역사 1987년 - 이란-이라크 전쟁과 탱커 워

[위종민]

이란-이라크 전쟁으로 이라크가 이란 유조선에 대함미사일 공격을 가하고 이란은 쿠웨이트 유조선을 포함해 이라크와 거래하는 유조선을 실크원 대함미사일로 공격하고 쿠웨이트의 항구에 기뢰를 부설하는 등 탱커 워가 벌어지자, 쿠웨이트가 자국 유조선의 선적을 미국으로 바꾸고 미해군이 보호해달라고 요청했었네요. 미국은 1987년 3월 7일 이에 동의했는데 1987년 7월 깃발을 바꿔 단 유조선도 기뢰에 피침당했다고 합니다. 

베트남전 당시 베트남 연안 및 강에서 LST 등을 특수부대들이 장시간 작전을 펼치기 위한 해상기지로 운용했던 경험이 있던 당시 미해군 지휘부는 브라운 앤 루트 사에서 석유-가스 바지선을 임차해 이동식 해상기지로 운용했다고 합니다. 

현재도 아덴만에서 상선을 기반으로 제작된 ESB-3 루이스.B.풀러 함이 원정해상기지로 운용중에 있지요. 

https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/revisiting-the-tanker-war/

Revisiting the Tanker War - War on the Rocks

REVISITING THE TANKER WAR

STEPHEN PHILLIPS

MARCH 20, 2024

COMMENTARY

A flight of three U.S. Army special operations helicopters conducting a night patrol over the ocean encountered a small Iranian freighter. Commonly known as MH-6 “Little Birds” due to their small size and nimble performance, the helicopters also carried a disproportionate amount of firepower. This flight was outfitted with rocket pods on both sides of the aircraft. If the 2.75-inch rockets were not enough, the pilots all carried small arms and were ready to use them for more than self-defense.

The ship turned off its deck lights. This provided the aircrew an advantage. Now, they could observe the vessel through their night vision devices. The after section had a deckhouse rising about four stories above the ocean’s surface with the ship’s bridge on the top level. A large open platform lay in front of the deckhouse with a tarp covering about a fourth of the space. Almost immediately after the lights extinguished, a group of men pulled the canvas sheet back, revealing what looked like trash cans or carts. They maneuvered these toward a gangplank and then pushed the cylinders over the side, splashing them into the ocean one by one.

One of the pilots keyed his radio and reported, “They’re pushing those … shopping carts … over the side now.”

This message was received miles away in the combat information center of a U.S. Navy command ship. There were more sailors in combat than usual, especially at night. Everyone was expecting something to happen since earlier in the evening, a staff intelligence office cryptically reported to the watch, “There are indications of Iranian activity up north.”

BECOME A MEMBER

Among all the men in combat, Rear Adm. Harold “Hal” Bernson, commander, U.S. Middle East Force, looked at Lt. Mark Helmkamp. A naval reservist, Helmkamp was recalled to active duty to support operations in the Middle East due to his expertise on mine warfare. Despite his best efforts, everyone aboard called him “the mine guy.”

“What do you think they are doing?” the admiral asked.

“Sir, I think they are laying mines.”

“Take them!” Bernsen commanded.

In seconds, the Little Birds were told they were clear to engage. They began to make runs on the ship, firing rockets at the deck, bridge, and engine room.

Helmkamp was surprised that Adm. Bernsen reacted so quickly to his analysis. He was unaware that Bernsen expected to hear the Iranian ship was laying mines and had already discussed rules of engagement with higher authority. It was determined that Iranian ships caught mine-laying would be deemed to be conducting an act of war. A kinetic response would be immediately authorized.

This event was not part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led mission started in December 2023 to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden, but of Operation Earnest Will, a U.S.-led mission to ensure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman in 1987 and 1988. The history of this operation is important to understand because of its parallels to ongoing U.S. combat operations in the Red Sea. Just as is the case today, the U.S. Navy had to commit to an open-ended effort to protect commercial shipping. This effort in the late 1980s did not completely deter or stop attacks on either U.S. Navy ships or the tankers they were escorting. Looking back at the “Tanker War,” the Iran-Iraq war at sea, is interesting to provide lessons for current operations in the Red Sea but also for how to think about contingencies in other parts of the world.

History Does Not Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes

Travel through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and beyond creates a shorter, more economical route between Europe and Asia. Similarly, the route through the Strait of Hormuz to all the nations of the Persian Gulf region has been an important source of energy, one that enables globalization. In the 1980s, 60 percent of the world’s oil passed through the strait. It is for this reason the U.S. Navy intervened in the Iran-Iraq War in July 1987.

For the Iraqi government, the war was about territory and prestige; Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Iran to obtain full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and two additional ports on the Iranian side of the river. For the Iranian leadership, the war was an extension of the Islamic Revolution as many Shiite holy sites were found in the more secular Iraq. Both adversaries attacked the other’s seaborne commerce, primarily the petroleum trade, to erode the other’s ability to finance the conflict. Iraq’s tactics focused on air-to-surface attacks. Supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi Air Force enjoyed overflight rights, enabling them to fly south through their neighbors’ territories. Then, the Iraqi aircraft would turn east over the Persian Gulf, find an Iranian oil tanker, and dispatch it with an Exocet missile. The Iranian navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy attacked tankers trading with Iraq, to include Kuwaiti tankers. Sometimes they attacked ships with Chinese-made Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, firing them long ranges from positions such as the al-Faw peninsula — captured Iraqi territory — at tankers laying at anchor or moored pierside in Kuwait. Iran also covertly mined the Kuwaiti port of Mina al-Ahmadi.

During this period, the United States did not trade much in Middle East oil, but many of its allies, like Japan, did. Eventually, the Tanker War led to an increase in insurance rates for shipping, which affected the entire oil market. In January 1987, the Kuwaiti government proposed a clever scheme to deter Iranian attacks against their shipping. They asked the United States if they could reflag Kuwaiti tankers as American and receive the protection of the U.S. Navy. The administration of President Ronald Reagan debated this idea but finally agreed to it on March 7, 1987. The surge of forces into the Persian Gulf assigned to commander, Middle East Force under Adm. Bernsen became Operation Earnest Will.

Bernsen and his staff planned for the traditional naval mission of convoy escort. A group of reflagged and renamed Kuwaiti tankers would marshal in the Gulf of Oman to meet a flotilla of three to four U.S. Navy warships. These would steam in company through the Strait of Hormuz, follow the shipping channels, to include the narrow but deep channel near Farsi Island in the central gulf, then finish the two- to three-day transit in a Kuwaiti port.

The first collection of two tankers and three warships got under way from the Gulf of Oman on July 22, 1987. The convoy enjoyed protective surveillance from E-3A airborne early warning aircraft. On the night of July 23, an E-3 observed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Boghammers, small patrol craft that carry heavy crew-served weapons, maneuvering in the Farsi Island ship channel that the deep-draft ships would be forced to employ. Onboard USS La Salle (AGF 3), the command ship sitting pierside in Bahrain, Adm. Bernsen and his staff decided to slow the convoy so that if the Iranians were rehearsing for an attack, the protective flotilla would have daylight visibility.

Proceeding on their transit on the morning of July 24, the newly reflagged MV Bridgeton was rocked by an explosion in the forward part of the ship at 6:55am. Sailors on the bridge saw a shockwave travel aft that knocked them to the deck. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy was not rehearsing an attack the night before. Anticipating the convoy’s arrival, they mined the channel. Bridgeton hit an Iranian M-08 contact mine that exploded and tore a 50-square-meter hole in the ship’s hull. Though Bridgeton was able to remain afloat and nobody on the ship was killed, the shock reverberated around the gulf as the U.S. Navy realized that the Iranians were willing to attack ships no matter the flag they sailed under. And now there was a minefield that needed to be cleared.

This provided the context for the night of Sept. 21, when the special operations helicopters from Task Force 160 discovered Iran Ajr, the Iranian navy auxiliary sowing mines near the U.S. Navy base in Bahrain. American warships were clearly the intended target.

The next morning, two groups of Navy SEALs conducted a take-down of Iran Ajr. A SEAL platoon deployed to the Persian Gulf aboard USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7) captured the ship. SEALs and other sailors from Special Boat Unit Twenty found Iranian sailors in a life raft and captured them, to include the wounded captain.

U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians took control of the mines that remained aboard Iran Ajr. They were transferred to La Salle. Intelligence analysis conclusively demonstrated Iran had mined Mina al-Ahmadi. The mines were of the same design and had serial numbers sequential to those swept from the Kuwaiti waters.

Mobile Sea Bases, Barges in the Persian Gulf

Naval warships assert influence through their presence. There are more economical means to create similar influence by positioning forces on islands, such as expressed in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept. Manmade islands work just as effectively, as suggested by the Chinese manmade islands in the South China Seaand the oil platforms employed by Iran in the Tanker War. Each of these concepts allowed a force to remain on station for longer periods of time, with minimal resupply or refueling compared to a surface vessel.

After the Bridgeton mine strike, Bernsen realized a sustained presence was required to wrest control of the Farsi Island shipping channel and the surrounding area from the Iranians. The MK III patrol boats of Special Boat Unit Twenty and the MH-6s of Task Force 160 would be perfectly suited to put the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in check. But without a friendly geographic feature nearby, some form of a manmade island was needed to serve as the “mother ship” for these boats and aircraft — a platform that could be their source of fuel, ammunition, and hotel services, a safe haven in the middle of the gulf.

To meet this need, Adm. Bernsen remembered his previous tour in Bahrain. He had been the commanding officer of USS La Salle, the Middle East Force command ship. During that tour, Bernsen visited an oil and gas barge named MV Hercules. Ironically, because of the Tanker War, the barge was not employed. Bernsen arranged for Hercules and another barge, MV Wimbrown VII, to be leased from Brown and Root. Hercules was 400 feet long and 140 feet wide and could accommodate 200 people. It had a crane that could lift the Special Boat Unit Twenty MK III patrol boats out of the water, plenty of deck space, and a helicopter pad for the Task Force 160 helicopters. Wimbrown VII was smaller, but at 250 feet by 70 feet to include a helicopter pad, it would be equally valuable.

Adm. Bernsen’s concept of employing a manmade island as the means to get his special operations forces closer to the Iranian adversary “rhymed” with a similar operation during the Vietnam War. In late 1968, then–Vice Adm. Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt was commander of Naval Forces Vietnam. He was tasked with interdicting the Viet Cong’s supply lines that flowed from Cambodia through the Mekong Delta’s various swamps, streams, and rivers into South Vietnam. Zumwalt directed Operation SEA LORDS, an acronym that meant “Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy.” He envisioned a sustained presence in the area to put pressure on the Viet Cong while also encouraging the South Vietnamese population that the communists could be thwarted.

Yard, Repair, Berthing, and Messing Barge-16 served as the home for River Division 522. Later, “Sea Float,” a series of nine barges moored together on the Cua Lon River, became the manmade island that housed Navy SEALs, underwater demolition teams, and other riverine forces in close proximity to their adversaries.

Mobile sea bases had already proven to be the best means to maintain the riverine forces in the Mekong. Each incorporated the same key features Bernsen and the commander of Middle East Forces staff was looking for twenty years later: the ability to moor, launch, and recover small boats; helicopter pads to ensure robust air support; spaces for command and control and planning; force protection for the platform; and berthing and hotel services for those embarked.

The Navy reactivated and commissioned four tank landing ships in 1966 to serve as mobile sea bases in Vietnam: USS Garrett County (LST 786), USS Harnett County (LST 821), USS Hunterdon County (LST 838), and USS Jennings County (LST 846). The initial thought was that each would be stationed in the mouth of a river in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta or Rung Sat zone. The Navy planned for ten riverine boats and two helicopters to be assigned to each tank landing ship.

After these four, a number of tank landing ships deployed to Vietnam to serve as mobile sea bases. Other ships and barges were also suited to the task and employed. USS Benewah (APB 35), the first in a class of barracks ships, served as the sea base for commander, River Assault Flotilla One. Built on the hull of a tank landing ship, the ship housed 1,100 sailors and soldiers and included a hospital and a helicopter pad.

The junior officers of the Vietnam War were in command during Operation Earnest Will, to include Adm. Bernsen and the commanding officer of Special Boat Unit Twenty. It was easy for them to see the value of MV Hercules and Wimbrown VII.

Battle of Middle Shoals Buoy

The joint force of Special Boat Unit patrol boats and Task Force 160 helicopters became known as Operation Prime Chance. The helicopters continued to deploy from frigates and destroyers in the gulf but also maintained a contingency on the two barges moored near Farsi Island to conduct operations with the MK III patrol boats. Just as SEA LORDS in Vietnam hampered the Viet Cong, their combined presence changed the game for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. A “control area” was established in which the Iranians could no longer lay mines, with a “patrol area” in which regular operations significantly reduced the opportunities for minelaying.

On Oct. 8, 1987, another flight of three Task Force 160 Little Birds approached the Middle Shoals Buoy near Farsi Island to conduct a reconnaissance of it ahead of one of the Special Boat Unit Twenty patrols that intended to set up a listening post on the structure. As they closed with the buoy, a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile was launched at them, followed by machine gun fire. The Little Birds returned fire with mini-guns and rocket pods. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy patrol was destroyed in minutes. A Boghammer was sunk, and a Boston Whaler on the surface burned. Several Iranian sailors were killed, and others were wounded. The Little Birds returned to MV Hercules to rearm while the Special Boat Unit Twenty patrol moved in to collect intelligence and capture any Iranians that were alive. A SEAL boarded one of the Iranian patrol boats to see if there was anything of interest aboard. He saw something he recognized — a battery case for an American-made Stinger missile, the one that was fired at the Little Birds. Later, the serial number was verified as from a lot that the United States had transferred to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.

Mobile Sea Base in the Gulf of Aden

The operational complexities of Operation Prosperity Guardian have brought the lessons of the Mekong Delta and Operation Earnest Will to the fore. The mobile sea base concept continued to rhyme, to reverberate in the U.S. Navy’s concepts for deploying sailors and marines conducting specialized missions in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In the current conflict, Iran is not the main antagonist. Rather, it is Iranian-backed Houthi rebels that began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea in November 2023. The Iranian government supplies the Houthis with missiles, drones, and speedboats. Providing arms to the Houthis is a violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law. The Houthis in turn used these weapons to strike ships in the Red Sea. Like Iran’s claim in the 1980s that it only targeted Iraq and its allies, the Houthis asserted that in solidarity with their Hamas brethren fighting in Gaza, they would only strike Israeli vessels. And yet one of the first victims was a Japanese car carrier named Galaxy Leader. Dozens of attacks on commercial vessels followed. Maritime insurance rates have quadrupled. While some nations need not worry about transiting the area — the Houthis announced specifically they would not target Russian or Chinese traffic — traffic in the region is reduced as major shipping companies are employing other routes.

In response, the United States is leading Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of nations and various forces focused on stopping Houthi aggression and restoring the sea lanes through the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. At its inception in December 2023, the United States was joined by the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain.

The force package for Operation Prosperity Guardian includes a unique Navy ship that is employed for specialized missions like visit, board, search, and seizure and mine-countermeasures. Named for a Marine, crewed by a mix of civilian and military personnel, USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) is lead in the class of six expeditionary sea bases. In effect, it is a modern-day mobile sea base, reminiscent of the mobile sea bases of both Operation Earnest Will and the Vietnam War that incorporates the best features of each. Built on a merchant ship profile, it is 760 feet long and has a flight deck that can embark vertical take-off aircraft to include MV-22s and CH-53s. Like MV Hercules and Wimbrown VI, Puller has a mission deck from which small boats can be loaded and unloaded for SEALs, explosive ordnance disposal, or unmanned undersea vehicle mine-countermeasures operations. It includes a hangar, something the platforms in Vietnam lacked, plus berthing for all the embarked forces as well as command and control facilities. Because it is a ship, based on an Alaska-class tanker, Puller enjoys the mobility that tank landing ships and other ships that served as mobile sea bases in the Mekong had and does not require a tug to move it as the barges did in Operation Earnest Will. It transits with a maximum speed of 15 knots and has a range of 9,500 nautical miles.

A unique aspect to Lewis B. Puller is its crew. The ship was originally categorized as a U.S. Naval Ship with a Military Sealift Command crew. Now, Puller is a United States Ship with a mixed crew of civilian mariners and military personnel. The uniformed personnel are divided into Blue and Gold crews so that the ship can remain in theater for long periods of time as the sailors cycle aboard and conduct a turnover with their opposite number.

Puller has already proven its worth. In January, the ship had members of SEAL Team Three embarked. U.S. Central Command reported that they deployed from Puller in a mission very similar to the takedown of Iran Ajr. It was supported by helicopters and a drone to conduct a visit, board, search, and seizure of a vessel off the coast of Somalia that was resupplying the Houthis with “Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components … propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles.”

During the operation, two SEALs perished. Special Warfare Operator Second Class Nathan Gage Ingram fell into the ocean while boarding the vessel. Special Warfare Operator First Class Chris Chambers heroically jumped into the sea after him, attempting to save his life. Wearing heavy equipment and weapons, both were soon reported missing and eventually determined to be lost at sea.

It is always better to perform a visit, board, search, and seizure, a “take down” mission to interdict one’s adversary, before they are able to lay mines as in the case of Task Force 160, Special Boat Unit Twenty, and La Salle, or capture weapons before they are transferred in the case of SEAL Team Three supported by Lewis B. Puller. The former mission clearly made an impression. The Houthis claimed they attacked Puller as it sailed through the Gulf of Aden. U.S. defense officials from the Pentagon said that no such attack occurred.

The United States and United Kingdom conducted their third set of coordinated strikes on February 24. More are surely to follow, and thus, this will not be the last the American public hears of Operation Prosperity Guardian or of USS Lewis B. Puller and the mobile sea bases that follow in its class. Indeed, USS John L. Canley (ESB 6), the third ship in the class, was commissioned on Feb. 17, 2024, in Coronado, California.

The legacy of mobile sea bases will also continue in other parts of the globe as other nations recognize the value of employing vessels like MV Hercules and USS Lewis B. Puller for special missions at sea. Even the legacy of the Vietnam War mobile sea bases continues. Recently, the Philippines grounded BRP Sierra Madre (LT 57) on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands with a contingent of Philippine marines aboard as a demonstration of sovereignty in their dispute over the islands with China. Thus, the former USS Harnett County (LST 821) still serves as a mobile sea base today.

As Operation Prosperity Guardian continues, the U.S. Navy should continue to look to history, to its institutional memory, to garner lessons from the past on force structure both for platform design and the number of assets in the fleet. This should begin by comparing and contrasting the number of ships that enabled the Vietnam War and Operation Earnest Will, both Cold War period conflicts that were enabled by a total fleet size of over 600 ships.

BECOME A MEMBER

Stephen Phillips has a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London. His dissertation was a study of Operation Earnest Will. Steve is one of the hosts of the Preble Hall Podcast, the naval history podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum.

Image: U.S. Navy accessed via Wikimedia Commons

[Minowski(김유철)]

중동에서의 세력교체랄까 그런게 느껴지는 것이, 저때만해도 공격당하지 않기 위해 성조기를 달았지만, 지금은 중국선사를 쓰거나 선박추적사이트에 "이스라엘과 관계없음"이라고 쓴다거나 AIS꺼버린다거나...연말까지 홍해를 정상화 시키지 못한다면 미해공군력에 의한 대만해협 억제력도 상당히 의심받을 것 같습니다.

[위종민]

올해 말까지 갈 것도 없이, 상반기 중에 중국과 친한 국가들 화물선만 안전운항을 보장받는 상황이 된다면 중동 세력균형이 한번에 뒤집힐 것 같습니다. 지금이야 이란-하마스-후티를 대놓고 중국이 밀어주기가 껄끄러워서 이러지는 못하겠지만 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁이 어떻게 흘러가냐에 따라서는 불가능한 시나리오는 아닐 것 같아요.