2050년부터 432로 안정화된다고 합니다. 그마저도 안작급의 8셀은 사실상 ESSM 장착용이라 각종 타격 미사일 장착 용도로 전용할 수 있는 셀은 호바트급의 48셀 중 ESSM 등을 장착할 8셀을 제외한 120셀이 한계입니다. 

미해군과 한국, 일본의 수상함은 VLS 96셀을, 중국은 128셀을 갖춘 군함을 건조중이며 유럽의 수상함들은 VLS 셀 수가 이 나라들보다 적은데 이 이유는 짧은 작전반경, 물류지원의 용이함 및 지상발진 항공기들의 근접 커버가 가능해서라고 해석하네요. 호주의 주전장인 태평양은 전장환경이 유럽과 다른데, 2018년 VLS 32셀을 갖춘 헌터급 프리깃을 조달하기로 결정한 것은 적절하지 않다고 비판합니다. 헌터급은 1만 톤이 넘어 호바트급보다 3천톤이 더 나가는데 셀 수는 16셀이 더 적고 조금 작은 알레이 버크급보다 64셀이나 적다고.. 

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/rearming-the-royal-australian-navy/

Rearming the Royal Australian Navy | The Strategist

Rearming the Royal Australian Navy | The Strategist

David Shackleton

7-9 minutes

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Much has been written on the importance of guided weapons and ensuring conflicts aren’t lost through a shortage of ammunition. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles’s observation about the need for ‘impactful projection’ implies that the Australian Defence Force’s firepower will be increased, and the intent to manufacture advanced guided weapons in Australia is a welcome development.

In 1995, the Royal Australian Navy possessed 368 missile cells on its major surface combatants. By 2020, that had reduced to 208, a 43% reduction in firepower. It will take until 2045 for the navy to get back up to its 1995 capacity. From 2050 it will plateau at 432, a net increase of 64 cells.

How did this happen, and how many is enough?

Figure 1: Number of missile cells on RAN major surface combatants, 1995 to 2060

After World War II, guided missiles progressively became the primary armament of large warships and countering saturation attacks was a priority. From the late 1970s, the US Navy designed ships around the Aegis combat system. The Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyer (DDG) reflects current best practice with 96 cells, and Japan and Korea have adopted the same philosophy. China has a slightly larger ship with 128 cells.

The US Navy uses advanced modelling to assess its needs against a changing threat. That has led to it having more advanced combat systems and heavily armed ships with fast missile launch rates. Large warships in the European region are less well armed than their Pacific counterparts. That might be due to generally shorter transit requirements, timelier logistics support lines, and the proximity of land-based air cover. Conditions in the Pacific are much less accommodating and Australia can’t ignore geographic realities.

The RAN was fully aware of this evolution in naval warfare when the air warfare destroyer program was announced in the 2000 defence white paper, producing the Aegis-equipped Hobart class. Plans for a new, larger frigate to replace the Anzac class were incorporated in the 2009 defence white paper, which warned of increased regional security risks, a mantra repeated in the 2013 and 2016 policy papers. The 2018 decision to acquire a British-designed warship requiring a wholesale change of its combat system, sensors and weapons, and fitting it only with 32 missile cells, appears irrational.

Guided weapons continue to increase in lethality, speed, range and accuracy. Their evolution follows the classic cycle of matching, neutralising and further enhancing their features. It’s an endless journey. It’s imperative for naval guided weapons to contribute to joint ‘all arms’ warfare. The US Navy’s soon-to-be-introduced hypersonic guided missile is being developed in concert with the US Army.

Standardisation, where sensible, offers considerable operational and other benefits, not least of which are resupply availability and cost.

Notwithstanding the desire for commonality and for a one-size-fits-all solution, that ambition remains out of reach. From announcements in the public domain, the RAN already operates or will acquire:

• the SM-2 (Standard Missile 2) for long-range air and missile defence
• the SM-6 which has a longer range than the SM-2 and can be used for the same role as well as ballistic missile interception. SM-6 might replace SM-2
• the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) for shorter-range air and missile defence
• the Tomahawk cruise missile for long-range land and anti-shipping attack
• the NSM (naval strike missile), a medium-range anti-ship missile with a land-attack capability (replacing the Harpoon missile).

Except for the NSM, which is carried in a deck-mounted cannister launcher, these missiles are stored in a strike-length Mk41 vertical launcher system (VLS) module allowing a ship to use different missiles in unpredictable circumstances. The ESSM is small enough for a cell to carry four, but the others occupy a full cell each. It’s suggested that the US Navy’s future large surface combatant, the DDG(X), which is expected to have 128 cells, might also require a larger cell capable of launching hypersonic land-attack missiles now under development.

By 2006, when the RAN’s final Anzac frigate, HMAS Perth, was commissioned, the class had 64 cells, but the ESSMs they contained were to be used for self-defence. In the interim, two of six older Perry-class ships were decommissioned to provide funds to upgrade the remaining four, including adding eight VLS cells. That gave each ship 48 cells, and an improved capability with the longer-range SM-2. After modernisation, the Perry class went from six ships to four, but the total number of cells went from 240 to 192.

HMAS Hobart, the first of the RAN’s three DDGs, entered service in 2015. Its Aegis combat system was matched to a 48-cell VLS, giving a class capacity of 144 cells. Some cells in a Hobart-class DDG can be used for ESSMs (for example, eight cells could carry 32 missiles). But the 40 remaining cells would limit the SM-2s it could carry to the same number, or fewer, if the ship embarked Tomahawks or SM-6s. Operational judgements, which might be compromises, are necessary.

In 1995, the RAN operated three guided missile destroyers, six guided missile frigates and the first of eight smaller frigates, with 368 missile cells in all, the most it has ever possessed. By 2020, the combined effect of several force structure changes meant that across its fleet of eight Anzac-class and three Hobart-class surface combatants, the RAN could provide only 208 cells.

Australia failed to comprehend the fundamental link between firepower and the number of surface combatants—and that it takes decades to overcome deficiencies.

Changing the RAN’s force structure where its major surface combatants (and submarines) are concerned always has very long-term implications for the nation and for the options available to the  government.

The eight Anzac frigates are to be progressively replaced from around 2032 by nine Hunter frigates, which are expected to have 32 VLS cells accompanied by deck-mounted cannisters for eight surface-to-surface and land-attack missiles. At an estimated 10,000 tonnes, these ships will be about 3,000 tonnes heavier than the Hobart class but have 16 fewer cells. They’ll be slightly larger than the US Navy’s Arleigh Burkes, which have 64 more cells. The Hunters will become the RAN’s most numerous, but least well-armed surface combatants.

If 32 ESSMs are used for self-defence, they would take up eight of the Hunter’s cells. Operational judgements will again have to be made as to which missiles will be loaded into the remaining 24 cells. For instance, two Tomahawks might be needed against some land targets, but how many are to be attacked? And then there’s the question of longer-range air and missile defence, usually requiring two missiles per target for a probable kill.

Even with advanced digital phased-array radars, sophisticated networking and weapon-management capabilities, the RAN’s small number of surface combatants will make the missile shortage more acute when facing a determined opponent.

That the US, Japan and Korea can fit 96 cells into a Hunter-sized ship raises the question of why that’s not being done for the RAN.

The same loss of firepower in the submarine force might become evident if the transition to nuclear-powered boats suffers serious setbacks. The RAN’s primary combat power comes from its surface combatants and its submarines. It’s not a case of choosing one or the other. Australia needs both.

[백선호]

전력 비교할 때 VLS 셀 숫자로 하는 방법이 신선하네요.

[위종민]

저도 이런 비교는 처음 본 것 같습니다.

미국/동아시아권과 유럽 수상함의 VLS 셀 수 차이를 전장환경의 차이로 분석했는데, 제 생각엔 토마호크로 어디 두들길 일이 많은 미국과 그 영향을 받은 일본/한국/중국 vs 그럴 일이 별로 없어서 대공미사일만 실어도 되는 영국과 프랑스, 그리고 그 영향을 받은 호주의 차이인 듯 한데요. 영국이 지켜야 되는 북대서양도 open ocean인데..

[ssn688]

중국의 남중국해 군사화, 미사일능력, (미사일 실은)대형 함정 세력의 팽창에 따른 반응 같습니다.
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/weekly-debrief-analyzing-case-australian-b-21-buy?utm_rid=CPEN1000001399908&utm_campaign=35927&utm_medium=email&elq2=c80629e041734d089490f469218bc023&utm_emailname=AW_News_Aerospace_20221213&sp_eh=373c43a115f91e648dea2b77dee3fcf49adca461cf2854fb2ca790ded92c0aec
집권할 노동당 정부의 국방정책검토를 맡은 브레인들이 B-21 도입까지 고려하는데, 여기서도 함정 문제가 거론되고 있습니다.
>China has built military bases on reclaimed land in the South China Sea, which is part of what Australia calls its “near region.”

[ssn688]

> If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deploys medium-range bombers and ballistic missile launchers to those bases, China could strike targets all over Australia. Moreover, the PLA Navy sailed a Luyang-class destroyer through the strait between the northern tip of Queensland and Papua New Guinea earlier this year, demonstrating a show of force by a ship with the capability to fire 64 missiles.
>But Australia lacks such striking range. The Hunter-class frigates will not arrive until at least 2033, and all 32 missile cells aboard may be needed for air defense.

[위종민]

저 곳에서도 B-21 도입을 적극 밀더라고요. 하지만 중국에 맞서려면 B-21 외에도 수상함, 잠수함 전력의 확충도 필요하다는 주장인 듯 합니다.